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Is Smart Growth Smart for Low-Income Households:  A Study of the Impact of Four 
Smart Growth Principles on the Supply of Affordable Housing 
 
 Andrew G. Aurand, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2007
 
This research tests the relationship between each of four smart growth principles and the supply 
of affordable housing for low-income households.  The four principles are higher residential 
density, a variety of housing options, mixed land use, and the preservation of open space.  The 
relationships are tested at the neighborhood level in two different types of metropolitan regions, 
those with an urban containment policy to combat sprawl and those without.  Four regions were 
chosen to represent two pairs.  Each pair consisted of two regions which had similar urban 
containment policies at one point in time and different policies at a second point.  By comparing 
regression analyses from these two points in time, the research design can detect the influence of 
urban containment on the relationships among the specific smart growth principles and the 
supply of affordable units.   
The first pair of regions is of Portland and Seattle.  Urban growth boundaries were 
present in the Portland region in 1990, but not in the Seattle region.  Such boundaries were 
present in both regions in 2000.  The second pair consists of the regions of Baltimore and 
Philadelphia.  Neither region had urban containment in 1990, but priority funding areas were 
established throughout the Baltimore region by 2000. 
The research provides evidence for the following conclusions.  First, a variety of housing 
options, specifically the availability of multi-unit structures, is associated with a greater supply 
of affordable rental units.  Second, greater residential density in general is typically associated 
with a greater supply of affordable rental units.  Third, a variety of housing options better 
explains the variation in the supply of affordable units than a general measure of density.  Fourth, 
urban containment policies do not influence the relationships between the smart growth 
principles and the supply of affordable housing.  A policy implication of these conclusions is that 
growth management mandates to increase residential density should also specify the type of 
housing developed if growth management is to have positive consequences for the supply of 
affordable units. 
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Even though a dissertation is the work of one person, this one would not have been accomplished 
without the help and strong support of a number of people.  They all deserve a thank you.  First, 
my dissertation committee was exceptional throughout the entire process.  As my chair, Sabina 
Deitrick’s guidance on my topic and reviews of my drafts gave me invaluable experience about 
how to write in a clear manner without excluding details.  Her guidance taught me to notice the 
nuances of various arguments.  Angela Foster was always available to answer my endless 
questions about statistics, modeling, and affordable housing.  Steve Farber’s and John Engberg’s 
comments vastly improved my theory and testable hypotheses.  Steve remained involved with 
my dissertation even in retirement.  John happily joined my committee even without knowing 
me. 
 Second, my friends were a strong source of support and deserve a thank you.  As my 
roommate, Jill put up with my occasional outburst of frustration with the dissertation process.  
Kelly encouraged me to get out of the house and relax with movie nights.  Katherine and Katy 
were entertaining at our happy hour(s).  Matt and Heidi and Carrie and Matt are great friends and 
great dinner companions.  Lunch discussions with Sungsoo were helpful in seeing the broader 
picture of the dissertation process.  Chris always had good advice about data, as well as 
 xvii 
 xviii 
interesting tidbits of information to share regarding just about anything.  Jane’s phone calls 
provided optimism when the process seemed endless. 
 Finally, my family deserves a big thank you.  I am grateful to my brother and sisters who 
always provide encouragement (after they remind me that most people my age have full-time 
jobs and are no longer in school).  Judy took in the piano when it was in danger of becoming 
homeless, for which I am appreciative, and she opened her home in Florida to me anytime I 
wanted a vacation.  Pat and Jan have been equally supportive. 
I save my final, and most important, thanks for my parents.   Just prior to starting my 
dissertation, I was telling a family friend the topic of my research while standing next to my 
Dad’s hospital bed.  At that moment, Dad literally took his last breath of life.  Without hesitation, 
someone informed me that he died of boredom.  I’m almost certain he didn’t, but then again the 
dissertation did turn out to be more than 300 pages.  My parents taught their children to think for 
themselves and to follow their own path.  I’m sure at times they worried about the decisions their 
children were making (at least my decisions), but my Dad was and my Mom continues to be 
supportive of anything I or my siblings decide to do.  I’m grateful for their confidence. 
 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the relationship between smart growth and the 
supply of affordable housing for low-income households.  The research is guided by the current 
debate surrounding smart growth’s impact on housing costs and its ability to address America’s 
shortage of housing for the lowest income households.  The two primary research questions are: 
• What is the relationship between smart growth principles – specifically neighborhood 
density, a variety of housing options, mixed land use, and public open space – and the 
supply of affordable housing for extremely and very low-income households? 
 
• Are these relationships different in metropolitan areas which have implemented a form of 
urban containment, such as urban growth boundaries or priority funding areas, from areas 
which have no such policy?  If so, what are these differences? 
 
Smart growth is defined by set of land use and development principles which together serve 
as an alternative to the dominant pattern of metropolitan growth broadly known as sprawl.  
Sprawl is characterized by low-density development, the segregation of residential land use from 
other activities, the rapid consumption of undeveloped land, inequitable regional development as 
older communities are abandoned for new development on the urban fringe, and the segregation 
of housing types as single-family dwellings are typically surrounded by other single-family 
dwellings (Nelson and Duncan 1995, p. 1; Downs 1998; Galster et al. 2001; Orfield 2002, p. 96; 
Burchell et al. 2005, p. 12).  The Smart Growth Network (SGN), a group of government agencies 
and non-profit organizations, adopted ten principles of smart growth to counteract against these 
characteristics of sprawl.  These ten principles are (SGN 2002; Chen 2003):  
1. Compact building design as opposed to low-density development;  
2. A variety of housing choices for a range of household types and incomes rather 
than development dominated by single-family homes;  
3. A greater level of mixed land use rather than segregated land uses;  
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4. Walkable neighborhoods;  
5. A strong sense of place within communities;  
6. Preservation of open space rather than the rapid consumption of land by 
development;  
7. Equitable regional development;  
8. A variety of transportation options;  
9. Predictable and fair development decisions; and  
10. Citizen participation in the planning process. 
 
This research tests the relationship between four smart growth principles and the supply 
of affordable housing for low-income households at the neighborhood level.  The four principles 
chosen are those most likely to influence housing prices and the supply of affordable units.  
Among the smart growth principles, 
 
• Compact development, or greater housing density, can result in lower housing 
costs and a greater supply of affordable units as dwelling sizes are reduced and 
less land is used for housing units. 
 
• A variety of housing options for a range of household incomes can increase the 
supply of affordable units.  In contrast to the exclusive development of detached 
single-family homes, smart growth promotes a mixture of housing types, 
including multi-family and attached single-family units.  These units are more 
likely to be affordable to lower-income households than single-family homes 
(Downs 2004). 
 
• Mixed land use development can provide for a better balance between affordable 
housing units and low-wage jobs within neighborhoods.  Mixed land use typically 
implies a variety of housing types, as well as a variety of land uses, which 
includes attached homes and multi-unit structures.   
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• Preservation of open space, in the form of public parks, may decrease the supply 
of affordable units for two reasons.  First, it reduces the supply of land available 
for residential development, increasing land and housing costs.  Second, public 
parks often provide a positive amenity to local residents, increasing demand and 
the price for housing near them. 
 
The Smart Growth Network (2001) argues that greater density, a variety of housing 
options, and mixed land use can better meet the affordable housing needs of low-income 
households than the traditional development patterns of sprawl.  But, there is no current 
empirical research testing these claims.1  An explicit purpose of this research is to do so. 
Another important focus of this research is the impact of urban containment on the 
relationships between the four smart growth principles and affordable housing.  Urban 
containment refers to policies which prohibit urban development outside of specified boundaries 
with the purpose of preserving land from development on the urban fringe and redirecting 
growth to existing communities (Nelson and Duncan 1995, p. 73; Pendall, Martin, and Fulton 
2002, p. 3).  By pushing development away from the undeveloped urban fringe and toward 
existing communities, urban containment is a tool to achieve the smart growth principle of the 
preservation of open space. 
Urban containment also helps to achieve other smart growth principles.  Land outside of 
urban containment boundaries is not available for development.  These restrictions on the supply 
of developable land increase its price, which encourages developers to use land more intensely, 
increasing density.  Mixed use may also increase as a result of the same process.  More costly 
developable land may entice developers to use land more efficiently (Nelson and Dawkins 2004). 
Density may increase also as a result of government mandates implemented along with 
urban containment.  As the supply of developable land is restricted and its price increases, 
housing prices also increase.2  To alleviate the upward pressure on housing prices as a result of 
urban containment, greater density is typically enforced or encouraged in order to ensure that the 
                                                 
1 There are numerous studies which test the relationships among housing density, mixed land use and housing prices 
in general, but only two studies focus specifically on affordable units for low-income households.  Both of those 
studies, by Alexander and Tomalty (2002) and Burton (2000), found evidence that greater density was associated 
with less affordability for low-income households.  These studies are discussed in Chapter 3. 
2 Chapters Three and Four will discuss the relationship among urban containment, land values, and housing costs. 
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population’s housing needs can be met even while development is restricted outside of urban 
containment boundaries.3 
Given that housing prices may be pushed upward as a result of urban containment, do the 
smart growth principles have the same impact on affordable housing in regions with urban 
containment as in regions without urban containment?  In regions of urban containment, greater 
housing density, multi-unit structures, and mixed land use may be a means to alleviate the 
upward pressure on the cost of the average priced dwelling through the production of smaller 
units or the use of less land per unit.  The literature review in Chapter Three provides evidence 
that an increase in density and a change in housing types in the marketplace help to maintain 
moderately priced housing in areas of land use regulation and urban containment.  However, do 
increasing prices from urban containment weaken the positive impact that density, multi-unit 
structures, and mixed use may have affordable housing for low-income households?  
A modified quasi-experimental research design is utilized to compare the relationship 
between specific smart growth principles and the supply of affordable housing in regions with 
and without urban containment.  To do so, four regions were chosen to represent two pairs of 
regions for an analysis of smart growth and affordable housing at two different points in time.  
The regions were selected so that each pair includes a region with urban containment and a 
region without urban containment at one point in time.  At the other point in time, the two 
regions of each pair have similar urban containment policies.  The results from these two 
different points in time are then compared. 
The first pair includes the regions of Portland and Seattle.  In 1990 only Portland had a 
region-wide urban containment policy in the form of urban growth boundaries.  Urban growth 
boundaries are “lines in the land” beyond which urban development is prohibited.4  In 2000, both 
Portland and Seattle had urban growth boundaries.  Interaction variables are included in the 
model to measure the extent to which the smart growth principles influenced affordable housing 
                                                 
3 An example is Portland, Oregon’s Metropolitan Housing Rule which was legislated after the region’s 
implementation of urban containment.  Fearing that housing prices would become unaffordable, the state legislation 
requires municipalities within the region to meet certain density targets.  Other examples can be found in almost 
every state which has legislated urban containment for their metropolitan regions.  In many instances, density targets 
are not specifically mandated but are encouraged. 
4 “Line in the land” is from the title of an article by Staley, Edgens, and Mildner (1999). 
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differently in Portland than in Seattle in 1990.  These results could then be compared to the 
analysis in 2000 when both regions had similar urban containment policies. 
A similar analysis is conducted for the second pair of regions, Baltimore and 
Philadelphia.  In 1990, neither region had a region-wide urban containment policy.  In 1997, 
Maryland passed the Smart Growth Act which requires every county in the state to direct state 
infrastructure funds to specified areas known as priority funding areas.  The purpose of these 
areas is to limit sprawl by steering public infrastructure funds away from the urban/rural fringe 
and toward existing communities and areas approved for future growth.  Therefore, the 
Baltimore region had priority funding areas in 2000 while Philadelphia did not have a region-
wide urban containment policy.  Once again, interaction variables for each of the smart growth 
principles of interest to this research were included in the analysis to capture differences between 
Baltimore and Philadelphia with regard to the impact of the smart growth principles on the 
supply of affordable housing. 
 
1.1 OUTLINE OF STUDY 
Chapter Two provides an overview of the context in which this research occurs.  The chapter 
first presents the primary housing problem which low-income households face, which is 
predominantly a lack of affordable units.  The severe shortage of affordable housing units for 
low-income households means that the impact of policies which, whether intentionally or not, 
influence the supply of affordable units must be fully understood.  The chapter also illustrates the 
importance of the private market to the supply of affordable low-income units as the private 
market, rather than public subsidies, provides the majority of affordable units. 
Chapter Two then defines sprawl.  It is difficult to discuss smart growth without defining 
sprawl, the dominant pattern of metropolitan growth which smart growth is proposed to alleviate. 
The chapter explains the relationship between sprawl, the housing market, and affordable 
housing.  It then defines smart growth and discusses its relationship to the housing market and 
affordable housing. 
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Chapter Three is a review of the literature pertaining to urban containment, the four smart 
growth principles and their impact on housing costs and affordable housing.  A significant 
conclusion from the review is that while there is a growing body of research concerning the 
smart growth principles and housing costs, there is little empirical research regarding their 
impact on housing specifically affordable to low-income households. 
Chapter Four presents the theoretical framework, drawn from economic theory of land 
use and housing markets, from which hypotheses can be drawn concerning the impact of the 
smart growth principles on the supply of affordable housing.  This framework presents the 
hypotheses that density, multi-unit structures providing multiple housing options, and mixed may 
have a positive association with affordable housing within regions of no urban containment 
policy, but the association will be weaker in regions with urban containment policies.  Open 
space, as measured by neighborhood parks, is expected to be associated with a lower supply of 
affordable units.    
Chapter Five presents the research design through which the hypotheses are tested.  
Quasi-experimental designs are discussed as a means to address our inability to conduct a true 
experiment in which urban containment and smart growth are isolated from other possible 
explanations for the variation in the supply of affordable housing.  The chapter also presents the 
potential threats to the validity of research findings. 
Chapter Six continues the discussion of methodology by presenting the regions chosen 
for this research.  The chapter first describes the selection process for two pairs of regions.  
Portland and Seattle are the first pair of regions, both sharing many similar characteristics except 
for the timing of their urban containment policies.  The second pair of regions consists of 
Baltimore and Philadelphia.  The chapter then provides detailed descriptions of each region’s 
growth management techniques, affordable housing policies, and changes in housing 
affordability during the 1990’s.   
Chapter Seven presents the model and data used to formally test the hypotheses in each 
of the two pairs.  The first section of Chapter Seven presents the model utilized in this study.  
The second section discusses the operationalization and measurement of the variables included in 
the model.  The third section describes the data sources from which the variables are measured.  
The fourth section of Chapter Seven presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in 
the model.  The fifth section then discusses the statistical assumptions that are necessary to test 
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the hypotheses through regression analysis.  The sixth and seventh sections present the findings 
of the statistical analysis regarding the relationships between each smart growth principle and the 
supply of affordable housing for low-income households, as well as the impact of urban 
containment on these relationships.  The sixth section discusses the findings of smart growth’s 
impact on affordable housing for extremely low-income households, while the seventh section 
presents the findings for rental units affordable to very low-income households.   
Chapter Eight relates the findings from Chapter Seven to each of the hypotheses drawn 
from the theoretical framework.  It then discusses the implications of these findings, as well as 
suggests future research to address the limitations of this current study.  
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2.0  AFFORDABLE HOUSING, SPRAWL, AND SMART GROWTH 
The purpose of this research is to test the relationships of four smart growth principles and the 
supply of affordable housing for low-income households.  To understand the context in which 
this research occurs, this chapter presents four major issues related to affordable housing, sprawl, 
and smart growth.  These issues are: 
1. the current shortage of housing for lower income households causing them to 
spend a significant portion of their income on housing; 
2. the importance of the private market in the provision of affordable units; 
3. sprawl’s relationship to the housing market and affordable housing; and 
4. the set of principles known as smart growth which are often proposed as solutions 
to sprawl and may impact the supply of affordable housing. 
 
The first section of this chapter discusses affordable housing for low-income households.  
It first defines affordable housing and then reveals a severe shortage of it, particularly for 
extremely low-income renters.  The shortage forces approximately 64% of extremely low-
income households to spend more than half of their income on housing.   
The first section then discusses three significant sources of affordable housing, which are 
the Federal government, the non-profit sector, and the unsubsidized, private market.  The section 
provides an overview of the Federal programs which provide subsidized housing for low-income 
households.  This housing is owned either by the Federal government itself, by non-profit 
organizations, or by private developers.  The section then shows that the private, unsubsidized 
housing market provides a significant number of affordable units, as well. 
The second section discusses sprawl, which is the dominant land use pattern of 
metropolitan growth.  Sprawl presents implications for housing for low-income households as 
development occurs further away from the central city of metropolitan regions.  Wealthier 
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households find it in their economic interest to move further from the central city, while lower-
income households remain in close proximity to it.  The purpose of the section is to present the 
current process of development which smart growth is intended is to interrupt.   
The third section presents smart growth, the most recent attempt to control sprawl 
through a variety of principles and policies.  Among the principles of smart growth are higher 
density, mixed land use neighborhoods, and an increase in the variety of housing types from 
which to provide greater housing opportunities to all households across a range of incomes.  
Advocates contend that these principles can increase the supply of affordable units for low-
income households by promoting smaller homes and more multifamily and attached housing 
units.  However, a dominant theme within the smart growth movement is the preservation of 
undeveloped land at the fringes of metropolitan regions by redirecting growth inward, rather than 
allowing outward growth of sprawl.  Restricting development on the urban/rural fringe may have 
a harmful effect on affordable housing as it increases housing prices.   
2.1 AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
Affordable housing is housing which households can afford given their current income.  As 
defined by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), affordable housing 
is housing which costs less than 30% of a household’s income (HUD 2005, pp. 4 and 39).  
Renter households spending more than 30% of their income on rental costs are said to have rent 
burdens. 
Based on these definitions, HUD measures affordable housing needs for three different 
categories of “low-income”, as shown in Table 2.1.  The three low-income categories for 
households are extremely low-income, very low-income, and low-income.  These categories 
include households whose income is less than 30%, between 30% and 50%, and between 50% 
and 80% of their area’s median income (AMI), respectively (Pelletiere 2006, p. 1).  Because 
HUD’s definitions of low-income are used to set eligibility guidelines for many of its supported 
housing programs, they are a common definition of low-income used in the affordable housing 
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literature (Nelson 1994; Bogdon and Can 1997; Millenial Housing Commission 2002; Green and 
Malpezzi 2003; Pelletiere 2006). 
 
Table 2-1. Definition of Low-Income Households, Affordable Housing, and Rent Burdens 
Low-Income 
Category 
Level of Household 
Income for 
Category 
Moderate Rent  
Burden 
Severe Rent Burden Affordable 
Housing Unit For 
Income Category 
Low-income 50% to 80% of AMI 30%-50% of Household Income 
More than 50% of 
Household Income 
<  30% of 80% of 
AMI 
Very low-income 30% to 50% of AMI 30%-50% of Household Income 
More than 50% of 
Household Income 
< 30% of 50% of 
AMI 
Extremely low-
income < 30% of AMI 
30%-50% of 
Household Income 
More than 50% of 
Household Income 
< 30% of 30% of 
AMI 
Source:  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2005. 
 
There are two significant measures of affordable housing needs calculated for each 
category of low-income households.  These measures are also summarized in Table 2.1.  The 
first measure is the number of households in each low-income category spending more than 30% 
of their income on housing.5  Households spending between 30% and 50% of their income on 
housing costs are defined as having a moderate rent burden while those spending more than 50% 
of their income on housing are defined as having a severe rent burden  (HUD 2005, Appendix 
B).6 
The second measure of affordable housing needs uses a rental cost-to-income ratio to 
determine the available supply of affordable units for these different income ranges.  As defined 
by HUD, an affordable housing unit is one whose cost is less than 30% of the highest possible 
income in each income category.  Therefore, a housing unit is considered ‘affordable’ for 
extremely low-income households if its cost is less than 30% of 30% of the AMI.  A unit is 
affordable for very low-income households if its cost is less than 30% of 50% of the AMI and is 
affordable for low-income households if its cost is less than 30% of 80% of the AMI. 
                                                 
5 The 30% housing cost-to-income ratio (HCIR) was established by the Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 
1983.  Prior to 1983, the standard HCIR was 25%.  The HCIR standard is used to determine the amount of rent low-
income renters receiving public housing assistance are expected to contribute toward their housing.  The standard is 
more the result of political, cultural, and social reasons than empirical findings that households should spend, at 
most, a specified proportion of their income for housing (Feins and Lane 1981; Hulchanski 1995). 
6 Similar definitions are also used by the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University (2003; 2005), as 
well as by the National Low-Income Housing Coalition (Pelletiere 2006) in measuring rent burdens among low-
income households.  Together with HUD, these three organizations provide the most commonly used estimates of 
affordable housing for low-income households. 
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2.1.1 The Affordability Problem 
Bi-annually, HUD publishes data on the housing needs among low-income households.  The 
reports emphasize a housing affordability problem which is especially acute for extremely low-
income households.  Figure 2.1 illustrates the number and proportion of renter households who 
are not receiving government housing assistance and experiencing moderate and severe rent 
burdens by income category in 2003.  Among extremely low-income renter households, 63.6%, 
or approximately 3.9 million out of 6.1 million, experience severe rent burdens while another 
15.9%, or almost 1 million, experience moderate rent burdens.7 
 
Figure 2-1. Rental Cost Burdens by Income for Unassisted Renter Households 
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Note:  A moderate rent burden is housing costs that are between 30-50% of a household’s income.  
Severe rent burden is housing costs that are more than 50% of a household’s income.  Numbers are 
in thousands.  Source:  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2005; American 
Housing Survey, 2003. 
 
                                                 
7 Throughout this section, numbers in text are rounded to nearest 100,000 while percentages are calculated from the 
actual numbers. 
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Among all renter households, the proportion with a severe rent burden declines as income 
increases.  When compared to extremely low-income renter households, very low-income renter 
households are much less likely to have severe rent burdens, but are still susceptible to moderate 
rent burdens.  Only 19.6%, or approximately 1.0 million out of 5.3 million very low-income 
renter households, experience severe rent burdens.  However, another 47.6%, or approximately 
2.5 million, have moderate rent burdens.  Among the 6.5 million low-income renter households, 
only 3.9% have severe rent burdens while 25.5% have moderate rent burdens. 
Housing cost burdens are not isolated to low-income renter households.  Figure 2.2 
illustrates the prevalence of housing cost burdens among homeowners.  Slightly more than 49% 
of extremely low-income homeowner households, or approximately 3.3 million out of 6.7 
million, experience severe housing cost burdens as they spend more than half of their income on 
housing (HUD 2005, p. 53).8  Another 1.3 million extremely low-income homeowner 
households, or 20%, experience moderate housing cost burdens. 
In comparison to extremely low-income homeowner households, only 18.9% of very 
low-income homeowner households, or approximately 1.5 million out of 7.8 million, have severe 
housing cost burdens.  An additional 1.9 million very low-income homeowner households, or 
24.1% of the total, have moderate housing cost burdens.  Meanwhile, 9.4% of low-income 
homeowner households, or approximately 1.1 million of 12.3 million, have severe housing cost 
burdens.  22.6% of low-income homeowner households, or 2.8 million, have moderate housing 
cost burdens. 
A comparison of Figures 2.1 and 2.2 reveals that a higher proportion of extremely low-
income and very low-income renters have housing cost burdens than homeowners of the same 
income.  Slightly more than 79% of extremely low-income renters versus 69% of homeowners 
have housing cost burdens.  Among very low-income households, 67% of renters versus 43% of 
homeowners have housing cost burdens. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Similar results were found by the U.S. Congress’ Millenial Housing Commission (2002, p. 15 and p. 93). 
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Figure 2-2. Housing Cost Burdens by Income for Homeowner Households 
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Note:  A moderate cost burden is housing costs that are between 30-50% of a household’s income.  Severe 
cost burden is housing costs that are more than 50% of a household’s income.  Numbers are in thousands.  
Source:  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2005; American Housing Survey, 2003. 
  
 
This section examined the proportion of households experiencing housing cost burdens at 
various income levels.  It defined housing cost burdened households as those who spend more 
than 30% of their income on housing.  However, there are number of criticisms of the housing 
cost-to-income ratio as a measure of affordability and affordable housing needs.  The next 
section presents those criticisms and alternative measures of affordability which attempt to 
address them. 
2.1.1.1 Alternative Measures of Affordability 
The criticisms of the housing-cost-to-income ratio as a measure of affordability focus on the fact 
that a ratio is kept constant across varying housing units and households.  However, housing 
units vary drastically in quality from one another while households vary in their non-housing and 
housing needs.  Ignoring differences in housing unit quality and households, the ratio can 
overestimate or underestimate the need for affordable housing for low-income households. 
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The first criticism of the cost-to-income ratio is that it ignores the varying life-cycle 
situations among households (Hulchanski 1995).  Cost-to-income ratios will show that very 
young householders at the beginning of their wage earning years, as well as older householders 
beyond their wage earning years, are more likely to have housing affordability problems than 
householders in their prime earning years.  In this regard, an affordability problem will be 
overestimated among younger householders, who may expect to have higher incomes in the 
future to help pay for housing, and among older householders who likely have access to savings 
or wealth which are used to pay for housing costs that appear to be unaffordable based solely on 
current income.  On the other hand, the ratio will show housing to be more affordable for 
householders in their peak earning years (Quigley and Raphael 2004, p. 194).  The affordability 
problem may be underestimated for these householders as they should be saving a portion of 
their current income for future uses. 
The second criticism of a 30% cost-to-income ratio as a measure of housing affordability 
is that not all households share the same capability of spending the same proportion of their 
income on housing (Grigsby and Rosenburg 1975; Hancock 1993; Stone 1993; Kutty 2005).  A 
low-income household may be able to afford housing costs up to 30% of its income, but an 
extremely low-income household may not be able to afford that level of housing costs, if 
anything, after other necessities, such as food and transportation, are purchased.  Similarly, larger 
households or households with children may have less of their income available for housing after 
they obtain other necessities than smaller households and those without children. 
Stone (1993, pp. 35-50) proposed a sliding scale measure of housing affordability based 
on household disposable income minus the cost of a non-housing basket of goods of acceptable 
adequacy as set by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for a given family size.  He chose to use 
as the non-housing basket of goods, a ‘Lower Family Budget’ which is the budget necessary for 
a minimum quality, minimum adequacy package of food, transportation, household furnishings, 
clothing, medical care, entertainment, and other personal care goods and services.9  The 
                                                 
9 The official Federal poverty line uses a similar approach to determine the necessary income for a family to meet its 
basic needs.  However, Stone used the BLS estimates rather than the official poverty line as a starting point for his 
package of goods because he argued the BLS estimates were more comprehensive.  He argued that the poverty line 
was inadequate for three reasons.  First, the poverty line is based solely on the cost of a minimal food budget to meet 
basic needs and does not explicitly account for the actual cost of other necessities.  Second, the food plan used to 
calculate the poverty line is based on an emergency food budget that is not meant to be a permanent level of food 
consumption.  And third, the poverty line does not take into account the deduction of personal income taxes from 
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proportion of income remaining after the deduction of the cost of the non-housing basket of 
goods is available for housing.10   Households spending a higher proportion of income on 
housing than this calculated level are said to be experiencing “shelter poverty” as they do not 
have enough disposable income after housing costs for the non-housing basket of goods of 
minimal adequacy. Stone’s “shelter poverty” measure finds four important features of housing 
affordability: 
1. The proportion of income spent on housing (or maximum cost of housing) that 
households could afford while still having enough income for the non-housing necessities 
increased steeply with increases in income.  For example, a four-person household with 
gross income of $20,000 could afford housing costs of 7% of income, but the same 
household with income of $30,000 could afford 29%.11 
 
2. The proportion of income spent on housing (or maximum cost of housing) that 
households could afford varied greatly with household size.  For example, he found that a 
single-mother with one child could afford housing costs of 37% of income, but a single-
mother of three children could afford 0%. 
 
3. There are households of every size that cannot afford anything for housing.  Their 
household income is low enough that money for housing is not available after other 
necessities are purchased.  Larger households are much more likely to be unable to pay 
anything for housing using Stone’s method. 
 
4. Alternatively, there are households of every household size that can afford to pay more 
than the conventional ratio of 30% of income for housing.  Their income is high enough 
that they spend less than 70% of it on non-housing necessities. 
 
Stone  (2006, p. 47) estimated that there were 32 million “shelter-poor” households in the 
United States in 2001.  The number of “shelter-poor” households was not much different from 
the 34.5 million households that were paying more than 30% of their income on housing.  These 
numbers include both renter households and homeowner households.  Among “shelter-poor” 
households, approximately 15 million were renter households and 17 million were homeowner 
households (Stone 2006, p. 51).   
                                                                                                                                                             
income (Stone 1993, p. 323-324).  The BLS Family Budget estimates were discontinued in 1981, but Stone updated 
the figures using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
10 This method is sometimes called the “residual approach” as it measures how much income a household has left 
for housing after other necessary and basic needs are met.  Stone credits Cushing Dolbeare, the late founder of the 
National Low-Income Housing Coalition, as the first person to propose such a measure (Dolbeare 1966; Stone 
2006). 
11 These figures are from 1991.  However, the concepts remain the same. 
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The primary difference between Stone’s shelter poverty measure and the conventional 
cost-to-income ratio of 30% was the demographic distribution of the affordable housing 
problem.  As expected, the shelter poverty measure of affordability showed that households of a 
larger size, as well as households with smaller incomes, were more likely to have housing 
affordability problems than smaller and higher-income households.  The impact of household 
size on the incidence of shelter poverty is evident when comparing the number of households in 
shelter poverty to the number of people.  There were 2.5 million fewer households in shelter 
poverty than paying more than the conventional 30% of income for housing.  However, 6 million 
more people were living in shelter poverty than paying more than 30% of income for housing. 
Kutty (2005) used a measure similar to Stone’s shelter poverty to calculate the number of 
households with housing affordability problems, but based it on the official poverty line rather 
than the minimal Family Budget of BLS.  Poverty thresholds are based on the idea, developed in 
the 1960’s, that households spend a 1/3 of their income on food, 1/3 on housing and, 1/3 on other 
goods.  The poverty line is calculated by determining the cost of an ‘economy’ or ‘thrifty’ food 
plan for a temporary or emergency situation for a household of a given size and multiplying it by 
three.  In theory, this amount is the level of income necessary for a family of a given size to 
afford basic necessities.12  Kutty subtracted a household’s housing costs from its total income.  If 
disposable income after the deduction of housing expenses was less than 2/3 of the poverty line 
(1/3 for food, 1/3 for other goods), she considered the households to be in “housing-induced” 
poverty.  Households with income slightly above poverty could experience “housing-induced” 
poverty if they are spending a large share of their income on housing.  Kutty argued that her 
measure was more appropriate for public policy discussions than Stone’s “shelter poverty” 
measure because the poverty line is the officially recognized standard for determining the 
household income needed to meet basic needs (p. 119). 
Using 1999 data, Kutty (p. 124) estimated that 17.2 million renter and homeowner 
households were in housing-induced poverty.  In comparison, there were 14.4 million 
households in official poverty.  In comparison, 30.1 million households had housing costs of 
more than 30% of income using the standard housing cost-to-income ratio.  The number of 
                                                 
12 For a summary of critiques of the official poverty threshold, as well as alternative measures of appropriate family 
budgets, see Bernstein et. al. (2000) and Citro and Michael (1995).  The typical argument against the poverty 
thresholds are that they are too low as they are based on the cost of an ‘emergency’ food plan and do not include 
specific measures of the cost of other non-food necessities. 
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households in housing induced poverty is lower than the number in Stone’s shelter poverty and 
the number spending more than 30% of income on rent.  Using the poverty budget provides 
conservative estimates of the housing affordability problem.  The budget for a minimally 
adequate standard of living is more generous in the Lower Family Budget than in the poverty 
budget.  Therefore, the assumed level of necessary expenditures on non-housing goods is lower 
using Kutty’s housing-induced poverty measure. 
The third criticism of the conventional housing cost-to-income ratio as a measure of 
housing affordability is its inability to account for housing quality (Lerman and Reeder 1987; 
Bogdon and Can 1997; Thalmann 1999).  A household might be spending more than 30% of its 
income on housing, but doing so to live in a housing unit that is of higher quality or size than 
necessary (Linneman and Megbolugbe 1992).  Likewise, a household may be spending less than 
30% of its income on housing, but occupying a unit of inadequate quality.  Lerman and Reeder 
(1987) used a hedonic price equation to estimate the cost of a rental unit of a minimally adequate 
quality.  Using data from the Annual Housing Survey from 1975 and 1983, their hedonic 
equation regressed current household rental costs on a combination of housing characteristics.13  
A hedonic model provides the value that is placed on each marginal unit of a specific housing 
characteristic.  Lerman and Reeder then used their hedonic results to estimate the cost of 
minimally adequate housing units of different sizes in different sized cities based on HUD’s 
adequacy criteria for publicly subsidized units.  Any household of a given size with income less 
the cost of a minimally adequate-quality unit divided by .3 was considered to have a housing 
affordability problem because the minimally adequate unit would consume more than 30% of the 
household’s income.14 
A comparison of the conventional cost-to-income ratio and Lerman and Reeder’s quality-
adjusted measure indicated that the conventional ratio may overestimate the housing 
affordability problem.  In 1983, 45.1% of renter households, or 12.7 million households, were 
spending more than 30% of their income on housing expenses.  However, the rental cost of a 
minimally adequate unit would be more than 30% of income for only 36.3%, or 10.2 million, of 
renter households.  A significant number of households, 4.4 million households, were spending 
                                                 
13 The Annual Housing Survey later became the American Housing Survey. 
14 The cost of the unit should not be greater than 30% of the household’s income.  Therefore, the rent of unit ⁄ .30 = 
necessary household income. 
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more than 30% of their income on housing because they were residing in a unit that was of 
higher quality than necessary.  On the other hand, 2 million renter households who did not have a 
housing affordability problem according to the conventional ratio did have a problem according 
to the minimal quality rental cost to income ratio (Lerman and Reeder 1987, p. 398).  A criticism 
of Lerman and Reeder’s measure is that it ignores the possibility that there is an inadequate 
supply of units of minimally adequate quality to meet the need, forcing households into higher 
quality units which they cannot afford and would not choose if lesser quality units were available 
(Kutty 2005, p. 117). 
Thalmann (1999) criticized Lerman and Reeder’s quality-based measure on the basis that 
it may overestimate the number of households with affordability problems.  Thalmann argued 
that households with not enough income to pay only 30% of income for a minimally adequate 
unit (which would be counted a household with housing problems by Lerman and Reeder) may 
actually not have a housing problem as they may live in a unit of acceptable quality but at a cost 
that is lower than the average price for a similar adequate-quality unit.  While these households 
could not afford a minimally adequate-quality unit in theory, they are able to afford the particular 
unit in which they are residing because of the lower than average rental price.  Thalmann argues 
that households can pay lower than average rents if their landlord is simply charging too little, 
they are receiving some form of rental assistance, or have a low-rent agreement from a family 
member.  These households do not have a current housing problem, but would have a problem if 
they tried to move.  He found that 3.7% of households fit this category in Switzerland (p. 1943). 
Despite their differences, the various measures of affordability all indicate that a 
significant number of households spend a large portion of their income on housing. Table 2.2 
provides a summary of four measures of affordability for low-income households discussed in 
this section.  While the measures are of different time periods and cannot be directly compared to 
one another, the table easily illustrates that each measure shows millions of U.S. households in 
need of affordable housing. 
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Table 2-2. Alternative Measures of Affordability 
Author (Year)a Method Results 
HUD (2003) Conventional Cost-to-Income Ratio 11 million renter households paying 
more than 30% of income for housing 
Kutty (1999)b Housing-Induced Poverty 17.2 million renter and homeowner 
households in housing-induced poverty 
Lerman & Reeder (1983) Quality-Adjusted Cost-to-Income 
Ratio 
10.2 million households for whom a 
minimally adequate rental unit would 
consume more than 30% of their income 
Stone (2001) Shelter Poverty 15 million shelter-poor renter households 
a. Indicates year of data from which the measure was calculated.   
b. Includes both renter households and homeowner households.  The other three entries include only renter 
households.   
Sources:  (Lerman and Reeder 1987; Kutty 2005, p. 124; HUD 2005, p. 56; Stone 2006, p. 51).. 
2.1.1.2 Using the Cost-to-Income Measure Despite the Criticisms 
Despite the criticisms of the housing cost-to-income ratio as a measure of housing affordability 
and housing needs among low-income households, it remains the most commonly used measure 
for several reasons.  First, a ratio is used by Federal housing programs to determine the 
contribution that a low-income household is expected contribute on its own toward housing costs 
when they receiving housing assistance (Nelson 1994).  The ratio of 30% is considered an 
affordable rent by HUD and is therefore accepted as the normative standard even though the 
ratio may be as much the result of politics, government budgetary constraints, or historical 
assumptions as it is the result of solid evaluation of households’ ability to pay (Feins and Lane 
1981; Mitchell 1985; Hulchanski 1995). 
The second reason for the continual use of the conventional ratio is that the quality-
adjusted measures that have been proposed fail to take into account the actual supply of 
minimally adequate-quality housing units (Hancock 1993; Kutty 2005).  Hancock points out that 
households may be living in housing units that are of higher quality or larger size than necessary 
because they cannot find units of lower quality or smaller size.  If the household has an income 
that allows it to afford a minimally adequate-quality unit with 30% of its income, it would not be 
considered to have a housing problem.  However, the household actually does have an 
affordability problem if it is forced to pay more than 30% of income for higher quality housing 
because lower quality housing is not available. 
The third benefit of the conventional ratio is the ease at which it is calculated with little 
data.  The measures of shelter poverty, housing induced poverty, and quality-based level of 
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affordability are useful in providing a more comprehensive picture of the type of households who 
are experiencing housing affordability problems.  The poverty measures provide a more accurate 
picture of the distribution of housing needs among households of varying sizes and incomes.  
The quality-adjusted measures provide insight into whether households are paying too high of a 
proportion of their income for housing because of their choice of housing quality of because of 
too little income.  However, these measures require significantly more data and complex analysis 
and they all conclude that a large number of low-income households are in need of more 
affordable housing. 
2.1.2 Supply 
As shown in Section 2.1.1, there are a large number of U.S. households who experience severe 
and moderate rent burdens.  The problem is particularly acute among extremely low-income and 
very low-income households.  There are two causes of this problem.  The first cause is the 
national deficit of rental units available to extremely low-income renters.  According to the 
National Low-Income Housing Coalition, there were 6 million rental units affordable for the 7.7 
million extremely low-income renter households in 2003  (Pelletiere 2006, p. 4).15  Therefore, 
there was an absolute deficit of 1.7 million units for extremely low-income renter households. 
The second cause of the high proportion of rental cost burdens among extremely and very 
low-income renter households is the occupancy of affordable units by higher income households.  
A large number of units are affordable but not available for extremely and very low-income 
households because they are occupied by higher income households.  The occupancy of 
affordable units by higher income households exacerbates the problem of a limited supply of 
affordable units for extremely low and very-low income households (Pelletiere 2006).16 
                                                 
15 Estimates from the NLIHC differ slightly from HUD estimates.  While both organizations utilize data from the 
American Housing Survey, NLIHC uses an older method of estimating Area Median Income and income limits than 
HUD.  See Pelletiere (2006, p. 13) for further details. 
16 These figures are not meant to criticize higher-income households who exercise their freedom of choice by 
choosing to reside in low-cost units which lower their housing costs.  The numbers are provided only to emphasize 
that many units that would be counted as part of the affordable housing stock are not actually utilized by low-income 
households.  ‘Available’ in the discussion and in Table 2.2 does not indicate that the units are vacant. 
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Table 2.3 presents the number of renter households, the number of affordable units, the 
number of the affordable units occupied by higher income households, and the overall number of 
affordable and available rental units for the three categories of low-income as of 2003.  These 
figures were calculated by the National Low-Income Housing Coalition.  Affordable and 
available rental units are defined as units which are affordable and either vacant or currently 
occupied by a household with income of the specified low-income range (HUD 2005, p. 86).  
The income categories presented in this table are cumulative.  Therefore, extremely low-income 
renter households are households with less than 30% of the area median income, very low-
income renter households are those with income less than 50% of the area median income, all 
low-income renter households are those with less than 80% of the area median income. 
 
Table 2-3. Number of Affordable and Available Rental Units and Renter Households, 2003 
 
Extremely Low-Income 
(0 – 30% AMI) 
Extremely & Very 
Low-Incomeb  
(0 – 50% AMI) 
All Low-Incomeb 
(0 – 80% AMI) 
Number of Households 7,723,592 13,732,752 20,731,167 
Number of Affordable Unitsa 6,027,628 15,565,448 31,152,926 
Absolute Surplus (Deficit) of 
Affordable Units 
(1,695,964) 1,832,696 10,421,759 
Number of affordable units 
occupied by higher income 
households 
2,773,350 5,718,592 9,078,059 
Number of Units Affordable 
and Availablec 
3,254,278 9,846,854 22,074,867 
Surplus (Deficit) of 
Affordable & Available Units 
(4,469,314) (3,885,898) 1,343,700 
a. Includes both the private market and subsidized units. 
b. Income categories are cumulative.  For example, “very low-income” includes households and units that are 
extremely low-income, as well as very low-income. 
c. Affordable and available indicates the affordable unit is not currently occupied by a higher-income household. 
Source:  Pelletiere, 2006; author’s calculation. 
 
Of the 6 million rental units affordable to extremely low-income renter households, 2.8 
million are occupied by households with higher incomes.  Therefore, only 3.2 million of the 
affordable units are actually affordable and available to extremely low-income renters, leaving a 
deficit of 4.5 million affordable and available rental units.  When the definition of ‘low-income’ 
is broadened to include extremely and very low-income households, there remains a deficit of 
3.9 million affordable and available units.  Of the 15.6 million affordable rental units for the 
13.7 million very low-income renter households, 5.7 million are occupied by higher income 
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households.  Therefore, there is a 3.9 million deficit of affordable and available affordable rental 
units for very low-income renters. 
Among all low-income renter households, there is a surplus of affordable and available 
rental units.  Of the 31.2 million affordable units, 9.1 million are occupied by higher income 
households.  Therefore, there are 22.1 million affordable and available units for the 20.7 million 
low-income renters, leaving a surplus of 1.3 million rental units. 
There are three significant sources of affordable housing for low-income households.  
The first significant source is financial subsidies from the Federal government.  Federal housing 
subsidies and tax credits are expended to assist eligible low-income households with housing 
costs.  HUD has a 2006 budget of approximately $33.5 billion dollars of which approximately 
$26.5 billion is spent on the three largest low-income housing programs in the country, public 
housing, Section 8-project based, and Section 8-tenant based assistance (NLIHC 2006, pp. 1-2).  
Despite being the largest sources of subsidized housing in the country, these three programs 
currently fail to provide a significant level of new units to the affordable housing stock as most 
of the money is spent to maintain the current stock of subsidized units (Dolbeare, Saraf, and 
Crowley 2004, p. 4; Dreier 2006, p. 111).  The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), 
administered by the Internal Revenue Service, is the most significant program in terms of the 
production of new affordable housing units, at a cost to the U.S. Treasury of $3.85 billion dollars 
per year (NLIHC 2006).  Since its inception in 1986 to 2003, the LIHTC has produced slightly 
more than 1.2 million affordable units (HUD 2006).  A final Federal program, the HOME 
Investment Partnership Program provides block grants to state, county, and local jurisdictions for 
affordable housing.  Since 1992, HOME has assisted approximately 367,000 rental units for low-
income households (NLIHC 2006). 
The second source of affordable housing is the non-profit sector, which in addition to 
receiving funding from federal programs such as LIHTC and HOME, receive money for housing 
initiatives from a variety of sources.  These sources include private foundations, intermediary 
organizations, and banking institutions.  The most significant type of non-profit organization 
with regard to the production of affordable housing units is the Community Development 
Corporation (CDC).  CDC’s are organizations characterized by their community-based 
leadership and their goal of improving the social and physical environment of their surrounding 
community or neighborhood (Bratt 2006, p. 340).  The National Congress for Community 
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Economic Development (NCCED) estimated that by 2005, CDCs had produced 1.25 million 
units of housing nationwide for low and moderate income households (National Congress for 
Community Economic Development 2005, p. 4).17 
The third significant source of affordable housing for low-income households is the 
private rental market (O'Flaherty 1995; Green and Malpezzi 2003).  Table 2.4 compares the 
number of affordable rental units in the private market to the number of Federally subsidized 
units. 
 
Table 2-4. Total Affordable Rental Housing Units for Extremely Low-Income and Very Low-Income 
Households by Federally Subsidized and Private Sectors, 2006 (in millions) 
Notes:  a. The total number of subsidized units is over-estimated.  There are two reasons for this over-
estimation.  First, no distinction is made between subsidized units available for extremely low-, 
very low-, and low-income households.  As the next section reveals, almost all of the units are 
required to be occupied by households with no more than 65% or 50% of the Area Median 
Income.  Second, a proportion of LIHTC and HOME units receive subsidies from additional 
sources.  Therefore, there are some units that are likely double-counted as a single unit can receive 
more than one type of subsidy. 
Source Number of Units 
Federally Subsidized Units  
Public Housing 1.3 
Section 8-Project Based 1.4 
Section 8-Tenant Based 2.0 
HOME Rentals  
(including tenant-based assistance) 0.4 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit +     1.2 
TOTAL Subsidized Unitsa 6.3 
  
Private Sector  
Affordable Private Sector Unitsb 9.3 
Affordable Private Sector Units Occupied by Higher Income 
Householdsc -      5.7 
Affordable and Available Private Sector Units 3.6 
  
Total Affordable and Available Rental Housing Unitsd 9.9 
b. Calculated by subtracting 6.3 million subsidized units from the approximately 15.6 million 
affordable units for very low-income households (both private and subsidized) reported in Table 
2.3.  Table 2.3 provides data from 2003, which was the most recent data available regarding the 
supply of affordable units in the private market. 
c. As shown in Table 2.3. 
d. Differs from Table 2.3 because of rounding. 
Sources:  (CBPP 2006; HUD 2006; NLIHC 2006; Pelletiere 2006). 
                                                 
17 NCCED was disbanded in August of 2006. 
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 The supply of 9.3 million affordable, unsubsidized rental units in the private market is 
significantly larger than the 6.3 million units subsidized by the five Federal affordable housing 
programs. Unfortunately, many of these private units are occupied by higher income households.  
Only 3.6 million of the private sector units are affordable and available.18 
The next three sections examine these three significant sources of affordable housing.  
Section 2.1.2.1 provides an overview of the major Federal housing programs which provide 
subsidies for low-income housing.  Section 2.1.2.2 discusses the role of the non-profit sector, 
particularly of CDCs, in the provision of affordable units.  Section 2.1.2.3 explains the private 
market’s provision of affordable housing, particularly through the process known as filtering.  As 
new housing is constructed for higher-income households, a chain of events occurs in which the 
oldest and lowest quality units become available to low-income households. 
2.1.2.1 Federally Subsidized Housing Programs 
There are five significant federal programs from which subsidies for low-income housing are 
provided.19 The oldest of these programs is public housing, established by the Housing Act of 
1937 as part of President Roosevelt’s package of New Deal policies to deal with the depression.   
The Act initially provided funds for less than 160,000 housing units, but was significant in that it 
created the framework of publicly-owned housing, in which local public housing authorities 
became responsible for developing, owning, and operating housing developments which were 
subsidized for eligible low-income households (Meehan 1977; Mitchell 1985).20 
Title III of the Housing Act of 1949 greatly expanded funding for public housing.  The 
Act authorized construction of an additional 800,000 units, which were to be completed by 1955 
(Banfield and Meyerson 1955).  However, public housing took a back seat in comparison to 
                                                 
18 Author’s calculation. 
19 This section only focuses on the largest federal housing programs.  For information on smaller federal programs, 
see Olsen (2001) and U.S. General Account Office (2002).  For information on federal housing subsidies not limited 
to low-income housing, see Dreier (2006). 
20 As with most low-income housing policies, the Housing Act of 1937 was not concerned primarily with affordable 
housing for low-income households.  Meehan (1977, p. 6) argued that the provision of public housing was seen as a 
means to raise employment in the construction industry during the depression and remove slums.  He wrote, 
“progress tended to be measured in terms of dollars spent, units of housing produced, construction wages generated, 
or number of units of dilapidated housing demolished rather than the amount of quality housing-in-use supplied to 
the poor.” 
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other urban redevelopment programs funded by the Housing Act of 1949, such as slum clearance 
and improving the appeal of the inner city to the middle and upper class.  More housing units 
were demolished than rebuilt (Von Hoffman 2000).  Anderson (1964, pp. 66-67) estimated that 
by 1961 only 28,000 housing units had been built and few of them were for low-income 
households.  But in 1968, there was a push for subsidized housing as the Nixon administration 
adopted a large-scale supply-side strategy to address the shortage of low-income housing.  The 
administration and Congress provided record levels of public housing funding from 1968 to 1972 
(Bratt and Keating 1993).  By 1974, there were 1,115,000 units of public housing (Meehan 1977, 
p. 8). 
The sudden increase in government spending on public housing in the late 1960’s, 
however, backfired.  Plagued by poor quality and maintenance of the housing units, growing 
public frustrations with the perceived failures of the liberal social policies of 1960’s, poor public 
perceptions of public housing, and financial scandals at HUD, President Nixon declared a 
moratorium on new subsidized housing construction in 1973 (Bratt and Keating 1993; Burchell 
and Listokin 1995, p. 598; Wallace 1995, p. 793; Von Hoffman 1996; Orlebeke 2000,  pp. 496-
502).  Support for public housing never regained momentum after the moratorium.  Practically 
no net additions to the supply of public housing units have been made since the early 1980’s and 
the number of units has been slowly declining from a high of 1.4 million units in 1991 (Olsen 
2001, Table 5; Dreier 2006). 
The last major public housing initiative began in the early 1990’s.  In 1994, more than 
$3.5 billion were committed to HOPE VI, a housing program initiated by HUD to financially 
assist public housing authorities to upgrade severely distressed public housing sites by turning 
them into mixed-income neighborhoods with new housing and supportive services (HUD 1999; 
GAO 2002).  These funds were not meant to increase the number of public housing units, but 
were allocated to improve housing and neighborhood quality.  To improve the quality of both the 
neighborhood and the housing units, HOPE VI funds were used to demolish dilapidated housing 
units and rebuild more modern units which were often built at lower densities than the previous 
units.  In addition, HUD removed restrictions requiring local housing authorities to give priority 
for housing assistance to the lowest income households.  HUD also eliminated the one-to-one 
replacement standard requiring local housing authorities to replace every demolished public 
housing unit with a new public housing unit (Salama 1999, p. 96).  The result was that by 2000, 
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the HOPE VI program had demolished over 30,000 public housing units and had built over 7,000 
new ones (GAO 2002, p. 79).   From 1996 to 2002, 62,797 public housing units were lost 
through demolition in total and another 43,000 demolitions were proposed by public housing 
authorities (NLIHC 2002, p. 88). 
Today, approximately 14,000 public housing developments contain a total of more than 
1.273 million units (GAO 2002, p. 78; NLIHC 2006).  Typically, 40% of new renters in public 
housing must be extremely low-income.  Residents pay rental costs that are the highest of 30% 
of their adjusted monthly income, 10% of their monthly gross income, their welfare shelter 
allowance, or an amount (not exceeding $50) that is set by the local authority.  Most residents 
pay 30% of income for rent.  The other rent levels are to ensure that every household pays at 
least some amount of rent regardless of their income. 
The second and third significant federally subsidized housing programs are broadly 
known as Section 8, established by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.21  
Section 8 housing assistance is provided in two distinctly different forms.  The first form of 
Section 8 is project-based subsidies provided to private developers and property owners to 
encourage them to develop and provide units to low-income households.  This was the one of the 
first large-scale attempts to encourage private entities to develop and operate affordable housing 
rather than a government agency.22 
Section 8 project-based subsidies provide 15 to 20 year rental contracts in which the 
Federal government subsidizes the portion of rent that low-income households cannot afford pay.  
The private owners were initially expected to obtain conventional mortgages for the construction 
of the units, to be repaid with the rental subsidies.  However, most developers had to use 
Federally insured mortgages in order to obtain funding (Wallace 1995). 
There have been no new Federal commitments made for new Section 8 project-based 
units since 1983.  In the early 1980’s, two shifts in housing policy occurred which would end 
future commitments to new project-based units.  First, priority for housing was given to 
                                                 
21 This Act also introduced Community Development Block Grants (CDBG).  
22 The federal government’s first attempts to encourage private developers to supply affordable rental units were 
through the use of lower-than-market rate mortgages, beginning in 1961.  Private developers of affordable units 
could obtain federally insured mortgages through a program known as Section 221(d)3 which provided 3% interest 
or, later, through program Section 236 which provided an interest rate of 1%.   Combined, these two programs 
created approximately 728,000 new affordable units from 1961 to 1973 (Schwartz 2006, pp. 130-131).     
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households who had income of less than 50% of the median.  This priority increased the cost of 
the subsidies to the Federal government as these households can afford less of the rental cost on 
their own as compared to households with income between 50% and 80% of the area median 
income (Listokin 1991, p. 166).  Second, the country grew increasingly more conservative on 
social policy, as well as faced a growing problem with the national debt (Sternlieb and Hughes 
1991, p. 133).  Amid growing concerns over the cost of project subsidies, President Reagan’s 
conservative views on social policy, and a belief that the marketplace could solve the nation’s 
housing problems, the President’s Commission on Housing stated that Federal housing programs 
should “help people rather than build projects” and recommended ending the project-based 
subsidy in favor of vouchers which the tenant can use for any housing unit of his or her choosing 
(Listokin 1991; Burchell and Listokin 1995, p. 599; Winnick 1995; Dreier 2006, p. 116).  In 
1983, the Section 8-project based subsidy was no longer available for additional affordable 
housing units.  
Today, approximately 1.4 million households live in Section 8 project-based assisted 
units (Olsen 2001, Table 5; NLIHC 2006).  To be eligible for project-based assistance, 
households must have income less than 80% of the area median income.  In addition, 40% of 
new residents must be extremely low-income.  Households pay 30% of their adjusted monthly 
income toward rent, while HUD subsidies provide the remaining rental cost.  The total rental 
price is a contract rent, based on Fair Market Rent (FMR), between HUD and the private owner 
of the unit.  In most areas, the FMR is the rent amount of the 40% percentile of rental units into 
which a new household has moved into in the past two years.   
The second form of Section 8, created in 1974, is Section 8 tenant-based assistance.23  
Rather than providing a subsidy to owners of specified properties, tenant-based assistance 
provides a voucher to tenants which they can use for a housing unit of their choosing.  In theory, 
a low-income household receiving tenant-based assistance is free to choose where they will 
reside.  The housing assistance follows the household, it is not tied to a specific unit.  However, 
the housing unit must meet HUD standards of quality and the landlord must be willing to enter 
                                                 
23 At the time of the passage of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Section 8-project based 
assistance was refered to as “Section 8 New and Rehab” and Section 8-tenant based assistance was called “Section 8 
Existing” (HUD 2000). 
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into a contract with the public housing authority or other administrative agency that is 
administering the voucher (HUD 2000; Sard 2001). 
The number of low-income households receiving Section 8 tenant-based assistance has 
steadily, yet slowly, increased over time (Olsen 2001).  The program was expanded by the 
Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983 and the Housing and Community Development 
Act of 1987 in response to the discontinuation of funding for new Section 8 project-based units 
(HUD 2000).24  This growth has been the result of the program being credited with improving 
the mobility of low-income recipients.  Tenant-based assistance is currently looked upon 
favorably.  There is evidence that tenant-based assistance is less likely than project based 
assistance to be used in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty (Newman and Schnare 1997; 
HUD 2000; Shroder 2001; Feins and Patterson 2005); is likely to help households manage the 
welfare-to-work requirements of welfare reform because it provides recipient households with 
improved mobility (Rosenbaum and Popkin 1991; Rosenbaum and DeLuca 2000; Sard and 
Lubell 2000); and is provided at a lower cost per unit to the Federal government than project-
based assistance (HUD 1995; GAO 2002). 
One drawback to tenant-based assistance is that they are not accepted by all landlords, 
limiting the range of housing options among recipients.  Poor public perceptions of the Section 8 
program limits the number of new landlords willing to accept the vouchers, forcing a large 
number of recipients to use their vouchers in their current location or among landlords who 
already accept vouchers from other tenants (Kennedy and Finkel 1994; HUD 2001).  In an 
evaluation of Section 8 in Chicago, Popkin and Cunningham (1999, p. 25-26) found that 
landlords refused Section 8 vouchers despite Chicago’s Human Rights ordinance which prohibits 
housing discrimination on “sources of income.” 
Another drawback to tenant-based assistance is that certain types of households have a 
more difficult time finding appropriate housing for which to use their vouchers than other 
households.  Finkel and Buron (2001) measured the success rates among tenant-based assistance 
                                                 
24 Section 8 tenant-based assistance, established in 1974, created certificates requiring tenants to choose units that 
rented at a price below an established maximum.  The 1980’s saw the introduction of housing vouchers which are 
similar to certificates except that recipients are not limited in choice by a maximum rent level.  Voucher recipients 
are permitted to choose a unit priced higher than the maximum allowable rent as long as they are willing to pay the 
difference, with the only limitation being that the rent paid by the recipient cannot be more than 40% of their 
income.  The 1998 Public Housing Reform Act merged the certificate tenant-based assistance into the voucher 
tenant-based assistance.  Therefore, there is no longer a distinction between the two (HUD 2000; Lubell 2001).   
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recipients across multiple metropolitan areas.  They found that 67% of households with five or 
more members succeeded in locating a housing unit in which to use their voucher.  This was 
statistically lower than the 72% of households with 3 to 4 people who were able to successfully 
use their assistance.  It is more difficult to locate larger rental units for households with greater 
than 4 people. 
A third drawback is the difficulty of using rental vouchers in a ‘tight’ housing market in 
which there are fewer vacancies.  Finkel and Buron (2001) found only 66% of vouchers were 
successfully used in tight housing markets with a vacancy rate of 2% to 4%.  61% of vouchers 
were successfully used in very tight markets with a vacancy rate of 2%.  In contrast, they found 
that 73% and 80% of vouchers were successfully used in markets with vacancy rates of 7% to 
10% and greater than 10%, respectively. 
Despite these criticisms, Section 8 tenant-based assistance is the largest Federal 
affordable housing program today for low-income households.  It is received by approximately 
2.0 million households (CBPP 2006).  With Section 8 tenant-based assistance, a tenant pays 30% 
of income for rent and HUD pays the remaining rental cost up to a set rental amount.  The 
maximum assistance that HUD will provide is the difference between 30% of the household’s 
income and the maximum allowable rent, the “rent standard”, which in most cases is set at the 
FMR.  All new voucher recipients must be very-low income households, with income that is less 
than 50% of the area’s median.  If public housing authorities decide to make low-income 
households (with income less than 80% of the area’s median) eligible for tenant-based 
assistance, the authority must state to HUD the reasons for doing so.  Regardless, 75% of all new 
voucher recipients must be extremely low-income households, with income less than 30% of the 
area’s median (CBPP 2003). 
The fourth significant Federal housing program for low-income households is the HOME 
Investment Partnership Program (HOME).  Authorized by Congress in 1990 by the Cranston-
Gonzales National Affordable Housing Act, the HOME program provides Federal block grants 
to participating jurisdictions (PJs) which are state, county, and local governments.  40% of 
HOME funds are reserved for the states while the remaining 60% are reserved for cities and 
counties which are capable of adequately utilizing at least $500,000 from the program.  Small 
municipalities, therefore, are not eligible.  To receive funds, local PJs must create a five year, 
HUD-approved consolidated plan which addresses the jurisdiction’s affordable housing needs, as 
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well as provide matching non-Federal funds of $0.25 for every $1 of HOME funds received 
(O'Regan and Quigley 2000; NLIHC 2006).  The HOME funds can be used for four primary 
purposes.  They are (Urban Institute 1998, p. 8): 
? purchase, construction, or renovation of rental housing. 
? renovation or construction of for-sale housing and assistance to individual 
homebuyers. 
? rehabilitation of owner-occupied housing units. 
? tenant-based rental assistance.  
The PJs can then use the funds as they see fit in addressing affordable housing needs in their 
area. 
Supporters of the HOME program, at the time of its creation, argued that housing 
programs needed to be less encumbered by HUD’s bureaucracy as local jurisdictions have better 
knowledge of local needs, the types of households living in subsidized housing, and local 
housing conditions (Cavanaugh 1992).  Therefore, local jurisdictions are better able to decide on 
the best mix of housing assistance – such as subsidies, low-interest loans, operating support, and 
grants – to improve the supply of affordable housing in their area (National Housing Task Force 
1988; Orlebeke 2000, p. 510).  After decades of experience in dealing with Federal housing 
programs, many housing advocates believed that local jurisdictions had the “capacity and 
experience” to pursue housing goals without hindrance from bureaucratic HUD guidelines. 
HOME funds are less restricted by Federal regulations than Section 8 or public housing 
in terms of income eligibility requirements.  HUD does not require units to be set aside for 
extremely low-income households, although local jurisdictions may do so (Urban Institute 1998).  
At least 90% of HOME units must be occupied by households with income less than 60% of the 
area median income.  The other 10% must be occupied by households with income less than 
80% of the area median income.  If a housing development has more than 5 HOME-funded units, 
20% of the assisted units must be occupied by very low-income households with income less 
than 50% of the area median income. 
With a budget of $1.7 billion in 2006, the HOME program is small compared to the $26.5 
billion that HUD spends on public housing and Section 8 project-based and tenant-based units 
(NLIHC 2006).  However, HOME is the most significant HUD program in terms of increasing 
the supply of subsidized units as neither the Section 8 project-based program nor the public 
housing program provide new commitments for additional units (O'Regen and Quigley 2000; 
GAO 2002).  From 1992 to 2005, HOME funds were used to subsidize approximately 234,600 
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rental units and 132,700 tenant-based vouchers for low-income households.  In addition, 
approximately 406,800 units were assisted for homeownership opportunities for low-income 
households (NLIHC 2006). 
The HOME program is criticized because it does not target assistance to the poorest 
households with the greatest need for affordable housing (Nelson and Khadduri 1992; Nelson 
1994).  While public housing and Section 8 programs target extremely low-income households, 
Federal guidelines do not require HOME funds to be targeted to the lowest income groups.  
However, Nelson (1994) and Daskal (1998) found that affordable units were consistently in short 
supply for households with extremely low-income.  Extremely low-income households are more 
likely to experience severe housing costs burdens, caused by the lack of affordable units, than 
other income groups (HUD 2005; Joint Center for Housing Studies 2005).  Evaluations of the 
HOME program indicate that between 80% and 90% of residents of HOME rental units have 
household income of below 50% of the area’s median (Urban Institute 1998, p. 88; Abt 
Associates 2001, p. 8; Swack 2006, p. 265).  A recent sample of HOME households indicated 
that 47% were extremely low-income (Abt Associates 2001, pp. vi & 33). 
Another criticism of the HOME program is the rent structure (Nelson and Khadduri 
1992).  Rather than paying 30% of household income toward rent, a low-income tenant’s rental 
cost for a HOME unit is pre-established.  Rents are typically set at the FMR for the area or 30% 
of 65% of the area median income, whichever is lower.  Because there is no relation between 
rents and income, many low-income families living in HOME-funded housing units pay more 
than 30% of their income for rent (NLIHC 2006).  Abt Associates found that the average 
extremely low-income household in a HOME-funded unit had a rent burden of 53% of its 
income (Abt Associates 2001, pp. vi & 33).  In order to afford a HOME funded unit, extremely 
low-income households need an additional subsidy.  The evaluations of the HOME program 
found that between 40% to 50% of households in a HOME unit received additional tenant-based 
assistance which allowed them to afford it (Urban Institute 1998, pp. xiii and 88; Abt Associates 
2001, p. 37). 
The fifth significant Federal affordable housing program is the Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credit (LIHTC).  It is currently the most active Federal affordable housing program in terms of 
new unit production (Wallace 1995; Cummings and DiPasquale 1999; NLIHC 2006).  From 
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1987 to 2003, the program assisted in the development of more than 1.25 million low-income 
households units (HUD 2006). 
Unlike the other housing assistance programs, LIHTC is not a direct expenditure from the 
Federal budget.  The program provides a tax credit administered by the Internal Revenue 
Service.  The program was established by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to encourage investors 
and developers to invest in the construction and rehabilitation of low-income rental housing in 
the face of disappearing tax shelters from rental units which the reform act eliminated (Case 
1991; Marcuse and Keating 2006, p. 150). The LIHTC gives investors a tax credit of 9% per year 
for 10 years of total construction costs for new construction.  The credit is 4% for rehabilitation 
projects of existing properties or projects financed by tax-exempt bonds (Wallace 1995, p. 797; 
Swack 2006, p. 267). 
Criticisms of the LIHTC are similar to those of the HOME program (Nelson 1994).  The 
LIHTC is not targeted to extremely low-income households.  To qualify for the tax credit, 
housing developments for which the LIHTC is applied must either reserve 40% of the units for 
households with income less than 60% of the area’s median or at least 20% of the units for 
households with income less than 50% of the area’s median.  An assessment in 2000 revealed 
that approximately 40% of LIHTC units were occupied by extremely low-income households 
with income less than 30% of the area’s median and another 34% were occupied by households 
with income between 31% and 50% of the area’s median (Abt Associates 2000, pp. vi & 3-6). 
Similar to the HOME program, there is no rent-to-income ratio to determine the tenant’s 
rent payment.  The tenant’s rent is pre-established by the landlord.  The maximum allowable rent 
is 30% of the maximum income that a household can have to quality for a tax credit unit (either 
50% or 60% of area median income).  Qualifying households with income levels close to the 
maximum allowed are better able to afford the rent, while households with the lowest income are 
often unable to afford the rent without additional assistance.  Approximately 70% of extremely 
low-income renters and 39% of all renters who reside in LIHTC units also receive an additional 
housing subsidy, typically through a Section 8 voucher or HOME funds, to assist with the rent 
(GAO 1997, p. 45). 
A concern regarding the LIHTC is the extent to which the housing remains available to 
low-income households after occupancy requirements expire.  As initially implemented, the 
LIHTC gave investors a tax credit for 10 years, but required the units for which the credit applied 
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to remain affordable to low-income households for 15 years.  The property’s owner was free to 
rent the units to any household, regardless of income, after 15 years.  This problem was partially 
addressed early in the history of the LIHTC through two Acts.  First, the Revenue Reconciliation 
Act of 1989 requires LIHTC units completed after 1989 to remain restricted to occupancy by 
low-income households for an additional 15 years.  Second, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
of 1990 requires owners of tax-credit properties to give qualified non-profit groups and public 
agencies the right of first refusal if they decide to sell their properties which received tax credits 
(Collignon 1999, pp. 10-11; Schwartz 2006, p. 96). 
These two new requirements are placed on all LIHTC units completed after 1990.  
Therefore, LIHTC units completed after 1990 are more likely to remain available to low-income 
households than units completed from 1986 to 1989.  Collignon (1999, p. 18) estimated that 
approximately 170,000 units produced through the LIHTC program between 1986 and 1989 had 
no affordability requirements after 15 years.  However, nearly half of these units have other 
funding sources in addition to the LIHTC which extend affordability requirements longer than 15 
years (Schwartz 2006, p. 97).   
The five Federal housing programs described in this section provide approximately 6.3 
million rental units to low-income households.  The oldest and largest programs, public housing, 
Section 8 project-based assistance, and Section 8 tenant-based assistance, require low-income 
households to contribute 30% of their income to their housing while the Federal subsidy covers 
the remaining portion of rental costs.  In comparison, the HOME and LIHTC programs require 
the same rent amount to be contributed by households regardless of their income.   The two 
programs establish rents at 30% of the highest income level eligible for assistance.  Therefore, 
households with income near the eligibility cut-off are better able to afford the units than 
households with the lowest incomes not receiving additional assistance from another program.  
The next section will examine the growing role of the non-profit sector in the provision of 
affordable housing for low-income households. 
2.1.2.2 Non-Profit Sector 
Non-profit organizations are the second significant source of affordable housing for low-income 
households.  There are three significant reasons why the non-profit sector has become an 
important source of affordable housing.  First, the federal government made a concerted effort to 
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reduce its role in the provision of low-income housing during the early 1980’s.  The termination 
of the Section 8 project-based program in 1983 signaled the end of the federal government’s 
direct involvement in categorical funding for the production of new low-income housing units.  
As the federal government’s direct involvement in affordable housing declined, non-profit 
organizations began to fill the void (Keyes et al. 1996).   
The second significant reason for the growth of the non-profit sector was the availability 
of money for non-profits to fill the void left by the federal government.  As early as 1974, block 
grants were introduced as a means to give greater autonomy to counties and local municipalities 
over their spending of federal grants.  Much of this money was made available to non-profit 
organizations. The most well-known block grant is the Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) established in 1974.  Seventy percent of CDBG money goes to cities with more than 
50,000 residents and to counties with more than 200,000.  At least 70% of CDBG money 
received by any jurisdiction must be spent for the benefit of low-income and moderate-income 
households (NLIHC 2006).  From 2004 to 2006, CDBG funds were used by local jurisdictions to 
provide housing assistance for approximately 170,000 units per year (HUD  2007).  From 2001 
to 2006, the average amount of CDBG money disbursed for housing services was $1.18 billion.  
This represents approximately 24.5% of total CDBG money available each year.  The remaining 
CDBG funds are used for commercial development, administration, and public improvements 
and services (HUD  2007).   
The importance of the non-profit sector in providing affordable housing was solidified by 
the HOME and LIHTC programs, described in the previous section.  At least 15% of a 
jurisdiction’s HOME funds must be set aside for local community-based housing development 
organizations (CHDO), which are non-profit housing organizations (NLIHC  2007). 
The third significant reason for the growth of the non-profit housing sector is the 
technical and financial assistance provided by foundations and intermediary organizations to 
small, local oriented non-profits focusing on affordable housing.  To understand the role of these 
large intermediary organizations, this section will first present the types of non-profit 
organizations that are significant to the production of affordable housing.  The three most 
significant types of non-profit organizations are Community Development Corporations (CDC); 
intermediary organizations which provide both technical assistance and funding to CDCs; and 
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regional non-profit housing organizations (Burchell and Listokin 1995; Bratt 2006; Schwartz 
2006). 
 A CDC is a community-based organization whose goal is to improve the structural, 
social, and economic characteristics of its local community.  The most frequent area of interest 
among CDCs is the physical improvement of the local community (Stoecker 1997).  Another 
primary characteristic of the CDC is its resident-based leadership drawn from its local 
community.  The Board of Directors consists of volunteer residents. 
 CDCs were initially created in the 1960’s to address the problems created by urban 
decline.  From 1966 to 1980, the Federal government provided more than $500 million to these 
newly created, local community organizations focusing on economic development and social 
services in their local neighborhoods (National Center for Economic Alternatives 1981; as cited 
by Bratt 2006, p. 341).25  Over time, CDCs moved their primary attention to the development of 
low-income housing and away from other development or social service programs.  By 2005, 
more than three-quarters of all CDCs were producing housing units, many of which affordable to 
low and moderate income households.  By 2005 these local non-profit organizations were 
credited with producing approximately 1.25 million affordable units, utilizing a variety of 
financial sources to do so (National Congress for Community Economic Development 2005). 
 Intermediary organizations which provide funding to these local CDCs are the second 
type of significant non-profit organization for the production of affordable units.  Between 1979 
and 1981, the Enterprise Foundation, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), and the 
Reinvestment Corporation were founded to provided provide money and technical assistance to 
non-profit housing organizations, particularly CDCs.  These organizations serve as 
intermediaries as they raise pools of funds through foundations, banks, private corporations, and 
the syndication of tax credits for low-income housing (Vidal 1997; Schwartz 2006, p. 202).26  
Vidal suggested that a function of these organizations is to act as community development 
“banks” as they provide financial tools to non-profit housing organizations.  According to reports 
reviewed by Schwartz (2006, pp. 202-203), the Enterprise Foundation has raised approximately 
                                                 
25 The Ford Foundation was also a significant financial supporter of CDCs from the mid-1960s through the 1970’s.  
For a history of the CDC, see Halpern (1995, Chapt. 4) and Stoutland (1999).  Also see Stoecker (1997).  
26 LISC and the Enterprise Foundation are the largest intermediary organizations.  There are also similar 
organizations which focus on specific geographic regions, particular large cities or metropolitan areas.  For a 
discussion of these organizations, see Nye and Glickman (2000). 
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$6 billion to distribute to 2500 nonprofit groups for the development of 175,000 affordable 
housing units.  Meanwhile, LISC has financially assisted in the development of more than 
158,000 affordable units. 
The third significant non-profit organization is the regional, or large city, housing 
organization (Schwartz 2006).  These are non-profit organizations whose function is to develop 
housing for low-income households, but they do not focus on a single neighborhood or small 
community as CDCs do.  Rather, they develop housing throughout a large geographic area.  
These organizations include the Bridge Housing Corporation which has produced more than 
10,000 affordable units in Southern California, Phipps Houses which has produced more than 
5,500 units throughout New York City, and the Community Builders, a national organization 
which has produced more than 17,000 units in eight states.27   
The Housing Partnership Network is a networking organization consisting of 90 of these 
large non-profit housing producers.  Through this partnership, they share knowledge, skills, and 
most importantly, financial resources.  The Network also has raised money for loan funds to help 
their members in various stages of the development process.  The network has been able to raise 
these funds from such investors as private foundations and financial institutions.28 
2.1.2.3 Unsubsidized, Private Market Provision of Affordable Housing 
The private, unsubsidized housing market is the third significant source of affordable housing for 
low-income households.  The unsubsidized market typically does not produce new affordable 
units.    The cost of producing new housing units and, more importantly, the rent charged to 
consumers for these new units exceeds the expense that low-income households can afford to 
pay.  The Joint Center for Housing Studies (2005, p. 23) estimated that $400 was the highest rent 
the poorest 1/3 of renter households could afford.  They calculated that only 10% of the newly 
built rental units rented for less than $400, compared to 25% of existing rental units.  More than 
43% of these newly built units rented for more than $800 as compared to 25% of existing units.  
Simultaneously, many of the new rental units merely replaced old ones.  As the Center states, 
replacing older rental units improves quality, but does nothing for affordability.  The Center 
found that, from 1993 to 2003, new construction was responsible for a net addition of rental units 
                                                 
27 These numbers were taken from Schwartz (2006, p. 203). 
28 See www.housingpartnership.net 
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only among those that rented for at least $600.  Sternlieb and Hughes (1991)  provided anecdotal 
evidence that these unaffordable rents among new units are the result of the of construction, even 
when regulatory barriers such as building codes and land use restrictions are relaxed. 
 There are two sources of affordable housing in the unsubsidized, private market.  The 
first source is manufactured homes.29  There are approximately 8.6 million manufactured homes 
in the United States, accounting for slightly more than 6.9% of all housing units (U.S. Bureau of 
the Census 2005, Table 1A-7).  Of these homes, 6.9 million are occupied.  Their median monthly 
cost is $417 for an owner-occupied unit and $513 for a renter-occupied unit.  This is significantly 
lower than the median monthly cost of $809 for a conventional owner-occupied unit and $694 
for a conventional rental unit (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2005, Tables 3-13 and 4-13).   
Manufactured homes are cheaper than a conventional home because they are typically on 
smaller lots and are of smaller size than a conventional home (Beamish and Goss 2001, p. 375).  
Despite the public’s perception that manufactured housing is of poor quality, there is no evidence 
for this belief (Genz 2001; Beamish and Goss 2001).  Since 1976, new manufactured homes 
have been built to meet at least a minimum level of quality as defined by HUD. 
Manufactured housing is most typically used as a homeownership opportunity for lower-
income households.  Of the 6.9 million occupied manufactured homes, more than 79% are 
owner-occupied (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2005, Tables 1A-1 and 3-1).  The median household 
income for owners of manufactured homes is $30,486, which is lower than the median household 
income of $55,571 for all owner households and the $71,350 median household income of 
owners of new housing less than four years old (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2005, Table 3-12).  
Renters occupy approximately 1.4 million manufactured housing units, with a median household 
income of $19,833, as compared to $27,051 for all renter households (U.S. Bureau of the Census 
2005, Table 4-12). 
The second source of affordable housing in the unsubsidized, private market is older 
housing units as they decline in value and quality in response to new (unaffordable) units being 
                                                 
29 These are commonly referred to as mobile homes because they are built on a chassis, allowing them to be 
delivered on wheels.  Disgruntled by the negative connotation given to the word “mobile” home, the Mobile Home 
Manufacturers Association changed its name to the Manufactured Housing Institute in 1975.  In 1980, the Institute 
successfully lobbied Congress to change the word “mobile” to “manufactured” in all relevant legislation.  For 
further details and history of manufactured housing, see Wallis (1991).  For challenges facing the manufactured 
housing industry, see Genz (2001). 
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built.  The mechanism by which older housing units become affordable in the private market is 
known as filtering (Baer and Williamson 1988; Downs 1994, pp. 9-10; O'Flaherty 1995; Green 
and Malpezzi 2003, p. 16-17).  New units in the private market are typically of high quality and 
contain the most current amenities.  Households with preferences and financial resources for this 
housing will vacate their older units for these new units.  These vacated older units are then 
available to other households.   If there is not a strong enough demand for these vacated units, 
they will ‘filter down’ in price.  A second group of households otherwise not able to afford the 
vacated units, could afford them if they decline in price.  This second group of households will 
vacate their current units, which will then decline in price for a new group of households of even 
lower income.  Filtering is a chain reaction as the oldest housing filters down to the lowest 
income households.  In one of the first popular definitions of filtering, Ratcliff (1945, p. 322) 
wrote: 
It is a common argument that the needs for additional housing on the part of the low 
income groups can be met by the production of new housing for higher income groups.  
Thus, used houses will be released to be passed down to successively lower levels until 
the effect has reached the bottom of the market…this process is popularly referred to as 
filtering down and is described most simply as the changing of occupancy as the housing 
which is occupied by one income group becomes available to the next lower income 
group as a result of decline in market price, i.e., in sales price or rent value. 
 
 
Table 2.5 provides a summary of significant empirical research of filtering.  These 
studies are not discussed in the text as filtering is not the primary focus of this dissertation.  
There are a limited number of empirical studies of filtering, but they suggest that older units do 
filter down in price to become affordable to low-income households.  More importantly, there is 
some suggestion that low-income households can experience an improvement in the quality of 
their housing as households ‘move up’ to a higher level of housing quality when new housing is 
constructed. 
Section 2.1.2 emphasized the importance of Federal subsidies, the non-profit sector, and 
the unsubsidized, private housing market in the provision of affordable housing to low-income 
households.  From this section, we can conclude that the unsubsidized, private market is an 
important component regarding the supply of affordable units for low-income households.  The 
private market provides as many affordable units as federal subsidies.  This section concluded 
with the concept of filtering, the process by which older housing units may become affordable in 
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the private market through the production of new, higher quality units for higher-income 
households.   
 
Table 2-5. Empirical Evidence of Filtering 
Author Location Unit of Analysis Method Independent Variable 
of interest 
Dependent Variable Significant Finding 
Grigsby (1963) 9 metropolitan areas SMA (Standard 
Metropolitan Area) 
Correlations New housing 
construction 
Prices of existing units Strong correlation 
between new 
construction and decline 
in housing prices 
(relative to income). 
Kristof (1965) New York City Households moving 
into vacant units 
(beginning with 
newly built unit) 
Vacancy Chain Occupation of a newly 
constructed housing unit 
(first time to be 
occupied) 
Movement of 
households down the 
‘chain’ of units 
For every new housing 
unit, 2.4 households were 
able to make voluntary 
adjustments to their 
housing situation. 
Lansing et al. (1969) 13 Metropolitan Areas Households moving 
into vacated units 
(beginning with a 
newly constructed 
unit) 
Vacancy Chain Occupation of a newly 
constructed housing unit 
(first time to be 
occupied) 
Movement of 
households down the 
‘chain’ of units 
Construction of 1,133 
new homes allowed 
3,039 households to 
move.  9% of the 
households were poor.  
55% of the households 
had lower incomes than 
the households which 
previously occupied the 
unit.. 
Sands and Bower 
(1976) 
Erie County, NY; 
Bronx, NYC; 
Rochester 
Metropolitan Area 
Households moving 
into vacated units 
(beginning with a 
newly constructed 
unit) 
Vacancy Chain Occupation of a newly 
constructed private and 
subsidized housing units 
(first time to be 
occupied) 
Movement of 
households down the 
‘chain’ of units 
New, private suburban 
homes had little, if any, 
impact on housing for 
low-income households. 
 
New city units and 
subsidized units for 
moderate-income 
households improved the 
housing for low-income 
households. 
Somerville & Holmes 
(2001) 
44 Metropolitan Areas Housing Unit Multinomial Logit 
Regression 
Unit characteristics and 
neighborhood 
characteristics 
1.  Probability of 
unaffordable unit 
becoming affordable. 
 
2.  Probability of an 
affordable unit 
becoming 
unaffordable. 
1.  Increase in age of unit 
was associated with an 
increase in the odds of 
the unit filtering down to 
an affordable rent level. 
 
2.  Increase in unit age 
was associated with a 
lower probability of an 
affordable unit ‘filtering 
up’ to an unaffordable 
rent level. 
Somerville & Mayer 
(2003) 
44 Metropolitan Areas Housing Unit Multinomial Logit 
Regression 
New single-family 
building permits, in 
addition to unit and 
neighborhood 
characteristics 
1.  Probability of 
unaffordable unit 
becoming affordable. 
 
2.  Probability of 
affordable unit 
becoming 
unaffordable. 
1.  No association 
between single-family 
building permits and 
probability of 
unaffordable unit become 
affordable. 
 
2.  An increase in single-
family building permits 
was associated with a 
decrease in the odds of an 
affordable unit filtering 
up to unaffordable rent 
level. 
Weicher & Thibodeau 
(1988) 
59 Standard 
Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas 
SMSA Simultaneous 
Equations (connecting 
3 sub-markets of sub-
standard quality, 
standard quality, and 
new housing  
New housing 
construction 
Supply of sub-standard 
housing units 
One new unit was 
associated with the 
removal of 1.4 (Census 
data) or 1.92 (AHS data) 
sub-standard units. 
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The next section presents sprawl, which is the dominant pattern of growth for 
metropolitan regions in the U.S.  Sprawl is the result of new development, both residential and 
commercial, outside of the urban environment of a region’s central city and older suburbs.  As 
new development occurs on the urban/rural fringe of metropolitan areas, housing affordability in 
the private market may improve for low-income households because of the filtering process.  
Wealthier households move to new housing developments on the urban/rural fringe, while 
vacating units in older communities.  The older units then become available to households of 
lower income.   
2.2 SPRAWL 
This section presents the pattern in which metropolitan areas grow outward from the 
central city.  This outward growth occurs as the majority of new housing, as well as commercial 
sites, are developed outside of the central city and on the urban fringe where there is an 
abundance of undeveloped land.  This outward growth of metropolitan areas is typically referred 
to as sprawl and has implications for housing for low-income households.  This section first 
discusses multiple interpretations and dimensions that have been given to sprawl.  It then 
presents an economic theory of land use used to explain sprawl’s occurrence.  This explanation 
includes the issues of land use, housing, and transportation. 
2.2.1 Definition of Sprawl 
Sprawl is the residential and commercial decentralization of cities as populations move to newly 
developed outer areas of metropolitan regions, consuming previously undeveloped land.  
Nationally, the amount of land in the United States considered ‘urbanized’ increased by 47% 
from 1982 to 1997, but the nation’s population grew by only 17% (Fulton et al. 2001, p. 1).  
Urbanized land is defined as land that is developed and is used for residential, industrial, 
commercial, institutional, and recreation uses and infrastructure such as highways, garbage 
landfills, and sewer and water treatment plants.  Out of 281 metropolitan regions across the U.S., 
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Fulton et al. found that 264 experienced a greater growth rate in urbanized land than in 
population.  Their findings imply that the density of development, which is the amount of 
development per unit of land, is decreasing in almost every metropolitan region of the country as 
development spreads out further from each region’s central business district (CBD) at lower 
densities than in the center. 
Gordon and Richardson (2000, p. 2) simply call sprawl “the shorthand term for most 
current suburban and exurban development.”  Gillham (2002, p. 3) writes that most people 
picture sprawl as “great urban centers erupting across the countryside in a devastating flow of 
superhighways, shopping centers, baking asphalt, and twinkling cars.”  Despite the notion that 
everyone can identify sprawl, creating a precise definition for it is difficult as the word typically 
is used to refer to multiple characteristics, including land use patterns, consequences of those 
patterns, and aesthetic qualities (Galster et al. 2001; Mattson 2002; Burchell et al. 2005).   
Table 2.6 provides a summary of the most commonly identified characteristics of sprawl 
in found in the literature.  The characteristics can be divided into land-use patterns, consequences 
of those land use patterns,30 and consequences of government structure. 
 
Table 2-6. Characteristics of Sprawl 
Sprawl as land use pattern Sprawl as a consequence of 
land use patterns 
Sprawl as a result of government 
structure 
Low density development, particularly low-
density single-family housing 
 
Loss of undeveloped farmland 
and open space 
No centralized planning 
Segregated land uses “Trickle-down” (filtering) as 
source of affordable housing 
 
Fragmentation of land use powers 
among jurisdictions 
Leapfrog development (non-contiguous 
development) 
Reliance on automobile for 
transportation 
 
 
Commercial Strip Development 
 
  
Development in rural, undeveloped 
locations 
  
Sources:  (Ewing 1997; Burchell et al. 1998; Downs 1998; Duany, Plater-Zyberk, and Speck 2000; Burchell et al. 
2002; Orfield 2002). 
 
                                                 
30 There is a large literature regarding the consequences of the land–use patterns of sprawl.  For a comprehensive 
review of the “cost of sprawl” literature, see the Cost of Sprawl reports by Burchell et al. (1998; 2002; 2005). 
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The four most commonly cited land use characteristics of sprawl are large areas of low-
density development, segregated land uses, commercial strip development, and leapfrog 
development (Nelson and Duncan 1995, p. 1; Ewing 1997, p. 108; Burchell et al. 2005, p. 12).  
Low-density development is likely the most typical land use pattern associated with sprawl.  It is 
typically defined and measured as the number of people or number of housing units per an area 
of land (Pendall 1999).  Density of a metropolitan area declines as the amount of developed land 
grows faster than the population, consuming a greater amount of land per person (Fulton et al. 
2001). 
In addition to lower density, new residential developments are often segregated from 
commercial and public land uses.  Duany et al. (2000) identify five components, each segregated 
from one another, of which sprawl consists.  These five components are:  housing clusters that 
consist only of residences and are typically of low-density single-family housing; shopping 
centers that are exclusively for shopping; isolated office parks surrounded by parking lots and 
highways; civic institutions, such as schools, churches, and other public gathering places, located 
just about anywhere rather than in convenient central places; and an extensive system of roads 
connecting the other four segregated components. 
Commercial strip development is the cluster of commercial enterprises located along the 
stretches of road (Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez 1993; Ewing 1997).  These commercial 
developments, because of their location along busy highways and segregation from residential 
neighborhoods, typically require an automobile for access.  They are located along highways 
which connect towns or large-scale residential developments to one another, while the residential 
developments themselves have little commercial activity. 
Leapfrog development refers to the way in which large tracts of privately owned land 
between developments remain vacant, separating new developments from one another (Clawson 
1962; Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez 1993).  This land, while not immediately developed, is kept 
in private hands away from public use (Ewing 1997).  Private owners keep the land vacant for 
speculative purposes, expecting the value of their undeveloped land to increase as development 
occurs around it (Clawson 1962; Mills 1981).  This type of development pattern leads to non-
contiguous developments that cover a wider area of land than necessary. 
A fifth land use characteristic of sprawl is the unlimited development outward from the 
central city (Downs 1998; Burchell et al. 1998; Squires 2002).  This outward growth consumes 
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farmland and other undeveloped exurban land, located on the urban/rural fringe at a distance 
farther from the city than current suburbs (Kline 2000; American Farmland Trust 2003).  In a 
recent literature review of the costs of sprawl for the Transportation Review Board, Burchell et 
al. (2002, p. 3) ignored all other land use characteristics and, instead, limited their definition of 
sprawl to high growth rates in non-urban and undeveloped locations.  The authors argued that 
there is no way to categorize development in rural, undeveloped locations as non-sprawl unless 
they are organized and planned centers of development, which are rare in the United States.  
Likewise, they argued that additional development in already developed areas cannot be 
considered sprawl.  They add that sprawl is:  
Growth where it would be unproductive; i.e., in places that are less desirable from 
resource consumption or capital provision perspectives.  These include rural, 
undeveloped, or developing suburban counties that simultaneously (1) lack infrastructure 
to support that growth; and (2) siphon development away from established development 
areas, effectively diluting the intensity of use for infrastructure that is already in place in 
these areas (p. 58). 
 
There are also non land-use characteristics that have been used to define sprawl.  A sixth 
characteristic is the lack of centralized land use planning (Nelson and Duncan 1995; Downs 
1998).  The Florida Department of Community Affairs, a state which took an early lead in 
growth management in an attempt to direct growth away from environmentally sensitive areas, 
defines sprawl as “scattered, untimely, poorly planned urban development that occurs in urban 
fringe and rural areas and frequently invades lands important for environmental and natural 
resource protection” (Mattson 2002, p. 19).   
Advocates of growth management argue that planning can prevent the traditional land use 
patterns that are associated with sprawl (Ewing 1997; Nelson 1999; Weitz 1999; Abbott 2002).  
Regional or state level growth management techniques, such as urban growth boundaries, 
comprehensive planning, and regional coordination of local growth plans, are implemented in an 
attempt to manage growth in exurban areas, prevent rapid consumption of undeveloped land, and 
protect environmentally sensitive areas.  Three of the most prominent state and regional growth 
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management programs, in Portland, Oregon; Seattle, Washington; and Baltimore, Maryland are 
discussed in a later chapter.31 
A few scholars add fragmented land use powers to the list of non land-use characteristics 
of sprawl (Carruthers and Ulfarsson 2002; Orfield 2002).  Orfield (2002, p. 96) credits 
competition for a strong tax base among multiple and fragmented municipal governments within 
a region as one of the causes of sprawl-like development.  An individual municipality is 
financially better off if it allows residential development which brings more public revenue to the 
local government than public costs.  Because local governments typically rely on property taxes 
as their primary source of revenue, they are sensitive to attracting types of development that will 
provide more revenue than require in public costs (Orfield 2002, p. 88-89).  The types of 
residential development which fit this criterion are large, expensive single-family homes or small 
apartments of only one or two bedrooms.  Large, expensive homes provide for a stronger tax 
base from which to draw public revenues greater than the cost of public services used by the 
households in these large units.  Small apartments attract either single or two-person households 
without children who are typically in need of little public services, yet the landlord of their 
apartment still pays property taxes.  In contrast, inexpensive single-family homes and higher 
density developments, such as large apartments or townhouses, are more likely to cost more in 
public services than the revenue they provide.  This is due to that fact that these types of 
residential units are more likely to attract moderate to low-income families with children, yet 
provide smaller source of property tax revenue than larger homes.   
Orfield suggested that this process encourages sprawl as it provides an incentive for 
municipalities to allow large lot single-family homes and prohibit smaller, higher density ones.  
Therefore, newer homes are more likely to be large-lot single-family units.  In addition to this 
municipal behavior, households continually have an incentive to move from high cost (in terms 
of property taxes) older areas to newer areas which have lower taxes because these new areas do 
not have the burdens of providing public services to a wide range of households with regard to 
income and needs for public services.32 
                                                 
31 For discussions of the variety of growth management legislation, including requirements for planning, that has 
been passed in order to address sprawl see Stein (1993), Porter (1996; 1997), and Weitz (1999). 
32 This characteristic is based on the “public choice theory” cause of sprawl.  For in depth explanations of public 
choice theory and its application to household and municipal behavior, see Mueller (2003), Fischel (2001), Peterson 
(1981), Hamilton (1975), and Tiebout (1956).  Razin and Rosentraub (2000) questioned the extent to which 
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Another non land-use characteristic of sprawl is the reliance on the automobile as the 
primary means of transportation (Burchell et al. 1998; Duany, Plater-Zyberk, and Speck 2000; 
Downs 2004).  The automobile is the dominant means of transportation as employment 
opportunities, commercial activities, and residential developments are segregated from one 
another, often by large highways making them inaccessible to and from one another without 
motorized transportation.  At the same time, public transit is economically inefficient and has 
lower utilization in sprawling, low-density communities with fewer than seven housing units per 
buildable acre than higher-density communities (Downs 2004, p. 210). 
Downs (1998, p. 8) adds another characteristic to his definition of sprawl, which is a 
“reliance on trickle-down to provide low-income housing.”  Trickle-down is Downs’ term for the 
filtering of older housing from higher-income to lower-income households.  He is the only 
author to explicitly relate sprawl to affordable housing through the filtering process.  As 
households move up to larger, newer homes in the outlying areas of metropolitan regions, older 
housing in older areas becomes less desirable among consumers.  As demand for the older 
housing declines, they become more affordable for lower-income households. 
As discussed in Section 2.1.2.2, there are few recent studies of filtering.  Meanwhile, 
there are no recent studies which specifically test the relationship between sprawl and the supply 
of affordable units for low-income households.  Theoretically, the relationship between the two 
is positive.  As more households move to new units further away from central cities and older 
communities, we would expect more of the older housing units to become affordable to low-
income households.  However, the one study which explicitly examines the relationship between 
new suburban development and its impact on housing for low-income households, which was 
conducted in the 1970’s, found little support for this theory (Sands and Bower 1976).  The 
limited availability of empirical evidence may be the reason filtering is rarely linked to sprawl in 
the literature. 
                                                                                                                                                             
competition among fragmented local governments cause sprawl within a region.  In a regression analysis for 98 
metropolitan regions, they found that fragmentation did not cause sprawl.  Rather, they found sprawl to be a weak 
predictor of fragmentation.  Their findings suggest that sprawl occurs with or without fragmentation.  Nonetheless, 
fragmentation is often identified as a characteristic of sprawl despite unclear evidence as to whether it is a cause of 
sprawl, an effect of sprawl, or neither. 
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2.2.2 Measuring the Complexity of Sprawl 
Sprawl is a complex phenomenon to measure.  It is typically measured by land use patterns, but 
not all of its characteristic land use patterns need to exist in order for suburban growth to be 
called sprawl.  Leapfrog, or non-contiguous, development could occur in which there are large 
tracts of vacant land separating developments of high density (Harvey and Clark 1965; McKee 
and Smith 1972).  In a case study of Houston, Mieszkowski and Smith (1991) found that the 
region had a significant amount of leapfrog development in which population centers were 
separated from one another by large tracts of vacant land.  This type of development is a 
characteristic of sprawl and in this regard Houston could be characterized as sprawling.  On the 
other hand, the residential density of these developed centers declined slowly as distance from 
the central business district decreased, at a rate of 5.0% for every mile.  In terms of the density, 
Houston does not appear to sprawl because the density of its population on developed land is 
more consistent throughout the region than compared to metropolitan regions which experience a 
greater decline in density as the distance from the central business district increases.  
Mieszkowski and Mills give a number of explanations for this development pattern, including 
Houston’s system of financing infrastructure for undeveloped land which encourages clustered 
development, the heterogeneity of land which discourages development on some large tracts of 
land, and its network of freeways which also encourage clustered development (Mieszkowski 
and Smith 1991, pp. 192-194).  
Los Angeles also illustrates the complexity of sprawl.  In a recent review of the literature 
regarding density, Myers and Kitsuse (1999, p.22) ask “is Los Angeles sprawl?”  They claim 
popular perceptions equate Los Angeles with sprawl despite the region having the highest gross 
population densities among the 20 largest U.S. metropolitan regions.  Despite its high density, 
Ewing (1997) implies that Los Angeles style sprawl is not desirable because of its lack of 
accessibility (without a car) and a lack of open space within the region. 
Recognizing these complexities, two recent research projects by two different groups 
were undertaken to measure its multiple characterizations and dimensions.  Defining sprawl as 
specific patterns of land use in an urban area, Galster et al. (2001) proposed eight dimensions by 
which to measure it.  The dimensions captured as many of the various characterizations of sprawl 
as possible, including low-density, segregated land uses, non-contiguous development, and 
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centralization.  Each of the dimensions pertained to land use.  These dimensions were defined as 
(pp. 687-697): 
(1) density – the average number of residential units per square mile; 
 
(2) continuity – the degree to which land is developed in a continuous or, at the other end of 
the spectrum, leapfrog fashion; 
 
(3) concentration – the degree to which development is located in relatively few square miles 
rather than spread evenly throughout the urban area; 
 
(4) clustering – the degree to which development has been tightly knit to minimize the 
amount of land in each square mile that is developed; 
 
(5) centrality – the degree to which development is located close to the central business 
district; 
 
(6) nuclearity – the extent to which the urban area is characterized by one center as opposed 
to multiple centers; 
 
(7) mixed use – the degree to which two different land uses (such as residential and 
commercial) exist in the same small area and the extent to which it occurs throughout the 
urban area; 
 
(8) proximity – the degree to which different land uses are close to each other across an 
urban area (this is different from mixed use in that because different land uses can be 
close to one another but not necessarily ‘mixed’ within the same square mile. 
 
The authors operationalized and quantified six of the eight dimensions within one square 
mile grids for thirteen urban areas.  They did not measure mixed use and continuity because of 
limited data.  Adding up the z-score (standardized score) for the measures of each dimension for 
the 13 urban areas, they found that Atlanta, Miami, and Detroit were the three most sprawling 
while New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago were the least sprawling.  More importantly, they 
found that each dimension on its own provided a different analysis of sprawl.  For example, 
Houston was the least sprawling in terms of clustering, which indicates that the metropolitan area 
has tightly knit development which minimizes the amount of land used for developement, but 
was the most sprawling in terms of nuclearity, which means that there are a greater number of 
centers of development in Houston than the other 12 urban areas. 
Galster et al.’s multi-dimensional measures of sprawl have been criticized for three 
reasons.  First, data are not readily available regarding different land uses within one square mile 
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grids, which served as the basis for measuring neighborhood mixed use and proximity of 
different land uses.  Second, these measures require use of complex GIS techniques which are 
difficult and time-consuming to carry out for a large number of urban areas (Lopez and Hynes 
2003).  Finally, Ewing et al. (2002) argued that by measuring these dimensions among urban 
areas, Galster et al. ignored parts of metropolitan areas that were not urban, which are locations 
where sprawl is occurring. 
Ewing et al. (2002) developed the second multi-dimensional measure of sprawl using a 
four-factor index for metropolitan areas.  These four factors focused on density, the diversity of 
land uses, significance of population centers, and street accessibility as indicators of sprawl.  
Using 22 potential components of sprawl that were each assigned to one of the four factors, 
principal components analysis was used to measure the four scores for 83 metropolitan areas.  
Table 2.7 lists the measures for each factor. 
Table 2-7. Multiple Measures For Each Factor of Sprawl 
Density Mixed Land Uses Significance of Centers Street Accessibility 
Gross population density per 
square mile 
 
% of population living in 
densities less than 1,500 
persons/sq. mile 
 
% of population living in 
densities less than 12,500 
persons/sq. mile 
 
Estimated density at center of 
the metro area (estimated from 
negative exponential density 
function) 
 
Population of urban lands 
 
Weighted average lot size (sq. 
feet) for single-family dwellings 
 
Weighted density of all pop. 
centers within metro area 
% of residents with 
businesses or 
institutions within a 
block of their homes 
 
% of residents with 
satisfactory 
neighborhood shopping 
within 1 mile 
 
% of residents with a 
public elementary 
school within 1 mile 
 
Job-resident balance 
 
Population-serving job-
resident balance 
 
Population-serving job 
mix (entropy) 
Coefficient of variation of 
population density across census 
tracts (stnd. deviation by mean 
density) 
 
Density gradient (rate of decline 
of density with distance from 
center  (CBD) of metro area) 
 
% of metro employment less 
than 3 miles from the CBD 
 
% of metro employment less 
than 10 miles from the CBD 
 
% of metro population relating to 
centers or sub-centers within the 
same metro33 
 
Ratio of weighted density of 
population centers within the 
MSA to the highest density 
center to which a metro relates 
Approximate average 
block length in the 
urbanized areas of the 
metro 
 
Average block size 
 
% of small blocks (less 
than .01 square miles) 
Source:  (Ewing, Pendall, and Chen 2002, pp. 16-25). 
                                                 
33 The authors used data from Claritas, Inc. to identify census tracts as being within “spheres of influence” of a 
population center within the same MSA, a population center within a different MSA, a population center not in an 
MSA, or not within a sphere of influence of any population center.  For example, some census tracts in the northern 
portion of Akron, OH MSA were identified as relating to higher density areas in the Cleveland MSA. 
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 Each of the four factors was a weighted combination of the original measures assigned to 
the factor.  The greater the correlation between the original measure and the factor to which it 
was assigned, the greater the weight it was given in the overall factor score.  The factor scores 
were then converted to a scale with a mean value of 100 and standard deviation of 25.  An 
overall sprawl index, which included all four factors, was calculated by summing the four 
individual factor scores.  The overall sprawl index was also transformed to have a mean value of 
100 and a standard deviation of 25.  A score of 100 indicated that a metropolitan region was 
average, among the 83 metropolitan areas, in terms of sprawl.  A number less than 100 indicated 
that a metropolitan area had greater than average sprawl and a score greater than 100 indicated 
lower than average sprawl. 
Like Galster et al., Ewing et al. (2002, pp. 35-36) found that sprawl occurs in a number of 
different forms as metropolitan areas grow in a variety of ways.  In a comparison of Tucson, 
Arizona and Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, both regions were slightly less sprawling than the average 
metropolitan region.  They had an overall sprawl index of 109 and 108, respectively.  Despite 
their similar scores on the overall index, the regions significantly differed from one another with 
regard to the individual underlying factors of sprawl. 
Tucson had one of the lowest urban densities of all 83 metropolitan areas for which the 
index was measured.  With 1,767 people per square mile, its score on the density factor was 90, 
or 90% of the average.  On the other hand, Tucson’s development is highly concentrated with 
almost all employment being within 10 miles of downtown.  In terms of the strength of its center, 
Tucson’s score on the centrality factor was 106.  The area also scored well on the diversity of 
land uses to which residents had access, with a score on the mixed use factor of 121.  
In contrast to Tucson’s lower than average density, Fort Lauderdale scored better than 
average on the density factor, scoring 114.  The region had an average urban density of 4,837 
people per square mile.  But while Fort Lauderdale is more densely developed, the region had a 
higher degree of segregation among its land uses and scored a 94 on the mixed use factor.  
Further, the region scored poorly on the centrality factor.  With less than 15% of the region’s 
employment located within 3 miles of the central business, Fort Lauderdale had a centrality 
factor of 75. 
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2.2.3 Economic Theory of Land Use – Explanation of Sprawl 
Economic models of land use are often used to explain the growth of sprawl.  These models 
provide explanations as to why development occurs at lower densities outside of the central city 
than within it, as well as why low-income households appear to reside in the central city as 
higher-income households move to the suburbs or beyond.  This section provides the general 
economic theory of residential land use within metropolitan regions.  It begins by introducing the 
first well-recognized scholars of residential land use.  It then presents the assumptions which the 
model makes regarding household behavior, employment patterns, and commuting.  The 
assumptions are followed by the primary theory of the model which is followed by conclusions 
drawn from the model. 
William Alonso (1964) proposed one of the first complete urban location theories to 
explain the land use patterns of a metropolitan region.  One of the primary questions he asked 
was whether the amount of money spent for land was associated with household income and 
distance from the central city (Alonso 1964, p. 125).  Alonso’s model hypothesized that a 
household divides its income among three primary items, which are residential land, 
transportation costs, and a bundle of other goods.  There are two important points about the 
combination of these three items.  First, consumers must find a balance between these three 
general items which will meet their preferences and satisfy their needs.  Second, transportation 
costs increase as distance from the central city increases, but the cost of residential land will 
decrease.  Land prices decrease with greater distance from the central city because greater 
transportation costs make the land less desirable.  On the supply-side, there is an increasing 
supply of land at greater distances from the central city.  Consumers, therefore, will make a 
trade-off between transportation costs and land costs. 
Mills (1967; 1972) and Muth (1969) applied Alonso’s theory of land use to housing 
services rather than to residential land.  Rather than make a trade-off solely between land costs 
and transportation costs, consumers in the Mills’ and Muth’s models make a trade-off between 
the costs of a constant-quality unit of housing services and transportation.  Housing services 
refers to the components of a housing unit, such as the land on which the unit is located, the 
unit’s size, and other unit amenities, from which the household receives benefits, or ‘services’.  
Muth (1969, p. 18) defines housing services as a “bundle of services yielded both by structures 
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and also by the land or sites on which they are built… (it) refers to the flow of services and the 
satisfactions they yield.” 
The Alonso-Muth-Mills model of urban spatial development is based on a number of 
significant simplifying assumptions.  These assumptions must be presented prior to the 
discussion of the model’s predictions regarding residential land use patterns.  The assumptions 
which underlie the model are (Muth 1969, pp. 17-21; Mills 1972, pp. 98-104; Mills and 
Hamilton 1989, pp. 426-428; Yinger 2005, Chapter 1.3, p. 3-6): 
? The region is monocentric.  It has one central business district (CBD) in which all 
employment and economic activity occurs.  This assumption allows the model to 
ignore the possibility that households may reside a distance from the CBD and not 
experience greater commuting costs if their location of employment is also 
located a distance from the CBD. 
 
? There is only one mode of transportation which has a constant cost per unit of 
travel over any distance from the CBD.  This assumption simplifies the model as 
a distinction does not have to be made between modes of transportation and the 
differences (in cost and time) among them. 
 
? Distance to work is the only locational characteristic that is significant in 
household decision-making.  This assumption removes extraneous factors to the 
model, such as neighborhood amenities (separate from distance to work) or air 
quality, that may attract households. 
 
? Land is available for urban uses in all directions from the CBD.  It is also 
assumed that land is available for urban uses at any distance away from the CBD. 
 
? A household cannot change its income by moving to a different location.  It is 
assumed that households already reside in an optimal location for their income 
and will not gain from a move. 
 
? Households are perfectly mobile within an urban area.  Therefore, households are 
at their maximum level of utility (maximum satisfaction of their preferences).  
They will move if they have an opportunity to improve their utility. 
 
? All households have the same preferences. 
 
? There are no local governments.  All public services are identical throughout the 
region.  This assumption removes the complexity of different levels of public 
services being offered throughout the region. 
 
? Housing services are produced with a Cobb-Douglas production function with 
constant returns to scale.  If capital or land inputs increase by 20%, housing 
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services will increase by 20%.  Housing services are a function of capital and 
land. 
 
The Alonso-Muth-Mills model assumes that households will maximize their utility. 34  
Utility, as an economic term, is the degree of satisfaction that a variety of different bundles of 
goods provides to consumers.  It is assumed that consumers will purchase a bundle of goods that 
maximizes their satisfaction.  In the Alonso-Muth-Mills model, households can choose any 
combination of housing services (H) and a composite of other non-housing goods (Z) that 
satisfies their preferences to the greatest extent possible.  The budget constraint on the 
combination chosen by consumers is income.  Households cannot spend more money on a 
combination of Z and H than their income.  The greater the proportion of income a household 
spends on housing, the less it has available to spend on non-housing goods.   
Higher income households consume a greater amount of housing services and non-
housing goods to satisfy their preferences than lower income households.  Figure 2.3 graphically 
presents a utility function and budget constraint for a household.  The Y-axis represents quantity 
of housing services and the X-axis represents quantity of non-housing goods.  Line B0 represents 
the budget constraint, or household income, which limits the amount of housing services and 
non-housing goods the household can consume.  It illustrates the trade-off that the household 
must make between the two goods.  The greater the quantity of non-housing goods consumed by 
the household (x-axis), the lower the quantity of housing services that can be consumed (y-axis).  
Point A on the graph represents consumption for a household spending its entire income on 
housing services.  Point C represents consumption for a household spending its entire income on 
non-housing goods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 The explanation of the model developed by Alonso, Muth, and Mills draws heavily from the following texts:  
(Alonso 1964; Muth 1969; Mills 1972; Mills and Hamilton 1989; O'Sullivan 2003; Briassoulis 2005). 
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Figure 2-3. Indifference Curve and Budget Constraint 
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Curve I0 on Figure 2.3 represents an indifference curve for the household with the budget 
constraint of B0.  The curve represents the combination of housing services and non-housing 
goods that will provide the household with an equal amount of utility, or satisfaction.  It is called 
an indifference curve because households receive the same utility along any points on the line.  
Therefore, households are indifferent to which combination they choose.  A household with a 
large quantity of either housing services or non-housing goods receives less additional utility per 
unit of the good of which they have abundance.  Therefore, a household with a great amount of 
non-housing goods is assumed to be willing to give up more units of non-housing goods for an 
additional unit of housing services (or vice versa).  This phenomenon is the marginal rate of 
substitution and explains the convex shape of the indifference curve.  The point along I0 which is 
equal to the household’s budget constraint presents the combination of housing services and 
other goods that the household should consume to maximize its utility.  This point is represented 
in Figure 2.3 by U0.  Although a household can purchase any combination of goods along B0, no 
other point along B0 meets the household’s preferences. 
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Line B1 represents the budget constraint for a household with greater income.  This level 
of income allows the household to increase its utility curve from I0 to I1.  U1 represents the 
greatest degree of utility that the household with income of B1 can achieve.  Figure 2.3 illustrates 
that a household with higher income will consume more of both housing services and non-
housing goods to satisfy its preferences.  This explains the purchase of more housing services on 
the part of higher income households.35 
The Alonso-Muth-Mills model of land use predicts that higher income households are 
better off as they move away from the central business district (Goodall 1972; Wheaton 1977; 
Margo 1992; O'Sullivan 2003).  Based on the assumption that transportation costs remain 
constant per unit of travel, commuting costs change only by the distance (u) from the CBD.  As a 
household moves away from the CBD, its income available for housing services and other goods 
is reduced by the additional commuting costs that are incurred.  Therefore, the per unit cost of 
housing services must decrease by at least as much as commuting costs increase as the household 
moves further from the CBD.  This can be written as: 
  t * ∆u = -∆PH * H       (2.1) 
Or,  (t * ∆u) / H = -∆PH       (2.2) 
Where t is the commuting cost per unit of travel, ∆u is a change in the distance from the 
CBD, H is the total quantity of housing services, and ∆PH is the change in the price per unit of 
housing services.   
It can be seen from equation 2.2 that households consuming a larger quantity of housing 
services (H) require a smaller decline in the price per unit to move further from the CBD as 
commuting costs are spread out over a greater quantity of housing.  For example, if the distance 
from the CBD (t) is 10 miles and the cost of commuting (u) is $10 per mile, a household 
consuming 500 square feet of housing services (H) of must benefit from a decline in the cost of 
housing services of $.20 per square foot (-∆PH).  A household consuming housing services (H) of 
                                                 
35 This assumes that the demand for housing services is income elastic.  Income elasticity is the ratio of the % 
change in the quantity of a good demanded to the % change in income.  If the ratio is close to zero, demand is said to 
be income inelastic and demand for the good does not increase with increases in income.  A higher ratio indicates a 
greater elasticity of demand.  It is widely accepted in the literature that there is a positive income elasticity of 
demand for housing services though there is significant debate regarding its magnitude, as well as methodological 
concerns in measuring it (De Leeuw 1971; Mayo 1981; Olsen 1987; Green and Malpezzi 2003, pp. 9-11). 
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1000 square feet must only benefit from a decline in the cost of housing services (-∆PH) of $.10 
per square foot. 
If all housing units throughout the region are homogenous, meaning each unit provides 
the same quantity of housing services, equation 2.2 illustrates that there would be an exact linear 
relationship between the price per unit of housing services and distance from the CBD.  Line A in 
Figure 2.4 graphically shows this relationship.  In the following example, housing services will 
be measured as the size of the housing unit.  If transportation costs (t) are $20 per mile and the 
quantity of housing (H) provided by each unit is 1000 square feet, then at one mile from the 
CBD the price of housing must be cheaper by $.02 per square foot.  Because housing is assumed 
here to be homogeneous, the quantity of housing services consumed by a household remains 
constant at any distance from the CBD.  Therefore, the cost of housing services must decline by 
$.02 per square foot for every mile from the CBD.  If the cost of housing is $1 per square foot at 
the CBD where commuting distance is 0, then the cost of housing at 4 miles from the CBD must 
be $.92 per square foot.  At 4 miles from the CBD, commuting costs will be $80 (4 x $20 per 
mile) higher than at the CBD and costs for 1000 square feet of housing will be $80 (1,000 x .08 
per square foot) lower. 
Housing, however, is not homogeneous throughout the region.  Housing units differ from 
one another in terms of size, as well as in quality.  As the price per unit of housing declines, 
consumers will demand more of it (De Leeuw 1971, pp. 8-9; Hanushek and Quigley 1980; Mills 
and Hamilton 1989, p. 192-193; O'Sullivan 2003, pp. 179-181).  They will demand more housing 
services either by demanding larger housing units or units of better quality.  Therefore, as the 
price of housing declines with distance from the CBD, households will increase their 
consumption of housing services.  Because the demand for housing services increases, the 
relationship between cost per unit of housing services and distance from the CBD is no longer 
linear.  The new relationship is convex and is represented by line B in Figure 2.4.  It is convex 
because as the cost of transportation is spread out over greater quantities of housing services, the 
price per unit of housing services needs to decline less.  For example, assume that H is 700 
square feet at 4 miles from the CBD.  Using the assumption that the cost of commuting (t) is $20 
per mile, the cost per unit of housing services must decline by $.029 rather than by $.02 as in the 
example of homogeneous housing units.  Assume that H is 1300 square feet at 10 miles from the 
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CBD.  At mile 10, then per unit cost of housing services must decline by $.015.  As distance 
from the CBD increases, the per unit cost of housing services will decline at a diminishing rate. 
 
Figure 2-4. Price per Unit of Housing Services with Distance from CBD 
 
Distance from Central City (miles)
Pr
ic
e 
of
 H
ou
si
ng
 p
er
 S
qu
ar
e 
Fo
ot
 
$ 1 
.98 
 
.86
1 4 7 10 
.92 
B 
A 
 
O’Sullivan (2003, pp. 186-187) provides evidence that higher-income households have a 
greater economic incentive to consume housing services at a distance further from the CBD than 
lower-income households.  Assume there are two households, a high-income household which 
consumes 2,000 square feet of housing and a low-income household that consumes 200 square 
feet of housing.  The low-income household is limited to this amount of housing because of its 
budget constraint.  Also assume that commuting costs are $40 per mile for the high-income 
household and $20 per mile for the low-income household.  Table 2.8 provides information on 
the decline in the price per unit of housing which will occur at each mile from the CBD.  The 
marginal benefit of moving an additional mile from the CBD is calculated for both the high-
income and low-income household by multiplying the decline in price per unit of housing by the 
quantity of housing consumed (2,000 square feet and 200 square feet, respectively).  For 
example, the marginal benefit of moving from 2 miles from the CBD to 3 miles is $160 for the 
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high-income household and $16 for the low-income household.  Meanwhile the marginal cost of 
each additional mile from the CBD is $40 for the high-income and $20 for the low-income 
household. 
 
Table 2-8. Benefit and Cost of Moving Further from CBD for a High-Income and Low-Income Household 
 
Miles 
from 
CBD 
Decline in Price 
Per Unit of 
Housing Services 
(slope of Housing-
Price Function) 
Marginal Benefit for 
High-Income 
Household 
(2,000 x decline in price 
per unit of housing) 
Marginal Cost of  
High-Income 
Household  
(Commuting Cost) 
Marginal Benefit of 
Low-Income 
Household 
(200 x decline in 
price per unit of 
housing) 
Marginal Cost 
of Low-Income 
Household 
1 .12 240 40 24 20 
2 .10 200 40 20 20
3 .08 160 40 16 20
4 .06 120 40 12 20
5 .04 80 40 8 20
6 .02 40 40 4 20
7 .01 20 40 2 20
Source:  (O'Sullivan 2003, p. 187). 
 
The households will choose to consume housing at a distance from the CBD at which the 
marginal benefit will equal the marginal cost of living an additional mile from the CBD.  If 
households consume housing at a distance close enough to the CBD that the marginal benefits of 
moving further away are greater than the marginal cost, they are not optimizing their utility and 
would do so if they moved further from the CBD.  If households consume housing at a distance 
far enough from the CBD that the marginal cost of their location is greater than the marginal 
benefit, they also are not at their optimal location.  These households would benefit by moving 
closer to the CBD. 
Table 2.8 illustrates that the optimal location for the high-income household is at 6 miles 
from the CBD.  At this point, the marginal benefit of an additional mile from the CBD is equal to 
the marginal cost of the addition mile ($40).  The high-income household should not move 
further away than 6 miles from the CBD.  If the household moved to a distance of 7 miles from 
the CBD, the marginal cost is greater than the marginal benefit of the additional mile.  The low-
income household is at an optimal location at only 2 miles away from the CBD.  At that point, 
the marginal benefit of an additional mile from the CBD is equal to the marginal cost of an 
additional mile ($20). 
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Based on the models of Alonso, Muth, and Mills, the economic theory of land use 
presented in this section provides an explanation for the phenomenon of sprawl.  The model 
leads to the following conclusions: 
• Sprawl occurs because households benefit by living further from the CBD.  The 
marginal benefit of lower housing costs by moving an additional mile from the 
CBD can be higher than the marginal cost of an additional mile of commuting 
costs. 
 
• As transportation becomes cheaper, sprawl will increase.  With lower commuting 
costs per unit of travel, the marginal costs of living an additional mile from the 
CBD declines while the marginal benefit remains the same.  By looking at Table 
2.8, we can see that if the marginal cost of an additional mile from the CBD 
declined, both the high and low-income household would benefit by moving 
further away from the CBD. 
 
• The cost per unit of housing services declines as distance from the CBD increases.  
Because of lower prices, consumers purchasing housing services at a distance 
from the CBD will demand a greater quantity of housing services in the form of 
large homes, larger lots, or both.  The demand for a greater quantity of housing 
services by each household lowers density as distance from the CBD increases. 
 
• Higher income households consume a greater quantity of housing services than 
lower-income households.  As shown in Figure 2.4, households with greater 
income have budget constraints which allow them to consumer more housing, as 
well as non-housing, goods than households with lower incomes. 
 
• Higher-income households receive greater benefits by living further from the 
CBD than lower-income households.  Because higher-income households 
consumer a greater quantity of housing services, they receive a greater marginal 
benefit in savings on housing costs than lower-income households.  Additionally, 
higher-income households have a greater quantity of housing services over which 
to spread over the cost of commuting to the CBD. 
 
• Because of the greater benefits to higher-income households of living further 
from the CBD than lower-income households, we can surmise that income 
segregation occurs.  Lower-income households are concentrated closer to the 
CBD while higher-income households live further away. 
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The purpose of this section was two-fold.  First, the section explained sprawl as a result 
of the economics of land use, housing, and transportation.36  It explained why households tend to 
move further from the CBD when their income increases, as well as when transportation costs 
decline.  The second purpose of the section was to illustrate the impact of sprawl on lower-
income households as compared to higher income households.  One conclusion of the section is 
that lower income households are more likely to live closer to the CBD.   
The next section will present smart growth, which is currently a popular alternative to 
sprawl proposed by anti-sprawl advocates, and smart growth’s relationship with affordable 
housing for low-income households. 
2.3 SMART GROWTH 
Smart growth is the most current attempt to control the outward growth of cities and reduce 
sprawl.  In 1996, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initiated the creation of the Smart 
Growth Network (SGN), an organization which consists of numerous Federal agencies, as well 
as national non-profit organizations.  SGN promotes 10 principles, or goals, for metropolitan 
growth which for the most part are in contrast to the current sprawl-like growth patterns.  These 
10 principles define smart growth.  They are (Smart Growth Network 2002): 37 
(1) Mixed land use rather than the segregation of different land uses from one another.  For 
example, residential units should be in close proximity to commercial and entertainment 
activities that serve the residents’ needs. 
 
(2) Compact building design rather than low-density development which is the prominent 
pattern of growth. 
 
(3) Housing opportunities and choices for a range of household types and incomes rather 
than the dominant pattern in new developments of single-family homes. 
 
(4) Walkable neighborhoods rather than a reliance on the automobile. 
                                                 
36 Two additional significant causes of sprawl are discussed in the literature.  Sprawl is widely believed to also be 
the result of Federal transportation, housing, and urban redevelopment policies, as well as a result of public choice 
economics.   
37 For alternative (yet similar) sets of smart growth principles, see Nelson (2000) and Downs (2001). 
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(5) Strong sense of place within the community. 
 
(6) Preservation of open space, farmland, and critical environmental areas rather than the 
continued development on undeveloped land and in environmentally sensitive areas. 
 
(7) More balanced regional development by reinvesting in and strengthening existing 
communities rather than the continual creation of new communities further from the 
center of the metropolitan region. 
 
(8) Variety of transportation options rather than a reliance on the automobile for travel. 
 
(9)  Predictable, fair, and cost-effective development decisions. 
 
(10) Citizen and stakeholder participation in development decisions. 
 
Downs (2004, p. 3) describes smart growth as a “set of broad policies designed to 
counteract sprawl.  Goals (of these policies) usually include limiting outward expansion; 
encouraging higher-density development; encouraging mixed-use zoning instead of fully 
segregating land uses; reducing travel by private automobiles; revitalizing older areas; and 
preserving open space.”  To this end, there is large number of state, regional, and local policies 
that are used to achieve the ten principles of smart growth (Nelson 2000; Downs 2001; Smart 
Growth Network 2002).  Appendix A provides a comprehensive list of policies recommended by 
SGN. 
At the regional level, the policies most often proposed by smart growth advocates are 
urban containment to preserve open space and farmland on the fringes of metropolitan regions; 
regional transportation planning to reduce dependence on the automobile and address 
congestion; tax-base sharing to reduce the fiscal disparities between wealthy and poor 
communities; and reinvestment in older communities (Hollis 1998; Nelson 2000; Katz 2002).  
Among these, urban containment policies have become one of the most significant and 
commonly used tools for smart growth (Nelson 2000; Pendall, Martin, and Fulton 2002).   
Urban containment policies prohibit, or at least discourage, development outside of pre-
determined boundaries.  The two primary purposes of these policies are to preserve agricultural, 
environmentally sensitive, and undeveloped land outside of a defined area, as well as encourage 
compact development and redevelopment in urban areas that can be efficiently served by public 
services (Nelson and Duncan 1995, p. 73; Nelson, Dawkins, and Sanchez 2004, p. 425).  There 
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are three commonly utilized techniques of urban containment.  They are (Nelson and Duncan 
1995, pp. 75-80; Farquhar 1999, p. 1; Pendall, Martin, and Fulton 2002, pp. 4-5): 
• Urban growth boundaries (UGB) are boundaries outside of which development is 
prohibited.  Included within the boundaries are existing urban development, 
municipalities, and undeveloped land designated for future growth.  Typically, UGBs are 
designed to include enough land to accommodate expected growth for at least 20 to 30 
years into the future.  Development of land outside of the boundaries is typically 
prohibited by zoning laws which set required densities at 1 unit per 10 to 20 acres, low 
enough that development cannot occur (Nelson and Dawkins 2004, p. 3).  UGBs are 
typically accompanied by mandates to increase density within the boundaries to ensure 
compact and efficient development.   
 
• Urban service areas are boundaries which establish where public investment in 
infrastructure such as roads, water, and sewer will occur.  The boundaries serve as a 
guide as to where public funds for infrastructure are spent, as well as where they will be 
spent in the future.  They are more flexible than urban growth boundaries as they are not 
necessarily meant to limit development, but are to ensure that development occurs in an 
efficient manner (Farquhar 1999).  Typically, urban service areas include a system of 
“tiers” which “direct public infrastructure into new areas in a particular sequence in order 
to eliminate leapfrog development, encourage orderly urban expansion and reduce the 
cost of public infrastructure (Pendall, Martin, and Fulton 2002, p. 5).”  The urban service 
area does not necessarily prohibit development outside of its boundaries as private 
developers can incur the costs of the necessary infrastructure if they are willing to do so. 
 
• Greenbelts are tracts of public land around existing development to preserve open space.  
The land for greenbelts is usually purchased with public conservation funds or by private 
non-profit land trusts for the sole purpose of ensuring the land will be permanent open 
space that will not be developed at any point in the future (Hollis and Fulton 2002).  They 
differ from UGBs and urban service areas in that greenbelts are not typically adjusted to 
accommodate future growth nor are they necessarily accompanied by land use planning 
to ensure compact development in particular areas. 
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 The use of urban containment policies to counteract against sprawl and the spread of 
development further from the center of metropolitan regions has steadily grown in the past two 
decades.  In a survey of government jurisdictions within the 25 largest metropolitan regions in 
the early 1990’s, 44% of county governments and 15% of cities had some form of urban 
containment policy to manage growth (Pendall, Martin, and Fulton 2002, p. 8).  The number of 
local and county governments within these 25 regions implementing some type of urban 
boundary increased steadily from the 1960s to the time of the survey. 
Increasingly, states are including urban containment policies in their attempts at 
managing growth.  Oregon was the first state to require local municipalities and counties 
throughout the state to implement urban growth boundaries as a part of its growth management 
legislation passed in 1973.  Since the 1980’s, other states have followed Oregon’s lead in making 
urban containment policies a component in their attempts to manage growth.  Some have chosen 
to encourage urban containment policies of counties and local governments, while others have 
chosen to require them.  The states include:   
• Florida’s Growth Management Act of 1985 which encouraged local governments to 
designate urban service areas for future infrastructure investments (Fulton et al. 2006). 
 
• New Jersey’s Planning Act of 1985 which designated central places in which to try to 
steer growth through the allocation of infrastructure funds.  However, the Act did not 
require a specific urban containment policy (Epling 1993; DeGrove 1994) 
 
• Washington’s Growth Management Act of 1990 and 1991 which required most 
municipalities and counties to establish urban growth boundaries as a part their 
comprehensive land-use planning (Pendall, Martin, and Fulton 2002). 
 
• Maryland’s Smart Growth Act of 1997 which required municipalities and counties to 
establish priority funding areas.  The spending of state infrastructure funds outside of 
these areas is restricted (Cohen 2002). 
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• Tennessee’s Growth Policy Law of 1998 which required every county to identify urban 
growth boundaries for the municipalities within each county (Johnson, Jordan, and Salkin 
2002; Pendall, Martin, and Fulton 2002). 
 
• Pennsylvania’s Acts 67 and 68 in 2000 which gave counties and municipalities the 
authority (optional) to create urban growth areas (Johnson, Jordan, and Salkin 2002) 
 
• Maine’s new legislation in 2000 which limits the state’s growth related capital 
investments to designated growth areas identified in local comprehensive plans or to 
areas already served by a public sewer system (Johnson, Jordan, and Salkin 2002). 
 
Greenbelts have also grown in popularity in recent years.  In 2006, 99 ballot measures 
were approved by voters in 23 states in support of state and local government spending on land 
preservation.  Combined, these measures approved approximately $5.73 of public spending on 
conservation measures to protect land from development (Trust for Public Land 2006).  Most of 
the money will be raised from bond issues, the proceeds of which will be used to purchase land 
for preservation from development. 
Urban containment policies, such as urban growth boundaries and urban service areas, 
are popular tools within the smart growth movement because they can be used to achieve a 
variety of the smart growth principles.  First, they preserve undeveloped land by directing growth 
away from rural areas and toward existing places.  UGBs “push” urban development toward 
areas within the urban boundaries by restricting land use outside of them.  Urban service areas, 
on the other hand, “pull” development away from lands outside of the boundaries by limiting the 
level of infrastructure, such as public sewer and water, which is available (Pendall, Martin, and 
Fulton 2002).  The lack of infrastructure (or planned infrastructure) provides a dis-incentive for 
development to occur outside of an urban service area’s boundaries (Cohen 2002). 
A second smart growth principle believed to be achieved through urban containment is 
reinvestment and revitalization of existing communities, particular the central city, by steering 
investment away from the rural fringe.  Nelson and Milgroom (1995) argued that effective 
central-city revitalization cannot occur without some type of regional growth management 
technique to prevent the continuing investment in more rural areas of a region.  They tested their 
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argument by comparing the central city vitality of Portland, a region with strong urban growth 
boundaries, and Atlanta, a region known for its rapid growth in population and sprawl.  They 
found that the City of Portland enjoyed greater gains in revitalization in development relative to 
its region than the City of Atlanta.  From 1960 to 1990, the City of Portland gained a greater 
regional share of retail sales, added twice as many housing units to its housing stock, and held a 
greater share of the region’s total employment than the City of Atlanta (Nelson and Milgroom 
1995, p. 7) 
In a more recent study, Nelson et al. (2004) compared the number of newly constructed 
residential units, as well as the total value of non-residential construction, in central cities of 
regions with urban containment policies to central cities in regions with no such policy from 
1985 to 1995.  Out of a sample of 144 central cities, 21 were in “urban containment” regions.  In 
comparing the mean number of newly constructed residential units per 1,000 residents of the two 
groups, the authors found a statistically significant difference between the two groups of cities.  
The central cities of urban containment regions had 150 newly constructed residential units, on 
average, while cities in uncontained regions had 110.  They found a similar statistically 
significant difference between the two groups of central cities with regard to the value of non-
residential construction per capita.  The value was $4,210 in central cities of urban containment 
regions and was $3,203 in uncontained regions. 
Nelson et al. then used Ordinary Least Squares to control for other explanatory factors of 
central city revitalization, such as input costs of land, labor, and materials and economic 
conditions of the region.  They used 6 dependent variables to test the hypothesis that urban 
containment increased investment in the central city.  These 6 dependent variables were the new 
construction value per capita for single family homes, multi-family homes, residential additions 
to established homes, commercial additions to commercial structures, office space, and 
retail/warehouse space in the central city.  They found a statistically significant relationship 
between urban containment and each dependent variable with the exception of retail and 
warehouse investment.  They conclude that urban containment appears to steer investment 
toward the inner city.  However, they also note that suburban investment continues to grow with 
or without urban containment. 
The third smart growth principle that urban containment is typically believed to assist in 
achieving is greater density of development and a greater variety of housing options.  The 
 64 
association between urban containment and higher density is made for two reasons.  First, 
restricting development activity outside of urban boundaries will push a region’s demand for 
developable land to inside the boundaries (Nelson and Dawkins 2004).  Because of the greater 
demand, the value of land within the urban boundaries will increase.  As the value of land 
increases, developers will use it more intensely by investment more capital in structures per unit 
of land, thereby increasing density (Knaap and Nelson 1992; Nelson and Dawkins 2004).  This 
process is discussed further in the theoretical chapter regarding the impact of urban containment 
on the smart growth principles and the supply of affordable housing. 
Second, urban containment policies are often accompanied by density requirements to 
ensure that higher density development occurs within the urban boundaries (Danielsen, Lang, 
and Fulton 1999, pp. 527-529; Fischel 2001, pp. 237 - 239; Carruthers 2002).  Density 
requirements are thought to reduce the pressure on housing prices which may occur as a result of 
urban containment’s restriction on the supply of developable land.  Without greater density, the 
restriction on the supply of land increases in value which, in turn, can increase housing prices 
(Landis 1986; Danielsen, Lang, and Fulton 1999).  The Portland Metro’s Metropolitan Housing 
Rule requiring specific density targets for municipalities within their jurisdiction is one such 
example (Knaap and Nelson 1992, p. 79; Portland Metro 2000).  The Metropolitan Housing Rule 
requires each municipality within the Portland region to use zoning ordinances to obtain 
residential densities of 6, 8, or 10 housing units per net buildable acre, depending on the 
municipality’s size.  In addition, the rule requires the zoning ordinances to allow at least half of 
all new housing construction to be of multi-family units. 
The fourth smart growth principle potentially addressed by urban containment is that of 
mixed land use, for two reasons (Nelson and Dawkins 2004).  Mixed land use is the diversity of 
land uses, such as residential and commercial, in close proximity to one another.  The first 
connection between urban containment and mixed land use are zoning codes accompanying 
urban containment policies are which encourage mixed land use development.  The second 
connection between urban containment and mixed land use development is the potential impact 
of higher land values.  Nelson and Dawkins (2004) contend that these high values will improve 
the efficiency of land use patterns.  One of those improved efficiencies is better access to 
employment, shopping, and other services. 
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2.3.1 Smart Growth and Affordable Housing 
Many smart growth proponents argue that the affordable housing needs of low-income 
households can be better met by higher-density, mixed land use neighborhoods, and a greater 
variety of housing options than the current growth patterns of sprawl occurring in metropolitan 
areas (Arigoni 2001; Kalinosky 2001; NLIHC 2001; Smart Growth Network 2001).  The Smart 
Growth Network (2001) linked a few of the 10 smart growth principles to affordable housing, 
including: 
• Compact development, which can result in lower housing costs as dwelling sizes 
are reduced. 
 
• Housing opportunities and choices for a range of household types and incomes.  
Rather than focusing exclusively on single-family detached units, new 
developments should include multi-family and attached single-family housing 
units.  Lower-income households are more likely to be able to afford the multi-
family and attached units (Downs 2004). 
 
• Mixed land use, which can provide for a better balance between the location of 
jobs and housing.  In addition, mixed land use also includes a variety of housing 
types including multi-family and attached single-family units. 
 
• Investing in existing communities, which can improves the infrastructure and 
public services in older communities where lower-income households are more 
likely to reside. 
 
Smart growth may make some types of housing more expensive, but other types more 
affordable (Voith and Crawford 2004, p. 101).  Voith and Crawford theorized about the impact 
of smart growth on the cost of single-family homes, as well as on higher-density units such as 
townhouses.  The implementation of an urban containment policy, combined with a mandate for 
higher density within the urban boundary, would reduce the supply of large-lot single family 
homes which would increase their cost.  However, the price of townhouses could decline as they 
become more abundant.  In addition, they hypothesized that residents in higher-density 
neighborhoods also benefit from lower costs of a more efficient infrastructure and public 
services. 
The Smart Growth Network (2001) argues that smart growth also incorporates regional 
solutions for affordable housing for lower-income households to achieve the smart growth 
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principle of providing housing opportunities for a wide range of incomes.  Two common 
solutions to the housing problem for low-income households are fair-share housing ordinances 
and inclusionary zoning practices.  A fair-share program requires each municipality to accept its 
‘fair-share’ of its region’s affordable units based on each municipality’s size in comparison to 
other localities in the region, employment, current housing conditions, and estimated population 
growth in the future.38   
The second common solution is inclusionary zoning which require new developments 
larger than a specified size to include units affordable to lower-income households (Porter 2004).  
For example, Montgomery County, Maryland requires at least 15% of units in new developments 
of 50 or more units to be affordable to the poorest one-third of the county’s households (Burchell 
et al. 2000, p. 13).  However, inclusionary zoning programs vary widely with regard to 
affordability requirements.  Some programs require units to be affordable for households with 
income below 50% of the area median income, while others require units be affordable for 
households with income below 120% of the area median income (Porter 2004, pp. 222-225). 
A range of incentives are given to developers to reduce their costs of providing affordable 
units.  Developers are typically given density bonuses by the local zoning board to achieve the 
affordable housing requirement.  Density bonuses allow a developer to build at a higher density 
than would normally be allowed.  The higher density allows the developer to build additional 
units from which the profits can be used to offset the costs of providing the lower-income units.  
Other incentives offered by a municipality to developers in order to make inclusionary zoning 
feasible include the waiving of impact fees, “fast-tracking” the development approval process, 
waiving of zoning requirements, or local tax abatements.39 
However, affordable housing programs suffer from the phenomenon of “not in my 
backyard” (NIMBY) attitudes among local residents and rarely achieve strong political support 
(Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing 1991; Stein 1996; Pendall 
1999; Downs 2003; HUD 2004).  This lack of political support makes regional solutions for 
affordable housing difficult to implement.  There are two primary reasons why affordable 
housing does not gain support.  First, municipalities find it in their economic interest to prohibit 
housing that attracts low-income households to their jurisdiction (Orfield 2002, Chapter 5).  
                                                 
38 For overviews of fair-share initiatives for affordable housing, see Meck, Retzlaff, and Schwab (2003). 
39 For an overview of inclusionary zoning programs, see Brown (2001), Burchell et al. (2000), and Porter (2004). 
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Municipalities are better off financially if they can attract higher-income households with the 
development of large, expensive homes rather than low-income households with affordable 
housing.  The higher-income households provide more public revenue than the costs for public 
services they require.  Municipalities are able to prohibit affordable housing through 
exclusionary zoning which restricts small lot and multi-family housing.  For this reason, a higher 
level of government, such as the state, must have some authority over local municipalities 
regarding housing if regional solutions to the shortage of affordable housing are to work 
(Calavita, Grimes, and Mallach 1997; Downs 2004). 
The second reason for the lack of political support for affordable housing is the fear that 
multi-family and low-income housing will lower adjacent property values (HUD 2004, p. 7).  
Fischel (2001, pp. 9-11) argues that homeowners fear the risk of any changes to their 
neighborhood that could possibly lower property values because they cannot insure against 
losses in the value of their home or neighborhood decline like they can against fire or theft.  The 
fear of declining home values is significant because the home is the most valuable asset for the 
majority of homeowners even though research shows that the relationship between affordable 
housing and adjacent house values depends on many factors, including the concentration of 
affordable units, the type of housing it is, and overall housing conditions of the neighborhood 
(Galster 2004). 
Pendall (1999) studied opposition to new housing developments to determine the extent 
to which residents opposed the developments based on the fear that the new development would 
have an impact on adjacent uses, particular on the value of adjacent single family homes.  He 
examined the approval process for 182 proposed new housing developments in the San Francisco 
Bay area in the 1980’s.  Of these planned developments, 58 had only single family homes, 102 
had multifamily or attached units, and 22 had a mix of the two.  56 of the developments had 
single-family or multifamily units affordable to lower-income households.   
Complaints were submitted by residents to the local planning board or council against 
113 of the proposed developments.  Complaints based on residents’ fears of the development’s 
negative impact on adjacent units were classified by Pendall as NIMBYism.  He found that 50 
developments received opposition based on NIMBYism.  38 developments received opposition 
based on anti-growth concerns with regard to traffic congestion and infrastructure.   
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Using a logistic regression, Pendall (pp. 127-131) found that proposed developments 
adjacent to single-family homes were 28% more likely to receive NIMBY protests than proposed 
developments next to other types of sites.  He also found that for every 1% increase in the 
community’s reliance on property taxes for public revenue, there was a 1% increase in the 
likelihood the development would be opposed on NIMBY grounds.  The type of proposed 
development was also significant in explaining NIMBY opposition.  Multifamily units were 42% 
more likely to receive opposition and affordable housing was 38% more likely to receive 
opposition than single-family and market-rate developments.  Pendall’s findings support the 
contention that home-owners will oppose developments which fear will lower their property 
values, as well as cause fiscal pressures on the local municipality. 
Downs (2003; 2004) argued that only in exceptional cases are efforts made within the 
smart growth movement to specifically address housing affordability for low-income 
households, particularly for households earning less than 50% of the area median income.  There 
are three explanations for this reluctance to include housing for poor households in the smart 
growth debate.  First, advocates of smart growth would risk alienating too many potential 
supporters by strongly advocating for affordable housing for the lowest-income households as 
there is more political opposition than political support for it.  Worse than not advocating for 
affordable units, smart growth, if it focuses too much on preserving open space at the expense of 
other principles, may even harm the supply of affordable housing.  In its 2004 report on the 
barriers to affordable housing, HUD (2004, pp. 6-7) claimed that some community groups have 
gained ammunition to exclude affordable housing by emphasizing the preservation of land and 
limits to growth, in the name of smart growth, and ignoring the other principles thought to 
improve housing affordability, such as higher-density development.   
Schill (2004, p. 103) wrote that “popular support for smart growth is based on a variety of 
factors that will create strong incentives for municipalities to adopt growth management 
restrictions without simultaneously promoting affordable housing.”  Smart growth advocates are 
typically more interested in restricting growth to protect the environment, reduce the cost of 
public services, and relieve traffic congestion than in housing for low-income households.  
Restricting growth from suburban or exurban areas, however, may be in direct conflict with 
improving the supply of affordable housing as limiting the supply of residential land likely 
 69 
increases the cost of housing.  The impact of restricting growth through urban containment is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
The second reason for the reluctance of smart growth advocates to encourage affordable 
housing is the nature of the affordable housing problem.  The majority of housing for poor 
households is provided by older units.  The easiest method to increase the supply of units for 
these households is to have values of the current stock decrease.  However, practically no owners 
of the current stock would view it ‘smart’ to take actions to lower values, especially as for many 
homeowners their housing is their biggest asset (Downs 2004, p. 268).  Legislation and local 
ordinances, such as high quality standards and prohibition of multi-family and manufactured 
housing, are passed to protect values of existing homes. 
Finally, when smart growth advocates discuss affordability, they are usually discussing 
housing at a level of costs that are affordable to moderate-income households, rather than at a 
level affordable to households with less than 50% of the median income.  But, it is these poorest 
households that have the greatest need in terms of affordable housing (Downs 2003). 
 
2.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter aimed to accomplish four things.  The first purpose of the chapter was to present the 
housing affordability problem which many extremely low-income and very low-income 
households face.  More than 79% of extremely low-income renter households spend more than 
30% of their income on housing costs and more than 63% spend more than 50% of their income 
on housing.  Among very-low income renter households, slightly more than 67% spend more 
than 30% of their income on housing and slightly more than 19% spend more than half of their 
income for housing.  This large proportion of low-income renters who have high rent burdens is 
a result of a lack of an adequate supply of affordable and available rental units. 
The second purpose of the chapter was to emphasize the importance of the unsubsidized, 
private market to the supply of affordable housing units for low-income renter households.  
Approximately 9.3 million rental units in the private housing market are affordable to households 
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with less than 50% of their area’s median income.  However, many of these units are occupied 
by households with higher income.  Approximately 3.5 million rental units are affordable and 
available to these households in the private market.  In comparison, approximately 6.3 million 
rental units are subsidized by Federal housing programs for these low-income households.  
Therefore, public policies and development practices affecting the private market will have an 
impact on the supply of units on which low-income renters rely for housing. 
The third purpose of the chapter was to explain the relationship between sprawl and 
housing.  Sprawl occurs as higher income households find it in their economic interests to move 
a further distance from the CBD.  As they move away from the CBD, lower income households 
remain closer to the CBD.  In addition, the theoretical framework of filtering relates sprawl, 
particularly the development of new housing, to a possible increase in the supply of units to 
lower income households.  However, the empirical evidence for this theory is weak. 
The fourth purpose of the chapter was to present smart growth, the most recent set of 
goals and policies intended to disrupt the dominant land use pattern of sprawl.  Smart growth 
was defined as a set of ten principles espoused by the Smart Growth Network.  Some of these 
principles were identified as a potential means of increasing housing opportunities for lower-
income households.  Two of the principles which smart growth advocates argue will improve the 
affordable housing supply are higher density and mixed land use development.  They argue that 
these principles can improve housing opportunities for low-income households because they 
promote smaller housing sizes, a greater variety of housing including multi-family and attached 
housing units, a better geographic balance between jobs and housing improving access to 
employment, and improving infrastructure and services in older communities where low-income 
households are more likely to reside.  However, the next chapter will show that there is little 
empirical evidence for these claims. 
A significant component of smart growth is the preservation of land, typically through 
forms of urban containment.  The restriction on the supply of developable land can increase 
housing prices and, in turn, decrease the supply of housing for low-income households.  
However, smart growth advocates claim that urban containment, if accompanied by higher 
density and mixed land use development, will not have a harmful impact on affordable housing. 
The chapter’s discussion of smart growth ended with its potential relationship to 
affordable housing.  While some authors contend that smart growth addresses the supply of 
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affordable housing through regional solutions, many other scholars contend that smart growth’s 
significant emphasis is on preserving open space and limiting development rather than on the 
principles which may increase affordable housing.  This lack of attention to affordable housing is 
attributed to NIMBYism and the lack of political support for affordable housing. 
The next chapter reviews the empirical evidence regarding the claims made by smart 
growth advocates.  It reviews the literature regarding the impact of four smart growth principles 
on the supply of affordable housing for low-income households.  These four principles are 
greater density, mixed land use, a greater variety of housing options, and the preservation of 
open space. 
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3.0  IMPACT OF FOUR SMART GROWTH PRINCIPLES AND URBAN 
CONTAINMENT ON HOUSING COSTS 
Chapter Two defined smart growth as ten principles for future metropolitan growth.  These 
principles are higher density, mixed land use, a variety of housing options for a range of 
household incomes, pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods, a strong sense of ‘place’ within the 
community, preservation of open space and farmland, more balance regional development by 
reinvesting in existing communities, a variety of transportation options, predictable and cost-
effective development decisions, and citizen and stakeholder participation in development 
decisions.  Four of these principles, higher density, a variety of housing options, mixed land use, 
and open space are those most likely to impact the affordability of housing and the supply of 
units for low-income households. 
Chapter Two also discussed urban containment as an important component of smart 
growth.  Urban containment is a policy adopted by metropolitan regions, counties, or local 
municipalities to limit development outside of pre-determined boundaries in order to preserve 
undeveloped land.  The previous chapter presented the argument proposed by urban 
containment’s advocates that keeping development to within specified boundaries not only 
preserves land from development, but also directs reinvestment into existing communities, while 
increasing density and mixed land use.  However, urban containment also has the potential to 
increase housing prices because of the restriction it places on the supply of residential land.  
The purpose of the current chapter is to review the empirical literature regarding the 
impact of urban containment and the four smart growth principles on housing costs and the 
supply of affordable housing for low-income households.  The four principles are higher density, 
a variety of housing options, mixed land use, and preservations of open space.  Figure 3.1 
illustrates the pattern of these relationships as found in the literature.  The figure focuses on 
housing costs as the review points out that little research explicitly tests the impact of urban 
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containment or the smart growth principles on the supply of affordable units for low-income 
households. 
 
Figure 3-1.  Diagram of Impact of Urban Containment and Four Smart Growth Principles on Housing Costs 
 
 
Density (-) 
Housing Options (-) 
Mixed Land Use (-) 
Open Space (+) 
Housing Costs 
Urban Containment (+) 
Note:  Sign in parentheses is expected relationship to the cost of housing. 
 
 
The literature review is presented in two sections and illustrates conflicting evidence 
regarding these relationships.  The first section reviews the research regarding the impact of 
urban containment policies on housing costs.  Urban containment’s restriction on the supply of 
developable land increases its price (Knaap 1985; Nelson 1986).  The cost of land is a significant 
component in the price of housing because the cost of a unit consists of the cost of land on which 
the unit sits plus the cost of the structure itself.  Therefore an increase in the cost of developable 
land may increase housing costs (Staley, Edgens, and Mildner 1999; Staley and Mildner 1999).  
However, there is an unresolved debate revolving around whether it is restrictions on land or an 
expanding economy that present the strongest influence on housing prices.  Some scholars argue 
that higher housing costs in regions with urban containment can be attributed to a growing 
economy which brings greater demand for land and housing and cannot be attributed to solely to 
urban containment (Phillips and Goodstein 2000; Downs 2002). 
The second section discusses the relationship between each of the four smart growth 
principles and housing costs.  The first smart growth principle is density.  Greater density has 
been shown to reduce the potentially negative impacts of growth management and urban 
containment on housing costs (Miller 1986; Carruthers 2002).  Greater density can offset higher 
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housing costs caused by land use restrictions because it reduces the amount of land needed for 
each unit.  But other research has found a lower supply of affordable units for low-income 
households in denser neighborhoods (Burton 2000).   
The second smart growth principle is a variety of housing types available in the market.  
This principle is closely related to density.  Large lot single-family homes lead to lower density 
while smaller single-family units, attached units, such as townhouses, and multifamily units are 
housing types of greater density as they require less land.  An increase in attached units and 
multifamily units increase the supply of housing, which decreases housing prices.  Low-income 
households are more likely to rely on these types of housing as they are typically more affordable 
than single-family detached homes on larger lots (Pendall 2000; Downs 2004). 
The third smart growth principle is mixed land use.  There is evidence that consumers 
value neighborhoods which are dominated by single-family homes and contain a limited amount 
of commercial activity (Stull 1975; Song and Knaap 2003).  Therefore, it is possible that demand 
for housing in mixed land use neighborhoods is lower than the demand for housing in 
exclusively residential neighborhoods.  This lower demand would decrease housing prices in 
mixed land use neighborhoods. 
The fourth smart growth principle is open space.  Public parks are a specific form of open 
space.  Unlike undeveloped land preserved on the fringes of metropolitan areas through urban 
containment, public parks are open space preserved within developed areas.  Parks typically 
create a positive amenity to residents, thereby increasing the demand for housing in close 
proximity.  This would increase housing prices.  However, this positive impact is significant only 
at close distances (Farber 2004).  The literature review also reveals that the magnitude of the 
positive impact decreases per unit of land as the amount of open space surrounding a home 
increases.  This indicates that public parks are more valuable to residents in areas that are highly 
developed. 
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3.1 URBAN CONTAINMENT AND HOUSING COSTS 
The effect of urban containment policies on housing prices and affordability is a topic of much 
debate among scholars.40  Urban containment is a policy which establishes a boundary outside of 
which urban development is restricted.  Three common urban containment techniques are urban 
growth boundaries which prohibit development outside of specified boundaries, urban service 
areas which establish boundaries outside of which public infrastructure will not be expanded yet 
development is not explicitly prohibited, and greenbelts which are large tracts of publicly-owned 
land which cannot be developed. 
The implementation of an urban growth boundary or urban service area is likely to divide 
the land market into two segmented markets (Gleeson 1979, pp. 351-352; Whitelaw 1980; Knaap 
and Nelson 1992, pp. 42-47).  One segment of the market will be for land inside of the boundary, 
while the other segment will be for land outside of it.  Within the boundary, demand for land will 
increase because anyone wishing to pursue new development must do so there.  With the 
implementation of urban containment, those who would otherwise have pursued developable 
land outside of the urban boundaries must shift their demand to locations within the boundaries.  
At the same time, an urban boundary limits the supply of developable land to the amount of land 
within the boundaries.  The increase in demand and the limit on its supply will increase the value 
of land within the boundaries.   
Outside of urban containment boundaries, demand for land will decrease because urban 
growth boundaries prohibit development while urban service boundaries discourage 
development through the lack of infrastructure such as public sewer and water systems.  The 
decrease in demand for land outside of the boundaries will decrease its value. 
An early test of the segmentation of the land market as a result of urban containment was 
conducted by Gleeson (1979) in Brooklyn Park, Minnesota.  He examined the impact of an urban 
service area, which is a form of urban containment, on the price of vacant land.  In 1962, the 
Minneapolis suburb chose to prevent development beyond a specified boundary on the north side 
of town.  The city purposely did not extend water or sewer services beyond the boundary they 
                                                 
40 This section deals only with the impact of urban containment on land and housing prices.  For a review of other 
types of land-use regulation and their impact on housing costs, see Lillydahl and Singell (1987), Nelson et al. 
(2002), and Quigley and Rosenthal (2005). 
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had established.  The city then passed an ordinance that prohibited development which could not 
be served by the public sewer system.  The combination of these two decisions created an urban 
containment policy through the control of infrastructure.   
To test the impact of Brooklyn Park’s urban containment policy on land prices, Gleeson 
chose a stratified sample of 378 unimproved, vacant parcels of land.  247 parcels were vacant 
unfarmed (urban) land of which 188 parcels were developable and 59 were not developable 
because they were outside of the infrastructure boundary.  An additional 131 parcels were 
farmed (agricultural) land of which 33 of the parcels were developable and 98 were not.  Gleeson 
used a regression analysis, controlling for explanatory factors of land prices including parcel 
size, access to downtown, and soil type, to measure the difference in prices between land within 
the boundary and land outside of it.  He found that developable farm land was significantly more 
expensive, $1,463 per acre, inside the boundary.  However, he found that there was no difference 
in prices, after controlling for other factors, between vacant non-farm (urban) parcels within the 
boundary and similar parcels outside of it.  He concluded that the segmentation in the land 
market occurred in the market for undeveloped, developable farm land because these parcels 
were, on average, much larger in size than the non-farm parcels.  Developers presented a greater 
demand for large parcels which they could subdivide than for smaller non-farm parcels. 
Nelson (1985) tested the impact of an urban growth boundary on land prices in Salem, 
Oregon.  His sample included 209 parcels of vacant land which were sold over a three year 
period.  86 of the parcels were located within Salem’s urban growth boundary and 123 were 
located beyond the urban boundaries.  He used a regression analysis to control for the parcel’s 
size, soil type, taxes, zoning, income and education of residents of the census tract in which the 
parcel was located, access to water and sewer services, and distance from Salem’s central 
business district.  He found that a dummy variable indicating whether or not the parcel was 
located within the urban growth boundary was statistically significant in explaining the value of 
the parcel. 
Knaap (1985) also examined the impact of an urban growth boundary on land prices.  His 
sample consisted of 455 vacant lots for single family homes in two counties of the Portland 
metropolitan region, Clackamas and Washington County.  The dependent variable was the sales 
price of each parcel.  He used regression analysis to control for each parcel’s size, peak-hour 
travel time to the central city of Portland, sewer access, taxes, slope, race and income of the 
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parcel’s census tract, and municipality.  He included two dummy variables to measure the impact 
of Portland’s urban growth boundary.  First, he included a dummy variable for whether or not the 
parcel was located within the boundaries.  Second, he included a dummy variable to indicate if 
the parcel was zoned for densities less than 4.4 housing units per acre which he called non-urban 
or for densities greater than 4.4 housing units per acre which he called urban.  He found that non-
urban parcels within the urban growth boundary were more highly valued than non-urban parcels 
outside of the boundary.41  He argued that the higher prices for non-urban land within the 
boundary reflected buyers’ expectations that non-urban land within the boundary would, in the 
future, become zoned for urban densities before land outside of the boundary. 
Gleeson, Nelson, and Knaap each controlled for the parcel’s accessibility to the central 
business district.  By including a variable for accessibility, they were able to control for the fact 
that land values decline as distance from the central business district increases.42  Keeping the 
distance or travel time to the central business constant, each of the authors still found that the 
value of land within urban containment boundaries is greater as compared to land outside of the 
boundaries. 
A number of studies have tested the impact of urban containment policies not on land 
values, but on housing costs.  Knaap et al. (2003) conducted a preliminary analysis of the 
Maryland Smart Growth and Neighborhood Conservation Initiative’s impact on housing markets 
and development trends.  One component of Maryland’s smart growth legislation was the 
requirement of counties to implement priority funding areas (PFAs) to which state infrastructure 
funds must be directed for future growth.  PFAs are similar in concept to urban services areas as 
no state funds are allowed for infrastructure outside of these boundaries.  PFAs must include 
every municipality in the state plus additional land each county identifies for future development.  
Knaap et al. compared recent housing trends between Maryland and Virignia, a state without 
urban containment policies.  They found that Maryland had fewer housing starts and a slightly 
greater increase in housing prices.  The authors concluded that Maryland’s PFAs may be a partial 
cause of these differences. 
                                                 
41 There were no “urban” parcels outside of the urban growth boundary which prevented a comparison of urban 
parcels within the boundary to urban parcels outside of it. 
42 See Section 2.2.3 and Alonso (1964). 
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Phillips and Goodstein (2000) examined the impact of land use regulations on housing 
prices, with a particular focus on the effect of Portland’s urban growth boundary.  For 37 
metropolitan regions, they regressed the metro’s median house price in 1996 on land use 
regulation while controlling for each region’s income, unemployment rate, climate, construction 
costs, number of municipalities, and change in housing prices for the prior five years.  To 
measure land use regulation, the authors used an index called the Wharton regulatory index 
which measures regulation as the length of time it takes, on average, to get development 
approval in each metropolitan region.43  The authors then modified Portland’s index score to 
indicate that the region was the most restrictive in terms of land use regulation.  They argued that 
this modification made adjustments for Portland’s urban growth boundary. 
Phillips and Goodstein found only weak evidence that Portland’s urban growth boundary 
raised housing prices.  They argued that Portland’s strong housing market during the 1990’s was 
mostly the result of a strong regional economy, but that the growth boundary also likely played 
some role.  They concluded that “the UGB has probably increased median housing prices; the 
most likely interpretation is that the price increase is less than $10,000” (p. 341).  Economic 
measures such as the unemployment rate had a much larger impact. 
Downs (2002) also tested the impact of Portland’s urban growth boundary on housing 
prices.  He regressed the change in the median home price in 85 metropolitan areas on 25 
independent variables and a dummy variable indicating the Portland region.  He also included a 
dummy variable for every other region.  He conducted multiple regression models for different 
periods of time.  One model examined the change in housing prices from 1990 to 1994, another 
for changes from 1996 to 2000, and another for changes from 1990 to 2000.   
Downs found that Portland’s dummy variable was significant in explaining price changes 
from 1990 to 1994.  The dummy variable for Portland was the only statistically significant 
dummy variable in this model.  He concluded that something in Portland, likely the growth 
boundary, was unique from the other metropolitan areas in explaining increases in housing prices 
during this time period.  He also found the Portland dummy variable to be significant in the 
model for 1990 to 2000.  However, the Portland variable was not significant in explaining 
changes in housing prices from 1996 to 2000.  He concluded that Portland’s urban growth 
                                                 
43 For more details of the Wharton regulatory index, see Malpezzi (1996). 
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boundary had some impact on rising prices, but only during the time period in which the region 
was experiencing strong economic and population growth.  He concluded that an urban growth 
boundary, on its own, did not raise housing prices but could exacerbate rising prices during 
periods of rapid growth.  His conclusion was that urban growth boundaries must be flexible 
enough to be adjusted in times of growth. 
Staley et al. (1999) used cased studies to study both urban growth boundaries, as well as 
urban service areas.  Two of their case studies were of the urban growth boundary in the region 
of Portland and the urban service area of Boulder, Colorado.  They examined housing prices, 
boundary expansions, and other forms of growth control in each location.  They determined that 
Portland’s significant increase in housing prices during the 1990’s was a result of the inflexible 
nature of its urban growth boundary.  The boundary was not adequately expanded in response to 
the strong economic growth that the region was experiencing.  In contrast, Boulder’s urban 
service areas were more flexible than Portland’s urban growth boundaries.  The urban service 
areas were allowed to “breath” by being expanded to include a greater supply of vacant land.  
This expansion increased the supply of developable land.  From 1990 to 1997, the municipalities 
in Boulder County annexed approximately 11,598 additional acres of land to include within their 
boundaries.  Staley et al. argued that this increase in land within Boulder’s urban service areas 
prevented housing prices in the county from rising as significantly as they did in Portland. 
Other scholars have tested the impact of urban containment policies on the production 
and supply of housing, which in turn would impact housing prices.  Levine (1999) studied the  
impact of various growth control mechanisms in 490 California jurisdictions.  Using ordinary 
least squares with the change in the number of units in each jurisdiction from 1980 to 1990 as the 
dependent variable, he found that strong growth controls in the form of zoning and maximum 
density regulations reduced production of new housing units.  However, he found that urban 
growth boundaries were a weaker form of regulation than zoning.  The boundaries were not 
statistically significant in explaining the change in the number of housing units from 1980 to 
1990. 
Pendall (2000) examined the impact of various land-use regulations on the production of 
housing, as well as on the supply of multifamily units, rental units, and affordable rental units.  
He surveyed 1,510 cities, towns, townships, and counties of the 25 largest metropolitan areas 
regarding their land-use regulations.  Using ordinary least squares, Pendall found evidence that 
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low-density zoning, which restricts higher-density multifamily units, was statistically significant 
in explaining a lower proportion of units being multifamily units and a lower proportion of units 
being rentals.  He then found that a lower supply of multifamily units was statistically significant 
in explaining a smaller supply of affordable rental units.  However, Pendall found no statistically 
significant relationship between urban growth boundaries and the supply of multifamily units, 
rental units, or affordable rental units.  He concluded that low-density zoning was more 
significant in explaining the lack of affordable housing than urban growth boundaries which 
were not significant at all. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the literature addressing the relationship between urban 
containment and the costs of land and housing. The literature reveals four important facts 
regarding these relationships.  First, urban containment policies increased land values within 
urban boundaries and reduced values outside of the boundaries.  Evidence of this impact was 
found for urban growth boundaries, as well as for urban service areas.  This finding is not 
surprising given that the purpose of these policies is to restrict development to locations within 
specified boundaries, thereby limiting the supply of land from which developers can choose for 
development. 
The second important finding is that the flexibility of urban boundaries may be an 
important factor which dictates the impact of the boundaries on housing values.  There is 
evidence from Staley et al. (1999) that Boulder’s flexibility in expanding the amount of land 
within its urban services areas alleviated at least some of the pressures created by population and 
economic growth on housing prices in the county.  Further evidence is found in the Portland 
region.  Downs (2002) suggested that had Portland’s urban growth boundary been more flexible, 
the region may not have experienced as strong of an increase in housing prices as it did during 
the economic boom of the early 1990’s. 
The third finding is the importance of the economy as a factor influencing the impact of 
urban containment policies on housing values.  Portland’s urban growth boundary did not appear 
to impact housing values until the region’s economic boom in the early 1990’s (Phillips and 
Goodstein 2000; Cox and Utt 2001).  Prior to that there was little growth throughout the region 
and housing in the area was some of the most affordable in the country among metropolitan 
regions (Phillips and Goodstein 2000, p. 337).  Therefore, constraints on the supply of 
developable land were not a significant concern until growth began to occur. 
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Table 3-1. Review of Relationship Between Urban Containment and Land/Housing Costs 
 
Author Location Unit of 
Analysis 
Method Policy/ 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Significant 
Finding 
Impact on Land Values 
Gleeson 
(1979) 
Brooklyn Park, 
MN 
Unimproved 
vacant parcels 
(n=378)  
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Dummy variable for 
inside and outside of 
urban service area 
Assessed value Farm land within urban 
service area had higher 
values 
Knaap 
(1985) 
Portland, OR Sold vacant 
single-family 
parcels (n=455) 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Dummy variable for 
inside or outside UGB 
Sale price Vacant lots inside of 
UGB were more 
valuable 
Nelson 
(1985, 1986) 
Salem, OR Sold vacant 
parcels (n=209) 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Dummy variable for 
inside or outside UGB 
Sale price Vacant lots inside of 
UGB were more 
valuable and increased 
faster in value 
Impact on Housing Values 
Downs 
(2002) 
U.S. Metropolitan 
regions (n=85) 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Dummy variable for 
Portland UGB 
Change in house 
prices 
Economy was more 
significant in explaining 
increasing housing 
prices than the UGB 
Knaap et at. 
(2003) 
Maryland and 
Virginia 
States and 
Counties 
Case studies Land use restriction Housing starts 
and house prices 
Maryland’s smart 
growth legislation may 
be a cause of lower 
housing starts and higher 
prices 
Levine 
(1999) 
California Local 
jurisdictions 
(n=490) 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Dummy variables for 
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ 
growth controls 
Change in 
number of 
housing units 
from 1990 to 
2000 
UGBs were ‘weak’ 
control measures that did 
not influence housing 
production 
Phillips and 
Goodstein 
(2000) 
U.S. 37 Cities (n=37) Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Regulation index (with 
adjustment to Portland 
for its UGB) 
Median house 
price 
Weak evidence that 
UGB increased housing 
price.  The economy has 
played a more 
significant role 
Pendall 
(2000) 
U.S. Jurisdictions in 
the 25 largest 
metro  areas 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Dummy variable for 
UGB 
% of population 
that is black and 
% that is low-
income black 
UGB was not significant 
in explaining supply of 
affordable units or 
exclusion of low-income 
or minority  populations 
Staley et al. 
(1999) 
Portland, OR; 
Lancaster County, 
PA; 
Boulder, CO; 
Napa County, CA 
Region or 
County 
Case studies Urban Containment Housing prices Portland’s inflexible 
UGB is one of the 
causes of rising prices 
Finally, urban containment does not appear to impact the supply of affordable housing for 
low-income households.  Levine (1999) found that urban growth boundaries in California did not 
affect the number of new housing units produced between 1980 and 1990.  Therefore, they did 
not appear to limit the supply of housing.  However, he did not examine the boundaries’ impact 
on affordability.  In the only study to explicitly test the impact of urban growth boundaries on 
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affordable rental units, Pendall (2000) found no statistically significant relationship between the 
boundaries and the supply of affordable rental units.   
3.2 SMART GROWTH PRINCIPLES AND HOUSING COSTS 
This section reviews the empirical literature regarding each of the four smart growth principles 
of interest to this research and their impact on housing costs and affordable housing. 
3.2.1 Density 
The first smart growth principle of interest is greater density.  Two significant factors make 
smart growth’s goal of higher housing density pertinent to a study of affordable housing.  First, 
density is often associated with a greater proportion of rental and multi-family units, which are 
more likely to be affordable for low-income households than single-family dwellings (Pendall 
2000; Smart Growth Network 2001; Downs 2004).  An argument is made that higher density 
housing development will help to address the housing needs of lower-income households 
because of this association.  Second, proponents of urban growth boundaries, and to a lesser 
extent urban service areas, argue that higher land and housing costs caused by the restricted 
supply of developable land can be off-set by increased density that should accompany any urban 
containment policy (Hannah, Kim, and Mills 1993; Nelson and Moore 1996; Phillips and 
Goodstein 2000). 
This section first reviews the empirical evidence of the relationship between density and 
housing prices without consideration of the potential impact of urban containment policies.  The 
literature reveals an association between greater density and lower housing prices in general.  
However, greater density is not associated with an improvement in housing affordability for low-
income households.  Two studies indicate that greater density is negatively associated with 
housing affordability at lower price ranges which are affordable to low-income households. 
This section then presents the empirical evidence of the impact of density on housing 
prices in regions that have implemented urban containment policies.  These studies support the 
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contentions among smart growth advocates that urban containment will not have negative effects 
on housing affordability, in general, if density is increased in tangent with the implementation of 
urban containment.  The studies illustrate that greater density will at the very least partially off-
set the pressure that urban containment may place on housing values.  Unfortunately, the studies 
also show that greater density does not improve affordability for low-income households. 
Li and Brown (1980) found no significant relationship between residential density and 
home values when they studied the sales price of 781 housing transactions in suburban Boston.  
They tested the impact of a variety of structural and neighborhood characteristics, public service 
costs, and accessibility to the central business district on each home’s price.  One of their 
neighborhood attributes was residential density.  They measured density as the number of 
residential units per square mile.  Using ordinary least squares, they found that the density of the 
neighborhood had no significant relationship with the sales price of the house. 
Other scholars have found statistically significant relationships between density and 
housing costs.  Song and Knaap (2003) examined the relationship between the price of 48,000 
individual real estate transactions over a ten year time period in Washington County, Oregon and 
neighborhood density.  They defined the neighborhood as the census block group in which the 
real estate parcel was located.  They defined density as the number of households per area of 
land in the neighborhood, as well as the number of single-family units per area of residential land 
in the neighborhood.  They regressed the sales price of the parcel on a variety of neighborhood 
features, including the mix of land uses, distance to public parks, distance to commercial uses, 
distance to bus stops, transit options, density, and walkability.44  They found a statistically 
significant relationship between greater density and lower real estate prices.  Song and Knaap 
concluded that people typically prefer neighborhoods with low residential density. 
Shultz and King (2001) also found a statistically significant relationship between greater 
density and lower housing prices.  They analyzed the median house value of 6,277 census blocks 
in Tucson, Arizona, in a variety of regressions.  In each regression, the dependent variable was 
the median house value of the census block.  The independent variables were structural and land 
use characteristics of the neighborhood.  The geography at which the independent variables were 
                                                 
44 The authors were testing the impact of specific features of new urbanism on the price of real estate.  For an 
explanation of new urbanism, see Katz (1994) and the charter of the Congress for New Urbanism (2001).  For a 
study of the impact of new urbanism on the price of single-family homes, see Eppli and Tu (1999). 
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measured was changed for each model.  The independent variables were first measured at the 
block, then the census block group, then the census tract level.  A census block is the smallest 
level of geography for which Census data is reported and represents the size of a typical urban 
street block.  A census block group represents a group of adjacent blocks.  A census tract is 
consists of multiple block groups and contains approximately 2,500 to 8,000 residents.  Census 
tracts are designed with the purpose of containment population, economic status, and living 
conditions with the tract as homogenous as possible.45  They used two variables to represent 
residential density.  The first variable was the number of single-family dwellings per area of land 
classified as single-family land use.  The second variable was the number of total residential 
units per area of land.  Shultz and King found that greater residential density of the neighborhood 
was associated with lower house values regardless of whether the neighborhood was defined as a 
block, a block group, or census tract.  Similar results were found for both measures of density. 
Alexander and Tomalty (2002) warned that higher density may not necessarily correlate 
with cheaper housing for low-income households.  They examined data from 26 municipalities in 
the British Columbia region of Canada.  Using a correlation analysis, they found that the 
municipalities with the highest densities also had the largest proportion of households paying 
more than 30% of their income on housing costs.  They suggested that there was an inverse 
relationship between density and housing affordability.  But, their conclusion was tentative as 
they recognized that inner cities were the densest in their sample.  At the same time, the inner 
cities had a larger proportion of low-income households.  Therefore, density may have been 
correlated with the proportion of households spending more than 30% of their income on 
housing costs because they had lower incomes. 
Burton (2000) examined the association between density and housing for low-income 
households.  Her primary purpose was to test the claim that compact development increases 
social equity among different income groups.  Using data from 25 medium-sized British cities, 
she used multivariate regression to test the relationship between density and housing costs.  She 
controlled for each city’s economic and social characteristics, size, and location within England.  
Her dependent variable was the average price of a “bottom-of-the-market” dwelling relative to 
the average earnings for males working full-time manual labor.  “Bottom-of-the-market” 
                                                 
45 For detailed definitions of census geography, see the U.S. Census Bureau’s (1994) Geographic Areas Reference 
Manual which is available at http://www.census.gov/geo/www/garm.html. 
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dwellings were those build before 1919 of a certain style most likely to be affordable for lower-
income households.  She found that greater density was associated with an increase in the 
relative housing prices for low-income workers.  She concluded that higher density was found in 
more expensive housing markets, but could not conclude that density caused higher prices.  
Some towns in her sample which were dense were old, historic cities.  She surmised that demand 
for housing in some of these old, historic and denser cities caused prices to be high. 
Other scholars have examined the impact of density on housing costs in locations with 
growth management or urban containment policies to limit sprawl.  The following research 
tested the argument that greater density helps to relieve pressure on house costs which may occur 
as a result of restrictions on the supply of land. 
Miller (1986) studied growth control in Boulder, Colorado, and Petulma, California, 
during the 1970’s.  He found that housing prices between the two communities behaved 
differently in response to restrictions on the number of new units that could be produced within a 
given year.  Boulder maintained a supply of moderately priced units, while Petulma became a 
more expensive, more exclusive community.  One potential reason for this difference was an 
additional ordinance passed in Boulder requiring a certain proportion of new homes be 
moderately priced.  Boulder’s housing market responded to the combination of growth 
restrictions and moderate-priced housing mandates with the provision of different housing types, 
through conversion and new construction, to include a higher proportion of smaller, attached 
units and condominiums.  The proportion of smaller, attached units grew in Boulder, while 
Petulma’s housing stock remained mostly single-family, detached dwellings.  Miller concluded 
that growth control did not necessarily eliminate moderate priced housing if the type of housing 
changes to include smaller units through government mandates. 
Staley and Gilroy (2001) recently studied growth management, density, and housing 
affordability among counties in Washington and Florida, both growth management states.  
Regressing the growth in median house prices from 1995 to 2000 in each county on income 
growth, population growth, and the length of time the county was in compliance with the state’s 
growth management legislation, they found a significant and positive relationship between the 
growth management and prices in both states.  However, density was a significant variable only 
in only Washington State’s counties.  Higher densities were associated with higher prices in 
Washington, but not in Florida.  They asserted that Washington’s urban growth boundary 
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increased density, as well as put pressure on prices because of constraints on the supply of land.  
Their analysis did not measure the extent to which housing prices would have increased in 
Washington in response to growth management without any increase in density.  
Carruthers (2002) studied the impact of state-level growth management programs in 283 
metropolitan counties at four different points in time which were the years of 1982, 1987, 1992, 
and 1997.  Their analysis included counties from 14 different states, five of which had growth 
management programs for at least part of the time period.  The five growth management states 
were Oregon, Washington, California, Georgia, and Florida.  All 14 states were experiencing 
rapid population growth.  The authors used simultaneous equations to measure the impact of 
growth management on five outcomes, which were the amount of developed land in the county, 
density, property values, infrastructure expenditures, and population.  They measured density as 
the number of jobs and residents per acre of developed land.  The variable measuring growth 
management was the number of years that a state mandated growth management was in place for 
each county. 
Carruthers presented two important findings with regard to density.  First, he found that 
Oregon State’s growth management mandates had a statistically significant impact on increasing 
density.  Oregon was the only growth management state in which this relationship was found.  At 
the same time, Oregon was the only state in which the relationship between growth management 
and property values was negative although it was not a statistically significant relationship.  
Therefore, Carruthers concluded that Oregon’s growth management program, including urban 
growth boundaries, did not increase housing prices possibly because of the increase in density. 
The second important finding of Carruther’s work was the endogenous relationship 
between housing prices and density.  Greater density was a statistically significant variable in 
explaining higher property values.  But at the same time, higher property values were a 
statistically significant variable in explaining greater density.  This finding illustrates that density 
may be associated with higher home values because density increases in more expensive housing 
markets.  It is not density that is the cause of higher housing prices. 
Table 3.2 summarizes the literature regarding density and the cost of housing.  Three 
important items are drawn from this literature.  First, little is know about the relationship 
between density and the supply of housing specifically affordable for low-income households.  
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The research that does exist suggests that density may not have positive consequences for low-
income housing (Burton 2000; Alexander and Tomalty 2002). 
 
Table 3-2. Review of Relationship Between Density and Housing Prices 
 
Author Location Unit of 
Analysis 
Method Measure of 
Density 
Dependent 
Variable 
Finding 
Alexander 
and 
Tomalty 
(2002) 
British 
Columbia, 
Canada 
Municipality 
(n=26) 
Correlation 
analysis and 
Case studies 
People per hectacre;  
housing units per 
hectacre 
% of households 
paying more than 
30% of income for 
housing 
Positive correlation between density 
and proportion of households paying 
more than 30% of income for 
housing 
Burton 
(2000) 
Brittain City/Town 
(n=25) 
Multivariate 
analyses 
14 indicators Ratio of avg. selling 
price at ‘bottom of 
market’ to avg. 
earnings of manual 
labor jobs 
Positive relationship between density 
and price and lower affordability at 
low end of housing market 
Carruthers 
(2002) 
14 U.S. 
States 
Metropolitan 
Counties at 
4 different 
time periods 
(n=1,131) 
3SLS # of jobs and people 
per acre of developed 
land 
Assessed property 
value per acre 
Endogenous relationship between 
density and value.  Oregon’s growth 
management had no impact on value 
because of increase in density 
Li & 
Brown 
(1980) 
Boston, 
MA 
Property 
Sales 
(n=781) 
Least Squares Housing units per 
square mile within 
property’s census 
tract 
Sale price No statistically significant 
relationship 
Miller 
(1986) 
Boulder, 
CO and 
Petulma, 
CA 
Municipality 
(n=2) 
Case studies % of units that were 
attached homes 
% of homes that were 
in ‘moderate price 
range’ 
Growth control in Petulma lowered 
affordability because density did not 
increase.  Boulder maintained  
moderately-priced housing because 
density increased with larger supply 
of smaller units 
Shultz & 
King 
(2001) 
Tucson, AZ Census 
block groups 
(n=6,277) 
Hedonic 
Pricing 
Model 
Number of 
residential units per 
acre 
Avg. of median value 
of owner occupied 
units and median 
value of capitalized 
rents for rental units 
Negative relationship 
Song and 
Knaap 
(2003) 
Washington 
County, OR 
Real estate 
transactions 
(n=48,070) 
Hedonic 
Pricing 
Model 
Single-family units 
per residential area of 
block group; also 
households per land 
area of block group 
Sale price Negative relationship 
Staley & 
Gilroy 
(2001) 
Washington 
and Florida 
States 
County Case study;  
Regression 
People per square 
mile 
Growth in median 
house price (1995 to 
2000) 
Positive relationship in Washington 
State 
Second, the level of geography at which density is measured may influence the 
conclusions concerning the relationship between density and housing costs.  It is interesting to 
note that the studies which measured density at the neighborhood level found greater density was 
associated with lower housing prices (Shultz and King 2001; Song and Knaap 2003).  
Meanwhile, studies measuring density at the municipal or county level found greater density was 
associated with higher housing costs (Staley and Gilroy 2001; Carruthers 2002).  These different 
findings may result from the fact that measurements of density at the county or municipal level 
hide the variation in density which occurs within a large jurisdiction.  As shown by Carruthers, 
 88 
housing costs and density are endogenous at the county-level.  A county with a more expensive 
housing market will likely be more dense than a county with a weaker housing market.  
However, residents within the more expensive county may still prefer low density 
neighborhoods. 
Third, the evidence is mixed as to the extent to which greater residential density will off-
set the impact of growth management on housing prices.  Staley and Gilroy (2001) found that 
while density increased in the state of Washington after growth management was implemented, 
housing prices also rose.  Carruthers (2002), on the other hand, found that the relationship 
between growth management and property values was not statistically significant in Oregon.  In 
Oregon, growth management was associated with greater density.  Carruthers credited this 
increase in density as the reason for no relationship between growth management and housing 
prices.  Miller (1986) made a similar conclusion by crediting an increase in density for the ability 
of Boulder, Colorado to maintain a supply of moderately-priced housing after its implementation 
of growth control. 
The research in this dissertation addresses two gaps in the research left by Staley and 
Gilroy (2001), Carruthers (2002), and Miller (1986) in their studies of the impact of density 
within the broader context of growth management.  First, their analyses used either the county or 
municipality as the level of observation.  Using such a large geographic area ignores the 
relationship between density and housing prices that occurs at smaller geographic levels such as 
the neighborhood.  There is a wide range of densities which are found within a single county or 
municipality.  Aggregation of data to the county does not capture this range.  Second, none of 
these authors specifically addressed affordable housing for low-income households.  They can 
only make generalizations regarding growth management, density, and general housing prices.  
They cannot make generalizations about the supply of affordable housing. 
3.2.2 Variety of Housing Options 
The second smart growth principle is the provision of a variety of housing options for a wide 
range of household incomes.  This principle is closely related to the principle of density.  Greater 
residential density can be achieved in three ways.  Lot sizes for single-family homes can be 
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decreased, the supply of multifamily units can be increased, or the supply of attached single-
family homes can be increased.  Therefore, one path to increasing density is to increase the 
variety of housing types to include multifamily and attached units. 
In a recent literature review titled “The Effects of Affordable and Multifamily Housing 
on Market Values of Nearby Homes,” Galster (2004, p. 178) wrote that there is little research 
that measures the impact of non-subsidized, market-rate multifamily units on adjacent property 
values.  He found that the literature dealt with subsidized housing’s impact on property values 
and argued that there is little information that can be generalized to non-subsidized units.  
Nonetheless, there are a limited number of studies that have examined the impact of market-rate 
multifamily housing on nearby house values.   
Song and Knaap (2004) examined the impact of multiple neighborhood land-use 
characteristics on the sale price of 4,314 single-family homes sold in the year 2000 in 
Washington County, Oregon.  They used an hedonic price model to measure the extent to which 
each land use characteristic was statistically significant in explaining each home’s sale price.  In 
their first model, they included distance from the home to a multifamily housing as an 
independent variable.  They found that a greater distance from multifamily housing was 
associated with an increase in the price of the single-family home.   
In their second model, they included the proportion of land in the neighborhood 
designated for multifamily residential use.  Song and Knaap defined the neighborhood as the 
Census Transportation Analysis Zone (TAZ) and land use data were obtained from the Portland 
Metro.  They found that the proportion of land designated for multifamily housing was not 
statistically significant in explaining the sales value of single-family homes.  The authors 
concluded that buyers of single-family homes preferred not to live adjacent to or near 
multifamily units given the results they found in their first model.  However, the amount of 
multifamily housing in the neighborhood was not significant. 
Cao and Cory (1982) tested the relationship between land use for multifamily housing 
and the median value of single-family homes in 52 neighborhoods of Tucson, Arizona.  They 
regressed the median value of homes on the proportion of land that was used for multifamily 
units, commercial activity, industrial activity, and public use.  They also included the age and 
average size of the housing units, school quality, and property tax rates as additional independent 
variables.  In contrast to Song and Knaap, Cao and Cory found that a greater amount of land 
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occupied by multifamily units was associated with higher single-family home values.  Their 
analysis, however, included neighborhoods of only one city.  Therefore, they could only 
conclude that multifamily housing units were associated with higher values for single-family 
homes within the city. 
There is no empirical research that tests the relationship between the variety of housing 
types and the supply of housing that is specifically affordable for low-income households.  The 
papers mentioned earlier only examined the effect of multi-family housing on the value of 
single-family homes.  As mentioned previously, it is widely accepted that multifamily units are 
more likely to be occupied by low-income households than single-family units (Downs 2003).  
Therefore, we could assume that a neighborhood with a larger supply of multifamily units will be 
more likely to have a larger supply of affordable units than neighborhoods dominated by single-
family homes.  This research directly tests that assumption. 
3.2.3 Mixed Land Use 
The third smart growth principle which is believed to be associated with a greater supply of 
affordable units is the principle of mixed land use neighborhoods.  Mixed land use is defined as a 
diversity of land use activities found within a specified area.  It is associated with a more diverse 
housing stock in the form of accessory units, as well as with apartments in the upper floors of 
commercial buildings occupied by retail space and offices on lower floors (Talen 2002, p. 181). 
The mix of land uses in a neighborhood is expected to impact the value of the 
neighborhood’s housing.  The research reviewed in this section shows that housing values are 
typically higher in neighborhoods which are predominantly single-family homes with some 
limited commercial activity.  Consumers prefer these neighborhoods.  The types of land use 
within the mix also have an impact on housing values.  Mixed land use may include activities 
that produce negative externalities, such as industrial or undesirable facilities, which decrease 
housing prices (Farber 1998).  On the other hand, a mix of uses that mostly includes amenities 
thought to be desirable will increase housing prices.  These positive uses include retail, 
entertainment, health, and education. 
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In an early study of land use effects on housing prices, Crecine et al. (1967) examined the 
sale price of single family dwellings in Pittsburgh from 1956 to 1963.  They used ordinary least 
squares with the sales price of each single-family dwelling that was sold as the dependent 
variable.  The independent variables representing land use were the proportion of land within the 
home’s block that was zoned for industrial, commercial, institutional, and multifamily use.  Each 
land use was represented by a variable.  They found that land uses within the block of the house 
were not statistically significant in explaining the sales price of homes sold in Pittsburgh.  The 
authors performed separate regressions for each neighborhood within the study to control for 
neighborhood factors that could not be captured at the block level.  One drawback to this 
research is that the authors used zoning to measure land use rather than the actual use of the land. 
Stull (1975) criticized Crecine et al’s study for performing separate regressions for each 
neighborhood and using the blocks of each neighborhood as the level of analysis.  He argued that 
land use throughout an entire neighborhood may influence home prices rather than the mix of 
uses just within the block of the home.  Stull looked at the median value of owner-occupied 
single-unit structures of 40 suburban cities outside of Boston.  He used both ordinary least 
squares, as well as two stage least squares to control for the possible endogenous relationship 
between his dependent variable of median single-family home values and his independent 
variables.  He controlled for the median size, average age, and average lot size of the cities’ 
homes.  He also controlled for each city’s tax rates.  He utilized two stage least squares because 
he feared lower tax rates would explain higher house values while higher home values explained 
lower tax rates. 
In his first analysis, he used only one independent variable to measure land use.  The 
variable was the proportion of land that was not single-family homes.  He found that a greater 
proportion of land devoted to single-family homes was associated with higher housing prices.  
This indicated that consumers preferred towns of mostly single-family homes.  In a second 
analysis, he used multiple independent variables for land use, including the proportion of land in 
the city that was multi-family, commercial, industrial, and vacant land.  The only favorable land 
use he found, in terms of a positive influence on home prices, was commercial use.  However, 
the relationship was quadratic.  As commercial uses increased up to 5% of the land, home prices 
increased.  As the proportion of commercial uses became greater than 5% of the total land area, 
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home prices declined.  He concluded that home buyers preferred municipalities that were of, 
predominantly, single-family homes with a small amount of commercial land uses. 
Cao and Cory (1982) examined the relationship between the mix of land uses and the 
median value of single-family homes in Tucson, Arizona’s, fifty-two neighborhoods.  They used 
ordinary least squares with the proportion of land zoned and used for multifamily housing, 
commercial activities, industrial use, and public use serving as independent variables.  In the first 
analysis, the authors used the proportion of land that was zoned for each land as the independent 
variables.  Similar to Crecine et al., they found no statistical significance in the relationship 
between zoning and house values. 
In their second analysis, Cao and Cory’s independent variables were the proportion of 
land that was actually used for each type of land use, as opposed to the amount of land that was 
zoned for each particular use.  They found that a greater proportion of land used for purposes 
other than single-family homes was associated with lower single-family home values.  Their 
findings differed from Stull in that he found only a smaller proportion of commercial use was 
associated with greater home values.   
Cao and Cory asserted that one potential reason for the difference is that they examined 
the relationship within one city’s neighborhoods while Stull tested the relationship among 
multiple cities.  Tucson’s zoning codes limited the amount of non-residential land uses that could 
be located in residential neighborhoods.  Therefore, the majority of their observations, which 
were the neighborhoods, had low levels of commercial activity.   More than 75% of their 
neighborhoods had less than 20% of the land utilized by commercial activities.  They cautioned 
that this limited amount of commercial activity in most neighborhoods may have biased their 
results upward.  Their findings may not be applicable to neighborhoods with a large proportion 
of commercial uses.  They wrote that there was “a need in future studies to analyze the 
relationship between land uses and property values at high ranges of various non-single family 
land uses” (p. 14). 
More recently, Cervero and Duncan (2004) examined the relationship between mixed 
land use and the land values of 5,364 single-family and 1,734 multifamily parcels that were sold 
in Santa Clara County, California.  They used two stage least squares to regress the value of the 
parcel on a variety of neighborhood and land use characteristics.  The ‘neighborhood’ was 
defined as the area within a one-mile radius from the sold parcel.  Two stage least squares was 
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utilized to control for the potential endogeneity between land values and land use.  They assumed 
that land uses would impact land values and that land values would impact the types of land uses 
in the neighborhood. 
The authors measured mixed land use with a modified formula of entropy which 
measured the diversity of jobs in various employment sectors within a one-mile radius of the 
property transaction.46  They used the variety of employment sectors in the neighborhood as a 
proxy for the variety of land uses.  They found that a greater diversity of land use activities in a 
neighborhood was associated with higher land prices.  They also found that a greater proportion 
of housing units that were single-family homes within 1 mile of the parcel was associated with 
lower land values.  Separate models for single-family parcels and multi-family parcels revealed 
the same results. 
Song and Knaap (2003) used a similar measure of land use diversity to test the 
relationship between mixed use and real estate values.  Their analysis included 48,070 housing 
transactions over a ten year period in Washington County, Oregon.  Song and Knaap used an 
hedonic pricing model to test the effect of land use characteristics on the sale value of each 
home.  In constrast to Cervero and Duncan who used employment data to calculate the diversity 
of land uses, Song and Knaap used actual land use data.  They calculated two different indices of 
mixed land use based on the census block group in which the home was located.  One index 
included single family dwellings in the mix of uses, as well as multifamily residential, 
commercial, industrial, and public uses.  The second index excluded single family dwellings 
from the mixed land use variable in order to capture the impact of only non single-family uses. 
When using the first measure of mixed land use, Song and Knaap found that a lower 
diversity of land uses was associated with higher housing prices.  They concluded that 
consumers preferred neighborhoods in which single-family dwellings were dominant.  The 
predominance of single-family homes was indicated by a lower level of diversity.  When using 
the second measure, which did not include single-family homes, they found that greater diversity 
of land uses was associated with higher prices.  From the second measure, they concluded that 
                                                 
46 Geoghehan et al. (1997) and Acharya and Lewis (2001) also examine the relationship between land use diversity 
and housing prices with a similar measurement of diversity.  However, they are not discussed here as their types of 
land use are based on data from USGS which classifies uses such as forest, agriculture, wetlands, residential, etc.  In 
the context of smart growth, “mixed land use” most often refers to the diversity of activities such as retail, 
residential, industrial, etc.  
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consumers preferred a more even distribution and greater diversity of land uses in neighborhoods 
where single-family homes did not dominate the landscape.  Therefore, the impact of mixed land 
use on house values was sensitive to the type of land uses which were being measured. 
Table 3.3 provides a summary of the empirical literature regarding the relationship 
between mixed land use and housing prices. 
 
Table 3-3. Review of Relationship Between Mixed Land Use and Housing Prices 
 
Author Location Unit of 
Analysis 
Method Measure of 
Mixed Land 
Use
Dependent 
Variable 
Finding 
Cao and Cory 
(1982) 
Tucson, AZ Neighborhoods 
(n=52) 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
% of land: 
Multi-Family 
Commerce 
Industry 
Public use 
Median value of 
owner-occupied, 
single-family units 
Positive relationship 
between proportion of 
land that was not for 
single-family use and 
housing prices 
Crecine et al. (1967) Pittsburgh, PA Residential 
transactions 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(separate 
analysis for 
each 
neighborhood) 
% of land in block 
for each zoning 
category, ie. multi-
family, 
commercial, 
industrial, etc. 
Sale price No statistically 
significant relationship 
Cervero & Duncan 
(2004) 
Santa Clara 
County, CA 
Individual parcel 
sales (n=5364 
single-family 
sales; n=1734 
multi-family sales) 
Two-Stage 
Least Squares 
1) Land use mix 
(within 1 mile 
radius) 
2) % single family 
units (within 1 
mile radius) 
Land value of 
parcel sales 
Positive relationship 
between mixed land use 
and land values  
Song & Knaap 
(2003) 
Washington 
County, OR 
Real estate 
transactions 
(n=48,070) 
Hedonic 
Pricing Model 
Land use (entropy) 
mix 
Sale Price Positive relationship if 
neighborhood is not 
dominated by single-
family homes.  But, 
neighborhood of single-
family use is preferred. 
Stull (1975) Boston SMSA Suburban Cities (n 
= 40) 
Ordinary Least 
Squares;  Two-
Stage Least 
Squares 
% of land devoted 
to: 
Multi-Family 
Commercial use 
Industrial use 
Institutional use 
Vacant 
Median value of 
owner-occupied, 
single-family units 
Consumers preferred 
single-family homes and 
small amounts of 
commercial activiy.  
Quadratic relationship 
between % of land for 
commercial uses and 
median home value. 
There are two important issues noticeable from the review.  The first issue is the 
sensitivity of housing values to the level of diversity among land uses.  Song and Knaap (2003), 
as well as Stull (1975), found that commercial activity lowered housing values if there was a 
significant mixture of housing, commercial, and other land uses.  For example, Stull’s study of 
Boston’s suburbs found a negative relationship between commercial land use and housing prices 
when commercial activities accounted for more than 5% of the suburb’s total land use.  He found 
a positive relationship if commercial activities accounted for less than 5% of the suburb’s land 
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use.  This evidence suggests that neighborhoods with a significant proportion of non-residential 
land uses may contain a larger supply of affordable units than neighborhoods dominated by 
residential land uses because of lower demand among housing consumers for housing in 
neighborhoods with a great diversity of land uses. 
Cao and Cory (1982) and Cervero and Duncan (2004) found that a greater diversity of 
land uses was associated with higher home and land values, respectively.  However, Cao and 
Cory questioned their own results.  They asserted that their analyses’ level of observation 
precluded having a wide range of values for their measure of land use activities.  Most of their 
neighborhoods had only small amounts of commercial activity.  They questioned whether they 
would find the same results if more of their observations had a greater proportion of land used 
for commercial purposes.  Cervero and Duncan noted that the county in which they performed 
their analysis was job-rich and housing-poor (p. 307).  There was a significant lack of housing in 
the county as compared to the number of workers.  It is possible that their results are not 
generalizable to other counties because of the stronger than average demand for housing. 
The second issue revealed by the literature review is the lack of research explicitly testing 
the relationship between mixed land use and the supply of affordable housing for low-income 
households.  There are two identifiable gaps.  First, the literature suggests that housing 
consumers prefer neighborhoods not dominated by non-residential land uses.  Therefore, less 
demand for housing in mixed use neighborhoods may lower prices and, in turn, increase the 
supply of affordable units.  However, no current research tests this hypothesis. 
Second, the research by Song and Knaap (2003) indicated that mixed use neighborhoods 
may be preferred by housing consumers when single-family homes are not included in the 
analysis.  This finding suggests a possible interaction between mixed land use and demand for 
specific types of housing.  Housing consumers may have higher demand for multi-unit structures 
and attached homes than for single-family homes in neighborhoods of greater land use diversity.  
Typically, multi-units structures and attached homes are more likely to be affordable for low-
income households.  Because of the potential for greater demand for these types of units in 
mixed use neighborhoods, they may be less likely to be affordable.  Once again, there is no 
research which explicitly tests this hypothesis. 
 96 
3.2.4 Open Space 
The fourth principle of smart growth which is of interest to the study of affordable housing for 
low-income households is the preservation of open space.  A previous section reviewed the 
impact of urban containment, which are policies to preserve open space on the fringes of urban 
areas, on housing.  This section discusses the impact of another form of open space, public parks, 
on housing costs. 
Public parks are likely considered an amenity among housing consumers.  Therefore, a 
park will be associated with higher housing costs in the park’s neighborhood because of greater 
demand for housing.  However, a review of the literature reveals two caveats concerning this 
assumption.  First, a park has a localized impact on house values.  The distance between the park 
and a home has significant implications for the effect the park has on the home’s value.  A park 
typically only increases the value of homes that are adjacent to or within a block of the park.  
The additional value that a park creates for a home declines as the walking distance between the 
two increases.   In addition, some studies have shown that houses within 100 feet of a park are 
not actually higher in value.  While the benefit of a park is captured in home values within 
walking distance, houses too close to a park might be devalued because of its proximity to space 
that attracts people and activities.   
The second caveat regarding parks and their positive relationship to housing prices is that 
undeveloped land not guaranteed to remain undeveloped does not increase the value of nearby 
homes.  Housing consumers appear to value permanent forms of open space, such as publicly 
owned parks, more than open space that can be developed in the future. 
Weicher and Zerbst (1973) examined the impact of five public parks on prices of single-
family dwellings sold between 1965 and 1969 in Columbus, Ohio.  They included homes that 
were the distance of a block or less away from one of the five parks.  Using ordinary least 
squares, the sales price was the dependent variable.  The independent variables were the number 
of rooms, age of the house, and lot size.  They used individual dummy variables to indicate 
whether the house was adjacent to and facing a park, adjacent to and backing onto a park, and 
adjacent to a park and facing an area of heavy recreational use or park building.   
Weicher and Zerbst found that the positive effect of a park on the value of a home was 
dependent on the location of the house in reference to the park.  They found that the sales price 
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of homes adjacent to and facing a public park were of higher value than those homes that were a 
block away.  On average, they sold for $3,434 more than homes a block away.  However, they 
also found that adjacent homes that backed into (faced away from) the park sold for, on average, 
$1,030 less than homes that were a block away.  Homes looking over a heavily used recreational 
area or a park building had, on average, a price that was $1,057 less than homes that were a 
block away. 
Correll et al. (1978) tested the impact of three greenbelts (a form of urban containment) 
in Boulder, Colorado, on the price of real estate transactions.  They used ordinary least squares 
with the sales price of individual property transactions within 3200 feet of one of the greenbelts 
as the dependent variable.  They controlled for the age and size of the house.  They did not 
control for neighborhood characteristics because they assumed Boulder to be a fairly 
homogenous community.  Therefore, neighborhood characteristics would be similar for all of the 
observations. 
Correll et al. found that a closer proximity to a greenbelt was associated with a higher 
sale price.  As the distance from the greenbelt increased, the price of the transaction decreased.  
However, when they analyzed each of the three greenbelts separately, they found mixed results.  
A closer proximity to one greenbelt was associated with higher prices.  For the second greenbelt, 
the authors found there was a negative relationship between proximity and housing prices.  And 
for the third greenbelt, they found no statistically significant relationship between proximity and 
prices.  The authors hypothesized that the different outcomes for the second and third greenbelts 
were the result of the fact that these two greenbelts were newer.  There had been less time for 
their presence to be captured in housing prices.  There was undeveloped land around the second 
greenbelt.  The authors felt that the positive amenity of the greenbelt would be capitalized into 
home values once new development occurred close to the greenbelt.  Around the third greenbelt 
were older, owner-occupied homes in a stable neighborhood.  Few transactions had taken place.  
Therefore, the authors predicted that the values of the homes would benefit from the greenbelt 
once turnover began occur in the neighborhood and more sales took place. 
Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) examined the relationship between the amount of open 
space surrounding a home and its asking price in two British towns.  Their sample included 350 
properties for sale in Darlington and 490 properties for sale in Reading.  Reading had a larger 
amount of open space that was accessible to the public than Darlington.  In contrast, Darlington 
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had a larger supply of “closed” open space which was undeveloped, privately owned land not 
accessible to the public.  To test the relationship between open space and housing prices, they 
used a hedonic price model which included a wide range of structural and neighborhood 
characteristics.  They measured open space as the proportion of land that was open space within 
1 square kilometer of the home.  They found that a 1% increase in the proportion of land that was 
accessible open space was associated with an increase of ₤83 in the asking price in Darlington 
and a ₤50 increase in Reading.  Because there was a smaller supply of the amenity in Darlington, 
it was more highly valued.  They found a 1% increase in the proportion of land that was “closed” 
open space was not statistically significant in Darlington and was associated with a ₤101 increase 
in asking prices in Reading.  This difference was likely due to the fact that Reading had a smaller 
supply of “closed” open space and was, therefore, more highly valued. 
Acharya and Lewis (2001) did a similar analysis of the relationship between the amount 
of open space surrounding a home and its value in New Haven County, Connecticut.  Their 
sample included 4,000 homes that had sold in the county from 1995 to 1997.  Using a hedonic 
price model, they controlled for social and economic characteristics of the home’s neighborhood, 
including the race of the population, education level of residents, crime rate, average commute 
times, and population density.  They also controlled for features of the housing unit’s structure, 
such as its size, style, exterior material, and the presence of physical amenities including a 
basement, attic, decks, and garage.  After controlling for these other features, they found that a 
greater percentage of open space within one mile of the home was associated with a higher sales 
price for the home.  Acharya and Lewis also found a diminishing marginal benefit of open space 
on housing values.  As the proportion of open space surrounding a house increased, the 
magnitude of its positive impact on housing values decline.  Households paid more per unit of 
open space when there was little open space surrounding the home. 
Irwin (2002) analyzed the impact of open space surrounding a home on its value in four 
Maryland counties.  Irwin’s research expanded the work of Acharya and Lewis in that she 
measured the effects of permanently preserved open space separate from the effects of 
developable open space that was not guaranteed to remain permanently undeveloped.  She used a 
hedonic price model with the sales price of 55,799 sales transactions of single-family homes 
from 1995 to 1999.  She measured the proportion of land within 600 meters that was open space, 
as well as the proportion of land within 100 meters that was open space.  She found that a greater 
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proportion of permanently preserved open space was associated with higher home values.  The 
relationship was of a stronger magnitude at 100 meters than at 600 meters.  Irwin found the 
developable open space was not statistically associated with home values.  She concluded that 
consumers value permanently preserved land more than developable land which may not remain 
open space. 
Geoghegan (2002) also examined the impact of both permanent open space and 
developable open space on housing values in the same manner as Irwin.  She measured the 
proportion of land within 1600 meters of a home that was either developable or permanent open 
space.  She used a hedonic price model in which the dependent variable was the sales price of 
5,599 residential properties in Howard County, Maryland.  Her results were similar to those of 
Irwin in that she found that a greater proportion of permanent open space surrounding a home 
was associated with higher home values.  Developable open space was not associated with home 
values. 
Bolitzer and Netusil (2000) tested the impact of different types of open space on home 
values.  They used a hedonic price model to analyze the sale price of 16,402 single family homes 
in the city of Portland, Oregon.  In their first analysis, they used a single dummy variable to 
indicate the presence of open space within 1500 feet of a home.  They included a second variable 
indicating the size of the open space.  They found having open space within 1500 feet was 
associated with higher home values and that a greater amount of it increased home values.  In a 
second analysis, they used multiple dummy variables to indicate the presence of public parks, 
private parks, cemeteries, and golf courses.  They found that public parks and golf courses were 
statistically significant in explaining higher home values.  The other types of open space were 
not significant. 
Bolitzer and Netusil did a third analysis to test the impact of distance on the relationship 
between the open space and house values.  They used dummy variables to indicate the presence 
of open space within a variety of distances from the home.  Table 3.4 presents the distance range 
for each dummy variable, its estimated impact on a home’s sales price and level of significance.  
The estimated impact of each dummy variable is relative to open space at distances greater than 
1500 feet from a home.  Starting at a distance of 101 feet away from a home, they found that the 
magnitude of the positive relationship between the presence of open space and a home’s value 
diminished as distance increased.  An interesting finding of their research was that open space 
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within 100 feet of a home was not statistically significant in explaining the home’s sales price.  
They concluded that open space too close to a home did not provide positive benefits, and might 
produce negative externalities, to residents as the space may attract noise and people to be within 
close proximity to the home. 
 
Table 3-4. Impact of Open Space on Home Values from Bolitzer and Netusil 
Dummy Variable (distance) Estimated Coefficient (Impact on a home’s sales price) 
Within 100 feet $ 3,522.80 
101 to 400 feet $ 2,755.36* 
401 to 700 feet $ 1,982.80* 
701 to 1000 feet $ 1,522.09* 
1001 to 1300 feet $ 1,454.59* 
1301 to 1500 feet $ 1,004.16*** 
*p=.01; ***p=.10 
Source:  Bolitzer and Netusil (2000, p. 192). 
 
Wu et al. (2004) looked at the relationship among environmental amenities –  such as 
parks, rivers, lakes, and wetlands – development density, and home values within Portland’s 
urban growth boundary.  They presented three simultaneous equations in which the price of a 
home was a function of structural amenities of the home and environmental amenities and 
density of the surrounding area; the density of the area was a function of housing prices and 
environmental amenities; and house size was a function of housing prices, density, and 
environmental amenities.  They argued that housing prices would increase with a closer 
proximity to parks and other positive environmental amenities.  Their second and third equations 
illustrate their argument that development density may increase and home size may decrease in 
areas of higher housing prices because developers would use land more intensely to be able to 
produce more housing units in order to achieve greater profits. 
Wu et al. applied their model of simultaneous equations to 14,191 residential sales in 
Multnomah County, Oregon.  They found that a closer proximity to parks, lakes, and wetlands 
was associated with higher home values.  In addition, they found that a larger amount of land 
within a home’s zip code that was located within park was associated with higher home values.  
Wu et al. then found that higher housing prices were associated with greater development 
density.  Higher density was associated with lower housing prices.  Therefore, Wu et al. 
concluded that parks were a positive amenity to housing consumers but do not prefer higher 
development density to accompany the open space. 
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Shultz and King (2001) examined the relationship between open space and median house 
values among census block groups in Tucson, Arizona.  They used a hedonic price model to test 
the relationship.  Their research differs from the other research presented in this section because 
they did not use the price of individual housing units as the dependent variable.  Rather, they 
used aggregate value data from the Census.  They measured the distance from each block 
group’s center to different types of open space, including large protected resource areas such as 
National parks; undeveloped, regional, and neighborhood parks; and public and private golf 
courses.  They then used these distances as independent variables, along with the median number 
of rooms per housing unit, residential density, and the proportion of land that was industrial, 
commercial, and vacant. 
Shultz and King found that different types of open space had different impacts on 
housing values.  They found that a closer proximity to golf courses, large protected resource 
areas, and undeveloped parks were associated with higher values.  They found that a closer 
proximity to neighborhood and regional parks was associated with lower values.  There are two 
possible explanations for finding the negative relationship between local parks on home values.  
First, they may introduce negative externalities to nearby homes, such as noise and a greater 
likelihood of non-residents coming to the park.  Second, the block group may be too big of an 
area to capture a local park’s impact on nearby homes.  A number of other studies reviewed in 
this section illustrate that the impact of parks diminishes as the distance between the park and a 
home increases. 
Roe et al. (2004)  used a conjoint analysis to determine the willingness of consumers to 
pay for the preservation of farmland, as well as their willingness to pay to live near a 
neighborhood park.  A conjoint analysis is a survey in which respondents are asked to choose 
among a randomized combination of neighborhood and housing attributes that they would prefer 
if they were moving to a new house.  Roe et al.’s respondents were given two hypothetical 
housing units from which to choose.  The two units were each randomly assigned a combination 
of one of four types of neighborhood designs, one of two density levels, one of six surrounding 
land uses, one of a variety of commute times, one school quality level, one neighborhood safety 
level, average neighborhood income, and price.  Table 3.5 presents the attributes that were 
randomly assigned to each potential house. 
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Table 3-5. Roe et al.'s Housing Attributes and Levels for Conjoint Analysis 
Attribute  Level of Attribute 
Neighborhood Design 
 
Cul de sac – no neighborhood park 
Cul de sac – with neighborhood park 
Grid – no neighborhood park 
Grid – with neighborhood park 
Housing Density Less dense 
More dense 
Surrounding Land Use None of the land within 1 mile in agricultural use 
½ of the land within 1 mile in agricultural use 
Most of the land within 1 mile in agricultural use 
None of the land within 1 mile is permanent cropland 
½ of the land within 1 mile is permanent cropland 
Most of the land within 1 mile is permanent cropland 
 
**Note:  Agricultural use is land that can become developed in the 
future.  Permanent cropland is land that is dedicated to be 
undeveloped in the future. 
Commute Time 5 to 60 minutes by 5 minute intervals 
School Quality Fair, Average, Good, or Excellent 
Neighborhood Safety Somewhat unsafe, Somewhat safe, Safe, Very safe 
Average Household Income in 
Neighborhood 
$35,000 to $70,000 in $5,000 intervals 
House Price $129,000 to $219,000 in $1,000 intervals 
Source:  Roe, Irwin, and Morrow-Jones (2004, p. 60).   
 
Roe et al. received 1,551 usable surveys from homeowners in Franklin County, Ohio.  
They used a utility model in which they measured the extent to which consumers were willing to 
pay more for a certain level of an attribute over another level of the same attribute.  They found 
that respondents were willing to pay for shorter commutes, greater school quality, better safety, 
more surrounding agricultural land and permanent cropland, and a neighborhood park.  These 
attributes increased the consumers’ utility as measured by the extent to which consumers were 
willing to pay for them.  Agricultural land was defined as land that could be developed in the 
future while permanent cropland was defined as land that was dedicated to being cropland and 
undeveloped in the future.  They found that consumers’ willingness to pay for surrounding 
permanent cropland diminished when there was also developable farmland surrounding the 
home.  They concluded that consumers valued permanent open space, either in the form of 
permanently preserved cropland or neighborhood parks, to a greater extent when open space was 
in limited supply. 
Table 3.6 summarizes the empirical literature regarding the relationship between open 
space and housing costs.   
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Table 3-6. Review of Relationship Between Open Space and Housing Prices 
Author Location Unit of 
Analysis 
Method Measure of Open 
Space 
Dependent 
Variable 
Finding 
Acharya & 
Lewis 
(2001) 
New Haven 
County, CT 
Property 
transactions 
(n=4,000) 
Hedonic 
Pricing Model 
% land that is open space 
within 1 mile and ¼ mile 
of house 
Sale price Positive relationship 
Cheshire & 
Sheppard 
(1995) 
Reading and 
Darlington 
Asking price 
of available 
property 
(n=840) 
Hedonic 
Pricing Model 
Open space within a 1 
square km of transaction 
Asking price Positive relationship 
Correll et al. 
(1978) 
Boulder, CO Property 
transactions 
(n=85) 
Regression Number of feet from house 
to greenbelt 
Sale price Closer proximity was 
associated with higher 
prices.  But mixed results 
if greenbelts were analyzed 
separately 
Bolitzer & 
Netusil 
(2000) 
Portland, OR Property 
transactions 
(n=16,402) 
Hedonic 
Pricing Model 
Dummy variables for 
different types of open 
space within 1500 feet of 
house 
Sale price Positive relationship 
between public parks and 
golf courses and price of 
home; but not significant if 
distance is less than 100 
feet 
Geoghegan 
(2002) 
Howard 
County, MD 
Residential 
transactions 
(n=5,599) 
Hedonic 
Pricing Models 
% of land within 1600 
meter buffer that is 
permanent open space and 
% that is developable open 
space 
Sale price Positive relationship 
between permanent open 
space and price.  No 
relationship between 
developable open space 
and price. 
Irwin (2002) Anne Arundel, 
Howard, 
Calvert, and 
Charles 
counties, MD 
Transactions 
of owner-
occupied  
homes 
(n=55,799) 
Ordinary Least 
Squares; 
Instrumental 
Variables 
Proportion of land within 
100, 200, 400, and 600 
meters of home that is 
private croplands, private 
forests, privately owned 
permanently conserved 
(not developed) land, 
public land 
Sale price Positive relationship 
between forms of open 
space and house price, 
except for privately-owned 
forests. 
Roe, Irwin, 
& Morrow-
Jones (2004) 
Franklin 
County, OH 
Surveys of 
individual 
households 
(n=1,551) 
Conjoint 
Analysis 
Respondents were asked to 
choose their preferred 
home from two houses 
with randomly selected 
surrounding land use and 
neighborhood attributes 
Willingness to 
pay for one 
combination of 
surrounding 
land use and 
neighborhood 
attributes over 
another 
combination 
Consumers placed greater 
value on a greater supply 
of surrounding agricultural 
and permanent cropland, as 
well as neighborhood 
parks. 
Shultz & 
King (2001) 
Tucson, AZ Census block 
groups 
(n=6,277) 
Hedonic 
Pricing Model 
Proximity to varying types 
of open space 
Avg. of median 
value of owner 
occupied units 
and median 
value of 
capitalized rents 
for rentals 
Mixed results depending 
on type of open space 
Weicher & 
Zerbst 
(1973) 
Columbus, OH Property 
transactions 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Dummy variables 
indicating: a)  if property 
was adjacent to and faces 
park; 
b)  if property is adjacent 
and backs up to a park 
c)  if property was adjacent 
to park and facing 
recreational facilities 
Sale price Positive relationship 
between price and being 
adjacent to and facing park 
Wu, Adams, 
and 
Plantinga 
(2004) 
Portland, OR 
(Multnomah 
County) 
Residential 
transactions 
Simultaneous 
Equations 
Distance to parks, rivers, 
lakes, and wetlands 
Sale price Positive relationship 
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The review of this literature reveals a number of important details regarding this 
relationship.  First, the distance between a home and open space is an important factor in the 
extent to which housing consumers value the space.  Open space is more highly valued at short 
distances of approximately a block from a home.  The research reviewed in this section shows 
that open space at a distance from 100 feet to 1600 meters was associated with higher housing 
values.  The extent to which the space is valued declines as a home’s distance from it increases.  
This finding has significant implications for research that aggregates the measure of individual 
home values to an average or median value for a neighborhood.  There is the possibility that 
aggregation of values to the neighborhood level does not adequately capture the impact of open 
space as the impact may be insignificant throughout the entire neighborhood, but significant in a 
block or two within the neighborhood.  However, in their analysis of block groups in Tucson, 
Arizona, Shultz and King (2001) determined that the impact of open space could be captured at 
the block group level. 
The second significant detail from the literature is that the type of open space is 
significant regarding the relationship between the open space and housing values.  Permanent 
open space was found to have a stronger positive impact on housing prices than open space that 
could be developed in the future.  Golf courses were also found to be associated with higher 
values of nearby homes.  Both permanently preserved open space and golf courses were 
considered a positive amenity among consumers.  
Interestingly, the research presents mixed results concerning the relationship between 
public parks and housing values.  On one hand, neighborhood parks provide a positive amenity 
to neighborhood residents as illustrated by the association between the presence of a 
neighborhood park and higher home values.  On the other hand, the positive benefits are 
sometimes balanced out by the negative aspects brought by a park to its neighbors.  These 
negative amenities are an increase in noise during public events, as a well as the presence of a 
greater number of strangers attracted by the park.  There is evidence that housing consumers take 
into account both the positive and negative aspects of a neighborhood park when deciding on the 
price they are willing to pay for a home.  The research found that neighborhood parks are 
associated with higher values of nearby homes, but with some exceptions.  Homes too close to a 
park or adjacent to an area of the park which attracts a sizable number of people had either lower 
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values than other homes or the relationship between the park and the home’s value was 
statistically insignificant. 
The third significant point drawn from the available research is that the marginal benefits 
of open space decline as the supply of it increases.  Consumers are likely to pay a higher price 
for proximity to a neighborhood park or other types of open space when undeveloped land is 
scarce in the area than when undeveloped land is abundant.   A limited supply of open space 
increases its value.  Therefore, the impact of neighborhood parks on housing costs is partially 
dependent on the amount of other types of open space accessible to residents.   
This third point is pertinent to this research as a region with a successful urban 
containment policy will have a greater amount of permanently preserved open space than a 
region with no urban containment policy.  On one hand, preserving the amount of undeveloped 
land on the outskirts of a region may make neighborhood parks less valuable as open space is 
more abundant in general.  On the other hand, urban containment policies preserve land on the 
fringe of a region by steering new development to within specified urban boundaries.  
Neighborhood parks, which are a form of open space, within the boundaries will become more 
valuable as the supply of undeveloped land diminishes as a result of development. 
The fourth significant point from the literature review of open space is that there is no 
research that explicitly tests the relationship between open space and the supply of affordable 
housing for low-income households.  All of the reviewed research uses either median house 
values of a neighborhood or the individual sales price of recent real estate transactions as the 
dependent variable.  The conclusions of the reviewed research apply to the average house, but 
does not address the possibility that open space may have different impacts on different types of 
housing or different segments of the housing market. 
3.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the literature regarding the relationships between urban containment, the 
four smart growth principles, and housing costs.  This chapter also reviewed the relationships 
between urban containment, the four smart growth principles, and the supply of affordable 
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housing for low-income households.  The four smart growth principles were greater density, a 
variety of housing options, mixed land use, and open space.  While there are numerous studies 
examining the impact of these variables on housing costs in general, there is relatively little 
research into the impact of them on the supply of housing that is affordable for low-income 
households.  There are a limited number of studies testing the relationship between density and 
low-income housing and no studies regarding urban containment, mixed land use, and public 
parks on affordable housing. 
While smart growth proponents argue that greater density and mixed land use are likely 
to improve housing options for low-income households, the literature review does not provide 
conclusive evidence for these claims.  Density has been shown to be associated with lower 
housing prices.  It has also been shown to help relieve pressure on housing prices after growth 
control or urban containment policies are implemented.  However, there is no evidence that 
greater density improves housing affordability or the supply of affordable housing specifically 
for low-income households.  The opposite relationship has been found instead.  Low-income 
households spend a greater proportion of their income on housing in areas that are denser.  Also, 
housing at the lower end of the market appears to be more expensive in denser areas.  The 
research does not, however, indicate causality between greater density and lower affordability for 
low-income households.  Rather, a strong housing market may become more dense in response 
to developers building more units within the same space.  Simultaneously, a strong housing 
market decreases the affordability of housing for low-income households. 
With regard to mixed land use, there are no studies that directly examine its impact on 
housing for low-income households.  Previous research found that consumers prefer 
neighborhoods that are predominantly single-family dwellings with only a limited presence of 
commercial land uses.  One study found that commercial activities were associated with lower 
home values in instances where the commercial activities accounted for more than 5% of the 
neighborhood’s total land use.  These findings suggest that there may be less demand for housing 
in neighborhoods dominated by other uses than residential and, in turn, a greater supply of 
affordable units.    
The literature also provides evidence that public parks within a limited distance are 
associated with greater home values, with a few exceptions.  The exception to the positive 
relationship between a public park and a home’s value is when the home is in close enough 
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proximity to the park to capture the negative externalities, such as a greater number of people 
attracted to the park, created by it.  While there are numerous studies indicating these 
relationships, there are no studies which examine the relationship between parks and housing that 
is affordable for low-income households. 
The next chapter builds on the evidence found in the literature regarding the relationship 
among urban containment, the four smart growth principles, and housing costs.  It develops a 
theoretical framework from which testable hypotheses are drawn concerning the impact that that 
these variables will have the supply of affordable housing. 
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4.0  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
The purpose of this dissertation is to test the relationship between each of four smart growth 
principles and the supply of affordable housing for low-income households.  The four smart 
growth principles are higher density, a variety of housing options, mixed land use, and open 
space.  An additional component of smart growth is urban containment, a policy intended to limit 
the outward growth of urban development.  Therefore, this research compares the relationship 
between each of the four smart growth principles and affordable housing in areas that have 
implemented an urban containment policy with areas that have not.  The specific questions 
addressed by this research are: 
• What is the impact of neighborhood density, a variety of housing options, mixed land 
use, and public parks on the supply of affordable housing for extremely and very low-
income households? 
 
• Are these relationships different in metropolitan areas which have implemented a form of 
urban containment, such as urban growth boundaries or priority funding areas?  If so, 
what are these differences? 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework from which hypotheses are drawn to 
address the research questions.  Modeling the impact of the smart growth principles and urban 
containment on affordable housing requires a theory which connects urban containment to the 
residential land market and, in turn, to the market for housing.  The theoretical framework must 
then connect the smart growth principles of higher density, a variety of housing options, mixed 
land use, and open space to supply and demand in the housing market in areas both with and 
without urban containment policies.  This chapter contains eight sections.  The first seven 
sections present the theoretical framework.  The last section provides a summary of the 
hypotheses drawn from the framework. 
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The first section presents the concept of dividing a general housing market into smaller 
submarkets, each consisting of housing units of similar characteristics.  Units within each 
submarket are substitutes for one another as they share similar traits desired by consumers.  For 
example, Rothenberg et al. (1991) divided housing markets into high-quality housing units, 
moderate-quality housing units, and low-quality housing units.  Consumers searching for high-
quality newer housing will choose their unit from those in the high-quality submarket as opposed 
to units in the low-quality submarket.  While these submarkets are segmented from one another, 
they are closely connected as shifts in the supply or demand in one submarket will influence the 
price of housing in other submarkets. 
The theoretical framework divides the general housing market into two submarkets.  The 
first submarket is of housing units affordable to low-income households.  These units are likely 
of lower quality than unaffordable units.  The second submarket is of housing units unaffordable 
to low-income households.  The quantity of low-quality affordable housing is influenced by what 
is happening in the unaffordable housing market. 
The second section explains the impact of urban containment on prices in the residential 
land market.  As illustrated in Chapter Three, urban containment policies restrict the supply of 
residential land and, as a result, prices in the residential land market increase.  Price increases for 
residential land have an impact on the housing market. 
The third section addresses the significance of higher residential land prices on the 
housing market and the supply of affordable housing.  Land is a significant portion of the total 
costs of a housing unit.  The cost of housing units will increase in the general housing market if 
there is no reduction in the amount of land consumed by each new housing unit.47  This section 
then presents the theoretical impact of urban containment on the two submarkets, which consist 
of affordable and non-affordable units.  Land use controls, such as urban containment, are shown 
to have a stronger impact on the lower-quality affordable submarket than on the unaffordable 
submarket (Malpezzi and Green 1996). 
                                                 
47 The literature review indicates that the impact of urban containment on housing prices may not be as strong as 
theoretically predicted.  Unlike research testing urban containment’s impact on land prices, research testing its 
impact on housing costs indicates other factors, particularly the strength of the economy, have a stronger influence 
on housing prices than urban containment.  
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The fourth section addresses the impact of greater residential density on affordable 
housing.  There are two ways in which greater density may increase the supply of affordable 
housing.  First, greater density increases the supply of housing on a given an area of land.  This 
increase in supply lowers prices.  It is assumed that a decrease in the cost of units will result in a 
greater supply of units affordable to low-income households.   
The second reason for the positive relationship between density and affordable housing is 
that greater density is often achieved by increasing the supply of attached housing units and 
multi-unit structures.  These types of housing are more likely to be found in the affordable 
housing submarket than in the non-affordable submarket.  An increase in these types of units will 
increase the supply of affordable units.   
On the other hand, demand for housing within urban containment boundaries will 
increase as the supply of housing is restricted outside of the boundaries.  This increase in the 
demand for housing within urban boundaries may increase housing prices to an extent which 
greater density may not be able to completely off-set through the provision of more units on a 
given area of land. 
The fifth section addresses the impact of a variety of housing options on affordable 
housing.  In this research, a variety of housing options is interpreted as the presence of both 
small and large multi-unit structures.  The relationship between a variety of housing options and 
the supply of affordable housing is similar to the relationship between density and affordable 
housing.   
The sixth section presents the impact of mixed land use on the supply of affordable units.  
The literature review in the previous chapter indicated that housing consumers prefer 
neighborhoods dominated by residential land uses.  Less demand for housing in mixed use 
neighborhoods will lower prices.  A decrease in housing prices will allow more units to be 
affordable for low-income households.  This relationship may be different in regions of urban 
containment.  Higher housing prices resulting from urban containment may increase the 
desirability of mixed use neighborhoods among housing consumers as they search for housing 
more convenient to employment and other necessities of daily life, such as retail establishments.  
If demand for housing in mixed use neighborhoods increases, then mixed use will be less likely 
to be associated with affordable units.    
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The seventh section addresses the impact of public parks, a specific type of open space, 
on the supply of affordable housing.  Public parks will have an association with a smaller supply 
of affordable housing units in neighborhoods for two reasons.  First, positive amenities provided 
by public parks will increase demand for housing within neighborhoods with a public park.  This 
higher demand will increase house values.48  An increase in values is assumed to reduce the 
supply of affordable units as fewer units would be priced at a level affordable to low-income 
households.  Second, the positive amenities of a park may increase demand for unaffordable, 
higher-quality housing as higher-income households are willing to pay for living near a park.  
This demand increase in the unaffordable housing submarket will encourage landlords in the 
affordable housing submarket to upgrade the quality their units, making them unaffordable to 
low-income households. 
The association between public parks and a smaller supply of affordable units may be 
stronger in regions of urban containment.  Within urban containment boundaries, permanent 
open space, such as public parks, will become more valuable to residents as undeveloped land is 
consumed by development.  The literature review showed that open space within developed 
areas is more highly valued when there is less of it.  Therefore, in regions of urban containment, 
the association between public parks and a smaller supply of affordable units will be stronger as 
demand for housing near public parks will be stronger. 
The eighth, and final, section of this chapter provides a summary of the hypotheses drawn 
from the theoretical framework.  Figure 4.1 illustrates the expected relationships.  The 
hypotheses are then tested in Chapter Seven, following the presentation of the research design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 As will be discussed in this chapter, this prediction assumes that all other things, such as perceptions of safety and 
crime, remain constant.  Some parks reduce the perception of a neighborhood’s safety and may increase crime.  In 
this case, a public park may have a negative association with housing prices. 
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Figure 4-1. Impact of Urban Containment and Four Smart Growth Principles on Affordable 
Housing 
 
 
 
Density (+) 
Housing Options (+) 
Mixed Land Use (+) 
Public Parks (-) 
Supply of 
Affordable Housing 
Interaction with Urban 
Containment: 
 Density (-) 
 Housing Opions (-) 
 Mixed Land Use (-) 
Public Parks (-)
Note:  Sign in parentheses is expected relationship to supply of affordable housing. 
Urban Containment (-) 
4.1 HOUSING SUBMARKETS 
There are two ways to theoretically connect prices in the general housing market to the supply of 
affordable units for low-income households.  The first, and simplest, connection is to assume that 
an increase in housing prices throughout the housing market will reduce the number of units that 
remain affordable to low-income households.  Assuming incomes do not increase, some units 
previously affordable to low-income households will become unaffordable if there is a price 
increase in the general housing market.   
The second connection between prices in the general housing market and the supply of 
affordable housing is through a general theory of housing submarkets.  A metropolitan area’s 
housing market is assumed to consist of separate submarkets which differ in quality and price 
(Grigsby 1963, Chapter 2; Sweeney 1974; Rothenberg et al. 1991, Chapter 3; Galster 1996).  The 
housing units within each submarket are assumed to be substitutes for each other as consumers 
would not prefer one unit over another within the same submarket as each submarket consists of 
units of similar characteristics.  Therefore, there is potentially a different market for high quality 
units than for moderate quality or low quality, less expensive units.49  Affordable units for low-
                                                 
49 The discussion in this section focuses on quality differences among housing units to define submarkets.  Grisby 
(1963) also focused on neighborhood based submarkets as neighborhoods typically consist of similar housing units 
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income households are most likely in the low-quality submarket.  A shift in the supply or 
demand for housing in a higher quality submarket will impact prices, and supply, in the low-
quality submarket.  This section provides an overview of the relationship between housing 
submarkets. 
Grigsby (1963) was one of the first scholars to divide a single housing market into 
smaller submarkets and explore the relationship between them.  Grisby explained movements in 
the supply and demand in each submarket as partially a result of exogenous events occurring in 
other submarkets.  For example, new construction of high quality units for higher income 
households would increase the supply of high quality units.  This increase in supply would lower 
prices in the high quality housing submarket and, in turn, reduce demand for moderate and lower 
quality units as households move from the moderate quality submarket to the high quality 
submarket.  In turn, prices would decline in the moderate quality and low quality market.  On the 
other hand, a decrease in new construction in the higher quality submarket could have the 
opposite effect and increase demand in the lower quality submarkets, and therefore increase 
prices of lower quality units.50 
Rothenberg et al. (1991, Chapter 8) presented three hypothetical submarkets to theorize 
the way in which submarkets are interdependent and related to each other.  Their three 
submarkets were of high quality, medium quality, and low quality units.  Using these three 
submarkets, they hypothesized the impact of multiple scenarios on each submarket.  These 
scenarios are useful for this chapter’s later sections which present the theoretical impact of urban 
containment and the four smart growth principles on the supply of affordable housing.  Their 
scenarios included an upgrading scenario in which owners of moderate and low quality housing 
upgrade their units in response to an exogenous factor which increases demand for high quality 
                                                                                                                                                             
in terms of type of structure and age.  Housing submarkets have also been defined by neighborhoods and school 
districts as potential residents may place a higher value on a home in a ‘desirable’ location as compared to a similar 
home in a ‘undesirable’ location (Goodman 1981; Goodman and Thibodeau 1998; Bourassa, Hoesli, and Peng 
2003); by type of structure as the market for single-family homes may be different from multi-family structures or 
the market for units with many rooms may be different from the market for units with fewer rooms (Schnare and 
Struyk 1976; Adair, Berry, and McGreal 1996; Larsen and Sommervoll 2004); or by socio-economic factors, such as 
race, as housing in minority neighborhoods may be in a different market from housing in white neighborhoods due 
to discrimination and racial preferences (King and Mieszkowski 1973). 
50 Sweeney (1974), Braid (1981), and Schall (1981) are credited with providing a comprehensive theoretical 
discussion of the relationship between housing submarkets.  Sweeney applies his theory to urban renewal programs 
which replace low-quality housing with new high quality housing.  He argues that prices will decline in higher 
quality submarkets because of the increase in supply, but will increase in low-quality submarkets as low-quality 
units are replaced by renewal. 
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housing.  Another scenario was an increasing supply scenario in which new construction 
increased the supply in the high quality submarket.  
Rather than use three hypothetical submarkets, the following discussion will only divide 
the general housing market into two submarkets, the market for units affordable to low-income 
households and the unaffordable submarket.  Table 4.1 summarizes two scenarios based on 
Rothenberg et al’s hypothetical scenarios.   The table presents an initial exogenous event which 
shifts either the supply or demand in the housing market.  It then provides the resulting shifts in 
supply and demand in the submarkets.  In the table, the following symbols are used: 
 U – Unaffordable submarket 
 A – Affordable submarket 
A significant assumption in this discussion is that the affordable submarket consists 
predominantly of lower quality units than units in the unaffordable submarket. 
 
Table 4-1.  Two Scenarios of Submarkets 
Exogenous Shift 1st Submarket Shift 2nd Submarket Shift 
Increasing Demand 
for unaffordable units 
as a result of higher 
incomes 
 
Demand increases in 
U, which increases 
prices in U 
Supply decreases in A, because landlords will 
get higher returns by upgrading unit in 
submarket A to be in submarket U 
Increasing Supply of 
high-quality units as a 
result of new 
construction 
 
Supply increases in U, 
which decreases 
prices in U 
Demand for low-quality units will decline as 
more households are able to afford high 
quality units.  Prices may decline in A. 
Source:  Rothenberg et al (1991, pp. 221-246). 
 
In the first scenario, demand for higher-quality, unaffordable units could shift upward as 
a result of higher household incomes or an increase in the population that would demand higher-
quality housing.  An increase in demand results in higher prices in the unaffordable submarket.  
Higher prices in the unaffordable market, in comparison to the lower-quality affordable 
submarket, will result in an increase in supply in the unaffordable submarket in two ways.  First, 
new construction will occur in the unaffordable submarket to meet the greater demand.  Second, 
higher prices in the unaffordable market will encourage landlords of affordable units to upgrade 
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the quality of their units.  Upgrading of these low-quality units in submarket A will reduce the 
supply of affordable units to low-income households. 
In a second scenario, there is an increase in the supply of higher quality units due to new 
construction.  An assumption for this scenario is that the shift in supply is the result of exogenous 
factors, such as a change in technology or input costs, which increases the supply of higher 
quality units.  The supply increase is assumed not to be a response to greater demand.  As supply 
increases in the unaffordable submarket, prices decline which allows more households to be able 
to affordable higher-quality units.  Therefore, demand for low quality units declines. 
There are two potential outcomes in the affordable submarket as a result of greater supply 
in higher-quality, unaffordable units.  First, the supply of affordable units may increase.  Prices 
in the general housing market will decline as supply increases, resulting in more affordable units 
as some units in the unaffordable submarket would decline in price to an affordable level.    
On the other hand, affordable units of the lowest quality may be abandoned and not 
remain in the market.  Prices for the lowest quality units may decline below the point at which 
income from the unit covers the owner’s cost of making the unit available.  These units will be 
removed from the market as owners abandoned them, removing some of the supply of affordable 
units for low-income households.  The potential abandonment of the lowest quality units 
indicates the final result of an increase in the supply of higher quality, unaffordable units may be 
ambiguous.  If abandonment occurs at a large enough scale, the quality of units in the affordable 
submarket may improve but their supply would not increase. 
These two scenarios provide an illustration of how submarkets may be used to develop a 
theory of the impact of an exogenous event on the supply of affordable housing for low-income 
households.  The previous examples were relatively simplistic as the general housing market was 
divided into only two submarkets.  These two submarkets were affordable units and unaffordable 
units.  However, there are potentially numerous submarkets within a general housing submarket 
(Rothenberg et al. 1991, p. 360). 
These two submarkets will be used as a tool to theorize about the impact of urban 
containment, as well as of the four smart growth principles, on the supply of affordable housing.  
The next section presents the theoretical impact of urban containment on residential land values, 
a significant input cost to the production of housing.  Section 4.3 then extends the discussion to 
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the theoretical impact of higher residential land values on the affordable and unaffordable 
submarkets of housing. 
4.2 URBAN CONTAINMENT AND RESIDENTIAL LAND VALUES   
Land value is one of the most influential factors determining the price and supply of housing.  
The price of a house consists of the cost of land on which the unit sits plus the structural costs of 
the unit itself.  Therefore, the theoretical framework begins with a discussion of the impact of 
urban containment on the supply and value of developable land for housing.  Because land 
provides for a variety of uses, such as residential, commercial, agricultural, and industrial to 
name a few, there are separate land markets for each type of use.  While these markets are 
closely connected, the primary land market of interest to this discussion is that of developable, 
residential land. 
Both supply and demand factors determine the price and quantity of land in the 
residential land market.  This section first presents a general model of the residential land market 
which discusses these factors.51  The supply of residential land (QLHS) is influenced by the price 
of residential land (PLH), the value of the land if it were used for non-residential purposes (O), 
such as commercial, industrial, or agricultural uses, topographical constraints (W), such as 
bodies of water, and growth management mandates (G).  An increase in the price of residential 
land (PLH), relative to other land uses, increases the supply of residential land as landowners will 
make more of their land available for residential use.  Increases in the value of land for non-
residential uses (O), relative to the value of residential land, decreases the supply of residential 
land as landowners will obtain higher prices by using the land for the other uses.  Topographical 
constraints (W) decrease the supply, as do growth management mandates (G) intended to 
preserve land from development. 
The demand for residential land (QLHD) is a function of the cost of capital (K), the cost of 
housing construction (C), environmental amenities associated with the land (AE), income (Y) and 
                                                 
51 This model of the residential land market draws primarily from Potepan (1996), as well as from Black and Hoben 
(1985), Rose (1989), Shilling et al. (1991), and Engle et al. (1992). 
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the price of residential land (PLH).  Demand for residential land will decrease in response to 
increases in the costs of capital (K) and housing construction (C).  Both capital and construction 
costs are significant inputs in the development of housing.  As these costs increase, the quantity 
of new housing supplied will decline.  Therefore, the demand for residential land on which 
housing would be developed will decline.  Demand for residential land will increase with an 
increase in environmental amenities (AE) associated with the location of the land.  Increases in 
household income (Y) will also increase the demand for residential land.  Greater income among 
consumers increases their ability to demand more residential land.  An increase in the price of 
residential land (PLH) will decrease the amount of residential land demanded by consumers. 
 
Equations for both the supply and demand functions for residential land can be written as: 
 
Supply: QLhs = f (PLH, O, W, G)      (4.1) 
Demand: QLhd = f (K, C, AE, Y, PLH)      (4.2) 
Where:   QLhs is the quantity of residential land supplied; QLhd is the quantity of 
residential land demanded; O is the value of land for non-residential use; W is 
topographical constraints, such as bodies of water and mountains; G is 
government mandates, such as development restrictions; K is the cost of capital; 
C is construction costs; AE is environmental amenities associated with the land; 
Y is income; and PLH is the price of residential land. 
 
In models of supply and demand, the relationship between quantity and price is 
endogenous.  A change in the price of a good will lead to a change in the quantity supplied, as 
well as in the quantity demanded.  If the price of a good increases, suppliers will produce a 
greater supply because they can obtain higher prices for it which will lead to greater profits.  
Consumers, on the other hand, will decrease their demand of the good when its price increases.  
Meanwhile, a change in either the quantity supplied or demanded of a good will lead to a change 
in its price.  If suppliers increase their production of a good, its price will decline as a greater 
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quantity of the good is available in the market.52  If consumers reduce their demand for a good, 
its price will decrease. 
This relationship between the price of a good and the quantity supplied and demanded in 
the market can be applied to the market for residential land.  An increase in the price of 
residential land relative to the price of land for other uses will increase the quantity of land which 
landowners are willing to make available for residential use.  They increase the supply of 
residential land because they can obtain a higher price for it.  For example, an owner of 
agricultural land has an incentive to provide his land for residential use when residential land is 
more valuable than agricultural land (Brueckner and Fansler 1983).  On the other hand, as 
landowners increase the supply of residential land, the price of the it will decrease.   
On the demand side, consumers demand less residential land as it becomes more 
expensive.  At the same time, as consumers demand a smaller quantity of residential land, the 
price of land declines. 
This theoretical discussion assumes that the market for residential land is in equilibrium.  
Equilibrium occurs when the quantity supplied is equal to the quantity demanded.  Equilibrium 
in the residential land market can be represented by: 
  QLHS = QLHD        (4.3) 
 
When the market is not in equilibrium, consumers and suppliers of residential land will 
adjust the quantity that they demand and supply, respectively, to find a point of equilibrium.  If 
the market’s price of residential land is too low, the quantity of residential land demanded will be 
greater than the quantity supplied (QLHD > QLHS).  In this case, there is a shortage of residential 
land and consumers will bid up its price.  In response, landowners will provide a greater supply 
of residential land as the price of land increases.  As the price increases, consumers will decrease 
their quantity demanded.  The quantity supplied will increase while the quantity demanded will 
decrease until demand equals supply at an equilibrium price.  When the quantity of residential 
land demanded is less than the quantity supplied (QLHD < QLHS), there is a surplus of residential 
land.  In this case, landowners have supplied too much residential land at too high of a price. The 
                                                 
52 In a competitive market, suppliers will increase their production only to the quantity level at which the marginal 
revenue gained from one additional unit of the good is equal to the marginal cost, which is the cost of producing that 
one additional unit. 
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price of residential land will decline and landowners will decrease the quantity supplied.  As the 
price declines, consumers will increase the quantity demanded.  The quantity supplied will 
increase and the quantity demanded will decrease until the market is in equilibrium.53 
Because the price of residential land (PLH) is found in both the equation for the quantity 
supplied and the quantity demanded, a reduced form function for PLH can be solved when the 
market is in equilibrium.  PLH becomes a function of the variables which influence supply in 
equation 4.1 and of the variables which influence demand in equation 4.2.  This equation can be 
written as: 
PLH = f (O, W, G, K, C, Y, AE)      (4.4) 
Equation 4.4 illustrates that a change in the value of any of the supply and demand variables 
found in equations (4.1) and (4.2) has an impact on the price of residential land.54 
Urban containment policies, a form of government mandate (G) for growth management, 
limit the supply of developable residential land by introducing restrictions which remove land 
outside of specified boundaries from the residential land market.  Development on land outside 
the boundaries is either prohibited or is discouraged by the unavailability of public infrastructure.  
As illustrated in Figure 4.2, urban containment should cause a shift (decrease) in the supply of 
developable, residential land from S0 to S1.  The shift in supply will increase the cost of 
residential land from PLH0 to PLH1. 
It is theorized that a secondary effect of urban containment policies is an increase in the 
demand for residential land as a result of amenities created by urban containment (Ellson and 
McDermott 1987; Shilling, Sirmans, and Guidry 1991; Engle, Navarro, and Carson 1992).  The 
amenity which urban containment may produce is increased certainty of the development 
approval process.  Landowners and developers determine the probability of receiving approval 
for a planned development when deciding on current and future investments.  Urban containment 
policies create a clear delineation between land which will be developed in the near future from 
land on which development will be restricted.  This delineation provides developers with better 
information on where future development will be allowed, making them more certain of the land 
                                                 
53 This is a textbook explanation of market equilibrium.  See, for example, Riddell, Shackelford, and Stamos (1990, 
pp. 153-155) or O’Sullivan (2003, pp. 561-563). 
54 The reduced form is equation is PLH = ∏0 +  ∏1O +  ∏2W + ∏3G +  ∏4K + ∏5C + ∏6Y +  ∏ 7AE where ∏ are the 
reduced form coefficients.  See Gujarati (1995, pp. 653-664) or Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998, pp. 338-340). 
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on which residential development will be approved.  Greater certainty of the approval process 
will increase the demand for land among developers (Ellson and McDermott 1987).   
 
Figure 4-2. Supply and Demand of Residential Land with Implementation of Urban Containment 
D0 S0 
S1 
PLH 
PLH0 
PLH1 
QLH 
 
 
Shilling et al. (1991) used a two-stage least squares estimation of the supply and demand 
of residential land to test this theory.  Their data consisted of residential land values of new 
single-family homes eligible for FHA-insurance and the total amount of residential land 
developed for FHA-insured new single-family homes from 1974 to 1976 in 37 states.  Their level 
of analysis was the state.  They found that state-level comprehensive land use planning 
requirements were associated with a greater quantity demanded of residential land for new 
homes. 
4.2.1 Urban Containment and Segmented Residential Land Markets 
Another aspect of urban containment policies discussed in the literature review in Chapter Three 
is that urban containment divides the residential land market into two different segments, the 
residential land market within the urban containment boundary and the market outside of the 
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boundary.  As shown in Figure 4.3, land outside of the urban boundary is referred to as ‘non-
urban.’  Land inside an urban boundary is referred to as ‘urban.’ 
 
Figure 4-3.  Illustration of Segmented Residential Land Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Urban Containment Boundary 
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Urban Land
Non-Urban Land 
The implementation of an urban containment policy prevents undeveloped non-urban 
land, outside of the urban boundary, from becoming residential in the future.  Therefore, the 
supply of residential land in the non-urban area is limited to the supply that already exists.  
Figure 4.4 provides a graph of supply and demand in the non-urban residential land market 
(LHNU).  Without urban containment, the supply of residential land is represented by S0.  The 
supply is elastic as it can adjust to changes in price.  With the implementation of urban 
containment, the supply of residential land becomes inelastic.  It does not adjust to changes in 
price because land cannot be developed for residential purposes outside of the urban boundary.  
Land that is already developed for residential use will likely maintain its current use.  Figure 4.4 
illustrates the change from an elastic supply to an inelastic supply of residential land by the 
change in the supply curve from S0 to S1.  The quantity, as well as the price, of non-urban 
residential land will not change if all other factors, such as economic and population growth, 
remain constant.55 
                                                 
55 This discussion focuses on the quantity and price of residential land, which is land that is currently used (or 
planned to be used) for residential purposes.  The implementation of an urban containment policy will decrease the 
price of undeveloped land outside of the urban boundary.  Undeveloped land outside of an urban boundary can no 
longer be developed in the future without a modification to the boundary.  This makes undeveloped land outside of 
the urban boundary less desirable and less valuable than it was before the boundary was established and less 
valuable than land within the urban boundary (Nelson 1985, 1986; Knaap and Nelson 1992, pp. 42-44). 
 122 
Figure 4-4. Supply and Demand of Non-Urban Residential Land Outside of Urban Boundary 
D0 S0 
QLHNU 
PLHNU 
PLHNU0 
S1 
 
The implementation of an urban containment policy will increase demand for urban 
residential land, which is located within the urban boundary.  Demand will increase because 
consumers who would otherwise pursue residential land in a location outside of the urban 
boundary must shift their pursuit of residential land to within the boundary once it is established.  
This shift in demand is illustrated by the shift from D0 to D1 in Figure 4.5. The price of urban 
residential land will increase from PLHU0 to PLHU1. 
The discussion regarding the impact of urban containment on residential land values, 
graphically represented in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, makes two significant assumptions.  The first 
assumption is that the urban containment policy is successful in preventing development outside 
of urban boundaries established by the policy.  If development continues outside of the 
boundaries, there will likely be little impact on land prices as the policy is not adequately 
restricting land uses and affecting the supply of residential land (Nelson 1986).  Exceptionally 
large minimum lot sizes, and other zoning restrictions, are typically used to prevent residential 
development outside of urban boundaries from occurring (Nelson and Dawkins 2004, pp. 9-10).  
Minimum lot requirements can used to prevent large-scale residential development.  Farquhar 
(1999, p. 9) reports that these minimum lot requirements outside of urban boundaries range from 
10 to 230 acres per unit.  In Britain, residential development on land within protected greenbelt 
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areas is prevented by restrictions on construction and building improvements.  Buildings can 
only be constructed for agricultural uses (Evans 1991). 
 
Figure 4-5. Supply and Demand of Urban Residential Land Inside of Urban Boundary 
D0 S0 
D1 
QLHU 
PLHU 
PLHU0 
PLHU1 
 
 
The second assumption is that total demand for residential land in the region is flat, or 
declining.  This assumes that there is flat, or declining, population and economic growth.  The 
increase in demand in Figure 4.5 comes from the displaced demand that would, without urban 
containment, otherwise occur for residential land located outside of the urban boundary.  With an 
increase in overall demand, either through an increase in the region’s population or income, there 
would a larger increase in demand in the urban residential land market.  There would also be an 
increase in the demand for non-urban residential land, which would be illustrated by an upward 
shift in the demand curve in Figure 4.4. 
4.3 URBAN CONTAINMENT AND THE HOUSING MARKET 
This section expands the discussion of urban containment from its impact on residential land 
values to its impact on housing costs and the supply of affordable housing for low-income 
 124 
households.  This section first explains the impact of higher residential land costs, the result of 
urban containment, on the general housing market.  The section then explains the increase in 
demand for housing within urban containment boundaries as consumers who would otherwise 
buy housing outside of the urban boundaries must shift their demand to housing located inside 
the boundaries.  Finally, the section presents the theoretical impact of urban containment on the 
supply of affordable housing, delineating the general housing market into affordable and 
unaffordable submarkets to do so. 
This section first provides a general model of supply and demand in a housing market in 
order to understand the impact of residential land values on the housing market.56  The supply of 
housing (QHS) is a function of the cost of materials (C), labor costs (L), the cost of capital (K), 
government regulations (R), and housing prices (PH).  Producers of housing will decrease their 
supply of new units when input costs increase.  These input costs include construction materials 
(C), Labor (L), capital (K) and additional expenses associated with government regulations (R).  
When input costs decline, producers will increase the supply of housing.  When the price of 
housing (PH) increases, more housing is supplied as producers can obtain greater revenue per unit 
of housing.  When the price of housing (PH) declines, producers will supply less housing. 
Demand for housing (QHD) is a function of the market’s demographics (D), income (Y), 
amenities of the units (AU), as well as amenities of the surrounding environment (AE), and 
housing prices (PH).  Greater household income (Y) will increase the demand for housing.  
Positive amenities provided by housing units (AU), as well as by the surrounding environment 
(AE), will also increase demand as consumers prefer the positive amenities.  Higher prices in the 
housing market decrease the quantity demanded by consumers.  Likewise, lower prices increase 
the quantity demanded. 
Based on the factors which influence supply and demand in the housing market, the 
functions for each can be written as: 
Housing Supply: QHs = f (C, L, K, R, PH)    (4.5) 
Housing Demand: QHd = f (D, Y, AU, AE, PH)    (4.6) 
                                                 
56 The housing literature includes a large number of articles presenting models of supply and demand to explain 
price differentials among markets.  The model presented here is a general model drawn from Ozanne and Thibodeau 
(1983), Segal and Srinivasan (1985), Malpezzi (1996), Potepan (1996), Jud and Winkler (2002), and Wassmer and 
Baass (2006). 
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Where: QHS is the quantity of housing supply; QHD is the quantity of housing demand; C 
is cost of materials; L is labor costs; R is government regulation; PH is the price of 
housing; D is demographics; Y is income; AU is amenities of the housing units; 
and AE is amenities of the surrounding environment. 
 
The price of a housing unit (PH) is a combination of the cost of the land on which the unit 
sits and the cost of the structure itself (DiPasquale and Wheaton 1996, Chapter 3).  The price of 
residential land, therefore, is a significant factor in the total cost of housing.  The price of 
housing (PH) can be written as: 
  PH = PS + PLH        (4.7) 
Where PS is the price of the structure and PLH is the price of the residential land on which the 
structure is located.  An increase in either PS or PLH will increase the total price of a housing unit. 
Additionally, the cost of a housing unit’s structure (PS) is a combination of input costs for 
the development of the unit.  These input costs include construction materials, labor, and 
regulation in the form of building codes which require a minimum level of quality.  The 
structural cost of a unit can be written as a function of these input costs: 
  PS = f (C, L, R)        (4.8) 
If the input costs of construction materials or labor increase, the price of the structure increases.  
Similarly, an increase in regulation requiring additional inputs to a structure will increase the 
price of the structure. 
An assumption is made that the housing market is in equilibrium where the quantity 
demanded equals the quantity supplied.  If the market were not in equilibrium, both the quantity 
supplied and quantity demanded would slowly adjust to reach equilibrium.  The explanation for 
these adjustments is the same as that given for equilibrium being assumed in the previous section 
for the residential land market.  If there is a shortage in the housing market, where demand is 
greater than supply, the excess demand results in an increase of prices.  The price increase 
encourages housing producers to increase the quantity of housing supplied while the higher 
prices encourage consumers to reduce their quantity demanded.  Eventually, the market reaches 
equilibrium.  If there is a surplus in the housing market, where supply is greater than demand, the 
opposite changes will occur.  Prices fall as producers have produced too much housing.  As 
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prices fall, consumers increase the quantity demanded and producers decrease the quantity 
supplied until the market is in equilibrium. 
When the housing market is in equilibrium, the following equation can be written: 
  QHS = QHD        (4.9) 
 
Because price is a factor in both the supply and demand equations, we can obtain a 
reduce-form function which solves for the price of housing.  Therefore, the price of housing (PH) 
can be written as:  
  PH = f (C, L, K, R, D, Y, AU, AE, O, W, G, PLH)   (4.10) 
This equation illustrates that the price of housing is a function of variables which 
influence both the supply of and demand for housing.  PLH is included in equation 4.10 as it is a 
component of PH.  PS is not explicitly included in equation 4.10 as it is a function of C, L, and R, 
as shown in equation 4.8.   
The model represented by equation 4.10 allows us to theorize about the impact of urban 
containment on the price of housing.  Urban containment is a government mandate (G) which 
was shown in Section 4.2, Figure 4.2, to restrict the supply of developable residential land, 
increasing its cost.  Assuming all other things, such as the type of housing, are kept constant, the 
price increase for residential land will result in a decrease in the supply of housing units (Knaap 
and Nelson 1992, p. 72).   Higher input costs reduce the quantity of housing produced by 
suppliers.  Figure 4.6 illustrates this decline in housing supply with a shift in the supply curve 
from S0 to S1.  The price of housing increases from PH0 to PH1. 
Theoretically, urban containment could also increase demand for housing by improving 
the amenities provided by the surrounding environment (AE) (Knaap and Nelson 1992, pp. 72-
74).57  By preserving undeveloped land and creating more open space in an area, urban 
containment may improve the quality of life which is associated with the environment.  People 
may prefer to live in places with better environmental amenities.  Figure 4.6 illustrates this 
increase in the demand for housing with a shift in the demand curve from D0 to D1.  The price of 
housing increases further from PH1 to PH2. 
 
                                                 
57 Also see Fischel (1988) for a literature review of the impact of local land use controls on the supply and demand 
of housing. 
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Figure 4-6. Supply and Demand of Housing with Implementation of Urban Containment 
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Source:  Knaap and Nelson (1992, p. 72) 
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The increase in housing prices as a result of urban containment presents potential 
implications for the supply of affordable housing.  A general increase of prices in the housing 
market will likely decrease the supply of units which are affordable for low-income households.  
As prices increase, the price of some affordable housing units filters up to unaffordable levels.  
However, the literature review in Chapter Three showed that the only study specifically testing 
the link between urban containment and affordable rental units did not find a statistically 
significant relationship.58  The relationship between urban containment and the supply of 
affordable housing will be further explored in Section 4.3.2. 
4.3.1 Urban Containment and Segmented Housing Markets 
Before discussing the relationship between urban containment and the supply of housing 
affordable for low-income households, this section explains urban containment’s division of the 
housing market into the urban market located within the urban containment boundaries and the 
non-urban market located outside of the boundaries.  In theory, supply in the non-urban housing 
                                                 
58 See Pendall (2000). 
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market will become inelastic as development restrictions prohibit increases in the supply of 
housing regardless of price changes in the housing market.  In reality, some new housing can be 
developed outside of urban boundaries, but in a limited quantity. 59 
Figure 4.7 illustrates the shift from an elastic supply to an inelastic supply of housing in 
the non-urban market.  The supply curve shifts from S0 to S1.  Demand for housing will increase 
in the non-urban housing market.  Demand likely increases because of environmental amenities 
associated with the development restrictions.  The literature reviewed in Chapter Three indicated 
housing consumers value permanent open space in the vicinity of their home (Geoghegan 2002; 
Irwin 2002; Roe, Irwin, and Morrow-Jones 2004).  Residents of housing outside of the urban 
boundary are, theoretically, guaranteed that undeveloped land surrounding their home will not be 
developed.  This increase in demand in the non-urban housing market is illustrated in Figure 4.7 
by the shift in the demand curve from D0 to D1.  Housing prices will increase in the non-urban 
housing market.  However, the supply will not adjust to greater demand and higher prices, as 
shown by S1, because of development restrictions in the non-urban market. 
 
Figure 4-7.  Supply and Demand in Non-Urban Housing Market 
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59 The supply of housing outside of urban boundaries is not perfectly inelastic.  As mentioned previously, a typical 
policy of urban containment allows new residential development outside of urban boundaries but requires 
excessively large minimum lot sizes.  These large lot requirements, in theory, make the number of new housing units 
negligible in comparison to new housing within the urban boundaries. 
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 In the urban housing market, a decrease in the supply of housing will occur as a result of 
higher residential land prices.  This shift is illustrated in Figure 4.8 with the supply curve shifting 
from S0 to S1.  Demand will shift upward in the urban housing market for two reasons.  First, 
housing consumers who would otherwise prefer housing outside of the urban boundary will have 
to shift their demand to housing located within the urban boundaries because the supply of 
housing outside of the urban boundaries is limited to the supply that already exists.  Second, 
amenities attributed to urban containment will increase demand for housing.  Within the urban 
boundaries, the amenities include less sprawl, shorter commute times, and preservation of open 
space throughout the region (Engle, Navarro, and Carson 1992; Richmond 1997).  This increase 
in demand is illustrated in Figure 4.8 by the shift in the demand curve from D0 to D1. 
 
Figure 4-8. Supply and Demand in Urban Housing Market 
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4.3.2 Urban Containment and Affordable Housing 
The theoretical discussion to this point has addressed the impact of urban containment on 
residential land values and housing prices in the housing market.  It has not dealt specifically 
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with its impact on the supply of affordable units for low-income households.  The previous 
sections illustrated that urban containment increases the cost of residential land which then 
increases the price of housing in the housing market.  Assuming household incomes do not 
increase along with housing prices, the price of some affordable units would filter up to an 
unaffordable level for low-income households.  Therefore, an increase in prices in the general 
housing market decreases the supply of units affordable for low-income households. 
To further consider the impact of urban containment on the supply of affordable housing 
units for low-income households, we will examine the urban housing market (housing within 
urban boundaries) and assume that it consists of two inter-related submarkets, one of affordable 
units for low-income households and one of non-affordable units, as discussed in Section 4.1.  
An exogenous supply (or demand) shock to the housing market will impact each of the 
submarkets in a slightly different manner.  These exogenous shocks can be a variety of events, 
including changes in residential land values, constructions costs, government regulations, 
amenities, and household income.  In the case of the implementation of an urban containment 
policy, the exogenous supply shock is an increase in residential land values. 
As discussed in the previous section, restrictions on the supply of residential land will 
cause a decrease in the supply of housing.  The decrease in housing supply will occur in both the 
affordable and non-affordable housing submarkets.60  Figures 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate the change 
in supply within the non-affordable and affordable housing submarkets, respectively, with the 
shift in the supply curve from S0 to S1.  This shift in supply will result in rising home prices 
throughout the market.   
In addition to the shift in supply, this section previously presented the theory that urban 
containment would increase demand in the urban housing market.  Demand would increase in 
both the non-affordable, as well as the affordable, submarkets for two reasons.  First, improved 
amenities created by urban containment policies may increase the demand for housing (Knaap 
and Nelson 1992, p. 72).  Second, the restriction on residential development outside of urban 
boundaries will increase housing demand in the urban market, both for non-affordable and 
                                                 
60 It could be argued that greater residential land costs may have a greater initial impact on the supply of housing in 
the non-affordable housing submarket.  Newly produced units are predominantly unaffordable to low-income 
households and it is the production of new units which would decline as a result of higher land values.  Rothenberg 
et. al (1991), however, argue that increases in input costs impact the supply throughout the entire market.  In 
addition, higher residential land costs would impact the development of subsidized units for low-income households. 
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affordable housing.  This shift in demand throughout the urban housing market is illustrated by 
the shift from D0 to D1 in Figures 4.9 and 4.10. 
 
Figure 4-9. Non-Affordable Housing Submarket  
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Figure 4-10. Affordable Housing Submarket 
D0 S0 
S1 
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For this discussion, we will assume that the affordable housing submarket mostly consists 
of units that are of lower quality than housing in the non-affordable submarket.  Typically, units 
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priced 
s of low-quality affordable housing to upgrade their 
units in
 will initially shift from S0 
to S1, r
sult of higher residential land values.  A further decreasing 
shift in
at an affordable level for low-income households are of lower quality because there is a 
lack of economic incentive among owners of the affordable housing stock to maintain the units 
at a higher level of quality.  Owners of the affordable housing stock will not increase the quality 
of their units, by increasing their expenditures on maintenance and renovations, without 
expecting to be able to increase their rents. 
An exogenous factor introduced into the housing market, such as an urban containment 
policy, may provide an incentive for owner
 quality and price, making them no longer affordable for low-income households.  If an 
increase in prices occurs in the housing market as a result of a reduction in supply or an increase 
in demand, some owners may improve the quality of their units given that the higher rents they 
can collect allow them the opportunity to upgrade their units.  The upgraded units would be lost 
from the affordable housing submarket.  The units would move from the affordable housing 
submarket to the non-affordable housing submarket.  This additional decrease in the affordable 
housing supply is represented by the supply shift from S1 to S2 in Figure 4.10.  Meanwhile, the 
upgrading of low-quality units would increase the supply of units in the higher quality non-
affordable market, as illustrated by a shift from S1 to S3 in Figure 4.9. 
In summary, figure 4.9 graphically illustrates the theoretical impact of urban containment 
on prices in the non-affordable housing submarket.  The supply curve
epresenting a decrease in supply in response to higher residential land values.  However, 
property owners will respond to higher housing prices by upgrading units in the affordable 
housing market which were initially of low quality.  The movement of units from the affordable 
submarket to the non-affordable submarket will shift the supply curve of non-affordable units 
from S1 to S3 and partially off-set the loss caused by urban containment.  Figure 4.9 shows that 
the price of housing in the non-affordable submarket will increase from PH0 to PH1 while the 
change in quantity is indeterminate.   
Figure 4.10 represents the affordable, low-quality housing submarket.  The supply curve 
will initially shift from S0 to S1 as a re
 supply from S1 to S2 will occur as a result of property owners upgrading their units from 
the affordable submarket to the unaffordable submarket.  Figure 4.10 shows that the quantity of 
housing in the affordable submarket will decrease from Q0 to Q1.  Comparing figures 4.9 and 
4.10, it is clear that, theoretically, urban containment will have greater consequences on the 
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quantity and price of housing in the lower-quality submarket than on other segments of the 
housing market.61 
The units lost from the low quality housing submarket to the non-affordable market are 
likely the affordable units which are of better quality prior to their upgrading.  Owners of the low 
quality
le to the lowest income households even if the units’ quality remains 
unimpr
rdable housing submarket, as well as of prices in the non-
afforda
                                                
 stock will first upgrade the units which require the smallest expense to improve their 
quality (Rothenberg et al. 1991).  By upgrading units which require the minimal level of 
upgrading costs, owners will maximize their profits.  The units requiring extensive rehabilitation 
in order to achieve higher quality are less likely to be upgraded.  The implication of this behavior 
among property owners is that the units which remain of low-quality and affordable to low-
income households are of the lowest quality units.  Potentially, the quality of the low-quality 
submarket declines further. 
Additionally, an increase in prices in the affordable submarket will make some of the 
low-quality units unaffordab
oved.  A price increase in the affordable submarket decreases the supply of low-income 
housing to some extent regardless of the quality upgrading of units, assuming the income of low-
income households does not increase. 
This section presented the theory that the supply of affordable housing is a function of 
exogenous factors influencing the affo
ble submarket.  The exogenous factor of interest was an urban containment policy 
resulting in an increase in residential land values.  Similar scenarios are conceivable for changes 
to any of the explanatory factors of the supply and the demand for housing, including changes in 
household income, environmental amenities, household composition, construction costs, or 
government regulation.  Therefore, the supply of affordable housing is a function of the variables 
presented in the discussion of supply and demand in the housing market in equation (4.10).  The 
quantity of affordable housing units for low-income households can be written as: 
  Qafford = f (C, L, K, R, D, Y, AE, AU, O, W, G, PLH)  (4.11) 
  Where:  Qafford is the quantity of affordable units 
 
61 Malpezzi and Green (1996) provided empirical evidence for this theory.  Among metropolitan regions, they found 
that higher levels of land use restrictions were associated with higher prices in the lowest cost submarket relative to 
the region’s other submarkets.  In addition, vacancy rates were lower in the lowest cost/quality submarket in regions 
with more regulation, indicating a tighter market for the lowest priced submarkets. 
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4 SING MARKET 
Up to this point in the theoretical discussion, there has been no consideration of the potential 
 the 
marketplace as a result of urban containment.  If the type of housing throughout the market 
d, helps to ensure that 
future g
lained the process through which urban containment 
increas
their urban containment initiatives often do so by requiring local municipalities within their 
.4 URBAN CONTAINMENT, DENSITY, AND THE HOU
changes that may occur in the structural characteristics and type of housing available in
remains consistent, an increase in the cost of residential land increases the cost of housing and 
decreases the supply of units, particularly for low-income households.  However, it is likely that 
the type of housing in the market and its structural characteristics will change with the 
implementation of urban containment and higher residential land values.  The changes are likely 
to occur in two ways, both of which reduce the amount of land per unit of housing.  First, 
housing units will become smaller and more multi-unit structures will become available.  
Second, the physical size of housing units may remain constant, but lot sizes will decline.  Either 
of these changes will increase residential density, which is measured as the number of housing 
units, households, or residents located on a given area of land.  This section explains the reason 
behind this change in density, as well as its impact on affordable housing. 
There are two reasons why urban containment increases residential density.  First, greater 
density is often required by legislative mandate accompanying urban containment policies.  
Greater density, which increases the amount of development per unit of lan
rowth can be accommodated on land located within the boundaries of urban containment 
(Nelson and Dawkins 2004, Chapter 6).  This accommodation helps to prevent development 
from occurring outside of the boundaries. 
Greater density is also legislated because it is a potential method of countering the 
negative consequences that urban containment has on housing prices (Knaap and Nelson 1992, 
pp. 77-80).  This chapter previously exp
es residential land values which in turn decreases the supply of housing if the type of 
housing remains constant.  This reduction in supply increases prices.  By increasing density in 
urban areas, the supply of housing can be increased.  This increase will partially off-set the 
decrease which occurs as a result of urban containment (Staley, Edgens, and Mildner 1999; 
Carruthers 2002; Nelson and Dawkins 2004). 
State, regional, or county governments which include minimum density targets as part of 
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jurisdictions to take steps to increase density (Nelson and Dawkins 2004, Chapter 6).  Local 
governments are encouraged to achieve greater density using a variety of techniques, including 
allowin
n 
the sup
Hamilt
 market remain constant.  Second, the number of 
multi-u
ential density 
shifts the supply curve from S0 to S1.  As a result, a new equilibrium where the quantity of 
g smaller lot sizes, accessory apartments in existing homes, zero lot line development 
(which allows a home to sit along the boundary line of a lot, thereby not placing the home in the 
middle of yard), and multi-family housing (Atash 1990, p. 240; Smart Growth Network 2002). 
The second reason why residential density increases in response to urban containment is 
that developers will choose to use less land in relation to other housing inputs, such as materials 
and labor, in response to higher residential land values (Mills and Hamilton 1989, pp. 126-127; 
Knaap and Nelson 1992, pp. 73-74; DiPasquale and Wheaton 1996, pp. 79-81).  A restriction o
ply of developable residential land increases residential land costs (PLH) relative to the 
other inputs.  To maximize their profits, developers will substitute for the more expensive land, 
other structural inputs (DiPasquale and Wheaton 1996, pp. 74-78).  The substitution away from 
land results in developers using their land more intensely by building more units per area of land. 
Because the cost of a home is equal to the price of the structure plus the price of the land, 
consumers may be willing to sacrifice the land around their house in response to higher 
residential land prices (Song and Knaap 2004).  They will substitute for land either other 
structural amenities in their home or non-housing goods which are less expensive (Mills and 
on 1989, p. 127).  Therefore, consumers demand less land per unit of housing while 
producers provide less land per unit of housing. 
The increase in residential density can be realized in two ways with regard to the housing 
stock.  First, consumers may be willing to sacrifice the size of their yard but maintain the same 
size home (Song and Knaap 2004).  In this situation, residential density increases but the 
distribution of the sizes and type of homes in the
nit structures and townhomes may increase relative to the number of detached single-
family homes.  Multi-unit structures, such as condominiums and apartment buildings, by their 
very nature result in higher residential densities (Knaap and Nelson 1992, p. 73).   
Greater residential density increases the number of available units in a housing market as 
there are more units built on any given area of land.  In an unregulated environment with no land 
use restrictions, higher density will be associated with a greater supply of housing units, 
including affordable units for low-income households.  In Figure 4.11, greater resid
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housing supplied equals the quantity demanded will be reached.  The quantity of housing 
increases from QH0 to QH1 and the price of housing declines from PH0 to PH1.  A decrease in 
prices in the housing market will increase the quantity of affordable units for low-income 
households as some previously unaffordable units would become affordable. 
 
 Figure 4-11. Effect of Greater Residential Density on Supply and Demand in a General Housing 
Market 
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This explanation for the positive association between density and the supply of affordable 
housing assumes density is homogenous throughout a single housing market.  However, there is 
not a uniform level of density throughout a single housing market.  Within the same housing 
market some neighborhoods have a large number of units on a given area of land, consisting o
small lot homes, multi-unit structures, townhomes, or a variety of each, while other 
neighb
f 
orhoods predominantly consist of low-density large lot single-family homes.  If 
consumers have a choice between a neighborhood of higher density or lower density, many 
economists argue that consumers will choose a lower density neighborhood as consumers prefer 
low-density single-family homes with yards (DiPasquale and Wheaton 1996, pp. 74; Shultz and 
King 2001; Song and Knaap 2003).  Therefore, there will be less demand for housing in 
neighborhoods of greater density, lower housing prices, and a greater supply of affordable units. 
If we view the general housing market as two submarkets presented in Section 4.1, higher 
density housing may increase the supply of units in the affordable submarket.  The types of 
 137 
housing that are higher density are often the most typical type of housing occupied by low-
income households.  Multi-unit structures, in particular, are more likely to be found in the 
affordable submarket than in the non-affordable submarket because they are smaller than single-
family 
demand for housing within the 
urban h
dwellings.  Therefore, an increase in the supply of these types of high-density units is 
likely to increase the quantity of housing in the affordable submarket. 
Density may have no impact on the price and supply of housing in a region with urban 
containment limiting the supply of residential land.  This theoretical discussion focuses on the 
impact of density within the urban market, or the market for housing located within the urban 
boundaries of an urban containment policy.  Theoretically, density cannot change in locations 
outside of the boundaries because of restrictions on development. 
Figure 4.12 illustrates the shifts in supply and demand in the urban housing market as a 
result of both urban containment and increases in residential density.  The initial equilibrium, 
where the quantity demanded for housing equals the quantity supplied prior to urban 
containment, is represented by point A.  The beginning of section 4.3 discussed the impact of the 
implementation of an urban containment policy on the supply and 
ousing market.  Keeping density constant, urban containment decreases the supply of 
housing because of higher residential land values.  This decrease is represented in Figure 4.11 by 
the shift in the supply curve from S0 to S1.  On the demand side, demand in the urban housing 
market increases as a result of urban containment (Knaap and Nelson 1992, p. 72).  The increase 
in demand is illustrated in Figure 4.12 by the shift in the demand curve from D0 to D1.   
The new equilibrium of supply and demand for housing in response to urban containment 
is represented by point B, keeping density constant.  The shift in the equilibrium from point A to 
point B illustrates that housing prices rise in the urban housing market with the implementation 
of urban containment policies without a change in residential density.  But, density is expected to 
increase in response to urban containment. 
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Figure 4-12. Supply and Demand in Urban Housing Market, with Implementation of Urban 
t and Change in Residential Density Containmen
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The increase in density which is expected as a result of urban containment will partially 
off-set the decrease in the housing supply (Miller 1986; Staley, Edgens, and Mildner 1999).  
Greater residential density increases the number of housing units on a given area of land.  
Therefore, greater residential density shifts the supply curve from S1 to S2.  In order for housing 
prices not to rise as a result of urban containment, density would have to increase enough to off-
set the 
 affordable 
units for low-income households.  
 
density 
 
loss of housing units from the implementation of urban containment.   Point C in Figure 
4.12 represents a potential equilibrium point with an increase in the supply of housing as a result 
of greater residential density.  Figure 4.12 illustrates that an increase in residential density will 
reduce the pressure on housing prices that urban containment may otherwise create.  
With this theoretical framework in mind, two hypotheses are tested concerning the 
relationship among density and the supply of affordable housing in areas with and without urban 
containment policies. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Greater housing density is associated with a greater supply of
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On the supply side, greater housing density increases the supply of available housing 
units as there are more units built on any given area of land.  An increase in supply lowers prices 
and increases the supply of affordable units for low-income households.  On the demand side, 
onsumers may prefer low-density.  Therefore, demand for housing in higher density 
 
ypoth
e housing market.  This section 
ointed out that higher density may lower the cost of housing and, in turn, increase the quantity 
the types of hou owever, 
rban c
A variety of housing options is the presence of housing types which serve as alternatives to the 
single-family home, such as townhomes and multi-unit structures.  For this research, a variety of 
housing options is defined solely as the presence of multi-unit structures.  Two hypotheses will 
be tested concerning the relationship between multi-unit structures and the supply of affordable 
housing for low-income households. 
 
c
neighborhoods will be less than in low density neighborhoods. 
H esis 2: In regions with urban containment, the association between greater 
housing density and a greater supply of affordable units for low-income 
households is weaker than in regions without urban containment. 
 
Higher density within regions of urban containment will not necessarily be associated 
with a greater supply of affordable units for low-income households for two reasons.  First, there 
are two contradicting forces at work on the supply side of th
p
of affordable units through both the reduction in prices, as well as an increase in the supply of 
sing units most typically found in the affordable housing submarket.  H
u ontainment policies increase the cost of residential land, a significant input cost for 
housing (Knaap 1985; Nelson 1985).  This increase reduces the supply of housing and increases 
prices for all types of housing.  It is unknown the extent to which higher density will off-set the 
higher housing prices caused by urban containment. 
4.5 URBAN CONTAINMENT, VARIETY OF HOUSING OPTIONS, AND THE 
HOUSING MARKET 
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 Hypothesis 3:   A greater supply of multi-unit structures, a measure of a variety of housi
seholds. 
ng 
options, is associated with a greater supply of affordable units for low-
income hou
 
A greater variety of housing options within a neighborhood will increase the supply of 
is that multi-unit structures are more likely to be in the 
ffordable housing submarket than the non-affordable submarket.  An increase in this type of 
 
ypothesis 4: In regions with urban containment, the association between multi-unit   
s may decrease while the 
roduction of multi-unit structures may increase to make more efficient and intensive use of 
The quantity of s
 PSF1. 
affordable units for low-income households for two reasons.  Both of the reasons are similar to 
those explaining the positive relationship between density and affordable housing.  The first 
reason is that multi-unit structures increase the supply of housing units on a given area of land.  
This increase in supply lowers prices which should make more units affordable.  The second 
reason for the positive relationship 
a
housing will increase supply within the affordable housing submarket. 
H
structures and a greater supply of affordable units for low-income 
households is weaker than in regions without urban containment. 
 
Urban containment may weaken the positive relationship between multi-unit structures 
and affordable housing.  If the housing market is divided into two types of housing, single-family 
housing and multi-unit structures, urban containment will cause a shift in the supply of both 
types.  Multi-unit structures use land more intensely and efficiently in terms of the number of 
housing units on a given area of land than single-family homes.  Because of higher land costs as 
a result of urban containment, the production of single-family dwelling
p
land.  Figure 4.13 shows the decline in the supply of single-family housing units from S0 to S1.  
ingle family units declines from QSF0 to QSF1 and their price increases from PSF0 
to
A price increase for single-family housing may push households to demand other types of 
housing as a substitute for single-family units.  Figure 4.13 shows a decline in the quantity of 
single-family homes demanded along the demand curve (D0) when the supply shifts from S0 to 
S1. 
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Figure 4-13.  Supply and Demand of Single-Family Units 
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Assuming only two types of housing in the market, single-family units and multi-unit structures, 
demand for housing in multi-unit structures will increase as consumers will choose it as a 
substitute for single-family homes.  Figure 4.14 shows this change in demand for housing in 
multi-unit structures with a shift from D0 to D1.  At the same time, there will be a shift in the 
supply of housing in multi-unit structures because of higher land costs.  This change in supply is 
illustrated by the shift from S0 to S1 in Figure 4.14.  A shown in Figure 4.14, the supply of 
housing in multi-unit structures increases from QMF0 to QMF1. 
While an increase in housing in multi-unit structures is typically expected to increase the 
supply of affordable units, the positive association may not be as strong in this situation.
emand for housing in multi-unit structures is also increasing.  Because of this shift in demand, 
roducts.  The inclusion of these 
  
D
two things will occur which limit the affordability of multi-unit housing for low-income 
households.  First, households who would otherwise prefer single-family units shift their housing 
demand to the multi-unit market.  Greater demand for housing in multi-units structures will 
increase the price of these units.  Second, higher-income households who, in areas without urban 
containment, would prefer a single-family unit may demand higher quality amenities in their 
multi-unit housing as a substitute.  These higher quality amenities could include more space, 
more advanced applicances, and higher quality building p
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amenities would make these units unaffordable for low-income households.  For these reasons, 
the positive relationship between multi-unit structures and the supply of affordable housing will 
be weaker in areas of urban containment. 
 
Figure 4-14. Supply and Demand of Housing in Multi-Unit Structures 
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4.6 URBAN CONTAINMENT, MIXED LAND USE, AND THE HOUSING MARKET   
There is little theoretical or empirical literature regarding the impact of urban containment on 
mixed land use.  Mixed land use is defined as the diversity of land uses, such as a mixture of 
commercial, residential, and industrial uses, within a specified geographic area.  Among smart 
growth advocates, the principle of mixed land use is more narrowly defined.  Their definition of 
mixed land use refers to a diversity of activities people typically undertake in daily life within a 
neighborhood.  The activities include employment, retail, entertainment, and professional 
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services that are easily accessible to residents, preferably by walking or public transit (Calthorpe 
and Fulton 2001, p. 55).62 
tructural costs for land costs as the price of land increases.   
f commercial activities will increase as land costs increase.  This more 
                                                
There are two factors which may encourage mixed land use development in areas of 
urban containment.  First, prices rise within the urban boundaries not only for residential land, 
but also for commercial and industrial land as well.  Prices increase for developable land for all 
uses as development on land outside of the urban boundaries is restricted (Knaap 1985; Nelson 
1985, 1986).  As in the residential land market, higher commercial and industrial land costs in 
relation to other inputs of commercial activities, such as construction costs, entice developers to 
use a greater amount of investment capital in commercial and industrial structures per unit of 
land.  They will substitute s 63
Therefore, the density o
intense use of land may increase the mix of commercial activities within neighborhoods. 
The second factor that will increase the mix of land uses within neighborhoods of urban 
containment is greater population density.  As discussed in Section 4.4, urban containment 
policies are likely to increase density within urban boundaries.  Greater population density 
provides an incentive for a greater number of stores and other commercial activities to locate in 
closer proximity to one another.64  Stores can achieve the same level of revenue from a small 
geographic area of greater population density as from a larger geographic area of lower density.  
Assuming that the cost of constructing and operating commercial facilities remains constant, 
stores draw revenue from a smaller market area when population density is greater.    
Mixed land use can only increase if zoning ordinances do not prohibit it.  There is a long 
history, since the early 20th century, in the United States of exclusionary zoning policies which 
prohibit non-residential land uses from residential neighborhoods (Fischel 2004).  Zoning is 
 
62 Popular books advocating for smart growth and mixed use neighborhoods do not include industrial uses in the 
es 
tion of capital expenses 
 
ivan (2003, Chapt. 5). 
mix.  For example, Calthorpe and Fulton (2001) argue that industrial sites and factories should not be part of 
residential communities, stating that “the low intensity of jobs in light industry and factory areas, the need for 
frequent truck access, and the scale of buildings do not lend themselves to mixed-use areas.  Warehouse faciliti
and businesses that use toxic materials also need separation into special districts (p. 55).” 
63 See Mills and Hamilton (1989, pp. 97-98) regarding commodity producing firms’ substitu
(buildings, equipment, etc.) for land as land prices increase.  A firm choosing between construction of two similar-
sized buildings or one building tall enough to provide the same output as the two buildings will base its decision on
the price of land.  The firm will also base its decision on the fact that the capital costs of one tall building are likely 
higher than two smaller buildings.  To the extent that savings on land costs exceed the additional capital expense of 
construction, firms will choose the taller, single building. 
64 For a full explanation, as well as an example, see O’Sull
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typically adopted as a means to protect homeowners from adjacent land use activities which 
could lower the value of their property.  Zoning typically excludes industrial activities, retail and 
other commercial activities, as well as multi-unit structures, from neighborhoods of single-family 
homes.  Smart growth advocates claim that zoning must be reformed in order to facilitate mixed 
use development (Smart Growth Network 2002, p. 4-7; Langdon 2006). 
The impact of mixed land use on the price of housing and the supply of affordable units 
for low-income households is dependent on a number of factors.  Most important is the level of 
demand among housing consumers for mixed land use neighborhoods versus their demand for 
exclusively residential neighborhoods.  The literature review revealed that consumers more 
highly value housing in neighborhoods with a minimal amount of commercial land use and a 
high proportion of single family homes than in neighborhoods of high land use diversity (Stull 
1975; Song and Knaap 2003).65  Therefore, we could hypothesize that greater mixed land use is 
associated with lower housing prices in an unregulated environment and a greater supply of 
afforda
hoods in areas of urban containment. 
 
                                                
ble units. 
Urban containment, however, may alter the relationship between mixed land use and 
housing.  This chapter has explained that urban containment policies are expected to increase the 
diversity of land uses, as well as the density and types of housing, found in neighborhoods.  Song 
and Knaap (2003) found that if consumers lived in neighborhoods not dominated by single-
family homes, they preferred neighborhoods which had a more even distribution of land uses, 
including public, commercial, residential, multi-family, and industrial uses without one use 
dominating over the others.  Therefore, consumers are likely in have a higher demand for mixed 
land use neighbor
Another factor increasing the demand for mixed land use neighborhoods in areas of urban 
containment is the trade-off consumers will make between housing prices and convenience.  As 
urban containment lowers the supply of housing and raises its price, consumers may be more 
likely to prefer housing whose location helps to decrease commuting and other traveling costs. 
 
65 In contrast, Cao and Cory (1982) found a positive relationship between mixed use and housing prices, but 
concluded that their findings could have been biased.  They argued that most of their neighborhoods had only small 
amounts of commercial activity and, therefore, they could not adequately measure the impact of commercial activity 
on housing costs where the commercial activity was a significant use of land in the neighborhood.  They suggested 
that their findings would have been different if they could have included neighborhoods which had large proportions 
of commercial activity in their neighborhoods. 
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Consumers may increase their demand for housing that is located near land uses that serve their 
daily needs in term of shopping and employment.  Improved access to employment and 
commercial activities will be considered a positive amenity and increase house prices (Nelson 
and Dawkins 2004, p. 4).  The increase in demand is illustrated by the shift in the demand curve 
in Figure 4.15 from D0 to D1.  As a result, the price of housing increases from PH0 to PH1.  As 
prices increase, the quantity of housing supplied by producers will increase along the supply 
curve, S0. 
 
Figure 4-15.  Mixed Land Use Effects on Supply and Demand of Housing in Urban Housing Market 
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Even while the quantity of housing units supplied may increase, the supply of units 
affordable to low-income households should decline.  First, it can be assumed that some 
affordable units will simply rise in price to an unaffordable level for low-income households in a 
neighborhood with a positive mix of land uses.  Second, stronger demand for housing units, 
resulting in higher potential rents for property owners, encourages owners of low-quality, 
affordable units to upgrade their units.  This incentive is especially pertinent if the positive mix 
of land uses attracts higher income households demanding higher quality units. 
n the other hand, a mix of undesirable land uses that produce negative externalities to 
neighbors, such as dirty and noisy industrial sites and warehouses, would have the opposite 
O
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effect o
n regions with urban containment are 
A prim pace.  Open space can be 
preserved by reserving land for public parks within developed areas, as well as by restricting the 
policies intended
This section hypothesizes about the impact of public parks within developed areas on the 
housing market. 
                                                
n demand for housing in these neighborhoods.66  Demand will be lower for housing in 
neighborhoods with undesirable land uses.  Undesirable land uses include landfills, utility plants, 
oil refineries, and hazardous waste sites.67  Therefore, neighborhoods that containment a mix of 
‘negative’ land uses will have lower demand.  This decrease in demand is illustrated by a shift in 
demand curve from D0 to DN in Figure 4.15.  Prices will decline from PH0 to PHN.  Therefore, 
there is likely to be a greater supply of affordable housing for low-income households in 
neighborhoods with a mix of undesirable land uses.   
If the market is divided into the two submarkets of affordable and unaffordable units, 
there is likely little demand for higher quality, unaffordable units in a neighborhood with a mix 
of unwanted and undesirable land uses.  Units will more likely be of lower-quality at an 
affordable price level because owners do not have an incentive to upgrade their low-quality 
units.  Additionally, owners of higher quality units do not have an incentive to maintain the high 
level of quality because of the limited demand. 
From this discussion, the hypothesis tested in this research is: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Mixed land use neighborhoods i
associated with a lower supply of affordable housing units for low-income 
households. 
4.7 OPEN SPACE AND THE HOUSING MARKET 
ary principle of smart growth is the preservation of open s
use of undeveloped land in outlying, rural areas in metropolitan regions.  Urban containment 
 to preserve land on the outskirts of urban areas have already been presented.  
 
66  As stated previously, smart growth advocates often either ignore industrial uses when discussing mixed use or 
argue that some uses, such as industrial sites and warehouses, should not be part of residential communities. 
67 For a review of the literature regarding the impact of undesirable land uses and negative environmental 
externalities, see Farber (1998) and Boyle and Kiel (2001). 
 147 
Pu ts for low-income 
households through factors of both the demand for and supply of housing.  There are three 
park increases housing prices.  As 
which may result in a negative relationship between home values and a public park is the type of 
                                                
blic parks influence housing prices and the supply of affordable uni
reasons that the presence of a public park in a neighborhood may be associated with a smaller 
supply of affordable units for low-income households.  First, public parks present positive 
amenities, such as access to open space and recreation, to neighborhood residents.  Because of 
these positive amenities, there is a greater demand for housing in close proximity to a public park 
than for housing without access to a public park (Bolitzer and Netusil 2000; Acharya and Lewis 
2001; Shultz and King 2001; Irwin 2002).  The greater demand associated with housing near a 
a result of higher prices, the supply of units affordable to low-
income households is smaller. 
Second, Wu and Plantinga (2003) hypothesized that a public park may attract higher 
income households demanding larger lot and more expensive housing than a neighborhood 
without a public park.68  The response to greater demand for more expensive housing is easily 
understood if the two submarkets presented in Section 4.1 are considered.  Greater demand for 
more expensive housing encourages owners of low-quality, affordable housing to upgrade their 
units if they can obtain greater profits by improving the quality of their units.  This upgrading of 
units from the low-quality, affordable housing submarket to the unaffordable submarket reduces 
the supply of affordable units and increases the supply in the unaffordable submarket. 
Third, a greater proportion of land reserved for public parks reduces the amount of land 
available for housing, which increases residential land costs and reduces the housing supply.  
Therefore, a greater proportion of land reserved for public parks is associated with a lower 
supply of housing, particularly housing that is affordable for low-income households, if density 
remains constant. 
 It needs to be noted that in some instances public parks may be responsible for negative 
externalities which lower adjacent property values.  The literature review in Chapter Two 
indicated that extremely close proximity to a public park, particularly to an area of a park which 
attracts a large number of strangers, may be associated with lower home values.  Another factor 
 
68 Wu and Plantinga (2003) argued that there are opportunities for low-income households to reside near a park if 
the open space is in the central city.  This result is due to the fact that higher-income households must weigh the 
benefit of living a further distance from the CBD, where the cost per unit of housing and land is cheaper, against the 
benefit of living near a park in the central city. 
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activity
y is kept constant, the following hypothesis is tested: 
daries, open space 
within 
n boundaries is that the 
value of developable land increases in response to urban containment.  As the value of 
make their land available for development.  They cannot realize the greater value of their land 
until th
 that occurs in the park.  Some parks attract the homeless, serve as a location for a drug 
market, or provide a place for criminals to commit crime.69  Therefore, public parks may lower 
housing values if residents have a poor perception of safety within the park.70 
Based on both the demand and supply effects of public parks, and assuming that public 
perception of safet
 
Hypothesis 6:  A greater proportion of land in public parks is associated with a lower 
supply of affordable housing for low-income households. 
 
As a result of urban containment, the amount of open space within urban containment 
boundaries will decrease for two reasons.  First, the purpose of urban containment is to develop 
land located within pre-determined boundaries and on land that would otherwise be skipped over 
in favor of further outlying, more rural areas (Nelson and Duncan 1995, p. 73; Nelson et al. 
2004).  As new development is steered or required to be within the urban boun
the boundaries declines faster than it would without an urban containment policy. 
The second reason for the decrease in open space within urba
developable land increases inside the urban boundaries, land owners have a greater incentive to 
ey are willing to sell it for development (or develop it themselves).71 
The literature review in Chapter Three indicated that as the amount of undeveloped and 
private open space surrounding a home declines, public parks will become more highly valued as 
an amenity among residents.  Demand for housing in close proximity to public parks will 
                                                 
69 For example, see the numerous newspaper articles (such as Hansel (2006) and Hennessey (2006)) describing the 
recent closing of Huntridge Circle Park in Las Vegas after a homeless man stabbed and killed another homeless man 
in the park .  The park had become an infamous haven for the homeless (Kulin 2006). 
70 On the other hand, public parks surrounded by properties of low value may receive less maintenance than parks 
surrounded by higher valued properties.  For example, see a recent article in the New York Times concerning “two” 
rk. 
ill 
parks within Prospect Park in Brooklyn (Brick 2004).  There is likely a complex relationship among adjacent 
housing values, the maintenance level of the park, and the public’s perception of safety within the park.  There is a 
possibility that the value of adjacent homes influences the perception of safety of the pa
71 Nelson (2000, p. 47) stated that a primary assumption of urban containment policies is that “undeveloped land 
inside the urban boundary will come on-line in sufficient amounts and at appropriate times to sustain development.”  
However, he then suggested that this assumption has not been tested.  There is a possibility that landowners w
hold onto their undeveloped land for speculative purposes, expecting to receive even more value for the land in the 
future, rather than make it available in a timely manner. 
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increas
Hypoth
This chapter presented the theoretical framework from which to draw hypotheses concerning the 
• What is t
use, and ry low-
income households? 
 
• Are these relationships different in metropolitan areas which have implemented a form of 
urban containm  funding areas, from areas 
which have no such policy?  If so, what are these differences? 
 
ouseholds.  The 
, in 
and 
 are a significant component of the housing market, housing prices 
two different environments, an environment without urban containment and an environment with 
urban containment, on the supply of affordable housing for low-income households.  Based on 
he 
e even further.  The greater demand for public parks in areas of urban containment will 
create an even stronger association between them and higher housing prices and, in turn, a 
smaller supply of affordable housing than in areas without containment policies.  The following 
hypothesis is tested: 
 
esis 7: In regions of urban containment, the association between a greater 
proportion of land in public parks and a smaller supply of affordable 
housing is stronger than in regions without urban containment. 
4.8 SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES 
research questions of the dissertation.  The two primary research questions are: 
he impact of neighborhood density, a variety of housing options, mixed land 
public parks on the supply of affordable housing for extremely and ve
ent, such as urban growth boundaries or priority
In summary, this chapter first provided a discussion of the housing market in terms of two 
submarkets, those of unaffordable units and affordable units for low-income h
chapter then theorized about the impact of urban containment on residential land values and
turn, on housing values.  Policies restricting the supply of developable land will increase l
alues.  Because land valuesv
will increase as a result.  Additionally, the supply of affordable units will decline.  The chapter 
then theorized about the impact of density, housing options, mixed land use, and public parks in 
the theoretical framework provided in this chapter, the following hypotheses are tested in t
following chapters: 
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Hypothesis 1:   Greater housing density is associated with a greater supply of affordable 
 
ociated with a lower supply of affordable housing units for low-income 
seholds. 
 
discusses the p l research designs which could be used.  It then 
non-equivalent c
Chapter S e process 
without such a p
units for low-income households. 
Hypothesis 2: In regions with urban containment, the association between greater 
housing density and a greater supply of affordable units for low-income 
households is weaker than in regions without urban containment. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  A greater supply of multi-unit structures, a measure of the variety of 
housing options, is associated with a greater supply of affordable units for 
low-income households. 
 
Hypothesis 4: In regions with urban containment, the association between multi-unit 
structures and a greater supply of affordable units for low-income 
households is weaker than in regions without urban containment. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Mixed land use neighborhoods in regions with urban containment are 
ass
hou
Hypothesis 6:  A greater proportion of land in public parks is associated with a lower 
supply of affordable housing for low-income households. 
 
 
Hypothesis 7: In regions of urban containment, the association between a greater 
proportion of land in public parks and a smaller supply of affordable 
housing is stronger than in regions without urban containment. 
 
Chapter Five presents the research design utilized to test these hypotheses.  It first 
otential quasi-experimenta
continues with the rationale for choosing an “untreated control group with pre-test and post-test” 
ontrol group research design.   
ix continues the presentation of the research design by describing th
by which appropriate regions were selected to represent areas with urban containment and areas 
olicy.  Chapter Seven provides the analyses of these hypotheses. 
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5.0 RESEARCH DESIGN  
This chapter presents the research design used to test the seven hypotheses presented in the 
previous chapter.  The purpose of this research is two-fold.  First, it is to test the relationship 
between four specific smart growth principles on the supply of affordable housing for low-
income households.  The second purpose is to test the hypothesis that the implementation of 
urban containment policies, which restrict development in outlying areas, alters the relationship 
between smart growth principles and affordable housing.  The four smart growth principles of 
interest to this research are greater density, a greater variety of housing options for all income 
groups, greater mixed land use rather than segregated land uses, and the preservation of open 
space and public parks. 
A modified quasi-experimental research design is used to test the relationships among the 
smart growth principles and affordable housing, as well as the impact of urban containment 
policies on these relationships.  A quasi-experimental design recognizes that a true experimental 
design, isolating the impact of a specific treatment on an outcome, is not possible (Cook and 
Campbell 1979; Reichardt and Mark 1998).  The ‘quasi-experiment’ in this research is the 
comparison of the relationships found among smart growth and affordable housing in a region of 
urban containment with the relationships found in a region without urban containment.  An urban 
containment policy is the treatment given to one group with its findings then compared to the 
findings of the control group. 
The first section of this chapter reviews the threats to validity, or threats to the 
“truthfulness”, of research findings.  The potential threats to accurate results and appropriate 
conclusions are threats to the internal, external, statistical, and construct validity of the research.  
Internal validity is the extent to which the research design is able to accurately assess the 
relationship between a treatment variable (Cook and Campbell 1979, p. 38).  External validity is 
the extent to which generalizations can be made from the research population to other 
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populations in different settings and at different times (Reichardt and Mark 1998, p. 198).  
Statistical validity refers to the extent to which appropriate inferences are made regarding the 
covariation between a cause and effect based on adequate statistical methods evidence (Cook and 
Campbell 1979, p. 37; Bickm dity is the extent 
to which the variable measures used in the research reflect the ideas expressed in the theory or is 
the research measuring what it says it is measuring (Cook and Campbell 1979, p. 38; Trochim 
2001, p. 22 & p. 69).  The potential threats to each form of validity are discussed. 
eriment research designs from which to choose.  The chapter 
conclud
pbell refer to four types of validity – internal, 
externa
an, Rog, and Hedrick 1998, p. 11).  Construct vali
The second section presents the strengths and weaknesses of potential research designs.  
Two primary designs for conducting research are the experiment and quasi-experiment.  An 
experiment can be performed when subjects can be randomly assigned to receive a specified 
treatment which is of interest to the researcher.  Random assignment ensures that other variables 
which differentiate subjects from one another are randomly present in both the treatment group 
receiving a treatment and the control group.  Therefore, differences in outcome between the 
treatment and control groups can be more confidently attributed to the treatment.  Quasi-
experiments are a group of research designs utilized when random assignment is not possible.  
There are multiple quasi-exp
es with a quasi-experiment design that is utilized in this research. 
5.1 THREATS TO VALIDITY 
Validity refers to the ‘truthfulness’ of research findings.  Cook and Campbell (1979, p. 37) wrote 
that the “concepts of validity and invalidity refer to the best available approximation to the truth 
or falsity of propositions.”72  Cook and Cam
l, statistical, and construct – which the research must try to protect in order to obtain 
approximately truthful conclusions.  Threats to validity refer to the possibility that incorrect 
inferences or conclusions can be made as a result of a researcher not considering every plausible 
alternative explanation for the observed outcomes. 
                                                 
72 Also see Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2003, Chapters 2 & 3) for a similar discussion regarding validity. 
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5.1.1 Internal Validity 
Internal validity is the extent to which approximately truthful inferences are made regarding the 
co-variation between a causation variable and an outcome variable (Cook and Campbell 1979, p. 
50; Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2003, p. 53).  Threats to internal validity create the 
misperception that event A causes outcome B, when in reality another factor is explaining 
outcom
validity.
increase in housing prices and decrease in supply of affordable units.   
The second threat to internal validity is maturation, which is the threat that “naturally 
occurring changes over time could be confused with a treatment effect” (Shadish, Cook, and 
Campbell 2003, p. 5  is the supply of affordable 
housing for low-income households.  One potential natural effect on the supply of affordable 
est and post-test.  For example, the method of 
collecting housing cost data may be different between the time affordable housing is measured 
prior to urban containment and the time affordable housing is measured after urban containment 
e B.  Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2003, p. 55) identify nine potential threats to internal 
 
The first threat is history.  History is the threat that another event has occurred that affects 
the outcome variable, but has not been captured by the research design (Reichardt and Mark 
1998, p. 200; Trochim 2001, p. 183).  One example of the history threat to internal validity is 
economic growth.  Stronger growth is a significant factor influencing the supply and demand for 
housing.  Economic growth increases demand for housing which increases housing prices, as 
well as potentially reduces the supply of affordable housing for low-incomes households.  If 
economic growth occurs in a region with urban containment, but does not occur in a comparative 
region without urban containment, urban containment will inaccurately be associated with the 
5).  In this research, the outcome of interest
housing could be the ageing of the housing stock.  Older units are more likely a source of 
affordable units than newer units.  Some regions have an older housing stock than other regions.  
If an older region has no urban containment policy, but has a larger supply of affordable housing 
units than a newer region with an urban containment policy, then the lack of an urban 
containment policy may be inaccurately credited with a greater supply of affordable units. 
The third threat to internal validity is instrumentation, which is the possibility that the 
measurement instrument changed between the pre-t
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is implemented.  In this research, the measurement instrument does not change.  Therefore, there 
is no threat of instrumentation.  
students were sim
change in the ‘cause’ 
The fourth threat is statistical regression.  The threat of statistical regression is the 
likelihood that extreme values will regress toward the mean value (Reichardt and Mark 1998, p. 
202).  For example, students with lower than average pre-test scores have a probability of 
achieving post-test scores closer to the average without any intervention.  If students with low 
pre-test scores were assigned to the treatment group, and post-tests showed improvement, the 
treatment could inaccurately be determined to be effective in increasing scores, when actually the 
ply regressing to the mean.  This threat is not too serious in this research as 
both the control and treatment groups consist of neighborhoods representing a wide range of 
affordable housing supplies. 
The fifth threat is ambiguous temporal precedence.  In attempting to determine cause and 
effect, the ‘cause’ event must occur before the ‘effect’.  Correlation studies are a classic example 
of research which illustrates covariance between a cause variable and an outcome variable, yet 
without a research design indicating that the cause variable changed first, there is no evidence of 
causation.  On the other hand, some correlation studies allow for conclusions regarding 
causation, because the other direction of causation (the outcome causes a 
variable) is implausible (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2003, p. 55). 
The sixth threat to internal validity is selection, which is the threat that there are 
“systemic differences over conditions in respondent characteristics that could also cause the 
observed effect” (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2003, p. 55).  In other words, subjects receiving 
the treatment are in some way different from those not receiving treatment.  For example, a 
region which has adopted an urban containment policy may be more progressive in social policy 
than a region which has not adopted an urban containment policy.  In turn, it might be the case 
that a more socially progressive region will be more likely to adopt affordable housing strategies 
than other regions not as progressive.  
The seventh threat is attrition, which is the fact that subjects in an experiment or quasi-
experiment occasionally drop out of the research project (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2003, p. 
59).  This is a threat to internal validity as the treatment and control groups of the research design 
will be composed of different subjects at the time of the pre-test from the time of the post-test 
(Cook and Campbell 1979, p. 53).  This attrition could result in the researcher attributing the 
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impact of the treatment variable to a change in the outcome variable when the outcome was 
actually a result of a change in the membership of the treatment and control groups.  This threat 
is not p
multaneously, “the net bias depends on the direction and magnitude 
of each
perience stronger economic 
growth
 86).  Cook and Campbell (1979, p. 73-74) identify three 
commo
resent in this research as the level of analysis will be neighborhoods, none of which are 
dropped during the analysis.  
The eighth threat to internal validity is testing, which is the possibility that exposures to a 
test will affect the results of subsequent tests.  One example is testing for the impact of a tutoring 
program.  If students are given a pre-test prior to tutoring and post-test after tutoring, they may 
do better on the post-test simply because the students had already taken a similar test.  Once 
again, this threat is not present in this research. 
The final threat to internal validity is that the other threats do not need to operate 
separately.  If they operate si
 individual bias plus whether they combine additively or multiplicatively” (Shadish, 
Cook, and Campbell 2003, p. 61).  For example, a selection-history additive threat is the 
possibility that selection bias is present in the selection of treatment and control groups, while at 
the same time the difference between the two groups also is a cause of the groups experiencing a 
different history.  Selecting a region with urban containment as a treatment group may be 
selection bias because regions with urban containment may be more sensitive to environmental 
quality.  At the same time, regions with a better environment may ex
 by attracting more new businesses than regions with poor environmental policy. 
5.1.2 External Validity 
External validity is the extent to which research findings can be generalized to other settings, 
times, persons, and treatment variations (Cook and Campbell 1979, p. 73; Trochim 2001, p. 42; 
Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2003, p.
n threats to external validity.  They are the interaction between the selection of subjects 
and treatment, the interaction of the research setting and treatment, and the interaction of history 
and treatment.  Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2003, p. 87) later added three more threats, which 
include context-dependent mediation, the interaction between the causal relationship with 
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different measures of the outcome, and the interaction between the causal relationship with 
different subtleties  of the same treatment. 
The first threat to external validity is the interaction of the selection of subjects and 
treatment.  Is there something different about the test subjects included in the research that make 
them d
rhoods may be significantly different in terms of 
their d
ting the 
research over different points in time can reduce this threat. 
the interaction of the causal relationship over different variations of a 
similar treatment (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2003, p. 87).  For example, there is a range of 
potential urban containment policies, including urban growth boundaries or urban service areas 
ifferent from the general population?  Does this difference influence the effect of the 
treatment?  For example, if the research focuses on the impact of urban containment policies on 
the relationship between the four smart growth principles and affordable housing in the 
neighborhoods of Portland, Oregon, can we assume that urban containment would have the same 
impact in New York City?  New York’s neighbo
ensity, the type of housing available, and the supply of affordable housing.  This 
difference between the neighborhoods of Portland and New York City may make conclusions 
regarding Portland not generalizable to New York.73 
The second threat to external validity is the interaction between the setting and the 
treatment is the second threat.  Can results from one setting be generalized to another setting?  
For example, can results from metropolitan regions be generalized to rural areas?  Or, can results 
from the largest metropolitan regions be generalized to the smallest? 
The third threat is the interaction between history and the treatment.  Can the results be 
generalized to a different point in time?  Cook and Campbell (1979, p. 74) argue that research 
findings cannot be logically extrapolated from the present time to the future.  Replica
The fourth threat is 
which were described earlier.  One type of urban containment policy may have a different impact 
than another type.  Therefore, external validity is weakened when the research examines only 
one type of urban containment policy. 
The fifth threat to external validity is the interaction of the causal relationship with 
different measures of the outcome.  An outcome variable can often be measured in multiple 
ways.  For example, affordable housing can be measured as the quantity of units that are 
                                                 
73 The groups in this research are regions.  However, the level of analysis is the neighborhood.  Therefore, the 
subjects within each group are neighborhoods.  This is explained in more detail in Section 5.3.2. 
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affordable for low-income households.  Or, affordable housing can be measured as the 
proportion of low-income households that are able to occupy a housing unit for which they pay a 
reasona
ncome households in one region, but not in 
another
 which those operationalizations are 
based” 
fine the same concept.  Has the researcher used the 
approp
theory and those chosen in the research design.  Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2003, p. 73) 
                                                
ble proportion of their income.74  These two outcome measures may lead to different 
results as units that might be counted as affordable to low-income households are not necessarily 
occupied by low-income households. 
The sixth, and final, threat to external validity is context-dependent mediation, which is 
the threat that a mediating variable which enables the treatment variable to reflect a causal 
relationship with the outcome can differ among different settings.  This threat is similar to the 
threat that research results cannot necessarily be generalized to other settings.  But this threat is 
more specific as it refers specifically to mediating variables between the treatment and the 
outcome.  For example, there is the possibility that an older housing stock may be associated 
with a greater supply of affordable housing for low-i
.  Or, multi-family units may be more strongly associated with affordable units in one 
region than in another. 
5.1.3 Construct Validity 
Construct validity is “the degree to which inferences can legitimately be made from the 
operationalizations in a study to the theoretical constructs on
(Trochim 2001, p. 69).  Cook and Campbell (1979, p. 38) defined construct validity as 
the “approximate validity with which we can make generalizations about higher-order constructs 
from research operations.”  In other words, is the research measuring what it says it is 
measuring?  
Threats to construct validity are typically the result of there being multiple measures 
which can potentially be used to de
riate measure (or measures) of the construct?  A mismatch between the variable in the 
research and the concept presented in theory is a significant threat.  Additional threats to 
construct validity are the result of a mismatch between the settings and persons presented in 
 
sehold income. 74 It is explained in the second chapter that a “reasonable” cost is typically assumed to be 30% of hou
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summarized a number of threats to construct validity.  Four of these threats are listed in table 
5.1.75 
 
Table 5-1. Threats to Construct Validity 
Threat  Definition 
Inadequ
Constru
ate Explication of 
cts 
Mismatch between the operations of the research design and 
constructs of theory under study 
Mono-Operation Bias Using only one operationalization of a construct 
Monomethod Bias Using only one method for each operationalization, such as one 
method of providing treatment or one method of recording 
outcome 
Confounding Constructs with 
Levels of Constructs 
Limited levels of the construct may have been studied 
Source:  Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2003, pp. 72-79). 
 
The first threat to construct validity is inadequate explication of constructs.  This threat 
occurs when there is a mismatch between the operations of the research and the theoretical 
constructs under study.  In this research, urban containment policies are assumed to successfully 
prevent new development from occurring outside of specified boundaries.  But, if an urban 
is research is not keeping development away from the urban 
fringe, then the research may be mis-labeling a policy as urban containment when it should not 
otential methods of measuring the extent of mixed land use.  Mixed land use can be 
defined
containment policy included in th
be. 
The second threat to construct validity is mono-operation bias.  This occurs when there is 
only one operationalization for a construct which can be measured in multiple ways.  The single 
measure underrepresents the theoretical construct of interest (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 
2003, p. 75).  Multiple measures of the same construct reduce this threat.  For example, there are 
a variety of p
 as the diversity of all types of land uses; the diversity of population-serving land uses, 
such as entertainment, health services, and retail; or simply the balance between jobs and 
residents without including the diversity of the types of jobs.  The measure of mixed land use 
may influence the conclusions regarding the relationship between mixed land use and the supply 
of affordable housing.  A greater mix of land uses may be associated with a greater supply of 
                                                 
75 The remaining threats to construct validity are primarily threats caused by the behavior of the research participants 
or researcher.  The research design, in the next chapter, will explain that census tracts rather than individuals are the 
unit of observations.  Census tracts do not exhibit behaviors as those presented by individuals. 
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affordable units if the mix includes industrial sites and warehouses which lower demand for 
adjacent housing.  In contrast, a greater mix of land uses may be associated with a smaller supply 
of affo  if the mix is limited to uses which bring positive amenities to adjacent or 
nearby es two measures of mixed land use.  One measure is 
 measure is the balance between “population-
ts. 
at is mo ent is provided in a 
or example, student 
achievement the researcher sh ze that there are multiple methods of providing tutoring.  
ere are multiple methods of implementing urban containment.  The states of 
s and counties to implement urban growth 
boundaries.  In contrast, Maryland requires its municipalities and counties to designate priority 
funding
boundaries is prohibited by zoning restrictions.  Therefore, urban containment policies in 
Oregon
Statistical validity is the extent to which appropriate inferences are made about the cause and 
rdable units
residents.  Therefore, this research us
of the mix of all types of land uses.  The second
serving” jobs and residen
The third thre no-method bias.  This occurs when the treatm
single manner.  F  if a research project is testing the impact of tutoring on 
ould reali
In the same way, th
Oregon and Washington require municipalitie
 areas, which are a form of urban service areas.  These differences will be more fully 
explored in the next chapter. 
The fourth threat to construct validity is that there may be different levels of the construct 
(Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2003, p. 76).  For example, Oregon has a top-down approach in 
growth management in that the state gives final approval to urban containment boundaries drawn 
by local municipalities, counties, and the Portland Metro.  Additionally, development outside of 
the 
 are strong.  In contrast, the state of Maryland does not have final approval authority over 
the size of urban containment boundaries established by the state’s municipalities and counties.  
Additionally, development is allowed outside of the boundaries as long as state money is not 
used for the infrastructure.  Therefore, urban containment policies are likely weaker in Maryland 
than in Oregon.  The research includes both the Portland region and Baltimore region in an 
attempt to capture these differences. 
5.1.4 Statistical Validity 
affect relationship between two variables based on statistical methods and evidence (Cook and 
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Campbell 1979, p. 37).  It refers to the accuracy of two statistical inferences which are made in 
most research, whether the cause and affect variables covary and how strongly they covary 
(Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2003, p. 42).  Shadish, Cook, and Campbell identified nine threats 
to statistical validity.  
Table 5.2 summarizes these nine threats.  The threats to statistical validity can be 
addressed through appropriate data screening, selection of observations, variable measurements, 
and statistical tests. 
 
Table 5-2. Threats to Statistical Validity 
Threat Definition 
Low Statistical Power Poor ability of test to detect relationships that exist between 
variables.  Low power increases the probability that a statistical 
test will fail to reject a null hypothesis which should be rejected 
Violated Assumptions of 
Statistical Tests 
Violations of statistical test assumptions can lead to inaccurate 
conclusions about the significance of relationships among 
variables 
Fishing and 
Problem
the Error Rate 
 
Repeated tests in an attempt to find statistical significance 
among variables may artificially inflate statistical significance 
and the probability of Type I Error (concluding there is a 
relationship when there is not) 
Unreliability of Measures Measurement error weakens the accuracy of statistical tests 
Restriction of Range of 
Variable Values 
Small range of values weakens the relationship between two 
variables.  Small ranges can lead to incorrect statistical 
conclusions regarding significance of relationships 
Unreliability of Treatment 
Implementation 
An inconsistent implementation of treatment can lead to 
inconsistent conclusions about covariation between two 
variables 
Extraneous Variance in the 
Experimental Setting 
Extraneous factors influencing the outcome, but not specifically 
measured will increase the error of the statistical tests  
Heterogeneity of Units Variation in the characteristics of research subjects (units) can 
increase the error variance of the statistical tests if these 
characteristics are correlated with the outcome.  
Inaccurate Effect Size 
Estimation 
Covariance e
poorly m
stimates can be inaccurate when effect size is 
easured.  Outliers can create a non-normal distribution 
of a variable which can drastically reduce effect sizes. 
Source:  Cook and Campbell (1979, pp. 39-50) and Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2003, pp. 45-52). 
In summary, Section 5.1 presented the potential threats to the validity of research 
accurate inferences regarding the covariance between two variables; generalize the findings to 
 
findings.  The threats are classified into four broad categories of validity, which are internal, 
external, construct, and statistical.  These threats decrease the researcher’s ability to make 
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other settings, places, or times; generalize from the research variables to theoretical constructs; 
and make accurate inferences regarding the statistical significance of relationship between two 
variables. 
5.2 RESEARCH DESIGNS 
There a ailable to assist in pursuing approximately truthful 
es regarding relations n two or more variables.  Each research design has it 
aknesses  in Section 
5.1.  This section reviews som
5.2.1 Randomized Experiment Research Design 
A randomized experiment is o omly assigned to either a treatment or 
atment r wants to 
tment group i om assignment 
  A ity because it 
usibility of a s in outcome 
 con
ch, how h in this 
dissertation uses the impleme tment.  Urban 
 impleme  and social 
such as political w prevent 
re a number of research designs av
inferenc hips betwee
own strengths and we  in addressing the variety of threats to validity presented
e of the potential research designs. 
ne in which subjects are rand
control group.  The tre
study.  The trea
 group is then given the ‘treatment’ which the researche
s comparable to the control group because of rand
(Boruch 1998, p. 162).76
reduces the pla
randomized experiment reduces the threats to valid
n alternative explanation for observed difference
between the treatment and trol groups (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2003, p. 247). 
For this resear ever, a random experiment was not possible.  The researc
ntation of an urban containment policy as the trea
containment is never
structures, 
nted in randomly chosen places.  There are economic
ill, which make urban containment policies possible and 
random assignment. 
                                                 
76 This is not to be confused with random selection, which is the selection of samples from a population on a random 
basis.  Random assignment refers to randomly assigning the treatment to some members of the sample after the 
sample has already been chosen (Trochim 2001, p. 196; Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2003, p. 248).  
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5.2.2 Quasi-Experimental Designs 
This research employs a quasi-experimental research design which recognizes that subjects 
cannot be randomly assigned to treatment and non-treatment groups.  The most common quasi-
experimental approaches to research are nonequivalent control group designs.77  These designs 
utilize two groups of subjec ent group.  The groups are 
nonequivalent because the subjects are not randomly assigned.  Therefore, the two groups are not 
nonequivalent control group 
designs discussed in this section and the random experiment.  The table includes the strengths 
 concerns of each design as they relate to 
this r search. 
 
Research 
ts, a control group and a treatm
as comparable in a quasi-experiment as in a true experiment with random assignment.  The 
threats to validity need to be explicitly considered in light of the fact that the groups are less 
likely to share similar characteristics than in a randomized experiment. 
Table 5.3 compares four alternative quasi-experiment 
and weaknesses of each design, as well as the practical
e
Table 5-3. Quasi-Experimental Nonequivalent Control Group Research Designs  
Design Notation Strengths Weakness Practical Concerns 
Randomized  Experiment O  X  O 
O       O 
Reduces threats to internal validity; 
Statistically unbiased estimates of 
effects 
Design is rarely realistic Urban Containment cannot
be randomly assigned 
Untreated 
Design wit
Posttest 
e the 
y 
Control Group 
h Pretest and 
O  X  O 
- - - - - -  
O       O 
Addresses non-random assignment 
of treatment 
Without careful attention to 
selection of groups, threats to 
internal validity are not 
eliminated 
Finding appropriately 
matched groups to reduc
threats to internal validit
Untreated 
Design wit
at More than One Tim
ata Control Group 
h Pretest Measures 
O  O  X  O 
- - - - - - - -  
Improves internal validity  Lack of d
e O  O       O 
Reversed Treatment 
Nonequivalent Co
Design wit
ent 
t 
ntrol Group 
h Pretest and Postest 
O  X   O 
- - - - - - -  
O  X-  O 
Can provide stronger evidence of 
causation than other designs; 
Improves internal validity; 
Improves construct validity 
No control group receiving no 
treatment.  Therefore, 
interpretation is difficult when 
change in the outcome variable 
is in the same direction 
Difficult to find a treatm
that is explicitly the opposite 
of an urban containmen
policy 
Switching 
its impact prior to treatment 
being applied to 2nd group 
Replication O  X  O       O 
O       O  X  O 
Improves internal validity, 
especially the threat of maturation 
and history 
Requires the removal of 
treatment from 1st group or the 
assumption that treatment loses 
Lack of data 
Note:  O is test of outcome; X is treatment; - - - - - - indicates non-random groups (no random assignment of treatment).   
Sources:  Cook and Campbell (1979) and Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2003). 
 
                                                 
77 The other common types of quasi-experimental designs are interrupted time-series. 
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5.2.2.1 Untreated Control Group Design with Pretest and Posttest 
One of the most frequently used nonequivalent control group research design is the “untreated 
2
are not randomly formed (Cook and Campbell 1979, p. 104). 
ntrol group with 
pretest and posttest” design.  There are still threats to internal validity, including the possibility 
roups ature at d  erent 
st and test.  Add he
consis embers who were chosen based e 
n.  Because random ent to the observed units occur 
i-expe design, it is more probable that the treatment group may differ from the 
 in f matur n in a erimen
researcher must pay more caref g the t i  choosing 
pecific ce these threats (Cook and Cam
ore than One Time 
Interval 
 
An alternative nonequivalent control group design is the “untreated control group design with 
pretest measures at more than one time interval” (Cook and Campbell 1979, p. 117).  The 
control group with pretest and posttest” design (Cook and Campbell 1979, p. 103).  In this 
design, both the control and treatment groups receive a pre-test.  The pre-test measures the initial 
differences between the two groups.  The treatment group then receives the treatment, while the 
control group does not.  A post-test is then given to the two groups to measure the differences 
between the two groups after the treatment.  The commonly used notation to illustrate this design 
is: 
 
Treatment Group: O1 X O2 
   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Control Group: O1  O2 
 
Where O1 is the pre-test, X is the treatment, O  is the post-test, and the dashed line ( - - ) 
indicates that the groups 
Some common threats to validity are not eliminated by the “untreated co
the two g  will m ifferent rates, as well as experience a diff history between 
the pre-te
initially 
 post- itionally, regression to t  mean will occur if one of the groups 
 on being not closts of m to the average 
observatio
in a quas
assignment of the treatm  does not 
rimental 
control group  terms o ation and history tha  randomized exp
hreats to internal valid
tal design.  The 
ty andul attention to listin
groups s ally to redu pbell 1979). 
5.2.2.2 Untreated Control Group Design with Pretest Measures at M
notation for this design is: 
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Treatment Group:         O1   O2    X   O3 
 the ability to determine if the outcomes were changing between the two groups prior to 
treatment.  If there is a change in the outcome from O1 to O2 in one group, but not the other, then 
a concl hat owing apart without the treatment.  If there is no 
change in the outcome rom O p or there is a similar change in both groups, 
then th nt rat o en the two groups is reduced. 
A second advantage of two pre-tests is that if there is anything atypical in the first pre-
s.  If there 
were on
 ith Pretest and Posttest 
nonequivalent control group design with pretest and posttest” (Cook and Campbell 
979, p. 124).  The notation for this design is: 
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Control Group:   O1  O2      O3 
 
Where O1 is the first pre-test, O2 is the second pre-test, X is the treatment, O3 is the post-test, and 
the dashed line (---) indicates that the groups are not randomly selected. 
This research design takes two pretests prior to the treatment intervention, which in this 
research is urban containment.  The advantage of two pre-tests is that they provide the researcher 
with
usion can be made t  the groups are gr
 f 1 to O2 in either grou
e threat of differe es of maturati n betwe
test, it can be identified in the second pre-test.  Results from O2 can be compared to results on O1 
to ensure that one of the two pre-tests did not result in unexplainable high or low result
ly one pretest, the possibility that the pretest outcome was an anomaly because of its 
timing or of another reason increases the threat the outcome results of the posttest will differ 
from the pretest only because of regression to the mean.  Earlier, regression to the mean was 
identified as the probability that extreme values among multiple observations will have a 
tendency to move towards the average of all the values.  Therefore, a pre-test which has an 
abnormally high or low value combined with a posttest which captures regression to the mean 
may indicate that the treatment is statistically significant when it actually may not be significant.  
Two pre-tests assist in eliminating this potential threat. 
5.2.2.3 Reversed Treatment Nonequivalent Control Group Design w
A third type of nonequivalent control group quasi-experimental research design is the “reversed 
treatment 
1
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Treatment Group:  O1 X O2 
 - - - -  
ent Gr O2 
 
here O1 is the pre-test, X is the treatment, X- is a treatment that is expected to have the reverse 
nd the exact opposite 
of the t  
on 
 
ge.  
79, 
of 
group receiving no treatment at all (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2003, p. 148).  If changes in 
- - - - - - - - -
Reverse Treatm oup: O1 X -  
W
impact from the primary treatment, and O2 is the post-test. 
The purpose of this design is to apply the treatment to one group a
reatment to the other group.  For example, if an urban containment policy is the treatment
(X) then an urban expansion policy is the opposite of the treatment (X-).  The finding that X has 
the exact opposite impact on the posttest outcomes than X- provides stronger proof of causati
than other designs.  Using both the treatment and the reversed treatment forces the researcher to 
more accurately define the treatment as an opposite can also be tested.  This more exact nature of
operationalizing the theoretical constructs improves construct validity (Cook and Campbell 
1979,  p. 125; Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2003, p. 147). 
Another benefit of using a reversed treatment control group is that it improves internal 
validity.  The threats of maturation and history to internal validity are reduced (Shadish, Cook, 
and Campbell 2003, p. 148).  Maturation in one group can explain a difference in outcome 
between two groups if the direction of change is the same but at a different magnitude of chan
But maturation cannot explain one group’s outcome moving in one direction and the other 
group’s outcome moving in the other direction from the initial pretest (Cook and Campbell 19
p. 125).  Therefore, if opposite treatments are used on the two groups and the two groups’ 
outcomes move in different directions from the pretest, maturation is not threat.  The threat 
history is reduced in the same manner.  It is unlikely that an event will occur which influences 
one group in one direction and yet influence the other group in the exact opposite direction. 
A significant drawback of the reversed treatment research design is the lack of a control 
the outcome variable occur in the same direction for both treatment groups, the results are not 
interpretable.  In this situation, it remains unknown whether the treatments had an impact on the 
outcome because there is no outcome from a control group without treatment for comparison. 
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5.2.2.4 tion 
A fourt l n qui t c ol group research design is the 
 p. 146).  In this design, two groups 
are giv  
Where e 
n the 
rom 
w 
r 
history
The quasi-experimental research design utilized in this research is the “untreated control group 
with pretest and posttest” described in Section 5.2.2.1.  This quasi-experimental design is 
 Switching Replica
h type of quasi-experimenta one valen ontr
“untreated control group design with dependent pretest and posttest samples using switching 
replications” (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2003, p. 137 &
en the pretest which is then followed by the introduction of the treatment to one group.  A
second pretest is then conducted, after which the treatment is removed from the first treatment 
group and applied to the other group.  A posttest is then conducted.  The notation for this 
research design is: 
 
Treatment Group 1: O1    X   O2      O3 
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Treatment Group 2: O1   O2     X   O3 
 
O1, O2, and O3 are the tests, X is the treatment, and the dashed line (----) indicates that th
groups are not a result of random assignment. 
This type of research design has two research phases.  The first phase occurs betwee
first and second tests.  It is a controlled quasi-experiment in which one group receives the 
treatment while the other group doesn’t.  The second phase is the removal of the treatment f
the first treatment group and the introduction of the treatment to the second group.  This design 
rules out the threat of maturation as the threat can be detected if one group continues to gro
apart from the other even after both groups received the treatment.  The design also allows the 
researcher to examine the impact of treatment at different time intervals and, presumably, unde
different contexts because of the time differences.  This reduces the threat of unrecognized 
 influencing the researcher’s conclusions of statistical significance between the treatment 
and the outcome. 
5.3 SELECTED RESEARCH DESIGN 
 167 
modified in this research in that it is not testing whether or not the ‘treatment’ of urban 
ousing.    
ps 
f 
 
t 
olitical, economic, and environmental factors which influence whether an 
rea will adopt an urban containment policy.  For example, a place in which the political process 
is influ ly to adopt an urban containment policy than 
environmentalists.  Or, a region which has 
nsitiv ts rot ly to consider the use of urban containment 
etest, 
990.  
                                                
containment directly impacts the dependent variable, which is the supply of affordable h
Rather, a primary hypothesis of this research is that urban containment impacts the relationshi
between smart growth principles, which are independent variables, and the dependent variable o
affordable housing. 
There are a number of reasons why the other potential research designs were not utilized
in this research.  First, places cannot be randomly assigned to receive an urban containmen
policy.  There are p
a
enced by environmentalists will be more like
a place where there is little public influence among 
se e environmental asse  to p ect is more like
than a region with few easily identifiable assets.  Because random assignment cannot occur, a 
randomized experiment is not possible. 
The “untreated control group design with pretest measures at more than one time 
interval” was not chosen because of lack of data.  A research design with more than one pr
or multiple tests over a long period of time, requires longitudinal data which covers a significant 
period of time.  However, there is a limit to the availability of historical data concerning 
affordable housing which is comparable over time.  As will be discussed later, a significant 
source of data is the Census and the level of analysis is the census tract.  Prior to 1990, not all 
counties within the chosen cases were dis-aggregated into census tracts.   In addition, some 
housing cost data for vacant housing units was not readily available in Census data prior to 1
This lack of availability made multiple pre-tests difficult.78 
 
78 The sources of data will be discussed in a later section.  The Metropolitan American Housing Survey (M-AHS) 
also provides longitu nnot be used for three 
reasons.  First, the su  to pre-1995 surveys with 
caution as they contain different samples.  Second, the smallest level of geography at which data can be aggregated 
in the M-AHS is the zone.  The zone is an area of approximately 100,000 housing units. The level of analysis in this 
research is the neighborhood and zones are much larger than a typical neighborhood.  Third, the variables in the M-
r 
ange 
resulted in respondents giving different answers. 
dinal housing data for select metropolitan regions.  But this data ca
rvey was re-sampled in 1995.  Post-1995 surveys should be compared
AHS that would measure the smart growth principles of open space and mixed land use were slightly changed in 
1997.   For example, in the question “are there any businesses or institutions, such as stores, restaurants, schools, o
hospitals within 300 ft. of this building,” 300 ft. was changed to ½ a block.  I do not know how much this ch
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The reverse treatment research design is not feasible for this research.  It require
introduction of a policy that is the exact opposite of urban containment.  There are no clear, 
explicit policies of urban expansion from which to choose as the reverse treatment.  Most explicit
policies to guide urban growth are to contain urban development from extending into rural areas, 
rather than expandin
s the 
 
g urban development.  Therefore, the use of a reverse treatment for this 
researc
 
p. 
hat the treatment introduced to the first group loses its 
effect i roup.  
ttest” 
inment in a single county, or a single 
municipality, has a different type of impact than a region-wide policy.  Local urban containment 
policies may limit the supply of residential land and push up residential land prices, locally.  But, 
developers will move development to adjacent jurisdictions without land use restrictions (Levine 
e 
t 
 
h is not realistic.  Advocates for urban containment argue that the expansion of urban 
development into rural areas is partially the result of a lack of planning, implicit policies 
supporting urban expansion, and no attempts to contain development.  Therefore, it is more 
realistic and appropriate to use a research design which compares a treatment group with urban 
containment to control group without similar policies. 
The switching replication research design is also not feasible.  It requires the removal of
treatment.  However, once urban containment policies are implemented, they are rarely 
withdrawn or removed.  If treatment cannot be removed, Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2003, 
146) suggested that researchers assume t
n the second phase of the research when the treatment is introduced to the second g
However, urban containment is unlikely to lose its significance over time.   
5.3.1 Treatment and Control Groups 
Treatment and control groups for the “untreated control group design with pretest and pos
were delineated by metropolitan regions.  Regions with a region-wide urban containment policy 
were considered as potential treatment groups.  Urban conta
1999).  Therefore, local urban containment policies will not have as strong of an impact on th
regional housing market as regional policies, particularly if households can easily move to other 
jurisdictions. 
Appropriate control groups were chosen based on their comparability to the treatmen
groups with the exception of urban containment.  The “untreated control group with pretest and
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posttes eful 
jects 
t the 
trol 
ation for 
s 
 
hborhood every day 
and make their residential location decisions partially based on this environment.   
The second reason to use the neighborhood as the unit of analysis is that aggregation of 
e variability of the data.  Measuring density, the 
variety of housing options, mixed land use, and open space at the municipal level assumes that 
st level, which is the block group consisting of multiple blocks, data are available 
only in
t” research design does not adequately address threats to internal validity without car
consideration of other potential explanations.  In a quasi-experimental research design, sub
are not randomly assigned to a treatment or a control group.  Therefore, the groups could differ 
from one another in other characteristics which explain a difference in outcomes.  To improve 
the validity of this research, the choice of treatment and control groups should ensure tha
groups share similar characteristics with the exception of the treatment.  The selection of con
and treatment groups is discussed in further detail in Chapter 6. 
5.3.2 Unit of Analysis 
The neighborhood, defined by census tract, is the unit of analysis or level of observ
testing the relationships among the smart growth principles and the supply of affordable housing 
in both the treatment and control groups.  There are three reasons why this level of analysis wa
chosen.  First, the neighborhood serves as the “basic building block of urban form” (Song and
Knaap 2004, p. 215).  Residents experience the environment of their neig
data to a larger level of geography eliminates th
each variable’s value is similar within all areas of the municipality.  The same is true if the 
variables are measured at the regional level.  As the size of the geographic unit of observation 
increases, the ability of the research design to capture the variations in both the independent 
variables and the dependent variable decreases. 
The third reason for this unit of analysis is that data constraints prevent analyses at a 
geographic level smaller than the census tract.  Adequate housing cost data from the U.S. 
Census, which is utilized in this research, are not available at smaller geographies.  Cost data is 
not available at the block level, which is the smallest level of aggregation for Census data.  At 
the 2nd smalle
 situations where there are enough housing units to calculate rents of renter-occupied units 
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and values of owner-occupied units without violating the Census Bureau’s confidentiality 
standards.79 
5.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the potential research designs available for testing this dissertation’s 
h design has its own strengths and weaknesses in terms of addressing 
the four broad categories of the threats to validity, as well as being a practical and feasible design 
to conduct.   
 their relationships in a region with urban 
contain
                                                
hypotheses.  Each researc
After exploring the strengths, weaknesses, and practical concerns with each design, the 
“untreated control group design with pretest and posttest” was chosen as the design for this 
research.  However, this research uses a modified quasi-experimental research design as its 
primary purpose is to test the impact of urban containment on the relationships among the four 
smart growth principles and the supply of affordable housing, rather than to test urban 
containment’s direct impact on the supply of affordable housing. 
The chapter then defined the treatment and control groups, as well as the unit of 
observation within the groups, that will be utilized in the research design.  The treatment is urban 
containment.  The treatment groups will consist of neighborhoods within a region of urban 
containment, while the control groups will consist of neighborhoods in regions with no region-
wide urban containment policy.  This research design allows for a comparison of the impact of 
urban containment on the relationships between each of the four smart growth principles and the 
supply of affordable housing by comparing
ment to a region without such a policy. 
The next chapter will explain the rationale for the regions chosen for this research.  It will 
then compare the treatment regions with the control regions in terms of their economic growth 
patterns, growth management policies, affordable housing policies, and housing market. 
 
79 See the U.S. Census Bureau’s (1994) Geographic Areas Reference Manual. 
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6.0  SELECTION OF TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUPS 
egional urban containment policy and the unit of analysis is the neighborhood. 
ation.  To reduce this risk, the 
groups 
mong the choices for urban containment regions, 
only tw
                                                
Chapter Five presented alternative research designs which could be utilized to test the 
hypotheses of this research.  The chapter concluded that the research design appropriate for this 
research is the “untreated control group design with pretest and posttest.”  The ‘treatment’ in this 
research is a r
This chapter continues the presentation of the research design by discussing the selection 
of the treatment and control groups.  The first section describes the criteria by which treatment 
and control groups were selected.  Because a quasi-experimental research design does not 
eliminate the threat that the treatment and control groups differ in a way which influences their 
outcome, the researcher runs the risk of concluding that a difference in outcome may be the 
result of treatment when in actuality there is some other explan
must be selected so as to ensure they are as similar as possible, with the exception of the 
treatment variable. 
The treatment and control groups were chosen in two steps.  In the first step, two regions 
with region-wide urban containment policies were chosen.  To ensure that urban containment 
policies were applied thoughout the region, only regions located in states mandating urban 
containment policies were considered.  For this reason, the selection of potential urban 
containment regions was limited to the states of Oregon, Washington, Maryland and 
Tennessee.80  Because of the limited diversity a
o were chosen.  The neighborhoods of the two chosen regions provided two treatment 
groups. 
 
80 As explained later in the chapter, Tennessee’s growth management legislation was passed in 1998 and urban 
containment boundaries did not need to be implemented until 2000.  Therefore, regions in Tennessee were not a 
practical option for this research. 
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In the second step, each treatment group was then paired with a control group consisting 
of neighborhoods of a region which had as many similar characteristics to the treatment group as 
possible, with the exception of a region-wide urban containment policy.  This selection process 
resulted in two pairs of m
control region and is analyzed separately. 
The second and third sections of this chapter provide descriptive information regarding 
the two pairs of regions selected for this research.  The first pair consists of the metropolitan 
0’s.  
Countie
daries.  Therefore, the neighborhoods of Baltimore are the treatment group.  
The ne
ction of appropriate treatment and control groups is explicitly related to improving the 
internal and external validity of the research.  Cook and Campbell (1979, p. 104-105) discussed 
two threats to internal validity that are not overcome in an “untreated control group pretest 
posttest” design without careful designation of subjects into the control and treatment groups.  
etropolitan regions.  Each pair consists of a treatment region and a 
regions of Portland and Seattle.  The neighborhoods of Portland are the treatment group as the 
region was one of the first to implement a region-wide urban containment policy with the 
establishment of urban growth boundaries in 1979.  The neighborhoods of Seattle are the control 
group as the Seattle region did not have an urban containment policy until the mid-199
s throughout Washington State began to implement urban growth boundaries in the early 
and mid-1990’s in response to the state’s Growth Management Acts of 1990 and 1991. 
The second pair of treatment and control groups consists of the metropolitan regions of 
Baltimore and Philadelphia.  In response to Maryland’s Smart Growth Act of 1997, every county 
and municipality in the state established priority funding areas (PFAs).  PFAs are boundaries 
outside of which state money for infrastructure, such as water and sewer systems, is restricted.  
PFAs serve as an urban containment policy as they discourage new development outside of the 
predetermined boun
ighborhoods of Philadelphia serve as the control group as there is no region-wide urban 
containment policy in the Philadelphia region. 
6.1 CRITERIA FOR SELECTION 
The sele
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Threats
uld influence the dependent variable.  If these events 
are not
on and is 
analyze
Using two different pairs allows for a comparison of the findings using two different urban 
containment policies, in two different settings, and in two different economies. 
6.1.1 Selection of Treatment Groups 
 to internal validity can make a treatment seem effective when in actuality the treatment 
is ineffective, or vice versa.   
The two significant threats to internal validity not overcome by the untreated control 
group design are history and maturation.  The treatment group may experience an event that is 
different from the control group, which co
 taken into consideration, the researcher could inappropriately conclude that the treatment 
was responsible for the change.  To reduce this threat to validity, the treatment and control 
groups paired in this research are chosen based on their comparability to one another in their 
characteristics, such as their economic growth patterns, climate, and location. 
The selection of treatment and control groups was also a means to improve external 
validity which is the ability to generalize the findings of the current research to other settings and 
times.  To improve the external validity of the research, two different pairs of treatment and 
control groups were chosen.  Each pair consists of a treatment region and a control regi
d separately.  The pairs were chosen so that there were three differences between the two 
pairs.  The three differences were: 
1. Different variation of an urban containment policy. 
 
2. One pair is located on the east coast and one on the west coast of the United 
States, representing two different parts of the country. 
 
3. One pair experienced large population and economic growth during the 1990’s 
while the other pair experienced greater growth in the 1980’s and stagnant growth 
in the 1990’s.   
 
Across the United States, Nelson and Dawkins (2004, p. 16) identified 131 examples of growth 
management plans which included an urban containment framework.  These examples were of 
regional, county, or city governments adopting an urban containment policy to reduce growth in 
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outlying, undeveloped areas.  However, unless urban containment is required by the state, urban 
containment policies are not typically found throughout an entire metropolitan region.   
ousing prices were 
not sig
al growth controls by comparing their impact on housing 
pri growth controls to situations 
where ne ls in 
Califo were significantly higher in 
ro in 
growth
unregu hich are regions with few growth controls, he found insignificant 
t growth control 
measures would absorb the development prohibited in a neighboring community with growth 
Levine’s (1999) study of local growth controls in 490 California jurisdictions found 
growth control measures, particularly zoning and maximum density requirements, were 
A single jurisdiction adopting an urban containment policy may simply push 
development to other areas of the region that have not yet implemented urban containment or 
other growth restrictions.  There is empirical evidence that growth restrictions redistribute new 
development, but have little overall effect on the supply and price of housing throughout the 
region.   Schwartz, Hansen, and Green (1981) compared two neighboring communities in 
California, Petulma and Rohnert Park.  Petulma implemented strict growth control measures 
while Rohnert Park had no similar constraints.  They found that increases in h
nificantly different between each community.  But, the growth in building permits was 
significantly higher in Rohnert Park.  The authors concluded that housing price increases did not 
differ between the two communities partially because the development prohibited by Petulma 
was displaced to other communities, including Rohnert Park.  Housing in Rohnert Park served as 
a substitute for housing in Petulma.81 
Elliot (1981) examined loc
ces in situations where neighboring communities had similar 
ighboring communities had no growth controls.  He studied local growth contro
rnia from 1969 to 1976.  He found that housing price increases 
g wth control communities that were neighbors to other growth control communities than 
 control communities that were neighbors to localities with no growth controls.  In 
ted housing markets, wla
differences in price increases between growth control and no growth control communities.  His 
findings provided evidence that additional development in communities withou
control. 
                                                 
81 If the communities were not perfect substitutes for each other, the results could have been different.  If housing (or 
other characteristics) of Petulma were significantly different and more highly valued than those of Rohnert Park, 
prices would have increased faster in Petulma than in Rohnert Park.  The supply would have remained restricted, but 
the demand would have been more inelastic (less of a decline in demand in response to the increase in price) 
because households would have seen a benefit to living in Petulma over Rohnert Park. 
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associated with a decline in the production of new housing units.  However, the study found that 
urban growth boundaries, a form of urban containment, were not statistically significant in 
explain
eir growth management strategies. 
onsidered to have region-wide urban containment policies as most counties or local 
jurisdic
                                                
ing the number of new housing units.  He concluded urban growth boundaries did not 
reduce development, particularly the supply of housing.  Even though growth boundaries were 
not statistically significant in his analyses, Levine’s research provided evidence that local growth 
controls have the potential to limit the supply of housing locally, but not impact the supply of 
housing in surrounding communities with no growth control.   
Because of these findings, only metropolitan regions in which urban containment policies 
are region-wide were considered as potential treatment groups.  Individual local urban 
containment polices may have little impact on the metropolitan region overall unless they are 
implemented throughout the region.  Growth management requirements from the state are most 
often responsible for region-wide implementation of urban containment.  Therefore, the selection 
of regions to serve as the treatment groups begins by examining states which have urban 
containment requirements as part of th
Nelson and Dawkins (2004, p. 29) identified nine states which have state-wide growth 
management legislation that mandates planning on the part of local jurisdictions and counties.  
They called these nine states “planning mandate” states because they require local jurisdictions 
to plan, provide statewide planning guidelines which local plans must follow, and require 
vertical consistency which mandates that local plans be consistent with state plans or state-wide 
goals.82  The nine states were Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, 
Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington. 
Of the nine states, Pendall et al. (2002, p. 7) identified three that require urban 
containment policies of local governments or counties throughout the state.  The three states they 
identified were Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington.83  The metropolitan regions of these states 
can be c
tions must designate urban growth boundaries, outside of which new development is 
restricted.  Maryland can be added to this list of states requiring region-wide urban containment 
 
s 82 Nelson and Dawkins acknowledge that identifying states with planning and growth management requirements i
difficult.  For example, Carlson and Mathur (2004, p. 16) listed 12 states with state-wide growth management 
legislation which requires local or county planning. 
83 Staley and Mildner (1999) identified the same three states. 
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policies as they require every county to designate priority funding areas into which state 
infrastructure funds are steered.  This is a form of urban containment.   
Tennessee was not considered as a potential source of treatment groups as the state’s 
Growth Policy Law, requiring urban growth boundaries of large cities, was not legislated until 
1998.84  Counties were not required to submit their comprehensive plans, including their 
designated urban growth boundaries, until 2000.  Therefore, data from the 2000 Census would 
not capture any impact of Tennessee’s growth management act.  Only metropolitan regions 
located
ntial treatment groups 
because
n, and Salkin 2002).  Delaware also requires counties to submit 
compre
in 1979, making them one of the first region-wide urban containment policies for a major U.S. 
                                                
 in Oregon, Washington, and Maryland were considered as potential treatment groups. 
The other five states identified as “planning mandate” states by Nelson and Dawkins 
were not considered as states with potential treatment groups for a variety of reasons.  Hawaii 
was not considered because it is unique from other states in that it consists of a series of islands, 
naturally limiting the amount of land available for development.  Sprawl is limited in Hawaii “in 
a way that is not possible in other states” (Nelson and Dawkins 2004, p. ix). 
Regions in Arizona and Delaware were not considered as pote
 the states do not require urban containment policies.  Arizona, as a result of its Growing 
Smarter Act of 1998 and its Growing Smarter Plus Act of 2000, requires all large or fast-growing 
communities to create a comprehensive plan which is approved by voters every ten years 
(Johnson, Jordan, and Salkin 2002, p. 35).  These plans must include designated growth areas but 
do not need to include boundaries outside of which development is prevented.85  The 
requirement of urban growth boundaries was rejected by Arizona voters in 2000 (Myers and 
Puentes 2001; Johnson, Jorda
hensive land use plans, but does not require specific urban containment policies. 
For the reasons just discussed, metropolitan regions in Oregon, Washington, and 
Maryland were considered as potential treatment groups because urban containment policies can 
be found throughout these regions as a result of state legislation.  Of these states, Oregon was 
chosen because it has the oldest state mandated urban containment policy, adopted in 1973.  In 
response to the state legislation, urban growth boundaries were established in the Portland region 
 
e Growing Smarter Legislation at 
g+Smarter+Legislation.htm. 
84 For a summary of every state’s current activities in growth management, see Johnson, Jordan, and Salkin’s (2002) 
Planning for Smart Growth:  2002 State of the States. 
85 See the Arizona Department of Commerce about th
http://www.azcommerce.com/CommAsst/GrowSmart/Growin
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metropolitan region.  Therefore, the neighborhoods of Portland were chosen as a treatment 
group. 
The neighborhoods of the Baltimore region in the state of Maryland were chosen as the 
second treatment group.  The Baltimore region was chosen for two reasons.  First, even though it 
is relatively new, Maryland’s growth management legislation has quickly become one of the 
most influential and most often discussed within the smart growth movement.  The title of the 
1997 legislation was called the “Smart Growth Act” and brought national attention to the smart 
growth movement as it was supported by then Governor Parris Glendening, a prominent 
support
 as water and sewer 
system
ting the 
impact
The criterion for selecting a metropolitan region as a control group to match with a treatment 
tainment policy.  Choosing treatment and control 
er of smart growth (Daniels 2001; Cohen 2002; Glendening 2002).  
The second reason for choosing the Baltimore region is that Maryland’s Smart Growth 
Act requires counties to designate priority funding areas (PFA), which are a different form of 
urban containment than urban growth boundaries.  PFAs are similar to urban service areas, 
which are boundaries outside of which state money for infrastructure, such
s, cannot be spent.  The lack of infrastructure discourages new development.  Unlike 
Oregon’s urban growth boundaries, PFAs do not completely restrict development outside of their 
borders.  New development may occur outside of PFAs so long as infrastructure costs are 
covered by private interests. 
Using two treatment groups, each with slightly different forms of urban containment, 
improves the external validity of the research.  Chapter Five presented the idea that external 
validity is threatened by the possibility that a research treatment can take different forms.  One 
form of urban containment may have a different impact than another, which reduces the ability 
of the researcher to generalize from one urban containment policy to another.  By tes
 of both urban growth boundaries and priority funding areas, this threat to validity is 
reduced. 
6.1.2 Selection of Control Groups 
group was that the region share as many similar characteristics as possible to the treatment 
region, with the exception of the urban con
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groups with similar characteristics improves the internal validity of the research because it 
reduces the chance that other factors, separate from the treatment, are responsible for the 
differen
 inconclusive debate 
within 
and Shapiro 2001; Berube and Katz 2006, p. 35).  Nine of the ten 
fastest-
ature serves as a mechanism of urban containment without the need for an explicit 
policy.  Therefore, a region with topographical restrictions on the outward spread of 
opriate control group to a treatment group, as the control 
group has a permanent constraint on the form of its outward growth.  
Construction costs were also required to be similar in both the treatment and control 
t outcomes that might occur between the two groups. 
The first characteristic necessary to be similar between the treatment and control groups 
of each pair was population and economic growth.  One of the most significant influences on the 
housing market, and the supply of affordable housing, is changes in the region’s population or 
economy.  Growth in the number of households, as well as an increase in household income, 
increases the demand for housing.  Greater demand for housing increases prices and decreases 
the supply of affordable units for low-income households.  An on-going and
the urban containment literature is to what extent an increase in housing prices is 
attributable to a change in income or population growth and to what extent an increase in prices 
is attributable to urban containment (Phillips and Goodstein 2000; Downs 2002). 
Two other similar characteristics between the treatment and control groups were climate 
and geographic location.  These two characteristics are closely related to population growth as 
cities and metropolitan areas in the South and West regions of the U.S. experienced great gains 
in population over the past fifteen years while those in the North and Midwest have lost residents 
(Fulton et al. 2001; Glaeser 
growing cities in the U.S. from 1990 to 2000 were located in California, Texas, Arizona, 
and Nevada (Glaeser and Shapiro 2001).  In general, these fast growing regions have warmer, or 
at least milder, climates than slower growing and declining regions. 
Another shared characteristic of the treatment and control groups were topographical 
constraints on growth.  Metropolitan areas adjacent to oceans, lakes, mountains, or deserts may 
have natural restrictions on the growth of sprawl and the supply of housing (Rose 1989; Lang 
2002).  N
development would not make an appr
groups of both pairs.  The cost of labor and materials is a significant input cost in the 
development of new housing.  Higher costs reduce the supply of housing.  Regions with higher 
 179 
input costs are likely to have a tighter housing market, in terms of higher prices and lower 
supply, as compared to regions with lower construction costs. 
A final threat to the internal validity of the research is that either the treatment or control 
group h
ave mandatory 
afforda
rgest metropolitan areas of 
their re
as more progressive affordable housing policies than the other region.  A region with 
more progressive regional policies, requiring local jurisdictions to reduce barriers to affordable 
housing, could likely have a more even distribution of affordable units among the region’s 
neighborhoods.  However, few metropolitan regions have an affordable housing strategy which 
addresses the need for low-income housing throughout the entire region.  The later sections will 
discuss the regional strategies for affordable housing in each region representing the treatment 
and control groups.  None of the regions require the adoption of affordable housing policies at 
the local level.  Therefore, the regional affordable housing strategies are typically limited in 
scope and effect.  However, some localities within the selected regions h
ble housing requirements. 
Based on the threats to internal validity discussed in this section, a region was chosen as a 
control group to each treatment group.  The neighborhoods of the Seattle region were chosen as 
the control group to treatment group neighborhoods in Portland, while the neighborhoods of the 
Philadelphia region were chosen as the control group to the treatment group of neighborhoods in 
Baltimore.  Section 6.2 compares the Portland and Seattle regions, while Section 6.3 does the 
same for Baltimore and Philadelphia. 
6.2 PORTLAND AND SEATTLE 
The metropolitan region of Seattle was chosen as the control group to the Portland region.86  
Both regions are located in the fast-growing northwest region of the United States, share similar 
climates, experienced similar economic growth patterns, and are the la
spective states.  Section 6.2.1 presents data that addresses the potential threats to internal 
                                                 
86 The geographic definition of each region is based on O.M.B. designated boundaries as of 2000. 
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validity discussed in the previous section.  The data illustrates the similar growth patterns of the 
two regions. 
Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 present a description of the growth management techniques 
adopted in the regions of Portland and Seattle, respectively.  Urban growth boundaries were 
implemented in Portland in 1979.  Almost fifteen years later, Seattle did the same.  Because both 
regions eventually received the “treatment” of urban containment, the research design of the 
Portland/Seattle analysis is slightly modified from the “untreated control group with pretest and 
posttest” design that was selected for this research in Chapter Five.  The research design for 
Portland/Seattle can be written as: 
 
Portland Region: X O1 X O2 
   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   
Seattle Region:  O1 X O2 
 
Where 
 expect to find similar relationships among smart growth 
principles and affordable housing because both regions had urban growth boundaries.  If there 
are significant (or insignificant) differences between Portland and Seattle in both 1990 and 2000, 
illustrating that the relationships had not changed, we can conclude that urban growth boundaries 
do not change the re nd affordable housing. 
Washington State.  As shown in Figure 6.1, the Portland region includes the counties of 
Clackamas, Columbia, Multnomah, Washington, and Yamhill in Oregon and Clark County in the 
state of Washington.  With the exception of Clark, all counties and their municipalities 
X is the treatment of urban containment (urban growth boundaries), O1 is the test in 1990, 
and O2 is the test in 2000. 
The concept is still similar to the “untreated control group with pretest and posttest” 
research design.  In O1, we would expect to find different relationships among the smart growth 
principles and affordable housing between Portland and Seattle as only Portland had urban 
growth boundaries.  In O2, we would
lationships between the smart growth principles a
6.2.1 Comparison of Regions 
Portland is the largest metropolitan region of Oregon, while Seattle is the largest region of 
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throughout Portland received a mandate in 1973 to develop comprehensive plans addressing 
state-wide land use goals and including urban growth boundaries. 
   
 Figure 6-1. Portland Region 
 
 
As shown in Figure 6.2, the Seattle region includes the counties of King, Snohomish, and 
Island in Washington State.  The state’s Growth Management Acts of 1990 and 1991 require 
most municipalities and counties to establish urban growth boundaries. 
 
 Figure 6-2. Seattle Region 
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Both Portland and Seattle experienced similar economic growth over the past twenty 
years.  Both regions recovered from a stagnant economy during the 1980’s to experience strong 
wth in jobs and household income during the 1990’s.  Table 6.1 shows the growth in income 
and jobs during the previous two decades. 
Table 6-1. Economic Growth, 1980 to 2000 
 Median Household Incomea Number of Jobs 
gro
 
Region 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 
Portland $ 42,194 $ 41,658 
(-1.3%) 
$ 47,077 
(13.0%) 
620,954 756,324 
(21.8%) 
968,429 
(28.0%) 
Seattle $ 47,270 $ 48,544 
(2.7%) 
$ 52,804 
(8.8%) 
815,306 1,086,190 
(33.2%) 
1,271,126 
(17.0%) 
a.  Constant dollars (1999).  Number in parentheses is percent change from previous decade.   
Source:  U.S. Census. 
 
During the 1980’s, Seattle’s median household income increased by only 2.7% while 
Portland’s median income declined by 1.3%, adjusted for inflation.  Household income growth 
did not occur in either region despite a 33.2% increase in the number of jobs in Seattle and a 
21.8% increase in Portland.  Of the Portland 
n retail.  Of 
in professional services, and 35,000 in manufacturing.87 
he 1990’s brought strong economic growth, and higher household income, to both 
regions.  Median household income increased by 8.78% in Seattle and by 13.01% in Portland, 
adjusted for inflation. During the 1990’s, both regions saw an increase of jobs in higher-paying 
employment sectors, including the sectors of professional and scientific services, information, 
health, and education.  Figure 6.2 lists the industry sectors which created, and lost, the greatest 
number of new jobs between 1990 and 2000. 
The computer industry grew significantly in the Seattle region and was a significant 
driver of higher-paying employment.88  Of the 185,000 additional jobs created in the Seattle 
region, 62,000 were in the scientific, professional (other than health and education) sectors, 
                                                
region’s 135,000 additional jobs, approximately 
25,000 were in health and education, 24,000 in professional services, and 22,000 i
Seattle’s 271,000 additional jobs during this time period, 44,000 were in the retail sector, 39,000 
T
 
87 Employment figures have been rounded to the nearest thousand. 
88 Jobs in omputer and software development are categorized as employment in the ‘information’ and ‘scientific, 
professional’ sectors.   
 c
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43,000 
able 6-2. Industries of Greatest Job Growth and Decline, 1990 to 2000 
Portland 
were in health, education, and social services, 36,500 were in the information sector, and 
31,000 were in retail.  At the same time, 37,000 jobs were lost in manufacturing and 8,000 were 
lost in the industries of natural resources such as forestry. 
 
T
Seattle 
J  ob Growth Job Growth
Scientific, ofes Health, Education, and Social Services 41,000Pr sional     62,000
Health, Educatio ial Scientific, Professional 38,000n, and Soc Services 43,000
Information R 26,00036,500 etail 
Retail 31,000 Construction 23,000
  
Job Los Loss Job s 
Manufacturing - 37,000 Natural Resource Industries - 5,000
Natural esource IndR ustries - 8,000  
Source:  .S. Census. 
 
reater population growth than Portland.  
From 1
bled in the 1990’s and was similar to the growth of 
the Sea
U
Of the 212,000 additional jobs in the Portland region, 41,000 were in health, education, 
and social services, 38,000 were in the scientific and professional sector, 26,000 in retail, and 
23,000 in construction.89  Employment in the natural resource industries declined by more than 
5,000 jobs during the 1990’s. 
Table 6.3 provides data on population and household growth for both the Portland and 
Seattle regions.  During the 1980’s, Seattle experienced g
980 to 1990, Seattle added approximately 381,000 residents for a 23.1% increase.  
Meanwhile, Portland’s population increased by 182,000 residents, or by 13.6%.  In terms of 
households, Seattle’s growth was also stronger than that of Portland.  Portland added 
approximately 80,000 households, for a growth rate of 15.7%, while Seattle added approximately 
175,000 households, for growth of 27.6%. 
Portland’s population growth rate dou
ttle region.  While Seattle’s population growth remained similar to the previous decade 
with another 381,000 residents added in the 1990’s, Portland added 402,500 residents for an 
                                                 
89 The Census’ industry classifications were significantly modified between the 1990 and 2000 Census.  The 
comparison between 1980 and 1990 is based on sectors as defined by the SIC.  The comparison between 1990 and 
ion system.  While 1990 figures could be re-
not attempted. 
2000 is based on sectors as defined by NAICS, the newer classificat
categorized from SIC to NAICS classifications, it was less clear if a re-classification of 1980 figures would be 
reliable and, therefore, was 
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increase of 26.6%.  In terms of households, both regions added a similar number of households 
in the 1990’s.  The Seattle region gained 153,000 households, while Portland added 152,000. 
 
Table 6-3. Population and Household Growth, 1980 to 2000 
Households  Population 
Region 19 1990 
Population 
2000 
Population 
1980 
Househol lds 
2000 
Households 
80 
Population d os
1990 
Househ
Portland 1,333,572 1,515,452 
) 
8,00
%
742,
(25(13.6%
1,91 9 509,845 
(15.7%) (26.6 ) 
590,049 381 
.8%) 
Seattle 1,651,517 2,033,156 
(23.1%) 
4
%
10,460 
(27.6%) 
963
(18
2,41 ,616 
(18.8 ) 
634,900 8 ,957 
.9%) 
N
S
ote:  Number in parentheses is percent change fr o
ource:  U.S. Census. 
s had similar po n rowth during the 1990’s, this variable should 
ay find between the two regions in terms of affordable housing 
in the 2
 on construction costs in both regions.  The R.S. Means Company 
produc
1995 2000 
om previ us decade.   
 
Because the region pulatio  g
not explain any differences we m
000 analysis.  However, Seattle likely had a somewhat stronger housing market in 1990 
given that the number of new residents and new households in Seattle were more than double the 
number in Portland during the 1980’s. 
Table 6.4 provides data
es an annual index of construction costs for 162 major U.S. and Canadian cities.  The 
index is based on a scale in which 100 equals the average material and installation costs among 
30 major U.S. cities.  A city with a score higher than 100 has construction costs higher than the 
average while a score lower than 100 indicates construction costs lower than the average.  
 
Table 6-4. Construction Cost Index for Portland and Seattle 
Region 1990 
Portland 101.0 105.2 106.0 
Seattle 101.6 107.2 105.7 
Source:  R.S. Means Company, Inc. 
 
In 1990, the construction cost index was 101.0 for Portland and 101.6 for Seattle.  
Therefore, construction costs in Portland were 1% higher than the average of major cities, while 
ive in 
6% 
Seattle’s costs were 1.6% higher.  During the 1990’s, both regions became more expens
terms of construction costs in comparison to other cities.  In 2000, Portland’s costs were 
higher than the average of major cities and Seattle’s costs were 5.7% higher.  Because the index 
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scores are similar in both regions, constructions costs are not a factor in altering the outcome of 
the neighborhood-level analysis. 
6.2.2 
 one of  o  g e 
management (Gale 1992; How  Nels uncan 1995).  In he Or e 
ure created  C on opm is DC) to review 
es.  Local municipalities were given 
the responsibility for developing and maintaining their comprehensive plans in accordance to 
goals e
).  By the end of 1974, LCDC adopted 14 initial planning 
goals r
zes an 
 
3. gricultural Lands – To preserve and maintain agricultural lands 
 
4. Forest Lands – To protect the State’s forest economy consistent with sound resource management and to 
rovide for recrea pportunities and agri  
en spaces, scen istoric areas – To c  open space and pro ural and scenic resources 
ality – To maintain and improve the quality of the air, water, and land 
sources of the state 
 
7. 
Background to Portland 
Oregon is  the first of few state g vernments to take a stron  leading rol in growth 
e 1993; on and D  1973, t egon stat
legislat  the Land onservati and Devel ent Comm sion (LC
comprehensive plans required of the state’s cities and counti
stablished by LCDC.  Counties were responsible for planning in their unincorporated 
areas. 
The state, through LCDC, gave the final approval of all plans in a “top-down” system of 
control.  Plans that were not initially accepted by the state were required to be revised until they 
were acknowledged (Knaap 1994, p. 13
equired to be addressed by each comprehensive plan.  Plans were required to address the 
following goals (Howe 1993, p. 64): 
1. Citizen Participation – To ensure the opportunity for citizens to be involved in all phases of the planning 
process 
 
2. Land Use Planning – To establish a land use planning process and policy framework which emphasi
adequate factual basis for land use decisions 
A
p tional o culture
 
Op5. 
 
ic, and h onserve tect nat
6. Air, water, and land resources qu
re
Areas subject to natural disasters and hazards – To protect life and property from natural disasters and 
hazards 
 
8. Recreational needs – To satisfy the recreational needs of residents and visitors 
 
9. Economic development – To provide adequate opportunities for a variety of economic activities through the 
state 
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10. Housing – To provide for the housing needs of citizens 
 
11. Public facilities and services – To plan and develop a timely, orderly, and efficient arrangement of public 
facilities and services that serve as a framework for urban and rural development 
 
courage a safe, convenient, and economic transportation system 
13. Energy conservation –To conserve energy 
 
14. Urbanization – To provide for an orderly and efficient transition from rural to urban land use 
ajority of the state’s population, the state’s three largest cities, as well as the state’s 
most prim
 1.5 million to 2.6 million while the proportion living in 
 Valley increased from 65.3% to 67.9% (Knaap and Nelson 1992, p.18).  At the 
 
regon’s prime farmland and produces 48% of the 
l 
imilar to that found in California would overtake the natural environment of the Willamette 
 p. 
 and environmental amenities of the valley.  At the same time, economic growth 
as bringing new young 
at these new professionals were attracted to the region not only by jobs, but also by 
12. Transportation – To provide and en
 
 
By the end of 1977, five additional goals were added by LCDC to protect the 
environmental resources associated with the state’s coastline and waterways (Howe 1993, p. 64; 
Department of Land Conservation and Development 2000). 
The impetus behind Oregon’s growth management legislation was the protection of the 
natural resources of the Willamette River Valley in the face of growing development (Abbott 
1997, p. 28).  The Willamette Valley stretches for almost 100 miles south of Portland and 
includes a m
e farmland (Howe 1993, p. 62; Abbott 2002, p. 211).  The late 1960’s and 1970’s 
brought an economic boom to the region through its newly established electronics industry 
(Abbott 1997, p. 14).  During these two decades, Oregon’s population grew twice as fast as the 
national rate and much of the growth was captured in the Willamette River Valley.  From 1950 
to 1980, the state’s population grew from
the Willamette
same time, the valley produces about half of the state’s agricultural products.  The land of the
illamette Valley accounts for 83% of the OW
state’s agricultural products (Knaap and Nelson 1992, p. 131). 
As population grew, farmers in the valley along with environmentalists feared that spraw
s
Valley.  Farmers were concerned that urban development would ruin their livelihood by 
disrupting their agricultural production with scattered residential subdivisions (Abbott 2002,
211).  Meanwhile, environmentalists were concerned with the impact of population growth on 
the loss of land
was being fueled by the development of the electronics industry which w
professionals to the state, and particularly to the Willamette Valley.  Abbot (1997, p. 20) 
ontended thc
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its environmental amenities and outdoor opportunities.  These new professionals, along with 
, 
strong coalition to 
ment 
90   
e’s growth 
manage
wth management in the Willamette 
Valley 
nt to establish and maintain urban 
growth
their employers, also had an interest in protecting the environment.  As a result, farmers
nvironmentalists, young professionals, and other businessmen formed a e
protect the natural resources of the valley on one hand and yet not stifle economic develop
on the other (Knaap and Nelson 1992, p. 125).
The comprehensive nature of Oregon’s planning goals makes the stat
ment legislation one the most innovative in the U.S. (Howe 1993).  The wide-ranging 
goals are the result, as well as a cause, of the broad coalition supporting the state’s growth 
management laws.  Farmers have consistently supported gro
to protect their income and way of life, which is represented by the goal to preserve 
farmland (goal #3).  Environmentists support the goals pertaining to the preservation of land and 
natural resources.  Developers support growth management to the extent that it provides easily 
identified rules for development and hastens the approval process.  Downtown businesses 
support growth management to the extent that it promotes development and revitalization of the 
central city (Leo 1998). 
The primary feature of Oregon’s growth management legislation is the urban growth 
boundary (Abbott 2002, p. 213).  The primary purpose of the urban growth boundary is to 
achieve goal #14 of urbanization, which is “to provide for an orderly and efficient transition from 
rural to urban land use to accommodate urban population and urban employment inside urban 
growth boundaries, to ensure efficient use of land, and to provide for livable communities” 
(Department of Land Conservation and Development 2005).  The urbanization guideline requires 
cities, counties, and in the case of Portland, regional governme
 boundaries (UGB) outside of which urban development is prohibited.  To set the 
boundary lines of the UGBs, government units must consider the projected needs for housing, 
employment, and public facilities based on a twenty year population forecast.   
UGBs, by designating the location of future development, are closely related to a number 
of the other goals in addition to the goal of planned and controlled urbanization.  Table 6.5 lists 
the LCDC goals that UGBs can help to achieve.  They include the preservation of farmland, 
                                                 
90 For readings on political culture and the politics of coalition-building for Oregon’s growth management 
legislation, see Abbott (1997; 2002), Leo (1998), and Durant, Thomas, and Haynes (1993).  For a discussion of the 
political divisions during the passage and implementation of the 1973 land use bill, see Knaap (1994). 
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preservation of open space, and the orderly and efficient placement of infrastructure.  The UGBs 
preserve agricultural land (goal #3) and open spaces (goal #5) by prohibiting development 
outside of the urban boundaries. 
 
Table 6-5. Goals of which Urban Growth Boundaries are a Tool to Acheive 
Goal Definition How UGB Achieves Goal 
#3 – Agricultural 
Lands 
 
To preserve and maintain agricultural 
lands 
Prohibits development on farmland outside of 
boundaries 
#5 – Open Spaces  
and Scenic Areas 
 
To conserve open space and protect 
natural and scenic resources 
Prohibits development on undeveloped land outside 
of boundaries 
#11 – Public 
facilities and 
services 
To plan and develop a timely, orderly, 
and efficient arrangement of public 
facilities and services that serve as a 
framework for urban and rural 
development 
 
Development occurs in a more contiguous manner, 
reducing infrastructure costs. 
#14 – Urbanization To provide for an orderly and efficient 
transition from rural to urban land use 
 
Land must first be developed within the boundaries. 
Incremental expansions of the boundaries occur as  
 
Source:  Howe (1993, p. 64) and Abbott (2002, p. 214). 
.  Urban growth 
bounda
unit of infrastructure, making more efficient use of it. 
As a result of Oregon’s growth management legislation, the Portland Metro adopted and 
r 
 
With the establishment of UGBs, public facilities and infrastructure are developed and 
operated in a more efficient manner (goal #11) for two reasons.  First, public infrastructure will 
be expanded in an orderly fashion as the boundaries prohibit large-scale development on the 
rural fringe which would otherwise occur.  New development occurs within closer proximity to 
current development and existing infrastructure.  This closer proximity reduces the distance and 
cost of expensive public infrastructure extensions (Nelson and Duncan 1995). 
The second reason that UGBs help to achieve more efficient infrastructure is by 
increasing density.  Chapter Four provided an explanation for greater development density in 
response to an urban containment policy, including urban growth boundaries
ries restrict the supply of developable land.  As a result, the price of developable land 
increases.  Developers then choose to invest more capital in structures per unit of land.  This 
results in an increase in density.  Greater population density means that there are more people per 
implemented their initial UGB in 1979.  The Portland Metro is unique in that it is responsible fo
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designating and implementing an urban growth boundary that surrounds the City of Portland and 
twenty-six of its suburban municipalities.  Typically, growth boundaries are implemented by 
local jurisdictions or counties to control local growth rather than in a regionally unified manner 
(Abbott 2002, p. 214).  The Portland Metro is the only regional organization in Oregon to be 
respons  implemented by each 
municipality and county.  The Metro’s UGB covers portions of Clackamas, Multnomah, 
ocat did not establish UGBs until 1994 in response to that 
th Man
el o
than localities woul ir own (Howe 1993, p. 66; Knaap 1994, p. 13-14).  
unwilling to accept re
es, LCDC sided with 
environmental organizations who wanted small growth boundaries rather than municipalities 
who wa
ible for a UGB.  Throughout the remainder of the state, UGBs are
local 
and Washington counties.  The other two Oregon counties of the Portland region, Columbia and 
Yamhill, oversee UGBs within their borders in
Clark County, l
dependent o
ed in Washington State, 
f the Portland Metro.  Meanwhile, 
state’s Grow
State lev
agement Acts in 1990 and 1991. 
versight of comprehensive planning led to sm
d have implemented on the
aller UGBs and higher density 
LCDC, the state agency given the responsibility for approving or rejec
 plans which the agency conside
ting local plans, was 
d to include too much land and minimal 
density requirements within the urban growth boundaries.  Many tim
nted larger boundaries in which to place future development (Knaap 1994).  LCDC was 
able to enforce smaller boundaries and higher densities by rejecting local plans and, as a result, 
withholding state funds or threatening to temporarily suspend local land use powers until local 
plans were determined to be in compliance with LCDC’s goals and criteria.  
6.2.2.1 Affordable Housing Policy 
Meeting the housing needs of the state’s citizens (goal #10) is a significant planning goal of 
Oregon’s growth management legislation (Toulan 1994).  LCDC states that for localities to 
achieve this goal:  
Buildable lands for residential use shall be inventoried and plans shall encourage the availability of 
adequate numbers of needed housing units at price ranges and rent levels which are commensurate with the 
financial capabilities of Oregon households and allow for flexibility of housing location, type, and density 
(Department of Land Conservation and Development 2005, Goal 10). 
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Table 6.6 lists four significant affordable housing policies established by the state and 
Portland Metro to achieve the housing goal since the implementation of urban growth boundaries 
in 1979. 
 
Table 6-6. Affordable Housing Policies of Portland Metro 
ear) Purpose Requirement Reason Policy was Established Policy (Y
Metropo
Housing
(1981) 
litan 
 Rule 
“Assure opportunity for 
the provision of 
adequate numbers of 
needed housing units 
and efficient use of land 
within the Metropolitan 
Portland urban growth 
Minimum density requirements 
for local municipalities within 
Portland Metro’s jurisdiction: 
 
6 largest cities – 10 units per net 
buildable acre; 
 
Local jurisdictions were not 
adequately addressing the state’s 
housing goal in their initial 
comprehensive plans required by 
the state. 
boundary.” Moderate sized cities – 8 units 
per net buildable acre; 
 
Smallest communities – 6 units 
per net buildable acre. 
Regional
Framewo
(1997) 
 
rk Plan 
Reemphasize need for 
affordable housing 
throughout the region. 
Establishment of the Affordable 
Housing Technical Advisory 
Committee (H-TAC) to discuss 
potential solutions to affordable 
housing problem. 
Strong growth in housing prices 
during the early 1990’s.  Median 
house value grew more than 
twice as fast as median household 
income. 
Regional
Affordab
Housing 
Strategy 
 
le 
(2000) 
Identify strategies to 
address the affordable 
housing problem. 
Estimated fair-share housing 
allocations for each municipality 
within the jurisdiction of the 
Portland Metro.  No 
requirements for municipalities 
to adopt them. 
Municipalities were reluctant to 
address affordable housing 
issues. 
Title 7 of Urban 
Growth 
Functional Plan 
(2001) 
Encourage 
municipalities to adopt 
supply of affordable 
Required municipalities to 
submit reports to Portland Metro 
arding their progress in 
addressing affordable housing.  
Municipalities were reluctant to 
address affordable housing 
issues. Management strategies to increase reg
housing. Adoption of specific strategies is 
voluntary. 
Source:  
afforda
goal.  Frus  that were then 
rejected by LCDC because they included low-density zoning which would exclude housing for 
low-income households, the state passed the Metropolitan Housing Rule (MHR) in 1981 (Knaap 
and Nelson 1992, p. 78; Toulan 1994, pp. 102-105).  The most important aspect of the MHR is 
(Knaap and Nelson 1992, p. 79; Portland Metro 2000, 2004). 
 
One of the earliest problems in the Portland region regarding growth management and 
ble housing was the reluctance among local municipalities to address the state’s housing 
trated by local jurisdictions submitting initial comprehensive plans
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its min
f the municipality (Portland Metro 2000, 2004).91  Another important aspect of the 
MHR is that also requires the Portland Metro to take steps to ensure that 50% of the new housing 
built in nd Clackamas Counties be attached 
-fa ulti-family housing (Portland Metro 2004). 
T   Po
system, particularly with regard to
1994; Le e a
households would have a legitima ainst them.  By increasing housing density and 
the supp family units, dable for most households even 
though the amount of land availa was restricted.  Hale (1991) argued that 
from 1985 to 1989 the Metropolit uirements increased the number 
f housin aila 24
esu al
to multi-family housing for politic le
ersonal  199 2).  L
lti-fam am o rced 
cision to do so.  Knowing ties faced the same rule also reduced local 
opposition to multi-family housing
In Portland Metr ework
 for rou  the affordability  in 
io be de nd’s housing market was strong 
in the early 1990’s as a result of a economy.  Portland’s housing market was becoming 
 
households.  The m
imum density requirements for each municipality within the Portland Metro’s jurisdiction.  
The minimum density requirement is six, eight, or ten units per net buildable acre depending on 
the size o
 the urban portions of Multnomah, Washington, a
single mily or m
he MHR is credited as
o 1998).  If the implem
ly of multi-
one reason for the success of
 the public acceptance of the urban growth boundaries (Toulan 
rtland’s growth management 
ries increased housing prices, ntation of urban growth bound
te complaint ag
 housing could remain affor
le for development b
an Housing Rule’s density req
o
T
g units allowed on av
he second important r
ble land from 129,000 units to 
lt of the housing rule is that loc
al purposes could accept smal
0,950 units. 
 politicians who were opposed 
r housing units without taking 
p
mu
their de
responsibility (Hale
ily units and, at the s
1, p. 14; Leo 1998, p. 37
e time, explain to disgruntled c
 that all municipali
. 
ocal officials could approve 
nstituents that the state fo
 1997, the 
affordable housing th
n declined.  As will 
o adopted a Regional Fram
ghout the metropolitan area as
scribed in Section 6.2.4, Portla
 booming 
 Plan which reemphasized the 
 of housingneed
the reg
over-priced for the median household and losing affordable housing for lower-income
edian value of a home grew more than twice as fast as median household 
income (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). 
                                                 
91 The minimum density requirements for specific cities and urban portions of Clackamas, Multnomah, and 
Washington Counties can be found on page 21 (Chapter One – Land Use) of the Metro’s Regional Framework Plan 
(2004) or in Knaap and Nelson (1992, p. 79). 
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The Regional Framework Plan called for the creation of the Affordable Housing 
Technical Advisory Committee (H-TAC) to bring local government representatives, developers, 
businesses, and affordable housing advocates together to discuss solutions to the growing 
affordable housing problem (Portland Metro 2004).  H-TAC published the Regional Affordable 
Housing Strategy (RAHS) in 2000, providing an analysis of the need for affordable housing, as 
well as a detailed list of strategies that could be implemented at the regional and local levels to 
satisfy 
or increasing the 
supply 
ys to reduce development costs 
s, discrepancies in planning and zoning codes, local 
lished by the Metropolitan Housing Rule, but no other 
strategies are mandated.  The only requirement of Title 7 is that jurisdictions provide an 
                                                
that need (Portland Metro 2000).  The RAHS estimated the fair-share of affordable 
housing each municipality was expected to attempt to attain.  The estimates were based on each 
municipality’s current population, current housing stock, and future projected growth.92 
Based on recommendations from H-TAC, affordable housing production goals and 
strategies to reach them were added in Title 7 of the Metro’s Urban Growth Management 
Functional Plan (UGMFP) (Portland Metro 2004).  Title 7 requires municipalities within the 
Metro’s jurisdiction to submit progress reports to Metro regarding their progress in addressing 
affordable housing needs.  Each jurisdiction is required to consider strategies f
of affordable units for low-income households.  The strategies include (Portland Metro 
2004, pp. 42-45;  2005): 
? Density bonuses 
? No-net-loss housing policies 
? Inclusionary housing policies 
? Transfer of development rights 
? Examine zoning codes for wa
? Review regulatory constraint
permitting or approval processes  
? Review parking requirements for ways to reduce development costs 
 
Despite the efforts of H-TAC, there is evidence of a lack of will among local jurisdictions 
to adopt these affordable housing strategies.  Municipalities only must “consider adopting a 
voluntary affordable housing production goal and a list of specific affordable housing strategies 
and tools” to meet the goal (Portland Metro 2004).  Municipalities must meet density and multi-
family housing requirements estab
 
92 For specific affordable housing targets for each municipality see page 18 of the Regional Affordable Housing 
Strategy report. 
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explana
Washin
ans of both municipalities and counties are required to include thirteen 
plement one another with a unified aim to preserve open 
esources, ensure efficient and orderly extensions of 
between economic growth and environmental protection.  
es exist 
 
2. educe sprawl – Reduce the inappropriate conversion of undeveloped land into sprawling, low-density 
opment 
 
experiencing insufficient economic growth, all within the capacities of the state’s natural resources, public 
services, and public facilities 
 
6. Property rights – Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation having been 
tion why any of the strategies recommended by H-TAC and Metro were not adopted.  
However as of the end of 2003, 14 out of 27 jurisdictions had not complied with the requirement 
to submit a progress report regarding their consideration of these affordable housing strategies 
(Portland Metro 2004).  Without legislation requiring to do so, local municipalities have been 
slow to address the affordable housing goals on their own. 
6.2.3 Background to Seattle 
gton’s Growth Management Acts of 1990 and 1991 require comprehensive planning 
among counties and their municipalities.  The planning mandate applies to counties with a 20% 
population growth rate from 1980 to 1990 or those with a population greater than 50,000 
residents and a 17% growth rate (Weitz 1999, p. 114).  Currently, sixteen counties in the state are 
required to have comprehensive plans and another ten counties have them voluntarily (DeGrove 
1994, p. 238; Weitz 1999, p. 114).   
Comprehensive pl
primary goals.  Many of these goals com
space and other environmental r
infr sa tructure, and manage the balance 
The goals are (Washington Research Council 2001, p. 2): 
1. Urban growth – Encourage development in urban areas where adequate public facilities and servic
or can be provided in an efficient manner
 
R
devel
3. Transportation – Encourage efficient multi-modal transportation systems that are based on regional 
priorities and coordinated with county and city comprehensive plans 
 
4. Housing – Encourage the availability of affordable housing to all economic segments of the population, 
promote a variety of residential densities and housing types, and encourage preservation of existing housing 
stock 
 
5. Economic development – Encourage economic development throughout the state that is consistent with 
comprehensive plans, promote economic opportunity for all citizens, and encourage growth in areas 
made. 
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7. Permits – Applications for both sate and local governments should be processed in a timely and fair manner 
to ensure predictability 
 
8. Natural resource industries – Maintain and enhance natural resource-based industries, including productive 
timber, agricultural, and fisheries industries.  Encourage the conservation of productive forest lands and 
productive agricultural lands, and discourage incompatible uses 
 
9. Open space and recreation – Encourage the retention of open space and development of recreational 
opportunities 
 
ironment and enhance the state’s high quality of life, including air and water 
 
11. Citizen participation and coordination – Encourage the involvement of citizens in the planning process and 
ent Act was the result of concerns among the state’s 
citizens, particularly those living in urban ar
 1980’s, the late 1980’s 
 
ing 
me 
in the Puget Sound Region which is an area known for its environmental 
 
or and managing economic development and growth (DeGrove 1994).  Table 6.7 compares the 
10. Environment – Protect the env
quality, and the availability of water 
ensure coordination between communities and jurisdictions to reconcile conflicts 
  
12. Public facilities and services – Ensure that public facilities and services necessary to support development 
shall be adequate at the time the development is available for occupancy 
 
13. Historic preservation – Identify and encourage the preservation of lands, sites, and structures, that have 
historical or archaeological significance 
 
Washington’s Growth Managem
eas of the Puget Sound region, regarding population 
growth, urban development, and the loss of natural resources.  The state’s population more than 
doubled from 2.4 million to 4.9 million residents from 1950 to 1990, with much of that growth 
captured by the Puget Sound region, particularly the Seattle metropolitan area (Staley and Gilroy 
2001, p. 12).  After a recession during the late 1970’s and the early
brought a resurgence of urban growth in the metropolitan area of Seattle.  The growth was
captured not only in the city of Seattle, but was felt in the suburbs which were fast becom
home to large corporate campuses, such as Microsoft (Fulton et al. 2006, p. 27).  At the sa
me, Seattle lies withti
amenities and natural resources of forests and water life. 
The goals of Washington’s Growth Management Act were heavily drawn from Oregon’s
experience, particularly with regard to protection of the state’s natural resources while planning 
f
states of Washington and Oregon with regard to growth management. 
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Table 6-7. Comparison of Growth Management between Washington and Oregon 
Washington  Oregon 
   
Year Passed 
 
1990/1991 1973 
Form of Urban Containment Urban Growth Area (same as 
Urban Growth Boundary) 
Urban Growth Boundary 
 
Year Urban Containment 
plemented in Region of 
1995 (Seattle) 1979 (Portland) 
Im
Interest to this Research 
 
Enforcement Approach Bottom-Up Top-Down 
 
Housing Goal Required in Yes Yes 
Comprehensive Plans 
 
Minimum Density Minimum density established by Minimum
Requirements Growth Management Hearing 
dable acre. 
 densities of 6, 8, to 10 
units per buildable acre in 
Metropolitan Housing Rule. 
Boards of the Seattle Region is 4 
units per buil
Portland Region.  Established by 
Source:  ale 1992; Dawkins and Nelson 2003; Futurewise 2005). 
ncourage development where adequate 
infrastr
, “Comprehensive plans – 
                                              
(G
 
A significant tool required by Washington’s Growth Management Act is the designation 
of urban growth areas, outside of which urban development is prohibited.93  The Puget Sound 
Regional Council provides the following summary of the urban growth area: 
 
Urban growth areas must be designated by counties, in consultation with municipalities.  
There areas are to accommodate 20 years of growth, based on projections provided by the 
Washington State Office of Financial Management (OFM).  Urban growth area 
designations are to be reviewed every 10 years.  No annexations are allowed beyond 
designated growth areas (Puget Sound Regional Council 2005). 
 
Urban growth areas are closely related to a number of the state’s growth management 
goals, including the goals to reduce sprawl (goal #2), e
ucture exists and ensure that public facilities and services are available to serve 
development prior to the time of occupation (goals #1 and #12), encourage the retention of open 
space (goal # 9), and encourage the availability of a wide range of housing densities and types to 
meet the needs for all income groups (goal #4).  Section 36.70A.110
   
93 In Washington State, this tool is called an urban growth area.  In Oregon, the tool is called an urban growth 
boundary.  They each refer to the same concept. 
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Urban ks each of these 
oals to urban growth areas. 
n growth areas en velopment in areas with adequate infrastructure because 
ow d wh  development 
already exist.  The urban grow de land that is expected to be provided with 
u ate mandate inclu on that development 
 in locations within the urban growth area until public services and 
red to be at the time the devel occupied.94 
eas ar o expected to assist local ictions in meeting the housing 
uires that comprehensive plans permit a range of housing densities within 
as to accomm en wever, 
there are few specific guidelin y pected 
awkins and Nelson (2003) refer to Washington’s growth management system as a 
“bottom
tandards and reject 
local plans (Gale 1992, p. 426-427; Fulton 1999, p. 19).  The state’s Department of Community 
Develo
out of c
require
h Management Hearing 
Boards to h
                                                
growth areas,” of the state’s growth management legislation explicitly lin
g
Urba courage de
the state requires urban gr th areas to first be locate
th areas can then inclu
ere infrastructure and
public infrastructure in the f
cannot actually occur
ture.  The st des a stipulati
infrastructure are ensu  available opment is 
Urban growth ar
goal.  The state req
e als jurisd
urban growth are odate housing needs for curr
es pertaining to actual densit
t and future households.  Ho
targets which localities are ex
to achieve. 
D
-up” approach in which local governments have a great degree of authority over their 
comprehensive plans.  Unlike Oregon’s Land Conservation and Development Commission 
(LCDC), there is no state level agency with the authority to impose rigid s
pment is able to review and comment on local plans, but does not determine if they are 
ompliance.  At the time of submission, plans are assumed to be in compliance with state 
ments until they are challenged by an interested third-party. 
The Growth Management Acts created three regional Growt
ear complaints filed by third-party organizations or individuals regarding municipal 
and county comprehensive plans.  After a complaint is filed, it is the responsibility of these 
regional hearing boards to then determine if a plan is in compliance with the growth management 
laws.  If a municipality’s or county’s plan is determined to be out of compliance, the state is able 
to withhold certain streams of revenue, particularly resources which are distributed by the state 
from the gas tax, liquor taxes, and sales tax (Gale 1992). 
 
ewers, and water supply (DeGrove 1994, p. 239). 
94 This requirement is concurrency, which was modeled after Florida’s growth management legislation.  The 
concurrency requirement is applicable to roads, s
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Amendments to the Growth Management Acts, passed in 1997, have given more control 
to local and county governments over their plans.  Prior to 1997, complainants only had to 
illustra
challenge a 
locality
achieving affordable housing for all income 
ies, manufactured housing, 
 
ion is the definition of affordability.  
However, the state does not mandate a specific definition of “affordability” nor does it specify a 
                                                
te to a Growth Management Hearing Board that there was a “preponderance of evidence” 
that a locality’s comprehensive plan was out of compliance of state goals.  The 1997 
amendments modified the growth management legislation to require complainants to show that a 
locality’s plans and development regulations are “clearly erroneous” in order to have them 
judged as out of compliance of state goals.  This is higher standard of review which makes it 
more difficult for interested parties, such as environmental organizations, to 
’s comprehensive plans (Black 1998). 
6.2.3.1 Affordable Housing Policy 
Counties and local municipalities are required to include a housing element in their 
comprehensive plans, providing a blueprint for 
groups.  The housing element must include:95 
1. An analysis and inventory of existing and projected housing needs that identifies the 
number of housing units necessary to manage projected growth; 
 
2. A statement of goals, policies, objectives, and mandatory provisions for the 
improvement, and development of housing, including single-family residences; 
 
 
3. Identification of sufficient lands for housing, including all types of housing such as 
government-assisted housing, housing for low-income famil
multifamily housing, and group homes; and 
4. Adequate provisions for existing and projected needs of all economic segments of the 
community. 
 
Counties and local jurisdictions are responsible for addressing in their plans a ‘fair’ 
distribution of affordable housing for low-income households throughout the county based on 
projections of future population and job growth (Washington Research Council 1998, p. 22-23).  
A significant factor influencing each county’s project
 
95 From the Revised Code of Washington (RCW), Section 36.70A.070, “Comprehensive plans – Mandatory 
Elements.” 
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definiti
 35).  To achieve this goal, King County suggests 
that jurisdictions adopt density bonuses for developers who include affordable housing in their 
ees for the development of housing units that service low-
han 95% of the median 
incom
tly have, 
nd re expected to have in the future, “housing needs” in the county.  It then allocates this total 
n of 
t 
concentrated in any one jurisdiction.  
 is 
ary factors (Snohomish County Tomorrow 2005, Executive Summary, p. 2).  
These f
 
3. The proportion of low cost housing units in each jurisdiction’s total housing stock as 
compared to the countywide average.  Jurisdictions with a smaller proportion of low cost 
 
on of “low-income” households.  Counties are free to adopt their own definition of 
affordability, as well choose the level of income at which they want to focus their housing 
affordability efforts (Washington Research Council 1998). 
In its comprehensive plan’s housing element, King County which includes the City of 
Seattle focuses on the housing needs of very low-income households with income less than 50% 
of the area’s median, as well as low-income households with income of 50% to 80% of the area’s 
median.  King County expects its jurisdictions to plan for at least 17% of their housing units to 
be affordable to low-income households and 24% to be affordable for very low-income 
households (King County 2004, Chapter 2, p.
new developments; reduce impact f
income households; and expedite review plans for housing developments which serve low and 
moderate-income households (King County 2004, Chapter 2, pp. 37-38). 
The housing element of Snohomish County’s comprehensive plan focuses on the 
distribution of affordable housing units for low/moderate-income households.  The county 
defines a household as having a “housing need” if its income is less t
e and it is spending more than 30% of its income on housing (Washington Research 
Council 1998, p. 25).  The county calculates the total number of households that curren
a  a
number of “housing needs” to local jurisdictions to achieve a “fair-share” distributio
affordable housing.  The purpose of this allocation is to ensure that low-income housing is no
Snohomish County’s fair share housing allocation for “housing need” households
ased on three primb
actors are: 
1. The existing need in each jurisdiction and the county.  
 
2. The proportion of low-income jobs within or adjacent to the jurisdiction as compared to 
the countywide proportion.  The fair-share allocation is adjusted upward for a jurisdiction 
which has a greater than average proportion of low-income jobs. 
housing in comparison to other jurisdictions are given an increase in their fair-share
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allocation, while jurisdictions with a larger than average proportion are given a decrease 
in their allocation.96 
 
The county recommends, but does not mandate, specific tools to increase the supply of 
afforda
 Management Hearing 
Boards
tland and Seattle 
.2.3 reviewed the state growth management mandates regarding urban growth 
tropolitan regions of Portland and 
eattle, respectively.  The sections first described each state’s growth management legislation 
ble units.  These strategies include reviewing parking, sidewalk, and curb requirements 
which may result in more expensive housing than necessary, reducing impact fees, streamlining 
the approval process to reduce costly delays in approval, and reviewing land use regulations to 
make sure they do not impede higher density and mixed use development (Snohomish County 
Tomorrow 1994, 2005). 
Despite the autonomy among counties regarding their affordable housing policies, there 
is one “regional” policy which may have an impact on the supply of housing, and the supply of 
affordable housing for lower income households.  Two regional Growth Management Hearing 
Boards have established a minimum acceptable density for new development within urban 
growth areas.  The Central Puget Sound and Western Washington Growth
, which combined cover the three counties of the Seattle Metropolitan Statistical Area, 
have established a minimum density of four single-family dwellings per net buildable acres 
(Futurewise 2005, p. 3).  Densities below this minimum are not considered urban and therefore 
not acceptable within the urban growth areas.  This minimum density is not as high as Portland’s 
Metropolitan Housing Rule which requires jurisdictions to try to achieve densities of six, eight, 
or ten units per net buildable acre and likely has less impact on the supply of affordable housing 
than Portland’s rule.   
6.2.4 Housing Affordability in Por
Section 6.2.2 and 6
boundaries, as well as affordable housing policies, in the me
S
and their requirement for local jurisdictions to designate urban growth boundaries.  Urban 
                                                 
96 For specific allocations for each jurisdiction, as well as details of the methodology for calculating the fair-share 
allocation, see the 2025 Fair Share Housing Allocation report published by Snohomish County Tomorrow (2005). 
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growth boundaries are one of the most significant aspects to growth management in both states
nd, in turn, in both regions. 
 
  
rtland Metropolitan Housing Rule requires localities to have density 
targets 
 the growth in household incomes for renter households.  The fourth 
measure is the median home value for owner-occupied housing units.  The fifth measure is the 
meowner households for homeowner 
households.  The sixth measure is the ratio of the percentage change in median home values to 
the percentage change in median household incomes from 1990 to 2000 for homeowners. 
rent to median household income ratio was .171 indicating only a minor increase as the median 
renter household was spending 17.1% of its income on rental costs.  In the Seattle, the ratio only 
a
The sections then provided a review of each region’s policies regarding affordable 
housing for low-income households.  The planning organization for the Portland region has a 
‘regional’ requirement that all jurisdictions consider voluntarily adopting specific strategies to 
increase the supply of affordable housing.  The jurisdictions must report to the Portland Metro 
their progress in considering the various strategies, even though not all jurisdictions have done 
so.  Additionally, the Po
of six, eight, or ten units per acre.  In contrast, there are no regional requirements for 
affordable housing strategies in the Seattle region with the exception of a density minimum for 
new development of four units per acre established by the regional growth management hearing 
boards. 
This section compares six measures of housing affordability within both regions from 
1990 to 2000.  Table 6.8 lists these six measures which include three for renter households and 
three for homeowner households.  The first measure is the median gross rent for rental units, but 
this does not indicate affordability without a comparison to income.  The second measure is the 
ratio of median gross rent to median income for renter households.  The third measure is the ratio 
of the percentage change in median gross rent to the percentage change in median household 
income for renter households during this same time period.  This ratio captures the growth of 
rental costs relative to
ratio of median home value to median income for ho
As shown in Table 6.8, the median gross rent to median income ratio did not significantly 
change in either region for renter households from 1990 to 2000.  In 1990, Portland’s ratio of 
median gross rent to median household income was .169.  This value means that the median 
renter household spent 16.9% of its income on rental costs.  By 2000, Portland’s median gross 
increased from .171 to .172 in the same time period. 
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Table 6-8. Housing Affordability in Portland and Seattle 
 1990 
Portland 
1990 
Seattle 
2000 
Portland 
2000 
Seattle 
Rental Units     
Median Rent 
 
$  436 $ 514 $  672 $ 758 
Ratio of Median Rent to Median Income 
for Renter Households 
 
.169 .171 .171 .172 
Ratio of Percentage Change in Median 
Rent to Percentage Change in Median 
Household Income, 1990 to 2000, for 
Renter Households 
NA NA 1.04 1.03 
     
Owner-Occupied Units     
Median V
 
alue $ 72,563 $ 135,763 $ 170,000 $ 223,100 
Ratio of Median Home Value to Median 
Income, 1990 and 2000, for Homeowner 
Households 
 
2.34 3.76 3.61 4.23 
Ratio of Percentage Change in Median 
Home Value to Percentage Change in 
Median Household Income, 1990 to 
2000, for Homeowner Households 
NA NA 2.59 1.39 
Note:  “Rent” is gross rent which includes utility costs.  Figures are not adjusted for inflation. 
Source:  U.S. Census. 
 
From 1990 to 2000, the ratio of the percentage change in median gross rent to percentage 
change in median household income for renter households was not significantly different 
between Portland and Seattle.  The ratio was 1.04 in Portland and 1.03 in Seattle.  This indicates 
that rental costs increased 4% and 3% faster than income in each region, respectively. 
The ratio of median home value to median household income for owner-occupied 
housing units tells a different story.  In both 1990 and 2000, median home value relative to 
median household income was higher in Seattle than in Portland.  But from 1990 to 2000, home 
values grew significantly faster relative to income in Portland than in Seattle.  In 1990, the ratio 
of the median home value-to-median household income was 2.34 in Portland as compared to 
3.76 in Seattle.  This comparison indicates that Seattle’s median house was 3.76 times higher in 
value than the median household’s income and 2.34 times higher in Portland.  By 2000, the ratio 
 202 
increased from 2.34 to 3.61 in the Portland region, which was a 54.3% increase.  It increased 
from 3. e period, which was a 12.5% increase. 
The ratio of the percentage change i ian hom ue to percentage change in median 
come for homeowner hou as m her nd Seattle.  
990’s, Portland was experiencing a much tighter hous rket in
d, the ratio was 2.59, indicating that the increase in the 
was 159% high an the ease in e.  
s 1.39 indicating that the median home value in Seattle 
ehol ome. 
e measures provide insight into changes in housing affo or the 
nges in affordab ity may vary for different income groups, particularly 
e households.  To measu bil -in se p ratio 
 affordable units to the number of low-income households.  
or omponent of the housing stock for extremely low-
ysis focuses on the rental market.  The value 
he p rtion of income rs who d be able to 
 the units were available to them.  A ratio with a value less than 
able rental units.    
Similarly, a ratio with a value greater than 1 indicates there are more affordable units than renter 
househ
e gap ratio 
for extr
76 to 4.23 in the Seattle region during the same tim
n med e val
household in seholds w uch igh  in Po tlar than i  n
During the 1 ing ma  home ownership 
opportunities that Seattle.  In Portlan
median home value er th  incr  median household incom
Meanwhile, the ratio in Seattle wa
increased only 39% faster than hous
While thes
d inc
rdability f
median household, cha il
for low-incom re afforda ity for low come hou holds, a ga
can be used to measure the number of
Because rental units are the most imp tant c
income and very low-income households, this anal
of the ratio can be interpreted as t
occupy an affordable unit if all of
ropo low- rente woul
1 signifies that there are more low-income renter households than afford
olds. 
Table 6.9 provides the gap ratio for extremely low-income, very low-income, and low-
income renter households.97  The table also includes the number of renter households in each 
income category, as well as the number of rental units affordable to them.  In 1990, th
emely low-income renter households was .49 in both regions.  These ratios mean that of 
the renter households earning less than 30% of the area’s median income only 49% would be 
                                                 
97 Section 2.1 defines these income categories, as well as provides the definition of ‘affordable’ units.  Following the 
example in Table 2.3, the income categories in Table 6.9 are cumulative.  Extremely low-income, very low-income, 
and low-income households have income less than 30%, 50%, and 80% of the area median income, respectively.  
Affordable housing is housing that costs less than 30% of household income.  An affordable rental unit for a given 
income category is a unit whose gross rental cost is less than 30% of the highest possible income for that income 
category. 
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able to occupy an ‘affordable’ rental unit if all of them were available.  In 2000, this ratio had 
dropped to .36 in Portland, for a 26.5% decline, and to .48 in Seattle, for only a 2.0% decline. 
   
Table 6-9. Supply of Affordable Rental Units to Number of Low-Income Renter Householdsa 
 Portland Region Seattle Region 
 1990 2000 % 
Change 
1990 2000 % 
Change 
Extremely Low-Income       
Gap Ratio .49 .36 -26.5% .49 .48 -2.0% 
# of renter households 54,822 64,678 18.0% 73,286 93,969 28.2% 
# of affordable rental units  26,698 23,105 -13.5% 35,606 45,382 27.5% 
       
Very Low-Income       
Gap Ratio 1.29 1.13 -12.4% 1.21 1.13 -6.6% 
# of renter households 97,664 117,397 20.2% 133,042 172,246 29.5% 
# of affordable rental units 125,577 133,240 6.1% 161,606 194,805 20.5% 
       
Low-Income       
Gap Ratio 1.33 1.38 3.8% 1.31 1.15 -12.2% 
# of renter households 154,006 184,919 20.1% 217,858 260,972 19.8% 
# of affordable rental units 205,540 237,367 15.5% 285,397 301,041 5.5% 
a.  Income categories are cumulative. 
Source:  U.S. Census. 
 
The gap ratio is influenced by both a change in the number of low-income renter 
households, as well as a change in the supply of affordable housing units.  In Portland, the gap 
ratio for extremely low-income renter households declined because the number of extremely 
low-inc
Why did the number of affordable rental units for extremely low-income renter 
households increase in Seattle, but decline in Portland?  One plausible explanation is the 
extraordinary strength of the housing market in Portland during the 1990’s.  While both Seattle 
 
k 
ome renter households increased by 9,856, or 18%, while the number of affordable rental 
units declined by 3,593, or 13.5%.   In contrast, Seattle also had an increase in the number of 
extremely low-income renter households by 28.2%, or by 20,683 households, but the region also 
had a 27.5% increase in the number of rental units affordable to extremely low-income renter 
households. 
and Portland experienced strong economic growth and little change in affordability of rental 
units to the median income household, the value of owner occupied units relative to income
increased much greater in Portland than in Seattle.  In Section 4.1, the theoretical framewor
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suggests that strong increases in housing prices in the general housing market give owners of 
low-quality housing, which is more likely affordable than higher-quality housing, an incentive to 
upgrade their units.  If this occurs, affordable housing is lost for low-income households.  
Extrem  see a 
ecline in the number of rental units affordable to them from 1990 to 20
The gap ratio also declined for very low-in ter holds e w es 
ea’s median).  The ratio of af rdable re al units to very low-income 
lined fro o by  in P  and .21 , or 
decl rre te an increase in the number of affordable rental 
income households in both regions.  Portland experienced an increase in the 
 rental un er com ho % 3 r its.  
very m  hou ds in
tle experienced a mu h greater ncrease in the number of affordable rental units for 
ter house h o low
he n f  in nte ol sed 204 
%. 
he growth in affordable rental units for very low-income renter households was smaller 
in Port
w-income renter households increased from 1.33 to 1.38, or 3.8%, in Portland.  In 
contras
ely low-income renter households in Portland were the only income group to
d 00. 
come ren house  (thos ith incom
less than 50% of the ar fo nt
renter households dec m 1.29 t 1.13, or 12.4%, ortland  from 1  to 1.13
by 6.6%, in Seattle.  This ine occu d despi
units for very-low 
number of affordable its for v y low-in e house lds by 6.1 , or 7,66 ental un
However, the number of  low-inco e renter sehol creased by 20.2%, or 19,733.  In 
contrast, Seat c  i
very low-income ren holds.  T e number f very -income rental units increased by 
33,199 units, or 20.5%.  T umber o very-low come re r househ ds increa by 39,
households, or 29.5
T
land than in Seattle.  Once again, this smaller growth may be the result of Portland’s 
expensive homeownership market, encouraging landlords to upgrade their low-quality units.  
Such a strong housing market may also make it less likely for units to be converted to rental 
units, and particularly low-income rental units.  Absentee-owners of housing units may find it 
more profitable to sell the units as owner-occupancy opportunities than to keep them for rentals.  
The broadest definition of “low-income” includes all households whose income is below 
80% of the area median income.  From 1990 to 2000, the ratio of affordable rental units to the 
number of lo
t, the ratio declined from 1.31 to 1.15, or 12.2%, in Seattle. 
In both regions, the number of affordable units to low-income households increased.  The 
supply increased by 15.5%, or 31,827 units, in Portland and by 5.5%, or 15,644 units, in Seattle.  
This difference between the two regions is interesting in that Seattle had greater growth than 
Portland in the number of rental units affordable to extremely low-income and very low-income 
renter households, yet had smaller growth than Portland in the number of affordable rental units 
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to all low-income renter households.  In Seattle, the decline in the ratio between the number of 
affordable rental units and the number of low-income renter households was the result of large 
growth in the number of low-income households.  The number of low-income renter households 
increased by 19.8%, or 43,114, in Seattle as compared to the increase in affordable rental units 
by 15,644 units. 
In summary, this comparison of housing affordability between the regions of Portland 
and Seattle indicate that Portland experienced a greater loss in housing affordability during the 
1990’s than Seattle.  While affordability in the rental market remained fairly constant for the 
median renter households in both regions, values in the homeownership market grew much faster 
for the median household in Portland.  The supply of affordable rental units for very low-income 
and extremely low-income renters is of primary importance to this research.  Portland saw a 
much larger decline in the number of affordable rental units relative to the number of extremely 
low-income and very low-income renter households than Seattle. 
6.2.5 Summary of Portland and Seattle 
Table 6.10 provides a summary of the most important comparisons between Portland and Seattle 
made in Section 6.2.  Urban growth boundaries were established in the Portland region in 1979 
while they were not established throughout the Seattle region until 1995.  This difference in the 
timing of the urban containment policies makes the two regions potential comparative regions 
regarding the impact of urban containment policies.  For fifteen years, Portland had an urban 
contain
icularly with regard to home 
owners
ment policy while the Seattle region did not. 
In comparison to the Seattle region, Portland experienced a greater growth rate in jobs 
and household income during the 1990’s.  Not unexpectedly, Portland also experienced a greater 
decline in affordability than Seattle during this time period, part
hip opportunities.   
Of significant importance to this research is the change in each region’s ability to meet 
the housing needs of extremely low-income and very low-income renter households.  In both 
regions, the gap between the number of affordable units and the number of extremely low-
income and very low-income renter households increased.  However, the actual number of 
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affordable rental units only declined for extremely low-income renter households in Portland.  
The gap increased for very low-income renter households in both regions, as well as for 
extremely low-income renter households in Seattle, because of a large increase in the number of 
low-income renter households rather than a decline in the number of affordable units. 
 
Table 6-10. Summary Comparison of Portland and Seattle Regions 
 Portland Seattle 
Urban Containment Policy Urban growth boundaries 
required in 1973, implemented in 
1979 
Urban growth boundaries 
required in 1990/91, fully 
implemented in region in 1995 
Regional Affordable Housing 
Strategy 
1.  Metropolitan Housing Rule, 
minimum density targets of 6-8-
10 units per acre 
 
2.  Regional Affordable Housing 
Strategy requires jurisdiction to 
voluntarily consider strategies to 
increase affordable housing, but 
1. Minimum density of 4 units 
per acre 
 
2. Counties/jurisdictions 
independently address affordable 
housing in comprehensive plans 
no mandates to implement 
strategies 
Economic Growth Stagnant growth
growth in 1990’
 in 1980’s, strong 
s. 
Stagnant growth during most of 
1980’s, strong growth beginning 
in late 1980’s.  Strong growth in 
1990’s, but growth rate in jobs 
and income not as high as 
Portland. 
Change in Regional 
Affordability from 1990 to 2000 
1.  Little change in rental market 
 
2.  Strong decrease in 
affordability of home ownership 
1.  Little change in rental market 
 
2.  Moderate decrease in 
affordability of home ownership 
Change in Supply of Affordable 
Rental Units for Low-Income 
Households from 1990 to 2000 
1. Decline in affordable rentals 
for extremely low-income renters 
 
2. Increase in affordable r
for very low- and low-inco
Increase in affordable rentals for 
all income segments of low-
income households (extremely 
entals 
me 
low-, very low-, and low) 
renters 
 
6.3 BALTIMORE AND PHILADELPHIA 
This section presents the other pair of regions for the analysis.  The Philadelphia metropolitan 
region was chosen as the control group to the Baltimore region which represents the treatment 
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group.  Both regions are located on the eastern coast of the United States, share similar climates, 
and have experienced similar growth patterns over the past twenty years.  Section 6.3.1 reviews 
the growth patterns of both regions. 
Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 provide a description of the growth management mandates that 
ffect the regions of Baltimore and Philadelphia, respectively.  In 1997, priority funding areas 
were e aryland’s Smart Growth Act.  
he purpose of priority funding areas i ent away 
f urb  p ority funding 
areas are a form of urban containment.  Meanwhile, the Ph ion does 
 a region-wide policy e between the two regions 
regarding urban containment policies m  appropriate for an “untreated control group 
with pretest and posttest” res ng the 
“treatment.”  The research des ia can be written as: 
 
  
Philadelphia Region:  1 O2 
 
Where X is the treatment of urban containment (priority fun test in 1990, 
 2000. 
Located within Maryl altimore metropolitan region is home to 
slightly more than 2.5 million people.  In addition to Baltimore City, the region includes the 
Maryland counties of Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Carroll, Hartford, Howard, and Queen Anne’s.  
Figure 6.3 provides a map of the Baltimore region. 
 
 
 
a
stablished throughout the Baltimore region in response to M
T s to reduce urban sprawl by directing investm
from the outer fringes o an areas and toward existing laces.  Therefore, pri
iladelphia metropolitan reg
not have  of urban containment.  Th
ake them
is differenc
earch design with the urban
ign for Baltimore/Philadelph
 O
 containment policy representi
Baltimore Region: 
  
1 X O2 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
O   
ding areas), O1 is the 
and O2 is the test in
6.3.1 Comparison of Regions 
and’s Chesapeake Bay area, the B
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 Figure 6-3. Baltimore Region 
 
Figure 6.4 provides a map of the Philadelphia region.  It includes nine counties in two 
states, Pennsylvania and New Jersey. 
ion 
 
 F adelphia Regigure 6-4. Phil
 
 
Economic growth was significant in both regions during the 1980’s as illustrated by the 
rowth rates in median household income and employment from 1980 to 1990.  Table 6.11 
resents this data.  From 1980 to 1990, median household income grew by 14.8% and 15.8% in 
e regions of Baltimore and Philadelphia, respectively.  The job growth rate was 20.9% and 
g
p
th
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15.7% in Baltimore and Philadelphia, respectively.  The number of jobs increased in the 
Baltimore region by 209,000 and in the Philadelphia region by 322,000. 
 
Table 6-11. Economic Growth, 1980 to 2000 
 Median Household Incomea Number of Jobs 
Region 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 
Baltimore $43,148 $49,515 
(14.8%) 
$49,938 
(0.8%) 
1,005,202 1,215,300 
(20.9%) 
1,248,344 
(2.7%) 
Philadelphia $41,237 $47,752 
(15.8%) 
$47,536 
(-0.4%) 
2,039,023 2,359,428 
(15.7%) 
2,361,552 
(0.1%) 
a.  Constant dollars (1999).  Number in parentheses is percent change from previous decade. 
Source:  U.S. Census. 
 
As shown in Table 6.12, the employment sectors which grew the most in each region 
from 1980 to 1990 were professional services; finance, insurance, and estate; retail; and health 
services.  Meanwhile,
 decline, and Philadelphia’s manufacturing 
sector lost 96,000 jobs, for a 19.7% decline. 
 
Table 6-12. Industries of Greatest Job Growth and Decline, 1980 to 1990 
Baltimore Philadelphia 
 both regions saw a significant loss in manufacturing jobs.  Baltimore’s 
manufacturing sector lost 31,000 jobs, for a 17.5%
Job Growth Job Growth 
Professional  Services   47,000 Professional Services 86,000 
Finance, Insurance, Real 
Estate 
31,000 Health 65,000 
Retail 31,000 Retail 57,000 
Health 30,000 Finance, Insurance, Real 
Estate 
53,000 
   
Job Loss Job Loss 
Manufacturing - 31,000 Manufacturing - 96,000 
Source:  U.S. Census. 
 
Philadelphia region by 0.09%.   
The economic growth of both regions slowed dramatically during the 1990’s.  Table 6.11 
shows that Baltimore’s median household income grew by only .85%, while Philadelphia’s 
median household income declined slightly by .45%.  Job growth was also stagnant during this 
time period as the number of jobs increased in the Baltimore region by 2.72% and in the 
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Table 6.13 lists the industries that experienced the greatest growth, as well as decline, 
from 1990 to 2000.  Both regions continued to see a decline in the manufacturing sector.  The 
Baltimore region lost 40,000 jobs, for a 28.2% decline, while the region of Philadelphia lost 
another 5.3% decline.  To replace manufacturing, both 
egions saw a large rofessional and s well as gains in 
 within the health and education sectors. 
 
-1 ies t Jo nd 0 
 96,000 jobs in manufacturing, for a 2
r  increase in the number of p  scientific jobs, a
employment
Table 6 3. Industr of Greates b Growth a  Decline, 199 to 2000  98
Baltimore Philadelphia 
Job Growth Job Growth 
Scientific, Professional 42,000 Scientific, Professional 77,000
Health, Education, and 
Social Services 
39,000 Health, Education, and 
Social Services 
57,000
  
Job Loss Job Loss 
Manufacturing - 40,000 Manufacturing - 96,000
Source:  U.S. Census. 
 
Table 6.14 provides data regarding population and household growth in the Baltimore 
and Ph  in the Baltimore region 
was 8.3%.  This growth rate was much higher than the 2.9% population growth rate in the 
solute  th ulat  by approximately 
 the Phil a s population grew by 1  
 
Table 6-14. Population and d
Popul ion 
iladelphia regions.  From 1980 to 1990, the population growth rate
Philadelphia region.  In ab  terms, e Baltimore region’s pop ion grew
183,000 residents while adelphi region’ 41,100.
Househol  Growth, 1980 to 2000 
 at Households 
Region 1980 
Populatio
1990 
la
2000 
ion 
80 
Househ
1990 
useholds 
2000 
Households n Popu tion Populat
19
olds Ho
Baltimore 
Absolute Changea 
Percent Changea 
2,199,531 2,382,172 
182,641 
8.3% 
2,552,994 
170,822 
7.2% 
765,770 879,968 
114,198 
14.9% 
974,359 
94,391 
10.7% 
Philade 7 lphia 
Absolute Changea 
Percent Changea 
4,781,494 4,922,175 
140,681 
2.9% 
5,100,931 
178,756 
3.6% 
1,662,905 1,798,667 
135,762 
8.2% 
1,915,18
116,520 
6.5% 
a.  Change from previous decade. 
Source:  U.S. Census. 
                                                 
98 Because of changes in industry classifications, this table is not comparable to Table 6.12.  See the footnote in 
Section 6.2.1. 
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From 1990 to 2000, the Baltimore region added 171,000 residents for a gain of 7.2% 
while the Philadelphia region added 179,000 residents for a gain of 3.6%.  Even though the 
regions had similar population growth in absolute terms, the growth rate was higher in the 
Baltimore region because of its smaller size in comparison to the Philadelphia region.  We might 
suspect that the housing market was stronger in the Baltimore region than the Philadelphia region 
as population growth in the Baltimore region was much larger relative to the region’s size. 
ctor in influencing the 
housing market than the number of additional residents.  An interesting note is that while the 
eater nu  r  the Phil a region 
absolute incr  ouseholds.  T mber of 
ore region increased parison, the number 
 region increased by 136,000 or 8.2%.  
to 2000, the Philadelphia region continued to add a greater number of new 
ouseholds in absolute numbers.  Despite smaller population growth, the Philadelphia region 
added 2
uring both the 1980’s and 1990’s, Baltimore experienced greater growth rates than the 
Philade ’s size, particularly with regard to 
e number of households, indicates that housing was likely less affordable in the Baltimore 
han the Phil cr nu u ea
r housing re alti ike encing greater dem
h tive to the regio  than delphia region. 
er i p r  h ord he n c
h .15 provides th . Mean struction Cost Index oth regi r 
he index illustrates that constructions costs in Baltimore are 
significantly lower than construction costs in Philadelphia.  In 1990, Baltimore’s construction 
  In 
The number of new households, however, is a more important fa
Baltimore region added a gr mber of esidents from 1980 to 1990, adelphi
experienced a larger 
households in the Baltim
ease in the number of new h
 by 114,000, or 14.9%.  In com
he nu
of households in the Philadelphia
From 1990 
h
3,000 more new households than the Baltimore region.  The number of households in the 
Philadelphia region increased by 117,000 households, or 6.5%.  The Baltimore region added 
94,000 households for an increase of 10.7%.  Although the Philadelphia region experienced 
greater growth in the number of households in absolute terms, Baltimore’s growth was higher 
relative to its size. 
D
lphia region.  This greater growth relative to the region
th
region t adelphia region.  An in ease in the mber of ho seholds incr ses the 
demand fo units.  The fore, the B more was l ly experi and for 
ousing units, rela n’s size, the Phila
Anoth m ortant facto concerning ousing aff ability is t constructio osts of 
ousing.  Table 6 e R.S s’ Con  for b ons fo
1990, 1995, and 2000.  T
costs were 96.1% of the average of major cities.  By 2000, costs were 91.0% of the average.
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contrast, Philadelphia’s construction costs were 7.2% higher than the average of major cities in 
1990.  During the 1990’s, Philadelphia’s costs rose faster relative to the average city.  In 2000, 
costs were 11.9% higher than the average of major cities.  The higher construction costs in 
Philadelphia could lead to lower housing affordability in the Philadelphia region as compared to 
the Baltimore region even though the Baltimore region experienced greater population and 
household growth rates. 
 
Table 6-15. Construction Cost Index 
Region 1990 1995 2000 
Baltimore 96.1 91.2 91.0 
Philadelphia 107.2 111.6 111.9 
Source:  R.S. Means Company, Inc. 
  
These variables – economic growth, population growth, and construction costs – impact 
each re
ew to rely on incentive-
based policies rather than land use regulati
gion’s housing market and housing affordability.  Each of these factors was reviewed in 
this section.  Housing affordability will be compared between the two regions in Section 6.3.4.  
The next two sections provide a description of growth management and affordable housing 
policies, which may impact housing affordability, in each region. 
6.3.2 Background to Baltimore 
With the passage of its Smart Growth Act in 1997, the state of Maryland came to be considered 
an exemplary example of smart growth and growth management (Cohen 2002, p. 293).  The 
Act’s primary purpose is to provide incentives to developers and other private citizens to not 
pursue urban development in rural areas.  Five significant components of the Act, which will be 
discussed, make Maryland’s growth management legislation one of the f
ons to limit sprawl (Cohen 2002, p. 305; Knaap and 
Schmidt-Perkins 2006, p. 10). 
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There were two significant concerns which led to the Smart Growth Act.99  The first 
concern was the decline of Maryland’s central places, particularly in regard to population loss 
from the City of Baltimore, in relation to newer suburbs and rural areas.  From 1970 to 1995, the 
city of Baltimore lost 24% of its population, or 213,000 people (Schneider 1999, p. 64).  
Meanwhile, a 1997 article in Planning magazine reported that Baltimore’s suburbs experienced a 
population growth rate of 67% in the previous 25 years, while Washington D.C.’s Maryland 
suburbs grew by 72% (Lambrecht and Martin 1997, p. 13). 
lution of the Chesapeake Bay, which is 195 miles long 
idth that range  4 to 30 miles.  Its watershed is 64,000 square miles, making it one 
nificant o  east coast (Co 002, p. 296).  A ly as 1983, the U.S. 
y issued a report warning about the growing pollutants to the 
Chesapeake Bay from nutrients and other chemical contaminants (Chesapeake Bay Program 
2007). 
aryland took a different route 
and offered incentives to change the public’s behavior.  The state’s Governor at the time insisted 
ation could not rely on regulation.  He feared there would be 
too many opponents to any proposal that increased state oversight and control of local land use 
issues (Frece 2005, p. 115).  He felt that any legislation creating state-level land use regulation 
The second concern was the pol
with a w s from
the most sig n the hen 2 s ear
Environmental Protect Agenc
 The deforestation and loss of wetlands surrounding the Bay increases the concentration 
of nutrients and other pollutants in the Bay, resulting in the overabundance of algae and 
depletion of certain fish and other species.100 
While other growth management states, such as Oregon and Washington, chose to use 
regulation to affect local behavior regarding land use, the state of M
that new growth management legisl
would be defeated. 
The Governor recognized that the state could influence the location of new development 
and the pattern of growth by how and where the state spent its money (Frece 2005, p. 109).  He 
believed that developers responded to financial incentives which would improve their bottom-
                                                 
99 The Smart Growth Act was an extension of a previous state attempt to control sprawl, preserve open space, and 
protect the Chesapeake Bay from environmental pollution.  The previous attempt was the Maryland Economic 
Growth, Resource Protection, and Planning Act of 1992.  For a description of this Act, see Appendix A.  
100 For an introduction to the sources of pollution to the Chesapeake Bay and the pollution’s effects see information 
from the Chesapeake Bay Program at www.chesapeakebay.net.  The Chesapeake Bay Program was founded in 1983 
as a partnership between the state of Maryland, state of Pennsylvania, Washington D.C., and the Environment 
Protection Agency to address the concerns regarding pollution of the Chesapeake Bay (Chesapeake Bay Program 
1983). 
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line.  T
2. 
ringes of metropolitan areas by steering development inward to places that 
already
 
Rather, new development is allowed outside of PFAs as long as private developers or applicable 
local governments are willing to absorb the costs of the infrastructure needed to support the new 
e 
 did not 
herefore, if state money was available to assist with new development only within 
specific areas, developers would develop in those areas.  To this end, the Smart Growth Act 
included five components.  These five components are (Daniels 2001, pp. 274-275; Cohen 
2002):101 
1. Priority Funding Areas – Priority growth areas designated by counties and local 
jurisdictions, outside of which state money cannot be used to pay the costs of 
infrastructure supporting new development. 
 
Brownfields Redevelopment Program – Funds the cleanup and redevelopment of 
industrial sites that have been contaminated with hazardous waste. 
 
3. Jobs Creation Tax Credit – Income tax credits available to business owners who create at 
least 25 jobs in a Priority Funding Area. 
 
4. Live Near Your Work Program – Incentive in the form of a grant of at least $3,000 to 
people who purchase homes in older neighborhoods and near their jobs. 
 
5. Rural Legacy Program – Funds to buy environmentally sensitive land and development 
rights to farmland in rural areas outside of priority funding areas. 
 
Among the five components, the cornerstone of Maryland’s Smart Growth Act is the 
mandate for counties and local governments to establish priority funding areas (PFA) (Office of 
Smart Growth 2005, p. 3).  A PFA is an urban boundary outside of which state money for 
infrastructure, such as water and sewer service, is not to be spent.  The purpose of the PFA is to 
control sprawl by controlling the location of new development.  Like urban growth boundaries or 
urban service areas, PFAs are an attempt to control development patterns and preserve open 
space on the outer f
 have public services or have plans for public services to be offered in the near future 
(Knaap 2001). 
Unlike urban growth boundaries, new development is not prohibited outside of PFAs. 
development without state assistance (Cohen 2002, p. 303).  The PFAs fit well with th
Governor’s desire to create an incentive-based growth management program which
                                                 
101 Priority funding areas are discussed in detail in this dissertation.  For details of the other four components, see 
Daniels (2001) and Cohen (2002). 
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regulate a change in land use behavior, but encouraged private developers to change from their 
current sprawl-like development patterns in rural areas to facilitate development in areas suitable 
(and designated) for growth.  The lack of state money for infrastructure outside of PFAs serves 
as a dis-incentive for private developers to pursue development on rural land that is not included 
s in their 
omprehensive plans.  All existing municipalities are automatically designated as a PFA, as well 
munity 
evelopment, enterprise zones designated by the federal government, and areas located inside 
en designated as PFAs by each county and its local jurisdictions for future development.  These 
ent 
r future water and sewer service (Maryland Department of Planning 1997, p. 5). 
, 
Maryland’s Smart Growth Act attempts to preserve open space and protect the environment 
withou
land Department of Planning 1997; Cohen 2002).  MDP created multiple PFA 
classifi
within PFA boundaries. 
Each county and its local jurisdictions are required to designate PFA
c
as areas designated for revitalization by the Maryland Department of Housing and Com
D
the beltways of Baltimore and Washington, D.C. (Cohen 2002, p. 302).  Additional lands are 
th
additional lands can be included in PFAs based on current and future land use, as well as curr
o
Similar to the growth management legislation in the states of Oregon and Washington
t disrupting or threatening economic growth in the state.  Governor Glendening (2002, p. 
1493), a strong advocate and supporter of the Smart Growth Act, wrote: 
Maryland’s Smart Growth plan is not a no-growth or even slow-growth program.  
Instead, it recognizes the inevitability and value of growth to the Maryland economy…. 
The Smart Growth program, however, attempts to minimize the adverse effects of growth 
by channeling it to those areas of the state where existing or planned infrastructure and 
services are in place to support it. 
 
The Maryland Department of Planning (MDP) provides guidelines regarding appropriate 
residential densities within PFAs, as well as consistency between PFAs and local infrastructure 
capacity (Mary
cations, each of which having a suggested minimum average residential density.  Table 
6.16 provides these recommendations.  MDP then requires the size of local PFAs to be 
determined based on these suggested densities and land capacity.  MDP writes that the amount of 
land included in PFAs be “based on an analysis of the capacity of land areas available for 
development, including in-fill and redevelopment; and an analysis of the land areas needed to 
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satisfy demand for development at densities consistent with the Master Plan” (Maryland 
Department of Planning 1997, p. 27).102 
 
Table 6-16. Recommended Residential Densities and Planning Requirements by Maryland Planning 
 
Department (MPD) 
Location of Priority Funding Area MPD Recommendation 
Existing municipality Average residential density of at least 2 units 
per acre 
Existing communitya Average residential density of at least 2 units 
per acre 
 
Has public water or sewer service.   
 
PFAs with only water service are typically 
rural and slow-growth areas and cannot receive 
state funds which increase the growth capacity 
of the community, except for in-fill and li
development. 
mited 
Outside of existing community Average residential density of at least 3.5 units 
per acre; 
 
Be part of planned water and sewer service 
area as outlined in an approved 10-year Water 
and Sewer Plan. 
a.  Community which is not incorporated, but citizens of the county typically recognize it as a distinct entity. 
Source: 
designations.  Rather, MDP reviews each county’s plan and PFA designations in terms of 
consistency with current water and sewer plans, the state’s residential density recommendations, 
and ex
 Maryland Department of Planning (1997; 1998). 
 
The state does not have final approval authority over local comprehensive plans and PFA 
pected population growth.  MDP then gives “comment” on all or part of the submitted 
plan to which it does not agree, but the Department cannot reject plans or mandate changes to 
them.  Porter (1999, p. 4) contends that without enforceable oversight from the state, counties 
have an incentive to designate as much of their land as possible (if the land is included in a sewer 
and water service plan) in order to not diminish their access to state funds.  If counties designate 
PFAs which include a more than ample supply of developable land needed for future economic 
                                                 
102 Initially, an analysis of land capacity and future demand was only required of counties when they designated 
PFAs outside of existing municipalities.  In 2006, this standard became required of all local governments (Maryland 
Department of Planning and Maryland Department of the Environment 2006). 
 217 
and population growth, then PFAs would have little impact on the housing market and the supply 
of affordable housing. 
Porter (1999) argues that Maryland’s smart growth legislation, particularly the priority 
funding
inconsistently across counties because of the limited state control.  Recent evidence from 1000 
ort this con ed the 
proportion of land designated as a PFA in the state’s counties.  They found a wide 
he counties.  For examp ed in 
PFAs and less than half of the county’s new housing units over the next 20 years are expected to 
be located within them (1000 Friends of Mar  
designated 40% of its land as PFAs and expec er the 
next 20 years to be located within them (1000
Development is not prohibited outsid
y cannot be us of the 
development.  Where there is strong development pressure because of strong housing demand, 
local governments and private developers r own 
FAs.  From 1997 to 2004, the percentage of 
residential single-family parcels improved by more than $1,000 which were outside of PFAs 
ranged 
When compared to the proportion of improved residential parcels that were outside of PFAs, it is 
 area component and its relation to the location of new development, is implemented 
Friends of Maryland (2002) supp tention.  1000 Friends of Maryland review
each of 
fluctuation among t le, 23.6% of Carroll County’s land is includ
yland 2002, p. 9).  In contrast, Howard County has
ts more than 80% of its new housing units ov
 Friends of Maryland 2002, p. 17). 
e of PFAs (Knaap 2001, p. 11).  Rather, the only 
restriction is that state mone ed to pay for the necessary infrastructure 
can provide public infrastructure with thei
nge among Maryland’financing.  MDP data show there is a wide ra s counties with regard to the 
proportion of housing that is built outside of P
from 13.0% in Prince George’s County to 85.8% in Garrett County (Maryland 
Department of Planning 2007).   
Table 6.17 provides the percentage of improved single-family residential parcels which 
were outside of the PFAs in each county of the Baltimore region.  The percentage ranged from 
20.0% in Baltimore County to 45.6% in Queen Anne’s County, indicating that more than half of 
improved single-family parcels in each county were within a PFA.103 
The percentage of improved (developed) residential land area which was outside of a 
PFA, however, is a different story.  In terms of land area, the percentage of improved land which 
was outside of a PFA ranged from 70.3% in Howard County to 83.0% in Queen Anne’s County.  
                                                 
103 Baltimore City, in its entirety, is a PFA.  Therefore, all improved parcels in the city were within a PFA. 
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clear the size of improved parcels were much larger outside of PFAs than within them.  While 
less than half of the improved parcels were outside of PFAs throughout the region, they 
accounted for more than three-quarters of the improved residential land area. 
 
Table 6-17. Improved Single-Family Residential Parcels from 1997 to 2004 
 
County 
Percent of Improved Parcels 
Which Were Outside of PFA 
Percent of Improved (Developed) Land 
Area Which Was Outside of PFAb 
Anne Arundel 30.6% 74.8% 
Baltimore Citya 0% 0% 
Baltimore County 20.0% 74.7% 
Carroll 37.4% 80.6% 
Hartford 20.9% 77.1% 
Howard 23.6% 70.3% 
Queen Anne’s 45.6% 83.0% 
a.  All of Baltimore City is a PFA.  Therefore, it is not possible for any improvement of parcels 
its PFA. 
to occur outside of 
b.  Land
Source: 
s the potential to displace older residents with 
not enough incom
 
at the cost o
 area measures in acres. 
 Maryland Department of Planning (2007). 
6.3.2.1 Affordable Housing Policy 
There are no components specific to affordable housing within Maryland’s Smart Growth Act.  
Frece (2005, p. 130) argued that insufficient attention to housing issues, particularly to 
“workforce” housing affordable to moderate income residents, is a flaw of the state’s smart 
growth legislation.  He presented the fear that redevelopment in older communities, which is a 
goal of the PFA component of the legislation, ha
e to afford their current housing if prices increase.  In an earlier article, 
Governor Glendening (2002, pp. 1497-1498) expressed the same fear.  He argued that state 
policy must be careful to protect working families from the high cost of housing.  Targeting 
funds into areas that are already developed could result in gentrification of older neighborhoods
f housing affordability for lower-income households. 
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6.3.3 Background to Philadelphia 
In contrast to the Baltimore region, Philadelphia does not have a region-wide urban containment 
policy.  Th 104  
Because both of these states have weak growth management legislation, there is no consistent 
ntainment p ita
lvania recently enacted “Growing Smarter” land use bills in 1999 to promote 
ration in the d ment of comprehensive plans and land use planning 
R 2000).  There are thre ficant pieces of the legislation in terms of comprehensive 
.  First, the legislation p technical assistance to jurisdictions who wish to undergo 
al Government is charged with the responsibility of identifying best 
e adopted by local governments.  In addition, the Act 
appropriated money from the state budget to be used specifically for providing assistance to 
sive plan.  In 2000, the amount of money available to assist 
ions are encouraged to identify 
designated growth areas, as well as rural areas.  Designated growth areas should currently be 
served by public infrastructure or planned to be served in the future.  Meanwhile, public 
infrastructure and urban development are expected to be prohibited from designated rural areas 
(Denworth 2002, pp. i-ii).  This is a policy of urban containment.   
                                                
e Philadelphia region lies within two states, Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
urban co olicy throughout the metropol n area. 
Pennsy
municipal coope evelop
(PADCN e signi
planning rovides 
a comprehensive planning process.  To assist local governments with their planning process, the 
Governor’s Center for Loc
land use practices and policies which can b
jurisdictions completing a comprehen
local planning was $3.6 million which represented the first time the state had appropriated 
funding for such a purpose (PADCNR 2000). 
The second significant component of the Act is that it gives authority to municipalities 
and counties to work together on comprehensive plans, or a multi-jurisdictional plan, in order to 
create planning consistency among adjacent jurisdictions (Denworth 2002, Introduction).  The 
tools available to jurisdictions creating multi-jurisdictional plans include the sharing of taxes or 
revenues and fees, combining specific plans for commercial and industrial development, and 
transferring development rights from jurisdictions that want to preserve open space to 
jurisdictions that need and want additional growth. 
The third potentially significant component is that jurisdict
 
104 See Figure 6.4. 
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But in a recently completed national survey, Nelson and Dawkins (2004) found only two 
Pennsylvania jurisdictions with urban containment policies in the Philadelphia metropolitan 
and exurban developm
containm
New Jersey’s growth management legislation 
ent.  New Jersey’s state legislature passed the 
ents, counties, and the 
 
region.  They were Bucks County and Delaware Valley.  Nelson and Dawkins categorized each 
of these jurisdictions as having a ‘weak-accommodating’ form of urban containment which they 
define as “urban growth boundaries or urban service limits (that) do little to manage 
development outside these boundaries, thus facilitating the proliferation of low-density suburban 
ent” (Nelson and Dawkins 2004, p. 53).  This weak form of urban 
ent is due to the fact that comprehensive plans in Pennsylvania are advisory in nature 
and non-binding.  Therefore, these urban containment policies have little impact on the housing 
market and affordable housing.  
Pennsylvania’s Growing Smarter legislation is a weak version of state-level growth 
management.  There are no requirements for local jurisdictions to submit comprehensive plans or 
to designate urban growth areas.  Comprehensive planning is voluntary, advisory in nature, and 
non-binding.  In addition, there is no state legislation allowing local zoning decisions to be 
challenged based on their inconsistency with a locality’s comprehensive plan (Pennsylvania 
Economy League et al. 2003, p. 22). 
Albeit slightly stronger than Pennsylvania, 
is also weak regarding policies of urban containm
New Jersey State Planning Act and Fair Housing Act in 1985.  The Planning Act created a 
commission to oversee the writing and implementation of a new state plan. The goals of the state 
plan include (Epling 1993, p. 99; NJDCA 2006): 
? Revitalization of the state’s cities and towns 
? Conserve natural resources and systems 
? Promote economic growth and development 
? Protect the environment 
? Provide public services at a reasonable cost 
? Provide housing at reasonable cost 
? Preserve historical and cultural areas 
? Ensure integrated planning statewide among local governm
state 
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There are two significant components of New Jersey’s Planning Act.  First, the state was 
required to develop a State Development and Redevelopment Plan to identify areas for future 
growth.  The Plan divides the state into five types of “planning areas,” which are based on the 
urban/rural nature of the area.  The planning areas are defined as “distinct geographic and 
economic units within the state and serve as an organizing framework for application of the 
Statewide policies of the State Plan” (NJCDA 2006, 'Planning Areas').  The five types of 
planning areas are (NJDCA 2006): 
? Metropolitan Planning Areas – Includes a variety of communities that range from 
large urban centers to small towns.  The communities of this type of planning area 
have strong ties to major metropolitan centers. 
 
? Suburban Planning Areas – Generally located adjacent to more densely 
developed Metropolitan Planning Areas.  Typically identified by more dispersed 
patter of predominantly low-density development. 
 
? Fringe Planning Areas – Predominantly rural landscapes that are not prime 
agricultural or environmentally sensitive land, with scattered small communities 
and free-standing residential, commercial, and industrial development. 
 
? Rural Planning Areas – Large masses of cultivated or open land surrounding rural 
 
e different planning areas in the state plan is to 
ide as, particularly rural farmland and 
environm velopment (DeGrove 1994, p. 233).  To 
tha provement plan, including planned 
investm lities, focus on development within existing 
co urban planning areas.  The state’s 
inf al of promoting economic development, while 
rev al and environmentally sensitive areas (Gale 
19
mportant component of the New Jersey Plan is that local jurisdictions were 
required to negotiate with the state through a process called “cross-acceptance” when a local plan 
concentrated centers of population, including large contiguous areas of farmland. 
? Environmentally Sensitive Planning Areas – Large contiguous areas with valuable 
ecosystems, geological features, and wildlife habitats particularly in the Delaware 
Bay and other estuary areas, as well as coastal areas. 
 
The primary purpose of designating the fiv
ntify areas for urban-scale development and other are
entally sensitive areas, for protection from de
t end, the Planning Act requires that the state’s capital im
ents in public infrastructure and faci
mmunities and urban centers in metropolitan and sub
rastructure plans are to be consistent with the go
italizing existing communities and preserving rur
92, p. 432; Epling 1993, pp. 99-100). 
he second iT
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was in
 state plan.  
requirem
commended, but not mandated at the county or local level (Gale 1992, p. 434; Godschalk 
20  
consistent w or local plan and the state plan 
o g Act 
contai , 
reser  Fainstein 
arg
e pla  
the com
that im
location of land uses. 
993, p. 153-154).  In response, the state passed 
 conflict with the State Development and Redevelopment Plan.  Cross-acceptance is 
defined as “a process of comparison of planning policies among governmental levels with the 
purpose of attaining compatibility between local, county, and state plans” (DeGrove 1992, p. 38).  
The product of this process is a written statement specifying areas of agreement and 
disagreement between the local or county level plan and the state plan.  Through this process 
counties and their local jurisdictions determine whether they can accommodate the growth that is 
projected for their jurisdiction in the
Despite the cross-acceptance process, the Planning Act’s comprehensive planning 
ents for local governments are weak for three reasons.  First, comprehensive plans are 
re
00, p. 17).  A plan is only required of the state.  Second, local plans are not required to be
ith the state’s plan.  Disagreements between a county 
d not need to be resolved in the cross-acceptance process.  Third, the state Plannin
ns weak requirements and standards for local plans with regard to compact development
vation of open space, and affordable housing (Fainstein 2000, pp. 459-460). p
ued that these lax requirements were necessary to entice local jurisdictions to participate in 
nning process because their participation is not a mandate, yet they weaken the impact ofth
prehensive plans.  While observing New Jersey’s planning system, Fainstein concluded 
plementation of local plans is half-hearted and the free market continues to dictate the 
6.3.3.1 Affordable Housing Policies 
There are no affordable housing policies for low-income households in Pennsylvania which 
impact the Philadelphia metropolitan region.  However, affordable housing receives special 
consideration in the New Jersey portion of the Philadelphia region.  Given the debate over 
growth management’s impact on housing costs, it is ironic that New Jersey’s growth 
management legislation was partially a result of the Mt. Laurel legal cases in which the state 
Supreme Court ordered state’s municipalities to plan for and provide a “fair-share” of affordable 
housing for low-income households (Bollens 1
both the 1985 Planning Act and the 1985 Fair Housing Act.  The history leading to the Fair 
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Housing Act, because it is a component of the growth management legislation in New Jersey, is 
reviewed. 
In 1975, a New Jersey court ruled that the zoning practices of a Philadelphia suburb, 
Mount Laurel, were in violation of the state constitution (Hughes and Vandoren 1990, pp. 99-
100; Calavita, Grimes, and Mallach 1997, p. 115).  The court ruled that exclusionary zoning 
codes, which prohibited housing types that are affordable to low and moderate income 
households, negatively affected the general welfare of the citizens of the state and municipal 
actions
rmined each municipality’s fair-share obligations for affordable housing 
based on a state growth plan which had been written in the 1970’s (Epling 1993, p. 98).  The 
growth areas, limited growth areas, and agricultural, 
 which conflict with general welfare were unconstitutional.  As part of the ruling, the state 
Supreme Court ruled that municipalities have a constitutional responsibility to provide 
opportunities for the construction of affordable housing within their jurisdiction (Meck, Retzlaff, 
and Schwab 2003, p. 32).  But, the 1975 ruling did not provide oversight to ensure that the 
suburb modified its regulatory practices.  Without the oversight, the suburb made no efforts to 
follow the court ruling (Calavita, Grimes, and Mallach 1997, p. 115). 
In 1983, the suburb of Mount Laurel was sued again regarding their coding practices.  
This time, the court made a much stronger ruling, now known as Mount Laurel II, which was to 
impact every municipality in the state.  The court decided that every municipality had a 
responsibility to ensure that the general welfare of citizens was not inhibited.  To this end, every 
municipality was expected to provide the opportunity to have its “fair-share” of affordable 
housing within its jurisdiction.   
The court dete
state plan divided the state into 
conservation, pinelands, and coastal zone areas.  The initial purpose of the state plan was to 
promote growth in growth areas while preserving agricultural and environmentally sensitive 
areas.  The courts made the decision that the communities within growth areas would have to 
absorb the bulk of the share of new affordable housing for low-income households since those 
were the locations where the state expected growth to occur (Buchsbaum 1985, pp. 65-66). 
The court demanded that local jurisdictions modify their zoning regulations and other 
ordinances to improve the probability that affordable housing would become available.  To 
enforce their rule, they instituted the “builder’s remedy” which stated that developers could bring 
suit against municipalities in order to gain development approval.  The state’s courts can grant 
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zoning relief or building permits to developers willing to set aside at least 20% of new units for 
low to moderate income households (households making less than 50% and 80% of area median 
income
olds for each region.  The 
initial f
nt responsibility is to review and approve housing elements and 
fair sh
, respectively).  Within 2 ½ years of the 1983 court ruling, 90 suits had been brought 
against local jurisdictions by developers (Calavita, Grimes, and Mallach 1997, p. 116). 
To remove the judicial oversight of local planning and affordable housing allocation, the 
state legislation passed the Fair Housing Act along with the State Planning Act which has 
already been described.105  The Fair Housing Act created the state’s Council on Affordable 
Housing (COAH) to provide municipalities with potential relief from the judicial process and the 
“builder’s remedy.”  COAH was given two significant responsibilities to oversee the state’s 
municipalities’ progress toward affordable housing goals. 
COAH first significant responsibility is to determine a fair-share allocation of affordable 
housing among municipalities.  To do so, COAH was directed to divide the state into regions and 
determine the affordable housing needs for low and moderate househ
air-share allocation of affordable housing needs was based on the present need, as well as 
prospective need that would be required in the future based on population projections, in each 
housing region (Meck, Retzlaff, and Schwab 2003, p. 35).  The regional need was then evenly 
allocated across municipalities so each one was expected to achieve the same proportion of 
affordable units through a modification of their zoning practices.106 
COAH’s second significa
are plans that are voluntarily submitted by local municipalities.  COAH provides 
certification to municipal housing plans which adequately address the fair-share affordable 
housing goals, as well explain the local methods that will be utilized to achieve the goals.  To 
receive certification, municipal housing plans can include a variety of techniques to achieve their 
fair allocation of affordable housing, including density bonuses, inclusionary zoning practices, 
                                                 
105 New Jersey Fair Housing Act, (N.J.S.A. 52:27 D-301).  The Act explicitly states that one of its purposes is to, at 
the recommendation of the courts, reduce the role of the judiciary and increase the role of the Legislature in 
affordable housing allocations. 
106 The al
certificat
this new methodology, see Retzlaff (2003) and the COAH Handbook (COAH 2006). 
location methodology has since been significantly modified.  Jurisdictions who have already received 
ion from COAH must update their plans within 10 years in a “3rd” round of allocations.  The new allocation 
calculation is based on a “growth share” methodology which requires 1 affordable housing unit for every 8 new 
units built within the municipality.  This ensures that growing municipalities incorporate affordable housing into 
their growth.  Jurisdictions who have not yet received certification, but are seeking it, must submit a housing plan 
which addresses the initial fair-share housing allocations which are explained in the text.  Then, they must address 
the new “growth share” allocation and how they will achieve 1 affordable unit for every 8 new units.  For details of 
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rehabilitation of sub-standard units, or payments by developers to subsidize affordable units 
(COAH 2006, Chapter 8).   
Municipalities receiving certification from COAH are protected from potential lawsuits 
brought against them by developers under the Mount Laurel II’s “builder’s remedy” ruling.  The 
recent 
ons, while maintaining control of land 
urt as a result of litigation concerning 
eceiving municipalities who 
agree 
 
two regions of Baltimore and Philadelphia.  Section 6.3.2 discussed 
re 
e 
COAH Handbook clearly states to municipalities that the incentive for receiving 
certification is protection from litigation and greater autonomy over their land use decisions 
without judicial involvement.  The Handbook states: 
  
If you choose to take part in the COAH process, you will have the opportunity to provide 
affordable housing using an increased array of opti
use rather than being subject to directives of the Co
affordable housing (COAH 2006, p. 16). 
 
Out of 566 municipalities, 211 have received certification from COAH and another 73 were in 
the process of filing housing plans (COAH 2004, p. 4). 
A unique component of the New Jersey’s Fair Housing Act is the Regional Contribution 
Agreement (RCA).  Using a RCA, a ‘sending’ municipality may pay other municipalities to take 
up to 50% of the sending municipality’s affordable housing obligations.  The fee paid by the 
sending municipality is $35,000 per unit (COAH 2006, p. 65 ).  R
to take on additional affordable housing obligations receive this money spend on 
affordable housing, as well as administrative costs.  From its inception in 1985 to the end of 
2003, COAH has approved more than 48,000 additional affordable housing units throughout the 
state, 8,650 of which where through RCAs (COAH 2004, p. 5). 
6.3.4 Housing Affordability in Baltimore and Philadelphia 
Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 presented the growth management legislation and affordable housing
policies which impact the 
the Maryland Smart Growth Act of 1997 which requires every county in the Baltimore region to 
implement priority funding areas, a form of urban containment which restricts state infrastructu
spending to areas designated for growth.  There are no affordable housing policies either at th
state or regional level which impact the Baltimore region. 
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Section 6.3.3 presented Philadelphia as the control region to Baltimore.  There is no 
strong growth management legislation in Pennsylvania requiring urban containment policies of 
local ju
nnsylvania has no state or regional policies 
which influence the Philadelphia region.  On the other hand, New Jersey has made strong efforts 
to ensu
share o
ility between the Baltimore and Philadelphia 
regions in both 1990 and 2000.  Table 6.18 presents six measures of affordability, three for 
lity between the regions of Portland and 
Seattle 
 percentage change in median 
household income was .77.  This measure indicates that rental costs increased 77% as much as 
00. 
From 1990 to 2000, owner-occupied units for the median household in the Philadelphia 
 of the median household.  In the 
ridictions.  In New Jersey, there is a state-level plan which divides the state into five 
types of planning areas in an effort to steer state infrastructure money to metropolitan and 
existing suburban areas.  However, there are no requirements for local planning or urban 
containment policies to pursue the state’s goals at the local level.   
With regard to affordable housing policies, Pe
re local municipalities modify their zoning codes and other regulation to achieve a fair-
f affordable housing with their jurisdiction.   
This section compares housing affordab
renter-occupied housing units and three for owner-occupied units.  These are the same six 
measures used in the comparison of housing affordabi
in Section 6.2.4. 
In both regions of Baltimore and Philadelphia, rental units became slightly more 
affordable, relative to income, during the 1990’s.  In 1990, the median gross rent was 16% of the 
median household income in the Baltimore region and 17.4% of median household income in the 
Philadelphia region.  During the 1990’s this ratio of median rent to median household income 
declined.  In 2000, median gross rent was 15% of median household income in the Baltimore 
region and 16.4% of median household income in the Philadelphia region.  In both regions, the 
ratio of the percentage change in median gross rent to the
income for the median household in both regions from 1990 to 20
region became more affordable.  In comparison, there was little change in affordability of owner-
occupied units in the Baltimore region.  In 1990, the ratio of the median value of owner occupied 
units to median household income was 2.78 and 2.87 in the regions of Baltimore and 
Philadelphia, respectively.  The median home value was fairly similar relative to median 
household income in each region.  The ratio indicates that, in the Baltimore region, the median 
home’s value was 2.78 times greater than the income
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Philadelphia region, the median home was 2.87 times greater in value than the median 
household’s income.  In 2000, the ratio of median value to median household income was 
smaller in both regions, but the decrease was more significant in the Philadelphia region.  In the 
Philadelphia region, the ratio declined from 2.87 to 2.55.  In the Baltimore region, the ratio 
declined from 2.79 to 2.70. 
 
Table 6-18. Housing Affordability in Baltimore and Philadelphia 
 1990 
Baltimore 
1990 
Philadelphia 
2000 
Baltimore 
2000 
Philadelphia 
Rental Units     
Median Rent $ 492 
 
$ 514 $ 626 $ 648 
Ratio of Median Rent to Median Income 
for Renter Households 
 
.160 .174 .150 .164 
Ratio of Percentage Change in Median 
Rent to Percentage Change in Median 
Household Income, 1990 to 2000, for 
Renter Households 
NA NA .77 .77 
     
Owner-Occupied Units     
Median Value 
 
$ 102,543 $ 101,934 $ 134,900 $121,200 
Ratio of Median Home Value to Median 
Income, 1990 and 2000, for Homeowner 
Households 
 
2.78 2.87 2.70 2.55 
Ratio of Percentage Change in Median 
Home Value to Percentage Change in 
Median Household Income, 1990 to 
2000, for Homeowner Households 
NA NA .89 .56 
Note:  “Rent” is gross rent which includes utility costs.  Figures are not adjusted for inflation. 
Source:  U.S. Census. 
 
The ratio of the percentage increase in median home value to percentage change in 
median household income was .89 in the Baltimore region and .56 in the Philadelphia region. 
This ratio indicates that the increase in the median home value was 89% of the increase in 
median household income in the Baltimore region and only 56% of the increase in the median 
household income in the Philadelphia region.  These ratios indicate that, relative to income 
growth, the growth in home values was slower in the Philadelphia region. 
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The previous six measures compare each region’s housing costs to the region’s income 
for the median household.  Therefore, the ratios tell us little about the changes in affordability or 
in the supply of affordable housing for low-income households.  Once again, a gap ratio of the 
number of affordable rental units to the number of low-income renter households was calculated 
for extremely low-, very low-, and low-income renter households.107  The gap ratio can be 
interpreted as the percentage of renter households within the specified income group that could 
find an them.  Table 6.19 provides the 
ap ratio, as well as the number of afford nits and er of re ousehol r each 
ory.  A discussion of the u l n of 
ons for its results. 
ly of Affordable Ren its to Nu  of Low-Inc enter Householdsa 
Baltimore Region Philadelphia Region 
 affordable rental unit if all of the units were available to 
g able u
 table’s res
 numb nter h
lowed by a
ds, fo
income categ lts will be fo   expla ation n
possible reas
 
Table 6-19. Supp tal Un mber ome R
 
 1990 2000 
Change 
1990 2000 % %  
Change 
Extremely Low-Income       
Gap Ratio .56 .77 37.2% .39  35.2%  .53
# of renter households 86,054 104,819 21.8% 151,293 182,577 20.7% 
# of affordable rental units 48,016 6 5  80,249 7.1% 59,0 3 96,366 63.2% 
       
Very Low-Income       
Gap Ratio 1.13 1.25 1  0.89 1.14 .0% 0.1%  29
# of renter households 138,501 23.2% 238,000 188  170,670 288, 21.1%
# of affordable rental units 157,148 213,224 35.7% 210,930 329,419 56.2% 
       
Low-Income       
Gap Ratio 1.25  -4.6% 1.24 1.20 -3.0% 1.19
# of renter households 216,703 242,688 12.0% 359,180 411,573 14.6% 
# of affordable rental units 270,073 288,642 6.9% 445,360 495,117 11.2% 
a.  Income categories are cumulative. 
ource:  U.S. Census. 
unit if all of the units 
S
 
In both the Baltimore and Philadelphia regions, the number of affordable rental units, 
relative to the number of extremely low-income renter households, increased between 1990 and 
2000.  In 1990, the ratio for the Baltimore region was .56.  By 2000, the ratio had increased to 
.77.  This ratio indicates that in 2000, 77% of extremely low-income renter households in the 
Baltimore region would have been able to occupy an affordable rental 
                                                 
107 Once again, these are households whose income is less than 30%, 50%, and 80% of the area’s median income.   
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would 
 households would have been able to occupy an affordable rental 
unit if all of them were available.  The number of affordable rental units for extremely low-
income er of 
extrem e renters increa y 31,300 ho
Both regions also had a ase  nu affo  ren its o the 
ome rente  househo s.  In the altimore
ber of v in nte hol as n 
he ra as  .89 4.  re n in in the 
le units explai s the improvement in this ratio.  In the Baltimore region, the 
 rental u a 6,1 s, o . ile mber 
ehol s ly  or ro  23 In the 
egion, similar chan s occurr .  The number of affordable ntal units ncreased 
 56.2%, n f  i re rea  only 
t category of low-income households, those making less than 80% of the area 
median income, is the only category for which the supply of affordable rental units did not grow 
faster t
the number of low-income renter households increased by a greater amount.  In the Baltimore 
have been available.  The reason for the increase in the ratio for the Baltimore region was 
a significant increase in the number of affordable rental units to extremely low-income 
households.  The number of affordable rental units increased by 67.1%, or by 32,200 units.  This 
increase was more than likely partially the result of a stagnant economy during the 1990’s.  In 
contrast, the number of extremely low-income renters by increased by only 21.8%, or by 18,800 
households.   
There was also a significant increase in the ratio of affordable rental units to the number 
of extremely low-income renters in the Philadelphia region.  From 1990 to 2000, the ratio 
increased from .39 to .53 in the Philadelphia region.  This ratio indicates that, in 2000, only 53% 
of extremely low-income renter
 households increased by 63.2%, or by 37,300 units.  Meanwhile, the numb
ely low-incom sed by 20.7%, or b useholds. 
n incre  in the mber of rdable tal un relative t
number of very low-inc r ld  B  region, the ratio of affordable 
rental units to the num ery low- come re r house ds incre ed from 1.13 to 1.41.  I
the Philadelphia region, t tio incre ed from  to 1.1 In both gions, a crease 
number of affordab n
number of affordable nits incre sed by 5 00 unit r 35.7%  Meanwh , the nu
of very low-income hous ds increa ed by on 32,200  by app ximately .2%.  
Philadelphia r ge ed re  i
by 118,500 units, or  but the umber o very-low ncome nters inc sed by
50,200, or by 21.1%. 
The broades
han the number of renter households.  As a result, the ratio of affordable units to the 
number of low-income renter households declined.  The gap ratio declined slightly from 1.25 to 
1.19 in the Baltimore region and from 1.24 to 1.20 in the Philadelphia region.  The number of 
affordable rental units for low-income renter households increased by 6.9%, or by 18,600 units, 
in the Baltimore region and by 11.2%, or by 49,800 units, in the Philadelphia region.  However, 
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region, the number of low-income renter households increased by 12.0%, or by 26,000 
households.  In the Philadelphia region, the number of low-income renters increased by 14.6%, 
or 52,400 households. 
The most significant difference between the two regions with regard to affordable 
housing is the supply of affordable rental units relative to the number of extremely low-income 
and very low-income renter households.  In 2000, 77% of extremely low-income renters in the 
Baltimo
that was affordable 
rental u
s.  In the Baltimore region, the proportion of units that was affordable 
rentals 
re region could have occupied an affordable unit if all of the affordable units were 
available to them.  In comparison, only 53% of similar renters in the Philadelphia region could 
have occupied an affordable unit.  A similar comparison can be made with regard to affordable 
rental units for very low-income renters.  In the Baltimore region there were 1.25 affordable 
units for every very low-income renter household.  In comparison, there were 1.14 affordable 
units for every very low-income renter household in Philadelphia.108   
Table 6.20 presents the proportion of the housing stock in each region 
nits for extremely low-income, very low-income, and low-income renter households.  As 
compared to the Philadelphia metropolitan region, the Baltimore region had a higher proportion 
of units which was affordable rental units for each income category in both 1990 and 2000.  This 
higher proportion explains the greater supply of affordable rental units in the Baltimore region 
relative to the number of low-income renters. 
From 1990 to 2000, the proportion of the Baltimore region’s housing stock which was 
affordable rental units for extremely low-income households increased from 5.1% to 7.7%.  In 
the Philadelphia region the proportion increased from 3.1% to 4.7%.  A similar increase occurred 
in both regions regarding the proportion of the housing stock that was affordable rentals for very 
low-income household
for very low-income households increased from 16.7% to 20.3%.  In the Philadelphia 
region, this proportion increased from 10.9% to 16.1%. 
The proportion of the housing stock that was affordable rental units for the highest 
income category for low-income households did not increase in both regions.  In the Baltimore 
region, the proportion of units which were affordable rental units for low-income households 
                                                 
108 This is, once again, assuming that all affordable units are actually available to very low-income households.  This 
assumption is unrealistic as many units are occupied by households of higher income, yet the measure provides a 
useful tool for comparison between two regions. 
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slightly declined from 28.8% to 27.5% between 1990 and 2000.  The proportion increased in the 
Philadelphia region from 23.0% to 24.2%. 
 
Table 6-20. Proportion of Housing Units that were Affordable Rentals, 1990 and 2000 
 Baltimore Region Philadelphia Region 
 1990 2000 1990 2000 
 
Total housing units 
 
938,979 1,048,046 1,932,499 2,047,843 
Percentage affordable 
rentals for extremely 
low-income renter 
households 
 
5.1% 7.7% 3.1% 4.7% 
Percentage affordable 
for very low-income 
renter households 16.7% 20.3% 10.9%
 
 16.1% 
Percentage affordable 
for low-income renter 
households 
 
28.8% 27.5% 23.0% 24.2% 
Source:  U.S. Census. 
 
The affordability data do not provide information on the quality or size of the housing 
units in
ck in terms of size.   Table 6.21 provides 
the pro
reveals that the Baltimore region had a slightly higher proportion of its housing stock in multi-
’s 
 each region.  There is the possibility that Baltimore has a greater supply of affordable 
rental units relative to the number of lowest income households because of lower quality or 
smaller size among housing units in the Baltimore region as compared to the Philadelphia region.  
Census data do not provide information on the quality of housing units, but do provide limited 
data on unit size.   
Census data do not provide evidence that the Baltimore region’s housing stock is 
significantly different from the Philadelphia region’s sto
portion of housing stock in each region that was in multi-units structures of more than 2 
units, more than 5 units, and more than 10 units.  Units in multi-unit structures, particularly in 
large structures, are apartments which are smaller in size than single-family homes.  The table 
unit structures than the Philadelphia region.  For example, 18.8% of the Baltimore region’s 
housing stock was in structures in five or more units, while 15.3% of the Philadelphia region
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housing stock was in similar structures.  This measure indicates that the Baltimore region may 
have a higher proportion of affordable rental units because the region has a larger proportion of 
its housing stock in multi-unit structures. 
Table 6-21. Proportion of Hou t Structures, 200
egion Percent
housing stock in 
struct r 
more units 
Percentage of 
f 5 or 
more units 
entage of 
g stock in
res of 10
more units 
 
sing Stock in Multi-Uni 0  
R age of 
ures of 2 o
housing stock in 
structures o
Perc
housin
structu
 
 or 
B 25.3%  18.8% 13.3% altimore 
P 24.9% 15  hiladelphia .3% 11.7%
S
 
re of h  sizes in opolitan region is the proportion of the 
housing stock which has four or more bedrooms.  The measure indicates that the Philadelphia 
region had a slightly higher proportion of larger housing units than the Baltimore region.  This 
m tly betw e two regions as 21.4% of the Baltimore region’s housing 
 four or more bedrooms while 22.7% of Philadelphia’s housing 
stock consisted of units with four or more bedrooms (U.S. Census Bureau 2000) . 
the smaller relative supply of affordable 
rental un
le 6.22 indicates that the vacancy rate increased in the Baltimore region but 
not in the Philadelphia reg
ource:  U.S. Census. 
Another measu ousing a metr
easure differed sligh een th
stock consisted of units with
There are two other possible explanations for 
its in the Philadelphia region as compared to the Baltimore region.  First, as shown 
earlier in Table 6.15, constructions costs are significantly higher than the national average in 
Philadelphia while Baltimore construction costs are lower than the national average.  These 
higher costs could have significant influence on the supply of new housing units and, in turn, 
may increase the price of housing in all segments of the housing market.   
Second, tab
ion from 1990 to 2000.  The vacancy rate in the housing market 
increased from 6.3% to 7.1% in the Baltimore region.  During the same time period, the vacancy 
rate slightly declined in the Philadelphia region from 6.8% to 6.5%.  Despite the Baltimore 
region’s greater growth rate in households and population (see Table 6.14), the vacancy rate 
increased while it slightly declined in the Philadelphia region.  This measure is an indicator that 
there might have been less upward pressure on housing prices in the Baltimore region than the 
Philadelphia region. 
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Table 6-22. Vacancy Rates, 1990 and 2000 
Region 1990 2000 
Baltim e 6.3% 7.1% or
Philadelphia 6.8% 6.5% 
Source:  
6.3.5 Summary of B ladel
izes mparison made betw ore and Philadelphia 
in Section 6.3.  The similarities between the two regions make them appropriate cases from 
which 
 
U.S. Census. 
altimore and Phi phia 
Table 6.23 summar  the co een the regions of Baltim
neighborhoods of the Philadelphia region serve as a control group without urban 
containment while the neighborhoods of the Baltimore region serve as the treatment group with 
urban containment.  An urban containment policy was implemented, in the form of priority 
funding areas, in every municipality and county in the Baltimore region as a result of Maryland’s 
Smart Growth Act of 1997.  In contrast, there is no consistent urban containment policy 
throughout the Philadelphia region. 
Table 6-23. Summary Comparison of Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions 
 Baltimore Philadelphia 
Urban Containment Policy Priority funding areas in every 
municipality and county 
throughout the region 
No 
Regional Affordable Housing 
Strategy 
No None in Pennsylvania.   
 
Municipal fair-share housing 
plans are certified by COAH, but 
the process is optional. 
Economic Growth Stagnant growth in number of 
jobs and household income 
during 1990’s 
Stagnant growth in number of 
jobs and household income 
during 1990’s 
Change in Regional Affordability 
from 1990 to 2000 
1.  Small increase in affordability 
in rental market 
 
2.  Small increase in affordability 
in home ownership market 
1.  Small increase in affordability 
in rental market 
 
2.  Small (but larger than 
Baltimore) increase in 
affordability in home ownership 
market 
Change in Supply of Aff
Rental Units for Low-In
ordable 
come 
Households from 1990 to 2000 
Increase Increase 
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 There are no regional affordable policies throughout either region.  The state of Maryland 
specifically address ble housing in their Smart Growth legislation.  In the 
 region, the state ennsylvania has fordable housing policies which it 
 county gov ents.  The state of New Jersey encourages municipalities to 
submit a fair-share housing plan to COAH detailing their plans to increase their share of low-
 is voluntary, but municipalities submit plans 
to receive protection from the judicial system which has the power to overrule local zoning codes 
which exclude affordable units for low-income households.  Municipalities which are certified 
ion, both regions experienced an increase in the supply of 
ffordable rental units relative to the number of extremely low-income and very low-income 
renter households.  The Baltim its, relative to the need 
come an hold as g he supply in 
the Philadelphia region. 
6.4 SUMMARY 
as e s for 
the “untreated control group with
This chapter began by discussin or the on was based 
heavily on the desire to improve the internal and external vali e research.  To improve 
l groups were chosen on the basis that they shared as 
did not afforda
Philadelphia  of P  no af
requires of local or ernm
income housing units.  Participation in this process
by COAH may have a higher proportion of units which are affordable for low-income 
households.  This possibility is controlled with a dummy variable which is discussed in a later 
section. 
There was little economic growth and housing affordability improved in both regions 
during the 1990’s.  The improvement in affordability was similar in each region for renter 
occupied units.  For owner-occupied units, affordability significantly improved in the 
Philadelphia region, but not in the Baltimore region.  Despite the implementation of priority 
funding areas in the Baltimore reg
a
ore region’s supply of affordable rental un
among extremely low-in d very low-income house s, w reater than t
The purpose of this chapter w  to explain the selection of th  treatment and control group
 pretest and posttest” research de
g the selection criteria f
sign presented in Chapter Five.  
groups.  The selecti
dity of th
internal validity, the treatment and contro
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many s ilar characteristics as possible with the exception of urban containment.  To improve 
externa
er Four concerning the impact of urban containment on the relationships among the 
smart g
im
l validity, two pairs of treatment and control groups were chosen.  The treatment group in 
each pair represented a different form of urban containment policy, in a different region of the 
U.S, in a different economic environment. 
The first pair of treatment and control group is the metropolitan regions of Portland and 
Seattle.  Urban growth boundaries were implemented in the Portland region in 1979 while they 
were not established throughout the Seattle region until fifteen years later.  The second pair is the 
metropolitan regions of Baltimore and Philadelphia.  Priority funding areas were implemented 
throughout the Baltimore region in 1997.  There are no region-wide urban containment policies 
in the Philadelphia region. 
The next chapter presents a linear regression model used to test the hypotheses presented 
in Chapt
rowth principles and affordable housing.  The chapter presents the model and data used to 
test the hypotheses, as well as the findings. 
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7.0 MODEL AND RESUL 
Chapter Four presented seven hypotheses concerning the relationships among four smart growth 
principles and the supply of affordable housing, as well as the impact of urban containment on 
these relationships.  Chapt
TS 
er Five then presented the threats to research validity and potential 
researc
t and control groups in this research. 
This chapter describes the regression model, variables, and data used to test the 
hypotheses of this research, as well as the findings from the model.  Linear regression is used to 
test the association of housing density, a variety of housing options, mixed land use, and public 
parks with the supply of affordable rental units for extremely low-income and very low-income 
households.  The regressions include interaction variables which represent the interaction of 
urban containment policies with each smart growth principle to capture their combined impact 
on the supply of affordable units. 
The analyses are conducted using data from two different periods of time, 1990 and 2000.   
Table 7.1 summarizes the urban containment status for each region by year.   As presented in the 
previous chapter, two pairs of regions are included in the analyses.  In the pair of Portland and 
Seattle, Portland maintained a regional urban containment policy in both 1990 and 2000, while 
Seattle did not implement region-wide urban containment until the mid-1990’s.  The interaction 
variables represent the Portland region.  In the pair of Baltimore and Philadelphia, neither region 
had urban containment policies in 1990, but an urban containment policy was required of 
counties in the Baltimore region beginning in 1997.  The interaction variables represent the 
Baltimore region. 
  
h designs to reduce these threats.  After considering the practical weaknesses of some of 
the designs, the chapter presented the “untreated control group design with pretest and posttest” 
as the research design which would be used to test the seven hypotheses.  Chapter Six presented 
the selection of the regions used as treatmen
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Table 7-1. Urban Containment Status by Region and Year 
 Portland Seattle Baltimore Philadelphia 
 
1990 
 
Urban 
Growth 
Boundaries 
 
 
None 
 
None 
 
None 
 
2000 
 
Urban 
Growth 
 
Urban 
Growth 
 
Priority 
Funding 
 
None 
Boundaries 
 
Boundaries Areas 
 
The analyses of two different time periods provide a means by which to test the impact of 
urban containment on the relationships between each smart growth principle and affordable 
housing.  In the study of Portland and Seattle, we would expect to find the interaction variables 
of Portland and smart growth principles significant in 1990, but not in 2000.  In 1990, urban 
growth boundaries were present in the Portland region, but were not yet implemented in Seattle.  
A stati
ent policy was required of Baltimore’s counties while 
Philade
e period. 
stically significant interaction variable indicates that a relationship between a smart 
growth principle and affordable housing is different in Portland than it is in Seattle.  In 2000, 
urban growth boundaries were present throughout both regions.  Therefore, there would be no 
statistically significant interaction variables. 
In the study of Baltimore and Philadelphia, we would expect to find the interaction 
variables of Baltimore and smart growth principles statistically significant in 2000, but not in 
1990.  In 2000, an urban containm
lphia had no such policy.  In 1990, neither region had an urban containment policy 
required throughout the region.  Therefore there would be no statistically significant interaction 
between the Baltimore region and smart growth principles in 1990. 
The first five sections of this chapter present the model and data used for the regression 
analyses.  The first section presents the regression model.  The model is static in that it does not 
test for changes in four the smart growth variables themselves and the resulting change in the 
supply of affordable units.  The static model, used for two different time periods, simply tests 
whether the relationship between each of the four smart growth variables and affordable housing 
is similar in each tim
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The second section presents the operationalization and method of measurement for each 
dependent v d t dent v ep s represent the four smart 
h princ  densi nd use, and public parks, as 
e supply of affordable housing for low-income 
households.  The dependent variables are the proportion of housing that are affordable rental 
nits for extr ely low-income and very low-income renter households. 
The third section discusses the sources of data that are used to measure the independent 
and dependent variables.  The fourth sectio
neighborhoods of each region. The fifth section presents transformations applied to the data in 
eet the assumptions of a linear regression model. 
  (7.1) 
Where 
nd demand for housing.  It is: 
in ariable an he depen ariable.  Ind endent variable
growt
well as other control variables which im
iples of ty, a variety of housing options, mixed la
pact th
u em
n provides the descriptive statistics for the 
order to m
The last two sections present the results of the regression analyses.  The sixth section 
discusses the findings regarding the relationship between eah of the four smart growth principles 
and the proportion of housing that is affordable to extremely low-income households.  The 
seventh section provides the results when the dependent variable is changed from the proportion 
of housing that is affordable rentals for extremely low-income households to the proportion that 
is affordable for very low-income households. 
7.1 MODEL 
To examine the relationships among the smart growth principles and the supply of affordable 
housing and the impact of urban containment on these relationships, a neighborhood-level model 
is utilized.  The model can be written as: 
Qafford = f (D, AU, AE, R)     
Qafford is the supply of affordable housing; D is the racial composition of the 
neighborhood; AU is amenities of the housing unit; AE is amenities of the surrounding 
environment (neighborhood); and R is local government regulation. 
This neighborhood-level model was derived from the theoretical framework presented in 
Chapter Four.  Equation (4.11) of Chapter Four presented the supply of affordable housing as a 
function of variables which influence both the supply of a
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Qafford = ƒ (C, L, K, R, D, Y, AE, AU, O, W, G, PLH)     (7.2) 
Where Qafford is the supply of affordable housing; C is cost of construction; L is labor cost; K is 
the cost of capital; R is local regulation; D is the demographics of the neighborhood; Y is median 
household income; AU is amenities of the housing unit; AE is amenities of the surrounding 
environment (neighborhood); O is the value of non-residential land; W is topographical 
constraints; G is growth management mandates; and PLH is the price of residential land. 
not include regional level variables 
which 
ine causation from this model.  For two reasons, 
the model simply tests for associations between each of the independent variables and the supply 
of affordable housing.  First, the model is static in that it does not include changes in the 
independent variables or in th its over time.  Given the pretest and 
posttest research design, the model tests for associations at two “points in time.”  Second, the 
model does not account for potential endogeneity between the independent and dependent 
llow for the possibility that the supply of affordable 
housing may 
homes (and little affordable 
Equation 7.1 was derived from the theoretical framework which argued the exogenous 
factors influencing supply and demand in the housing market also influence the supply of 
housing in the affordable, low-quality submarket for low-income households.109  The 
neighborhood level model presented in the equation does 
would be consistent among all neighborhoods of the individual regions.  The costs of 
capital, labor, and construction; regional amenities, such as climate and location within the U.S.; 
and regional regulation would not vary significantly across neighborhoods within each region.  
These regional variables are addressed through the selection of appropriate treatment groups and 
their control groups, which were presented in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. 
It is inappropriate to concretely determ
e supply of affordable un
variables.  The model assumes a one-way relationship between each of the four smart growth 
variables – density, multi-unit structures, mixed land use, and open space – and the supply of 
affordable units.  The model does not a
impact the four smart growth variables.  For example, the model ignores the 
possibility that developers may have an easier approval process for multi-unit structures in 
neighborhoods that already have a large supply of affordable units as compared to 
neighborhoods dominated by high-quality, expensive single-family 
                                                 
109 See Section 4.2.2. 
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housing
 sources used to measure the 
depend
                                                
).  There may be more opposition to multi-unit structures in the neighborhood dominated 
by expensive, single-family homes. 
7.2 OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
This section describes the variables which are used in the model to test the hypotheses 
concerning the relationships among the four smart growth principles and the supply of affordable 
housing.  Section 7.2.1 discusses the measurement of the dependent variable, which is the 
proportion of housing units in a neighborhood that are affordable for low-income households.  
Section 7.2.2 then presents the operationalization and measures of the four smart growth 
principles of density, a variety of housing options, mixed land use, and neighborhood open space 
in the form of public parks.  The other independent variables included in the model are presented 
in Section 7.2.3.  Section 7.3 then provides a description of the data
ent and independent variables.  
7.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, Qafford, is represented by two measures of affordable housing.  The first 
measure is of the proportion of the housing stock that is affordable rental units for extremely 
low-income households.110  The “extremely low-income” definition of affordable housing is a 
narrow definition as it represents a small fraction of the total housing market.  Table 7.2 shows 
the average proportion of the housing stock among neighborhoods in each region that is 
affordable rentals for extremely low-income households, as well as the average proportion that is 
affordable rentals for very low-income households.  In 2000, only 3.7% of the housing stock in 
the average Portland neighborhood was affordable rentals for extremely low-income households, 
4.8% in the average Seattle neighborhood, 9.1% in the average Baltimore neighborhood, and 
 
110 As discussed earlier in Chapter Two, Section 2.1, these are rental units whose gross rent is less than 30% of 30% 
ome. of the area median inc
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4.8% in the average Philadelphia neighborhood.  Because these units are such a small portion of 
the housing market, it may be hard to capture the impacts that smart growth principles have on 
their supply. 
 
le 
 Region
Table 7-2. Average Proportion of Housing Stock (among neighborhoods) that are Affordab
Rentalsa in 2000 
 
 Portland Seattle Baltimore Philadelphia 
Percentage affordable 
to extremely low-
income households 
 
3.7% 4.8% 9.1% 4.8% 
Percentage affordable 
to very low-income 
households 
18.6% 19.1% 21.4% 16.2% 
a.  Adjusted for physical adequacy using adequacy factors calculated from the American Housing Survey. 
Source:  U.S. Census and American Housing Survey. 
 
The second measure of the dependent variable is the proportion of the housing stock that 
is affordable rental units for very low-income households.111  A greater proportion of housing is 
affordable at this income level.  In 2000, 18.6% of the housing stock in the average Portland 
neighborhood was affordable rentals for very low-income households, 19.1% in the average 
n Baltimore neighborhoods, and 16.2% in the average Philadelphia 
neighborhood. 
There are three important details of these two measures of affordable housing which must 
                                                
Seattle neighborhood, 21.4% i
be discussed.  First, this research examines the supply of affordable rental units.  Rental units are 
the most important segment of the housing market for low-income households, particularly for 
those households whose income is less than 50% of the area median income.  While some 
extremely low- and very low-income households own their home, it is unclear how these 
households can purchase a home in the unsubsidized housing market without assistance from 
either family or friends.  It is possible that a number of these households purchased their homes 
while their income was higher. 
The second detail is that the number of affordable rental units is calculated from Census 
data.  The Census reports the number of units in various ranges of rents.  For example, Census 
 
111 As discussed earlier in Chapter Two, Section 2.1, these are rental units whose gross rent is less than 30% of 50% 
of the area median income. 
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data report the number of rental units whose rents are from $0 to $99, $100 to $149, $150 to 
$199, and so on.  These cost ranges do not necessarily coincide with the “cut-off” rental cost that 
is affordable.  For example, the highest affordable rent to extremely low-income households may 
be $375, which would lie in the range of $350 to $399 reported in the Census data.  To calculate 
the number er 
an the affordable limit are added to a proportion of units in the rent range in which the 
s loca
 provides a mple of this calculation.  In this example, the highest rent 
able’ to extremely low-income households is $375.  The number of units 
 cut-off is found by adding ber of units in each rent range up to 
a proportion of the units in the range which includes $375.  The proportion of 
bound of range – lower bound of range). 
g
 of affordable units, 100% of the units in each rent range whose upper limit is low
th
affordable rent limit i
Table 7.3
onsidered ‘afford
ted.   
n exa
c
below this affordable
$350 plus 
 the num
affordable units in the final range is found by (affordable limit – lower bound of range) / (upper 
 
Table 7-3. Sample Exercise - County Affordable Units Usin  U.S. Census Data 
Rent Range (per month) # of Units % Affordable Affordable 
Supply at $375 
0 to $99 20 100% 20 
$100 to $149 20 100% 20 
$150 to $199 20 100% 20 
$200 to $249 20 100% 20 
$250 to $299 20 100% 20 
$300 to $349 20 100% 20 
$350 to $399a 20 51% 
(($375 - $350)/($399 - $350)) 
10 
Total Affordable Supply   130 
a.  Affordable units in this rent range = number of units * proportion with gross rent < $375 per month. 
 
The third important detail in calculating the number of affordable units is the three 
specific delineations which can be used to define the supply of units for low-income households.  
The affordable housing stock for low-income households can be divided into three different 
measur
 
• Availability – Housing units that are affordable to a low-income household, based 
es.  They are (HUD 2005, pp. 39-40): 
• Affordability – Housing units that are affordable to low-income households, 
regardless if the units are vacant or occupied. 
on their cost, and are either occupied by a low-income household or vacant.  This 
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measure is sometimes used as units affordable to low-income households are 
often occupied by higher income households. 
 
• Adequacy – Housing units that are affordable, available, and are in adequate 
physical condition for occupants.   
 
The supply of rental units for low-income households, in this research, is defined as those 
units that are affordable and adequate, and includes those units not necessarily available at the 
time of the data collection.  This research includes in its calculation of affordable units those 
units w
if they are unsafe for potential occupants.  Rental units 
of lower cost are more likely to be inadequate in terms of their physical condition than those 
units with higher rents. 
s do ud  which to estimate the physical condition 
units.  Therefore e Censu are adjusted based on adeq
tropolitan American Housing Survey (M-AHS), a data source described in the next 
 M-AHS calcu s an “ade ” variable ranging from 1 t  to identify occupied 
s as adequate, derately quate, or severely inadequ   A housing unit is 
considered moderately or severely inad  quality standards in terms of 
eas of the 
structure (HUD 2005, pp. 79-80)  
 were then applied to the number of rental units in 
eac  units 
with ren s g to the M-AHS, then the adequacy 
hose rents are affordable but currently occupied by higher-income households.  While 
these units are not available at the time-period of the data collection, they have the potential to be 
available to low-income households without a change to the units’ quality or adequacy.   
Inadequate units are not included in the measure of supply.  From a public policy 
perspective, units that are affordable based solely on price should not be considered an 
appropriate supply of affordable housing 
The U.S. Censu es not incl e variables from
of housing , th s data uacy factors calculated 
from the Me
section.  The late quacy o 3
housing unit mo inade ate.
equate if it fails specific
plumbing, heating, electricity, physical upkeep, and physical condition of public ar
Adjustment factors were estimated for each metropolitan region based on the proportion 
of units in designated rental cost categories that were physically adequate.  The rental cost 
categories for which adequacy factors were calculated are larger ranges than the rental cost 
categories found in the Census.  These factors
h of the Census’ rental categories.  Table 7.4 provides an example.  If 80% of rental
t ss than $300 were physically adequate, accordinle
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factor cost 
atego
ata for Physical Adequacy of Units 
Rent Ra
of .8 was applied to the number of rental units to each of the census’s rental 
ries up to $300.112 c
 
aT ble 7-4. Sample Exercise - Adjusting Census D
nge Rental units 
counted by Census 
M-AHS Adequacy 
Factor for rental units 
less than $300 
Adequacy-Adjusted 
number of rental 
units 
< $99 100 .80 80 
$100 –  $149 75 .80 60 
$150 - $199 200 .80 160 
$200 - $249 100 .80 80 
$250 - $299 150 .80 120 
Total 625  500 
 
A caveat to the adequacy factor is that it likely over-estimates the proportion of adequate 
units, particularly among lower cost units.  The M-AHS does not determine the physical 
adequacy of vacant units.  Therefore, vacant units are not included in the adequacy factor.  It is 
probable that unoccupied units are more likely than occupied units to be physically inadequate.  
The actual adequacy factors can be found in Appendix B. 
ated to be in parks is not included in the 
denominator.   
7.2.2 Smart Growth Variables 
The smart growth principles represent AE, amenities of the neighborhood, in the regression 
model represented by equation 7.1.  These independent variables are housing density, a variety 
of housing options, mixed land use, and open space defined as public parks.  Housing density is 
measured as the number of housing units per square mile of land.  For a more accurate measure 
of density, water and the amount of land estim
A variety of housing options is measured as the proportion of housing that is in multi-unit 
structures.  Two variables represent multi-unit structures in the model.  The first variable is the 
                                                 
112 The Census uses rental cost categories in increments of $50 for lower cost rental units.  However, the M-AHS has 
a limited sample size for small ranges of rent.  For more accurate estimates of the adequacy factor, larger rental cost 
categories had to be used. 
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percentage of total housing units that are in structures of 2 to 4 units.  The second variable is the 
percentage of units that are in structures of 5 or more units. 
ixed land use is measured using employment data from the Census Transportation 
Plannin ecause the two 
land use d approp ptio  is to use parcel-
level data for each property ong parcels 
ly among regions, but among counties and jurisdictions within those regions.  I want 
 mixed land use from data which is dardized across of the four metropolitan 
andardized da akes for more appropriate comparisons across regions. 
he second option for land use data is the USGS’ National Land Cover Dataset (NLCD).  
The NL
as retail and entertainment.  Therefore, 
I want to use data which provides more detailed classifications of land use.  
 mixed land use are used in two different models.  In the first 
model, mixed land use is represented by an index of the diversity of employment and residential 
activity within each neighborhood.  This diversity index is calculated using a common formula 
                                                
M
g Package (CTPP).  Employment data is used to measure mixed land use b
options for ata are not 
in every neighborhood.  However, 
riate.  The first o n for land use data
coding for land use am
differ not on
to measure stan each 
regions.  St ta m
T
CD provides land cover data, but classifies land cover into 21 categories which include 
low intensity residential development, high intensity residential development, 
commercial/industrial development, forest, and grasslands.113  These categories do not 
differentiate commercial developments which may be industrial in nature, such as 
manufacturing, from other commercial development such 
Two different measures for
found in the transportation and land use literature.  It accounts for both the number of residents 
residing in the neighborhood, as well as the number of employees who work in the neighborhood 
in various employment sectors.  The index is calculated as (Ewing, Pendall, and Chen 2002; 
Krizek 2003; Song and Knaap 2003; Cervero and Duncan 2004; Song and Knaap 2004):114  
 
 
 
 
 
113 For a complete list of land cover categories, see www.epa.gov/mrlc/classification.html. 
114 Ewing, Pendall, and Chen (2002) and Cervero and Duncan (2004) also use CTPP employment data rather than 
ver data. 
land use data.  Song and Knaap (2003; 2004) use land use data from the Portland Metro’s Regional Land 
Information System.  Geoghegan, Wainger, and Bockstael (1997), as well as Acharya and Lewis (2001), use a 
similar index using land co
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D = - ∑ Pi  * ln(Pi) / ln (J)        (7.3)  
Where:   D is the index of mixed land use 
 Pi is the proportion people in activity i where activity i is: 
   agricultural employment; construction employment; manufacturing employment; 
wholesale employment; retail employment; transportation, warehouse, and utility 
employment; information industry employment; finance, insurance, and real estate 
employment; professional, scientific, management employment; education, health, 
and social services employment; arts and entertainment employment; other services 
employment; public administration employment; armed forces employment; people 
residing in census tract. 
J is the total number of activities 
 
The ind
y coincide with the 
bounda
land 
uses which provide positive amenities could have the same diversity score as a mix of 
residential, manufacturing, and warehousing land uses (Krizek 2003, p. 274).  This is a drawback 
to the diversity index as a measure of mixed land use.   
mart growth advocates generally define mixed land use as a mix of positive amenities 
serving the population, such as entertainment, retail establishments, and food services.  Popular 
books advocating for smart growth and mixed land use neighborhoods do not include industrial 
t 
 and 
ex ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating an equal mix of job types and residents.  0 
indicates an area of single use. 
For 2000, CTPP employment data by type of industry are available at the census tract 
level within all four metropolitan regions.  In 1990, CTPP data are available at the census tract 
level for the Portland region while data are reported for transportation analysis zones (TAZ) in 
the regions of Seattle, Baltimore, and Philadelphia.  TAZ boundaries are designated by the 
metropolitan planning organization of each region and do not necessaril
ries of census tracts.  They do, however, coincide with census blocks.  In order to allocate 
TAZ data to census tracts, census blocks were assigned to their appropriate TAZ.  TAZ level 
employment data was then allocated to each block in the TAZ proportional to the percentage of 
the TAZ’s land area that was in the block.  Employment data for census blocks was then 
aggregated to the census tract level. 
The diversity index does not differentiate between activities providing positive amenities 
from those producing negative amenities.  A mix of residential, retail, and entertainment 
S
uses in the mix.  Calthorpe and Fulton (2001) argue that industrial sites and factories should no
be part of residential communities, stating that “the low intensity of jobs in light industry
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factory d 
e facilities and businesses that use toxic materials also 
need se
A s
of balance 
of resident
jobs in thi
education, health nment, and food services.   
he purpose of using this measure is two-fold.  First, it includes only activities which are 
 measure captures the balance between all population-service jobs 
and res
residing in the neighborhood 
e dominant in the neighborhood. 
be the most appropriate category which allows for comparisons across regions. 
 areas, the need for frequent truck access, and the scale of buildings do not len
themselves to mixed-use areas.  Warehous
pa cration into spe ial districts” (p. 55). 
econd measure of mixed land use, included in a second set of analyses, is a measure 
between the number of “population-serving” jobs in a neighborhood and the number 
s (Ewing, Pendall, and Chen 2002; Cervero and Duncan 2004).  “Population serving” 
s research are defined as employment in retail; finance and insurance, real estate; 
, social services; and arts, entertai
T
more likely to provide positive amenities to neighborhood residents as opposed to a mix of all 
types of land uses.  Second, the
idents as opposed to a diversity index which may underestimate an actual mix of jobs and 
residents.  For example, if a neighborhood consists of 100 residents and 100 population-serving 
jobs then there is an equal balance.  If in this same neighborhood, these 100 jobs are within only 
one of the four population-serving employment categories listed above, then a diversity index 
would indicate an unequal mix of land uses.    
The formula for the balance between population-serving jobs and residents for each 
neighborhood is (Cervero and Duncan 2004): 
Balance = 1 – (Abs(S – P) / (S + P))      (7.4)  
Where:  S is the number of “population-serving” jobs in the neighborhood 
  P is the number of residents 
 
The measure ranges from a value of 0 to 1, with 1 indicating a neighborhood which has an equal 
balance between population-serving jobs and residents.  A score of 0 indicates that the 
neighborhood is dominated by one or the other.  However, a score of 0 does not indicate which 
of the variables (residents or population-serving jobs) ar
The presence of open space, in the form of public parks, is measured as the proportion of 
neighborhood land which is a park.  Data from the NLCD designates land use into 21 different 
categories, including “urban/recreational grasses” which the USGS defines as vegetation planted 
in developed settings.  This category is used as a proxy for neighborhood parks.  While this 
excludes park land categorized as forests or other types of shrubs and land cover, this seems to 
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To capture the impact of urban containment on the relationships among smart growth 
principles and the supply of affordable housing, interaction variables are included in the model in 
which neighborhood housing density, multi-unit structures, mixed land use, and public parks are 
interact
ing areas created a 
change
wth principles’ impact on the supply of affordable 
housing
ch region has similar policies with regard to urban 
contain
7.2.3 ontrol Variables 
pply of 
afforda
ed with a dummy variable representing the treatment region of each pair.   
A statistically significant interaction variable indicates that a relationship is either weaker 
or stronger in the treatment region than in the control region.  In the analyses of Baltimore and 
Philadelphia, the treatment region is Baltimore.  A change in the statistical significance of the 
interaction variables from 1990 to 2000 indicates the Baltimore’s priority fund
 in the relationships among smart growth principles at the neighborhood level and 
affordable housing. 
In the analyses of Portland and Seattle, Portland is the treatment region.  A statistically 
significant interaction variable in 1990 indicates that the smart growth variable had a different 
impact on affordable housing in Portland than in Seattle.  In 1990, only Portland had urban 
growth boundaries.  But in 2000, both regions had them.  If the interaction variables change from 
being statistically significant in 1990 to being insignificant in 2000, it can be determined that 
urban growth boundaries modify the smart gro
.  When both regions have urban growth boundaries, we would expect no statistically 
significant interaction variables because the ea
ment. 
C
Table 7.5 lists the control variables, as well as the smart growth and interaction variables, 
included in the model.  The table also provides the category from equation (7.1) which each 
variable represents, the variable’s data source, and its expected relationship to the su
ble housing. 
On the demand side, the vacancy rate signals the preference for housing in the 
neighborhood.  A higher vacancy rate, indicating less demand, is expected to be associated with 
a greater proportion of units being affordable rentals for low-income households.  The racial 
diversity of the neighborhood may also be an influence on demand.  However, the relationship 
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betwee
, demand may 
increas
n the minority population and the supply of affordable units is unknown.  Demand for 
housing in increasingly diverse neighborhoods may decline among those who prefer 
homogeneous neighborhoods, resulting in more affordable units.  On the other hand, there are 
other potential residents who may prefer diverse neighborhoods and, therefore
e. 
 
Table 7-5. Independent Variables 
Variable Expected 
Effect 
Description Data Source 
Smart Growth Variables    
Density + AmenityE – Supply and Demand U.S. Census Bureau 
Mixed Use -  + AmenityE – Supply and Demand Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) 
% Land that is Public Park - AmenityE - Demand U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 
% 2 to 4 units in structure + AmenityU – Supply and Demand U.S. Census Bureau 
% 5 or more units in structure + AmenityU – Supply and Demand U.S. Census Bureau 
    
Smart Growth Variables 
Interaction w/ Region (R) 
   
Density * R - AmenityE – Supply and Demand U.S. Census Bureau 
Mixed Use * R - AmenityE – Supply and Demand Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) 
Public Park * R - AmenityE - Demand U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 
% 2 to 4 units in structure * R - AmenityU – Supply and Demand U.S. Census Bureau 
% 5 or more units in structure* R - AmenityU – Supply and Demand U.S. Census Bureau 
    
Other Controls    
% Vacant + AmenityU and AmenityE – 
Demand 
U.S. Census Bureau 
% Built 20 or more years ago + Amenity  –  Supply U.S. Census Bureau U
% of rooms with 4
bedrooms 
 or more - AmenityU – Supply and Demand  U.S. Census Bureau 
% Subsidized Units + Supply HUD 
% Minority Unknown Demographic – Demand U.S. Census Bureau 
“Place” dummies Unknown Regulation and taxes – Supply U.S. Census Bureau, MABLE-GEOCORR 
Regional Dummy Unknown Regional Supply/Demand 
Factors 
U.S. Census Bureau, MABLE-GEOCORR 
Note:  AE = neighborhood amenity and AU = unit amenity. 
ral housing subsidies from a public housing agency is used to represent 
subsidi
 
On the supply side, a greater proportion of units that are subsidized for households with 
low-income will be associated with a greater supply of affordable units.  The proportion of units 
which receive Fede
zed units.115  Another supply-side influence on affordable units is local regulation, local 
taxes, and the availability of public infrastructure, such as access to sewer and water systems.  
                                                 
115  Subsidized housing owned and operated by non-public housing agencies, such as local non-profits, is not 
included in this measure due to data limitations.  There were a large number of these units which did not have 
specific addresses or census tracts reported. 
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Including accurate measures of these variables for every jurisdiction for four large metropolitan 
regions is a difficult task.  To capture these local influences on the supply of affordable housing 
in neighborhoods, dummy variables representing each ‘place’ as defined by the U.S. Census 
Bureau are included in the model.  It should be noted that the dummy variables represent both 
incorporated places with actual governments, as well as census defined places which are clusters 
of population within a named community even though there may be no locally incorporated 
govern
nal hou enities are included in the addition to the smart 
 density nd multi-unit structures.  The proportion of housing with 4 or more 
s included in th odel to o
f hom fo e  with a 
abl nits fo   ble is the age of 
An old r housin  stock is likely to be ass iated with a greater supply of 
nits.  Most un  provid f
inco e house
n stock, t ic  20 years old is 
he model. 
Finally, a region dummy vari included to account for any differences between the 
air.  T s dumm f  the regions not 
“place” dum y variables.  The region dummy v ents the ‘treatment’ 
e Portland t y v
neighborhood is in the region of Portland.  In the Baltimore and Philadelphia analysis, the region 
od is in the region of Baltimore. 
                                                
ment to represent it.116 
Two additio sing am model, in 
growth variables of  a
bedrooms i e m  capture the average size f homes in the neighborhood.  A 
greater proportion o es with ur or more bedrooms is xpected to be associated
smaller supply of afford e u r low-income households. The second varia
the housing stock.  e g oc
affordable u its ed in the private market or low-income households have 
filtered down to lower m holds over time.  They are not new.  To capture the age of 
the neighborhood’s housi g he proportion of units wh h are more than
included in t
able is 
two regions in each p hi y variable captures any di ferences between
captured by the m ariable repres
region.  In th and Sea tle analysis, the dumm ariable is equal to one if the 
dummy variable is equal to one if the neighborho
 
al 116 For more details on census defined places, see the U.S. Census Bureau’s Geographic Areas Reference Manu
(1994, Chapter 9). 
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7.3 SOURCES OF DATA 
The sources of data are listed in Table 7.6.  The U.S. Decennial Census provides population and 
housing data for a variety of geographic units, nationwide.  This research uses data from the 
Census’ Summary File 3, sample data from 1/6 of the U.S. population, to measure the minority 
population, housing costs (to determine the proportion of units that are affordable rentals), and 
other variables of the neighborhood housing stock. 
 
Table 7-6. Sources of Data 
Data Source Purpose 
U.S. Decennial Census, 1990 
and 2000 
Neighborhood variables for density; multi-unit structures; control 
variables. 
U.S. Census Bureau’s Census 
Tract Relationship File 
Allocate 2000 data to 1990 census tracts. 
Census Transportation 
Planning Package, 1990 and 
2000 
Measures of mixed land use. 
 
Metropolitan American 
Housing Surveys 
Adequacy factors for supply of affordable rental units. 
USGS National Land Cover 
Dataset 
Measure proportion of land in parks. 
HUD – A Picture of 
Subsidized Housing, 1998 
Measure proportion of units that are subsidized by public housing 
agency. 
 
The U.S. Census Bureau’s Census Tract Relationship File is used to allocate 2000 census 
data to 1990 census tracts.117  Census tracts are small geographic units for which census data are 
reported.  They typically range in size from 2,500 to 8,000 residents.  Between census surveys, 
tract boundaries may be adjusted depending on changes in the population.  A region 
experiencing population growth may have a number of its tracts split into additional tracts.  
Similarly, places experiencing population decline may have multiple tracts merged together.  
Because the analysis examines data from both 1990 and 2000, the relationship file was used to 
allocate 2000 census tract data to 1990 census tract boundaries in order to have consistent 
boundaries.  The relationship file provides a weight, based on the proportion of each 2000 tract’s 
                                                 
ound at the Census Bureau’s website, http://www.census.gov/geo/www/relate/rel_tract.html. 117 This file can be f
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population that would h 90 boundaries.  These weights 
were used to allocate each census variable from 2000 tracts to 1990 tracts. 
 
 the Decennial 
ployment data are available by 
industry type.  Therefore, it is possible to know how many jobs for each industry are located 
within a geographic area. 
0 hosen 
tan regions for which 1990 CTPP data were not available were dropped from the 
e dropped counties represent only a small portion of each region’s total 
rem ng with e proportion of their region’s 
ation that they represent, are listed in Table 7.7. 
itho
Phila
Regi
ave been in a different tract based on 19
The Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) provides the data necessary for 
calculating the diversity index and the balance between population-serving jobs and residents. 
The CTPP includes detailed data regarding the level and types of employment of both residents 
and non-residents within census tracts, block groups, or transportation analysis zones (TAZ) 
depending on the region.  The data are tabulated by the U.S. Census Bureau from
Census for the U.S. Department of Transportation.  CTPP em
CTPP data from 199
metropoli
are not available for rural counties.  The counties within the c
analysis.  However, th
population.  The counties 
popul
oved from the analysis, alo th
 
Table 7-7. Counties w ut CTPP Dataa 
Baltimore Region delphia 
on 
Portland Region Seattle Region 
Queen Anne’s (1.6%) Salem (1.3%) Columbia (2.3%) Island (3.0%) 
Yamhill (4.4%) 
a. Percen
                                                
tage in parenthesis is percentage of region’s population in county. 
 
The supply of affordable units for low-income households is adjusted for quality based 
on adequacy data from the Metropolitan American Housing Survey (M-AHS).  The M-AHS is a 
series of longitudinal surveys taken of individual housing units, and their residents, by the U.S. 
Census Bureau for HUD.  The M-AHS focuses on a revolving set of metropolitan areas every 
year.  There are approximately 15 metropolitan areas covered by this survey, each of which is 
surveyed every 4 to 6 years.118  Unlike most large surveys, the M-AHS does not follow 
households, but rather includes the same housing units in each survey year.  The dataset includes 
 
118 Due to budgetary constraints at HUD and the U.S. Census Bureau, the Metropolitan AHS is undergoing 
evaluation and the cycle of surveys has fluctuated over time. 
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a variable which identifies each housing unit as being physically adequate, moderately 
inadequate, or severely inadequate based on its own criteria.  This adequacy variable was used to 
estimat
d by using GIS software which joined NLCD data with census tract 
bounda
creational” grasses excludes parkland that 
is classified as forest, shrubs, or other types of natural land uses.  Therefore, the amount of land 
which is in public parks is likely to be underestimated, particularly in areas which have large 
ce w r natural
lim LCD is 
NLCD provides land use data that is standardiz r metropolitan regions included 
ormation across different regions.  
ne alternative is to collect land use data from the regional organizations in each metropolitan 
area.  U
g
occasionally released by HUD, titled A Picture of Subsidized Housing.  This dataset provides 
income 
e the proportion of rental units in various price ranges that were physically adequate for 
occupancy. 
The proportion of neighborhood land in public parks is measured using data from the 
U.S. Geological Survey’s (USGS) National Land Cover Data Set (NLCD).  The NLCD 
designates land use into 21 different categories.  It is one of the few datasets that provides 
standardized land use data for the entire nation.  One of the 21 categories is “urban/recreational 
grasses” which is used as a proxy for parks.  The proportion of land in this category for each 
census tract was calculate
ries. 
There are two threats to the validity of using this dataset.  First, the data is best used when 
applied to regional analyses rather than smaller levels of geography.  The NLCD estimates of 
land use are based on sample data which provide a greater degree of accuracy at larger levels of 
geography.  Second, the land use category of “urban/re
amounts of open spa hich have othe
itations, 
 ground covering. 
Despite these the N used as there are few other alternatives.  The 
ed across the fou
in this research.  Other alternatives do not provide uniform inf
O
nfortunately, not all regional planning organizations maintain this data.  Among those 
regional organizations that do maintain land use data, they do not use uniform definitions of land 
use. In addition, each organization has collected its data at a different point in time.  The lack of 
standardization makes it difficult to assess the comparability of land use data among regional 
planning organizations. 
The proportion of housin  subsidized by a local public housing authority is provided by 
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.  The data are available in a dataset 
geographic and socioeconomic data for all federally subsidized housing for low-
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households.  It includes units funded their public housing authorities, including rental vouchers 
and certificates, as well as units owned and managed by private organizations.  Only units 
provided through public housing authorities are included in this research as many privately 
operated units are missing the identification of their census tract. 
iples and the supply of affordable housing, the descriptive statistics for each region 
are pre
7.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Prior to using the model presented in Section 7.1 to test the relationships among the four smart 
growth princ
sented.  This section presents two tables of descriptive statistics, one table for each pair of 
treatment and control groups.  Table 7.8 provides the mean and standard deviation for each 
variable at the census tract level for both 1990 and 2000 in the regions of Portland and Seattle. 
 
Table 7-8. Descriptive Statistics, Census Tracts in Portland and Seattlea 
 
Portland – 1990 
(n=328) 
Seattle – 1990 
(n=405) 
Portland – 2000 
(n=328) 
Seattle – 2000 
(n=405) 
 Variable Mean 
Std 
Deviation Mean 
Std 
Deviation Mean 
Std 
Deviation 
Std 
Mean Deviation 
% Rentals for 30% AMI 4.7 7.8 4.7 8.9 3.7* 6.4 4.8 7.5 
% Rentals for 50% AMI 20.6 15.8 18.1 16.9 18.6* 14.8 19.1* 16.0 
HU per square mile 1816.6 1909.8 2081.3 2666.8 2041.7* 1987.0 2326.5* 2951.2 
Mixed Use (D) .35 .22 .31 .24 .39* .19 .38* .20 
% Park 1.8 3.3 1.4 2.8 1.8b 3.2 1.4b 2.8 
% 2 - 4 units 7.9 6.8 6.2 6.0 8.0 6.4 6.1 5.6 
% 5 or more units 19.1 20.3 23.6 23.6 21.4* 21.0 25.6* 23.6 
% Vacant 5.0 4.3 5.2 6. 5.6* 3.4 4.4* 3.2 
% More than 20 years 
old 60.2 27.0 56.5 25.4 69.9* 22.0 66.3* 20.7 
% Four or more 
bedrooms 17.0 9.4 20.2 12.8 17.3 10.7 21.0* 12.9 
% Subsidized 4.6 9.2 4.0 9.7 3.8b 6.8 3.3b 7.7 
% Minority Population 9.8 11.5 13.4 15.0 16.9* 11.4 22.0* 15.6 
a.  * indi
paired sa
cates difference between 1990 and 2000 is statistically significant below the .05 level of significance, using 
mple t-test.   
b.  Indicates that the paired sample t-test was not performed as the same data was used for 1990 and 2000.   
 
On average, the proportion of housing units that were affordable rentals for extremely 
low-income households declined in Portland neighborhoods from 1990 to 2000.  The average 
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proportion of units that were affordable rental units in each neighborhood declined from 4.7% to 
3.7%.  A paired samples t-test indicates that this decline among census tracts in the Portland 
region was statistically significant below the .000 level of significance.  In contrast, the change in 
the average proportion of affordable rentals for extremely low-income households was not 
statistically significant in Seattle neighborhoods.  On average, the proportion of affordable 
rentals for extremely low-income households slightly increased from 4.7% to 4.8%. 
Regarding a ilar difference 
between Portland and Seattle neighborhoods was found.  On average, the proportion of units that 
were affordable rental units for very low-income households declined from 20.6% to 18.6% 
able 7.8 also shows that average neighborhood density is higher in the Seattle region 
than in from 1990 to 2000.  In 
Portland, the average h ity amo tracts in  1,817 units to 2,042 
units per square mile.  In Seattle, housing density increased from an average of 2,081 units per 
s 46. both re ns, th  increases were statistically significant at the .000 
level of significance. 
hborhoods the Po nd reg  have  average, a greater proportion of units in 
multi-unit structures of 2 to 4 units than the Seattle region, but Seattle has a greater proportion in 
m ctures o r more units.  In Portland, the pro n of  in ure 2 to 
4 lightly increas  on av e, fro 7.9% 8.0%. Seattle, the proportion slightly 
d ined, on average, f  6.2% .1%. ther ese ch s is st ically significant.  In 
contrast, neighborhoods of both regions on average experienced an increased in the proportion of 
units in structures of 5 or more its.  aver propo  among neighborhoods in the 
ffordable rental units for very low-income households, a sim
among neighborhoods in Portland.  Once again this decline was found to be statistically 
significant at the .000 level of significance using a paired samples t-test.  In contrast, the average 
proportion of affordable rentals for very low-income households slightly increased in Seattle’s 
neighborhoods.  The average proportion increased from 18.1% to 19.1%.  The difference was 
statistically significant below the .000 level of significance. 
T
 the Portland region, with density increasing in both regions 
ousing dens ng census creased from
quare mile to 2,3  In gio ese
Neig  of rtla ion , on
ulti-unit stru f 5 o portio units struct s of 
 units s ed, erag m to  In 
ecl rom  to 6  Nei of th ange atist
 un The age rtion
Seattle region increased from 23.6% to 25.6%, while the average proportion among 
neighborhoods in the Portland region increased from 19.1% to 21.4%. 
The average degree of mixed land use was higher among the Portland region’s 
neighborhoods than the Seattle region in 1990.  But both regions’ neighborhoods experienced a 
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statistically significant increase in the diversity of land use between 1990 and 2000, with 
Seattle’s neighborhoods experiencing a greater increase.  From 1990 to 2000, the average degree 
of mixed use among the Portland region’s neighborhoods increased from .35 to .39.  It increased 
from .31 to .38 in the Seattle region.  The increase in Seattle was greater than in Portland, 
bringing both regions to have a similar average degree of mixed use among neighborhoods in 
2000. 
The average housing vacancy rate among neighborhoods increased in the Portland region, 
but decreased in the Seattle region.  The average vacancy rate among Portland’s neighborhoods 
increased from 5.0% to 5.6%.  The increase was statistically significant below the .01 level of 
significance.  This finding was somewhat surprising, given that Portland experienced a decline in 
the proportion of units that were affordable rentals for extremely low- and very low-income 
housing units.  A higher vacancy rate could signal a decrease in the strength of the housing 
market, which could increase the supply of affordable units.  However, these descriptive 
statistics reveal that despite Portland’s slight increase in vacancies, the supply of affordable 
rental u
iven that, on average, the proportion of affordable rental units increased.  
Once a
using stock in the average 
Seattle 
nits, as a percentage of the market, declined.  Therefore, we could hypothesize that the 
increase in vacancy rates is not necessarily an indicator of the strength of the low-end of the 
housing market, but is an indicator of the home ownership or more expensive housing market. 
In Seattle, vacancy rates declined from an average of 5.2% to 4.4% among the region’s 
neighborhoods.  The change was statistically significant below the .01 level of significance.  This 
was also surprising g
gain, the vacancy rate as an indicator of the overall housing market may not capture well 
the market for affordable units for low-income households. 
Regarding the other independent variables in the model, the average size of housing units 
among neighborhoods in both regions slightly increased.  From 1990 to 2000, the average 
proportion of units with four or more bedrooms increased slightly from 17.0% to 17.3% in the 
Portland region and from 20.2% to 21.0% in the Seattle region.  Only the increase in Seattle was 
statistically significant.  On average, the neighborhoods of the Portland region have an older 
housing stock than the Seattle region.  In 2000, 69.9% of the housing stock was more than 20 
years old in the average Portland neighborhood versus 66.3% of the ho
neighborhood.  Both regions saw a statistically significant increase in the proportion of 
units that were more than 20 years old from 1990 to 2000.  This was not unexpected as housing 
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is a durable good, which lasts a significant amount of time once it is built.  In any given year, the 
number of new units is minimal compared to the existing housing stock. 
The neighborhoods of the Portland and Seattle regions saw a substantial increase in the 
proportion of residents who were minorities between 1990 and 2000.  On average, the minority 
population increased from 9.8% to 16.9% of the population in the average Portland 
neighborhood.  In the Seattle region, the proportion of minorities increased from 13.4% to 22.0% 
of the p
as 
statistic
region.  In neighborhoods of the 
Philade
opulation in the average neighborhood.  In both regions, the increase in the proportion of 
minorities was statistically significant.  The increase in the minority population was not led by an 
increase in the number of African-Americans, but rather by an increase in other minorities such 
as Asians and Pacific Islanders.  The proportion of African-Americans in both the Portland and 
Seattle regions remained constant at 3% and 4%, respectively.119 
Table 7.9 provides the same descriptive statistics for the neighborhoods of the 
Philadelphia and Baltimore regions.  On average, the proportion of housing units that were 
affordable rentals for extremely low-income renters increased in the neighborhoods of both 
regions from 1990 to 2000.  In the Baltimore region, the average proportion among 
neighborhoods increased from 6.0% of the housing stock to 9.1%.  In neighborhoods of the 
Philadelphia region, the average proportion increased from 3.1% to 4.8%.  The increase w
ally significant in both regions below the .01 level of significance. 
The supply of affordable rental units for very low-income households, as a proportion of 
the housing stock, also increased among neighborhoods of both regions.  The average proportion 
of affordable rentals for very low-income households increased from 17.3% to 21.4% of the 
housing in the average neighborhood of the Baltimore 
lphia region, the average proportion increased from 10.6% to 16.2%.  The increase was 
statistically significant in both regions below the .01 level of significance. 
With regard to housing density and multi-unit structures, there was little statistically 
significant change in the neighborhoods of either region.  While housing density declined 
slightly in the average neighborhood for both regions, the decline was not statistically 
significant.  Similarly, changes in the proportion of housing in structures of 2 to 4 units and in 
structures of five or more units were not statistically significant among neighborhoods in the 
                                                 
119 Author’s calculation from U.S. Census. 
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Baltimore region.  Among neighborhoods of the Philadelphia region, there was no statistically 
significant change in the proportion of housing in structures of 5 or more units.  However, the 
average proportion of housing in structures of 2 to 4 units increased slightly from an average of 
9.4% to 9.6% among the Philadelphia region’s neighborhoods. 
Mixed land use, as measured by the diversity index, between the neighborhoods of both 
regions is relatively similar.  In 1990, the Baltimore region’s neighborhoods had an average 
score on the diversity index of .36 while the Philadelphia region’s neighborhoods had an average 
score of .35.  The average diversity index among the Baltimore region’s neighborhoods declined 
from .36 to .34.  In contrast, it increased in the Philadelphia region’s neighborhoods from .35 to 
.37.  Both of these changes were statistically significant. 
 
Table 7-9. Descriptive Statistics, Census Tracts in Baltimore and Philadelphiaa 
 
Baltimore – 1990 
(n=564) 
Philadelphia – 1990 
(n=1215) 
Baltimore – 2000 
(n=564) 
Philadelphia – 2000 
(n=1215) 
 Variable Mean 
Std 
Deviation Mean 
Std 
Deviation Mean 
Std 
Deviation Mean 
Std 
Deviation 
% Rentals for 30% AMI 6.0 11.1 3.1 6.6 9.1* 12.3 4.8* 7.4 
% Rentals for 50% AMI 17.3 17.1 10.6 11.4 21.4* 17.9 16.2* 14.3 
HU per square mile 3162.4 3700.5 3312.8 4245.7 3151.6 3549.3 3289.1 4119.0 
Mixed Use (D) .36 .21 .35 .22 .34* .19 .37* .18 
% Park 4.2 6.6 2.4 4.4 4.2b 6.6 2.4b 4.4 
% 2 - 4 units 7.9 9.8 9.4 9.2 7.6 9.1 9.6* 8.8 
% 5 or more units 15.7 19.9 14.4 17.8 16.1 19.1 14.4 17.1 
% Vacant 6.4 6.1 6.4 5.9 8.0* 8.2 6.6 6.8 
% More than 20 years 
old 69.2 26.4 75.6 23.8 77.0* 21.9 82.7* 19.3 
% Four or more 
bedrooms 18.7 14.3 23.0 17.0 20.3* 15.7 23.6* 16.9 
% Subsidized 5.8 13.6 3.1 8.1 5.7b 14.0 3.1b 8.4 
% Minority Population 28.7 34.3 22.1 31.0 36.5* 34.8 28.4* 31.6 
a.  * indicates difference between 1990 and 2000 is statistically significant below .05 
paired sample t-test.   
level of significance using 
b.  The p
region.  The average proportion of units with four or more bedrooms also increased among the 
neighborhoods in each region.  The average proportion increased from 18.7% to 20.3% among 
aired sample t-test was not performed as the same data was used for 1990 and 2000. 
 
With regard to the other independent variables, the average proportion of housing units 
that are more than 20 years old increased from 69.2% to 77.0% in the average neighborhood in 
the Baltimore region and from 75.6% to 82.7% in the average neighborhood in the Philadelphia 
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neighborhoods in the Baltimore region and from 23.0% to 23.6% among neighborhoods in the 
Philadelphia region. 
The average size of minority population among each region’s neighborhoods, as a 
proportion of total population, increased in both regions.  From 1990 to 2000, the average 
proport
TIONS 
A linear regression is utilized to estimate equation (7.1) in which the dependent variable is the 
proportion of housing units that are affordable rentals for low-income hou   Therefore, 
the data must meet c n io  a  ct v t to 
w et se assumptio s w s the transform ons wer plied to the 
i
 Prior to testing the data, a small number of observations were rem d fro he analyses.  
C cts in whic ore n hal  the sing s k was sidi
agency were excluded.  These tracts, particularly those in which the vast majority of housing 
consists of subsidized units, are more likely ntifi  pub hou com ities.  The 
m nits in t  nei rho re a e households because they 
are subsidized specifically for low-income hou
Philadelphia were 
dropped, accounting for 1.2% of all census tracts in each analysis. 
ion of minorities increased from 28.7% to 36.5% among neighborhoods of the Baltimore 
region.  Among neighborhoods of the Philadelphia region, the average proportion increased from 
22.1% to 28.4%. 
7.5 MODEL ASSUMP
seholds.
iews the extenertai assumpt ns of  linear regression.  This se ion re
hich the data me  tho ns, a ell a ati that e ap
nitial data. 
ove m t
ensus tra h m tha f of hou toc  sub zed by a public housing 
 ide ed as lic sing mun
ajority of u hese ghbo ods a ffordable for low-incom
seholds.  Neighborhood characteristics or housing 
features are irrelevant to the affordability of these units.  Nine census tracts in the regions of 
Portland and Seattle and twenty-two tracts in the regions of Baltimore and 
The first assumption tested is that there are linear relationships between the dependent 
variable and each independent variable.  However, scatterplots revealed that not all of these 
relationships are linear.  A common method of improving the linearity of a regression model is to 
transform the dependent variable, independent variable, or both.  Any transformation to a 
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variable does not alter its relationships with other variables as all observations are transformed in 
the same manner (Mertler and Vannatta 2002, p. 31). 
y = (yλ – 1) / λ        (7.5) 
The box-cox transforms variable (y) using multiple values of λ, which typically range from -2 to 
2.  The model allows for a maximum-likelihood estimation to test which transformation of 
variable (y) provides the best ld 1998, pp. 277-279).  The 
box-cox model is a popular tool as it allows for an easy comparison of the fit among different 
potential transformations of variables.  If λ = 0, the variables under question are transformed by 
rity of the model.  The results illustrated that the ideal transformation would be a 
, the transformation applied to 
the dep
A box-cox model was utilized to find a transformation of the dependent variable that 
provided for the best fitting model.  A box-cox transformation transforms either the dependent 
variable, specified independent variables, or both using the formula (Davidson and Mackinnon 
1993, p. 483): 
  
 fitting model (Pindyck and Rubinfe
their log.  When λ = 1, the transformed variables are similar to their initial non-transformed 
variables. 
In every analysis, the box-cox model found that neither the log transformation (λ = 0) nor 
the lack of transformation (λ = 1) of the dependent variable was the best solution to addressing 
the non-linea
box-cox transformation where λ was something other than 0 or 1.  However, a drawback of 
transformations where λ does not equal 0 or 1 is that the regression results are difficult to 
interpret. 
Because interpretability of the results was important, the log of the proportion of units 
that were affordable rentals was used as the dependent variables in the regression analyses. 
When the dependent variable is transformed by its log, the coefficients of each independent 
variable are interpreted as the proportional increase in the dependent variable given a one unit 
increase in the independent variable.  Because a number of observations had a value of 0 for the 
proportion of affordable rental units, and the log of 0 is undefined
endent variable was: 
  y = log (y + 1)        (7.6) 
Scatterplots show that this transformation of the dependent variable improved the linearity of the 
relationships between the dependent and independent variables. 
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The results of the box-cox model with the best transformation are reported in Appendix 
D, as well as the log-likelihood estimations for the best fitting model, the log-linear model (λ = 
0), and
useholds was a better fitting model with no transformation.  For this reason, the 
central 
idence intervals of the coefficient and, therefore, less accuracy both in terms of the 
coeffic
 multi-unit structures.121  Multi-unit structures, particularly apartment buildings with 5 
or more
 the linear model (λ = 1).  The box-cox model found only one group of analyses for which 
no transformation was a better fitting model than a log transformation of the dependent variable.  
The analysis limited to the central city of each region for the supply of units affordable to very 
low-income ho
city analysis for very low-income rental units uses the proportion of units affordable to 
very low-income households as the dependent variable rather than the log of the variable. 
The second assumption of regression analysis is that there is no exact linear relationship 
between two or more independent variables, or no multicollinearity.  If two or more independent 
variables have a perfectly linear correlation, regression coefficients cannot be determined.  If two 
or more independent variables have a strong linear correlation (but not perfect), regression 
coefficients can be determined but their standard errors are large.  Large standard errors create 
wider conf
ient itself, as well as its statistical significance (Gujarati 1995, p. 322).  
The first step to detect multicollinearity was to explore pair-wise correlations among the 
independent variables.  The correlations were measured, separately, for each of the four regions.  
The full correlation matrices for each region are located in Appendix D. 120  Of particular 
concern is the potentially strong correlation between residential density and the proportion of 
housing in
 units, concentrate more housing units on a given area of land than single-family housing 
units.  Therefore, multi-unit structures are believed to have a strong correlation with residential 
density. 
Table 7.10 provides the correlations between residential density and multi-unit structures 
in each region in the years 1990 and 2000.  To explore the differences between two different 
                                                 
120 Correl
two vari
sented a severe threat of 
multicollinearity.   The correlation ranged in value from .812 in the Seattle region in the year 2000 to .998 in the 
Baltimore region in the year 1990.  The African-American variable was dropped from the final analysis.  See 
Appendix J for further details. 
ations range in value from -1 to 1.  Correlations of -1 and 1 indicate an exact linear relationship between 
ables.  0 indicates no linear relationship.  Typically, a strong pair-wise correlation greater than .8 or less than 
-.8 indicates a serious threat of multicollinearity (Gujarati 1995, p. 335). 
121 Initially, the proportion of the population that was African-American and the proportion that was minority were 
both included in the model.  The correlations between these two variables pre
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sizes o
 
f multi-unit structures, correlations are provided for the linear relationship between 
density and the proportion of housing in structures of 2 to 4 units, as well as for the relationship 
between density and the proportion of housing in structures of 5 or more units.  Surprisingly, 
these linear relationships are not as strong as expected. 
Small multi-unit structures of 2 to 4 units were more strongly correlated with density in 
the regions of Baltimore and Philadelphia than in the regions of Portland and Seattle.   In 2000, 
the correlation was .537 in Baltimore and .436 in Philadelphia.  The correlation was .298 in 
Portland and .166 in Seattle.  Similar correlations were found in 1990. 
Table 7-10.  Correlations of Housing Density and Multi-Unit Structures 
Year Region 
Correlation of density 
and % units in 
structures of 2 – 4 units 
Correlation of density 
and % units in 
structures of 5 or more 
units 
1990 
Portland .271*** .539*** 
Seattle .194*** .583*** 
Baltimore .454*** .106** 
Philadelphia .426** .155** 
2000 
Portland .298*** .525*** 
Seattle .166*** .607*** 
Baltimore .537*** .119** 
Philadelphia .436*** .161*** 
Note:  ** Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 1%. 
 
Larger multi-unit structures of 5 or more units were more strongly correlated with density 
in Portland and Seattle than in the regions of Baltimore and Philadelphia.  In 2000, the 
correlation was .525 and .607 in the regions of Portland and Seattle, respectively.  Surprisingly, 
the cor
The correlations between multi-unit structures and housing density were not as strong as 
expected.  We would expect a neighborhood consisting of multi-unit structures to be denser than 
n 
borhood is measured as the number 
te between 
tal 
relation between density and multi-units structures of 5 more units in the regions of 
Baltimore and Philadelphia were much lower.  In 2000, the correlation was .119 and .161 in the 
regions of Baltimore and Philadelphia, respectively. 
a neighborhood of single-family units.  There are at least two explanations for these weaker tha
expected correlations.  First, housing density for each neigh
of dwelling units divided by total land area.  The measure does not differentia
developed land area and undeveloped land area.  The only land area not included in the to
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amount within the neighborhood is land included in public parks.  Neighborhoods consisting of 
single-family units with little space between them may be just as dense as neighborhoods 
consisting of multi-unit structures separated by undeveloped land. 
e other land uses, such as 
ommercial activities, that prevent land from being used for housing.  This land is still included 
in the d e some evidence for this 
explanation.  In 2000, the correlation between the proportion of housing in structures of 5 or 
more units and the index of mixed land use was .550 in Portland, .551 in Seattle, .202 in 
Baltimore, and .295 in P l of these st nt at the 
.01 level
These two explanations lead to the conclusion that there could be neighborhoods with a 
high proportion of singl  units and high  as well as neigh s with a high 
proportion of multi-unit structures nd low dens ure 7.1 provides x in which the 
egorized by the proportion of single-family units and 
housing density. 
 
The second potential explanation for the lower than expected correlations is that multi-
unit structures may be more likely to be located in neighborhoods with other land uses.  While 
neighborhoods dominated by single-family units may be exclusively residential, neighborhoods 
with a larger proportion of housing in multi-unit structures may includ
c
enominator for density.  The correlations in Appendix D provid
hiladelphia.  Al  correlations were stati ically significa
. 
e-family density, borhood
 a ity.  Fig  a matri
census tracts of Portland and Seattle are cat
Figure 7-1.  Single-Family Dwellings by Housing Density  (Portland and Seattle) 
High Density 
Note:  Number is count of census tracts in each quadrant.
221 138 
228 137 
High Single 
Family 
Low Single 
Family 
Low Density 
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Census tracts with a proportion of single-family units greater than the median among the 
region’s tracts are categorized as “high single-family” while those with a proportion lower than 
the med
high density, as well as neighborhoods with a high proportion of non single-family 
housing
f single-family units. 
 
hia) 
ian are categorized as “low single-family.”  Tracts with housing density greater than the 
median density among the region’s tracts are categorized as “high density” while those with 
density lower than the region’s median are categorized as “low density.”  Of 724 census tracts, 
there were 138 tracts with a high proportion of single-family dwellings and high density.  There 
were 137 tracts with a low proportion of single-family dwellings and low density.  There were 
221 census tracts with a low proportion of single-family units and high density and 228 tracts 
with a high proportion of single-family units and low density. 
Figure 7.2 is the same matrix, but for the regions of Baltimore and Philadelphia.  The 
matrix indicates that in there are neighborhoods with both a high proportion of single-family 
units and 
 and low density.  Of 1,754 census tracts, there were 325 with a high proportion of 
single-family dwellings and also high density.  There were 326 census tracts with a low 
proportion of single-family homes and low density.  There were 543 tracts with low proportion 
of single-family homes and high density and another 560 census tracts with low density and a 
high proportion o
Figure 7-2. Single-Family Dwellings by Housing Density (Baltimore and Philadelp
 
Note:  Number is count of census tracts in each quadrant. 
 
543 325 
560 326 
High Single 
Family 
Low Single 
Family 
Low Density 
High Density 
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A strong correlation between two independent variables is a sufficient condition for 
multicollinearity, but is not always necessary when there are more than two independent 
variables in a model (Gujarati 1995, p. 336).  There may be a linear relationship between 
multiple variables not captured by pair-wise correlations.  Therefore, variance inflation factors 
(VIF) were obtained for the independent variables as a second test of multicollinearity.  The VIF 
measures the extent to which the variance of an independent variable’s coefficient is increased as 
a result of the variable’s correlation with other independent variables (Gujarati 1995, p. 328).  
The variance of an independent variable’s coefficient is: 
  
2Var(bxi)   =       σ       *      1              (7.7) 
   Var(xi)  (1 – r2xi) 
 
Where bxi is the estimated regression coefficient of xi, xi is the independent variable in question, 
and r2xi is the resulting R2 of xi regressed on all other independent variables.  R2 is the proportion 
of the variance of xi explained by the other independent variables.  The VIF is 1 / (1 – r2xi), the 
second part of equation 7.7.  As r2xi increases, the VIF increases for xi.  In other words, a greater 
proportion of variance in xi that can be explained by xi’s relationship to other independent 
variables leads to a greater VIF.  Typically, a VIF greater than 10 is considered a severe problem 
and a score greater than 5 is considered a potential problem (Mertler and Vannatta 2002, p. 169; 
Gujarat
The VIF scores are presented in Table 7.11.  For the analysis of Portland and Seattle, 
there are two variables which may cause some concern of multicollinearity.   First, the 
interaction variable of Portland with the index of mixed land use has a VIF of 9.92 and 11.32 in 
1990 and 2000, respectively.  It is likely that the correlation between mixed land use and the 
proportion of housing in structures of 5 or more units is partially responsible for the large VIF.122  
These high scores indicate that the performance of this interaction variable should be closely 
watched as variables are added into and removed from the model. 
The second concern is the variable representing multi-unit structures with five or more 
units.  The VIF for the interaction of Portland with multi-unit structures of 5 or more units was 
6.98 and 7.18 in 1990 and 2000, respectively.  VIF scores for multi-unit structures of 5 or more 
                                                
i 1995, p. 339). 
 
122 When structures of 5 or more units are removed from the analysis, the VIF for the interaction of Portland and 
mixed land use declines to 6.06 and 7.43 in 1990 and 2000, respectively. 
 266 
units (without the interaction) were 6.11 and 5.79 in 1990 and 2000, respectively.  These scores 
do not indicate a definite and severe threat of multicollinearity, but do indicate the potential for 
multicollinearity.  Because of this concern, structures of 5 or more units are dropped from an 
additional analysis for Portland and Seattle. 
 
Table 7-11. Variance Inflation Factors for Independent Variables 
Variable Portland/Seattle 
1990 Analysis 
Portland/Seattle
2000 Analysis 
Baltimore/Phila. Baltimore/Phila. 
1990 Analysis 2000 Analysis 
Smart Growth      
Density 3.56 3.52 3.16 3.17  
Mixed 2.51 Land Usea 4.12 3.37 2.08 
% Park 2.52 2.72 2.75 2.51  
Units in    Structure   
% 2-4 Units 3.51 3.81 3.04 2.99 
% => 5 Units 6.11 5.79 2.34 2.30 
     
Interaction Variablesb     
Density 4.93 5.11 4.80 5.15 
Mixed Land Usea 9.92 11.32 5.84 7.14 
% Park 3.03 3.00 3.35 3.37 
Units in Structure     
% 2-4 Units 5.66 6.60 3.89 3.99 
% => 5 Units 6.98 7.18 2.93 3.24 
     
Other Variables     
% Vacant 1.26 1.45 1.99 2.44 
% > 20 yrs. Old 3.28 2.50 2.45 2.32 
% => 4 bedrooms 2.49 2.85 1.85 2.10 
% Subsidized 1.88 1.81 1.51 1.50 
% Minority Pop. 1.92 1.82 2.46 3.19 
Region Dummy 4.95 8.22 8.08 9.82 
a.  Diversity index as presented in Section 7.2.2. 
b.  Smart growth variables interacted with either Portland or Baltimore.  
 
Table 7.11 indicates the analysis of the Baltimore and Philadelphia regions contains one 
variable which poses a potential threat of multicollinearity.  This variable is the interaction of the 
Baltimore region and mixed land use.  The VIF scores for this interaction variable are 5.84 and 
7.14 in
other independent variables in the regions of Baltimore and Philadelphia. 
 1990 and 2000, respectively.  There are two reasons I do not believe this VIF should be 
cause for concern.  First, a VIF between 5 and 10 only suggests potential multicollinearity.  
Second, Appendix D indicates that mixed land use is only weakly correlated with any of the 
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The third significant assumption of linear regression is homoskedasticity, or a constant 
variance of the error term across observations.  In addition, the error term is assumed to be 
random across observations and normally distributed.  Constant variance of the errors indicates 
that they are not related to any of the model’s independent variables or to the predicted value of 
e dependent variable.  A typical violation of homoskedasticity occurs when the regression 
residua e of the dependent variable 
increases.123  For the analyses in this research, the plotted residuals against the predicted values 
of the dependent variable reveal a strong likelihood that the assumption of homoskedasticity is 
violated.  Rather than constant variance of errors, there is heteroskedasticity or non-constant 
variance of errors.  A selection of scatterplots from the initital regressions is in the appendix. 
When heteroskedasticity is present, the estimates of the coefficients for the independent 
variables may still be unbiased and consistent.  They are not necessarily incorrect estimators of 
the true value of the coefficient.  However, the variance of the coefficients is not efficient, 
meaning that the variance of the coefficient is not kept to a minimum.  The t-statistic used for 
hypothesis testing is not accurate when variance is not kept to a minimum.  Therefore, wrong 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the significance of variables when the homoskedasticity 
assumption is not met. 
To address the lack of homoskedasticity, a procedure of robust standard errors was 
utilized.124  This procedure, included in STATA and other statistical software packages, provides 
a correction for heteroskedasticity using robust variance estimates obtained from a procedure 
developed by Huber and White.125  Stock and Watson ( 2007) argue this procedure has become 
commonplace in applied econometrics as heteroskedasticity is more common among data than 
homoskedasticity.  A benefit of robust standard errors is that they provide more accurate 
estimat
th
ls among observations increase as the predicted valu
es of standard errors when heteroskedasticity is present, but do not provide incorrect 
standard errors when heteroskedasticity is not a threat (Stock and Watson 2003, Chapter 4). 
                                                 
123 Another example is increasing errors as the value of an independent variable increases. 
124 Appendix H provides regression results for Ordinary Least Squares with standard errors, assuming 
homoskedasticity. 
125 A second method of correcting for heteroskedasticity is weighted least squares (WLS).  W
lower weight to observations whose error terms are the highest and a higher weight to obs
LS is used to give a 
ervations whose error 
terms are small.  However, appropriate use of WLS requires the pattern of heteroskedasticity to be known.  Because 
the independent variables identified as heteroskedastic changed from model to model throughout these analyses, the 
procedure of robust standard errors was used rather than WLS. 
 268 
 269 
s.  For reasons which will become apparent, Models 1 and 2 exclude the 
variabl
 
.65 to .70. 
Now that the variables, measurements, data sources, and assumptions of the regression 
model have been reviewed, the next two sections present the model’s findings.  Section 7.6 
presents the results when the proportion of affordable rental units for extremely low-income 
households is regressed on the four smart growth variables, as well as on the other control 
variables.  The level of analysis is the neighborhood as defined by census tracts.  Section 7.6.1 
examines the same dependent variable, but includes only the neighborhoods within the central 
city of each region.  In Section 7.7, the dependent variable is broadened to include the proportion 
housing that is affordable rental units for very low-income households.  Section 7.7.1 examines 
this relationship only in the central city of each region. 
7.6 ANALYSIS OF EXTREMELY LOW-INCOME RENTAL UNITS 
Table 7.12 provides the regression results for the supply of affordable rental units for extremely 
low-income households in the regions of Portland and Seattle for 1990 and 2000.  There are a 
total for four regression
es for multi-unit structures.  In model 1, mixed land use is measured as the diversity index 
which includes all types of employment and residential activity in the neighborhood.  In model 2, 
mixed land use is measured as the balance between population-serving jobs and residents.  
Models 3 and 4 are the full models which include all variables.  Mixed land use is measured by 
the diversity index of all types of activities in model 3 and by the balance between population-
serving jobs and residents in model 4.   All of the models explained a significant proportion of 
the variation among neighborhoods in the proportion of housing that was affordable rental units 
for extremely low-income households.  Among the four models, the Adjusted-R2 ranged from
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 0  1 1990  2000 199 2000 990  2000 1990 2000 
Smart Growth Variables         
Residential Density (1,000 dwellin 4** 4*** -.0g units / square mile) .027** .027*** .02 .02 00 .017 -.000 .015 
Mixed Land Use         
Diversity of all uses -.0.352** .581***   24 .436**   
Balance of pop. serving jobs t 9** 2***  o residents   .34 .48  .061 .373** 
% of land in parks 5 0 -.0.003 .008 .00 .01 01 .008 -.001 .009 
Units in Structure         
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units     .019*** .021*** .018*** .021*** 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units     .009*** .004** .008*** .004** 
         
Interactions         
Residential Density * Portland (1, 4 7 -.0000 d.u.(s) / square mile) -.003 -.000 -.00 -.00 00 -.001 .000 -.002 
Mixed Use * Portland         
Diversity * Portland -.2-.186 -.237   35 -.220   
Servbal * Portland 2 2    -.16 -.16  -.112 -.121 
% of land in parks * Portland 4** 4*** -.0-.042 -.041*** -.04 -.04 34 -.041*** -.035 -.043*** 
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units * Portland     -.005 -.005 -.006 -.004 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units * Portland     -.001 -.002 -.002 -.003 
         
Other Variables         
% of housing that is vacant 4 3** .006 .004 .010 .00 .01 .014** .006 .016*** 
% of housing stock that is 20 or m 1*** 5*** .013*** ore years old .011*** .005*** .01 .00 .006*** .012*** .006*** 
% of housing with 4 or more bedr 4*** 2*** -.017***ooms -.024*** -.022*** -.02 -.02  -.017*** -.017*** -.017*** 
% of housing that is subsidized 0*** 6*** .066*** .070*** .076*** .07 .07 .075*** .066*** .074*** 
% of population that is minority 6** 4*** .004** .006** .005*** .00 .00 .004** .004** .004** 
Portland City 2 5 -.175 --.169 -.167 -.16 -.15 .185** -.199 -.179 
Seattle City 7** 2 -.342***-.280** -.103 -.26 -.10  -.166 -.336*** -.163 
Portland Region 
 
3 6** .065 -.000 -.145 -.01 -.18 .118 .032 -.159** 
Constant 0*** 3*** .381.653*** .783*** .73 .87 *** .564*** .394*** .630*** 
R-squared 0 3 0.72 0.70 0.73 0.7 0.7 0.74 0.72 0.74 
Adjusted R-Squared 5 9 0.67 0.65 0.69 0.6 0.6 0.70 0.67 0.70 
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The purpose for the first two models is to highlight the statistical significance of 
residential density prior to the inclusion of multi-unit structures.  In models 1 and 2, residential 
density was associated with a greater proportion of affordable rentals for extremely low-income 
renters.  In both 1990 and 2000, an increase in residential density by 1,000 dwelling units per 
square mile was associated with 2.7% and 2.4% increase in the proportion of affordable rental 
units in models 1 and 2, respectively.126  These results change when variables for multi-unit 
structures are included in models 3 and 4. 
In the full models 3 and 4, residential density was not statistically significant.  The only 
smart growth variables to be consistently statistically significant in models 3 and 4 were multiple 
housing options as measured by the proportion of housing units in multi-unit structures.  In 1990, 
Model 3 indicates that an increase of .01 in the proportion of units in structures of 2 to 4 units 
was associated with a 1.9% increase in the proportion of affordable rental units.  A similar 
increase in the proportion of housing in structures of 5 or more units was associated with a .9% 
increase in the proportion of affordable rentals.  Similar relationships were found in 2000.  A .01 
increase in the proportion of units in structures of 2 to 4 units was associated with a 2.1% 
increase in the proportion of affordable rental units and a similar increase in the proportion of 
units in structures of 5 or more units was associated with a .4% increase in the proportion of 
affordable rental units. 
There are two possible explanations for the lack of statistical significance of the density 
vari  when multi-unit structures are included in the analysis.  First, there is the possibility that 
multi-unit structures and residential density are too strongly correlated to include both in the 
model.  The correlations and variance inflation factors (VIF) presented in the previous section 
did not definitively indicate severe multicollinearity, but indicated that a potential threat 
exis 7  Additional models were analyzed without the variable for structures of 5 or more units.  
The results are presented in Table 7.13. 
                                                
able
ts.12
 
126 O quare mile is equivalent to 640 acres.  Therefore, an increase in density by 1,000 units per square mile is 
equi  to an increase of 1.5625 units per acre.  The regression coefficient would be larger if housing density was 
mea  in 10,000 units per square mile or smaller if measured as units per acre.  However, the statistical 
signi  the variable would not change. 
127 Eigenvalues is another method of diagnosing multicollinearity.  From these eigenvalues, a condition index can be 
used to determine if multicollineaity is a threat to a regression.  The condition index for the regression is 17.59, 
 is considered a moderate threat by some statisticians (See SPSS Results Coach,  Gujarati 1995, p. 338)
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Comparing models 5 and 6 in Table 7.13 to models 3 and 4 in Table 7.12, we find that 
residential density is once again positive and statistically significant in explaining the proportion 
of affordable rental units.  These results indicate that collinearity between structures of 5 or more 
unts and residential density may make the results regarding density from models 3 and 4 less 
reliable. 
 
Table 7-13.  Regression Coefficients, Portland and Seattle, Extremely Low-Income Rental Units, 
Without 5-or-more Unit Structures (n=724) 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 
Note: ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Dependent variable:  ln(% of all units that are affordable rentals for 
extremely low-income households).  Interpretation of coefficients is the relative change in the dependent variable given 
a 1-unit change in the independent variable. 
  1990  2000 1990 2000 
Smart Growth Variables     
Residential Density (1,000 dwelling units / square mile) .030*** .031*** .027*** .029*** 
Mixed Land Use     
Diversity of all uses .329 .564***   
Balance of pop. serving jobs to residents   .330** .468*** 
% of land in parks .005 .011 .007 .013 
Units in Structure     
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units .018*** .021*** .018*** .021*** 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units     
     
Interactions     
Residential Density * Portland (1,000 d.u.(s) / square mile) -.006 -.007 -.007 -.013 
Mixed Use * Portland     
Diversity * Portland -.212 -.279   
Servbal * Portland   -.168 -.189 
% of land in parks * Portland -.043** -.045*** -.046** -.048*** 
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units * Portland -.006 -.006 -.006 -.006 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units * Portland     
     
Other Variables     
% of housing that is vacant .006 .014** .006 .017*** 
% of housing stock that is 20 or more years old .011*** .005*** .010*** .005*** 
% of housing with 4 or more bedrooms -.021*** -.018*** -.021*** -.019*** 
% of housing that is subsidized .070*** .075*** .070*** .075*** 
% of population that is minority .004 .005*** .004 .005** 
Portland City -.183 -.190** -.179 -.173 
Seattle City -.330*** -.167 -.319*** -.167 
Portland Region .023 -.116 .005 -.167** 
Constant .576*** .619*** .603*** .707*** 
R-squared 0.70 0.74 0.71 0.74 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.66 0.70 0.66 0.70 
 
ousing is more significant in explaining the supply of 
tial 
 
The second explanation for density’s lack of statistical significance in the complete 
models 3 and 4 is that the type of h
affordable rental units than density.  Holding the type of housing constant, greater residen
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density
o the size of homes or the type of structures built, may have little impact on housing for 
low-income households. 
M g 
the models.  As measured by the diversity index of all activities, mixed land use was not 
statistically significant in 1990 in models 3 or 5.  In 2000, the diversity index was statistically 
significant. 
There is no obvious explanation for mixed land use’s association with a greater 
proportion of affordable rental units in 2000, but not in 1990.  One possible explanation is that 
high home values in a strong housing market may make home buyers risk-adverse to purchasing 
a home in a location in which they may have little control over adjacent land uses.  A homebuyer 
making a large investment in a home may want assurances that adjacent land uses do not cause a 
threat, in the form of negative externalities, to the home’s value.  This aversion may reduce 
demand for housing in mixed use neighborhoods.  Both Portland and Seattle experienced strong 
growth in home values during the 1990’s.128 
The balance of population-serving jobs to residents, the second measure of mixed land 
use, performed in a slightly different yet similar manner.  With one exception, the ‘balance’ 
measure of mixed land use was statistically significant and positive in both 1990 and 2000.  A 
more even balance between population-serving jobs and residents was associated with a greater 
supply of affordable units in all models except for model 4 in 1990.  This finding was 
unexpected.  I suspected that the ‘balance’ measure of mixed land use, which only includes land 
uses likely to provide positive amenities, was less likely to be associated with a greater supply of 
affordable units than the diversity index of all land uses (which includes land uses that produce 
both positive and negative externalities).   
 itself was not associated with a greater supply of affordable rental units.  This is a 
significant finding as it provides evidence that policies meant specifically to promote residential 
density may have little impact on affordable housing unless specific attention is paid to the type 
of housing available in the market.  Reducing lot sizes to increase density, without similar 
changes t
ixed land use is the only smart growth variable which provided mixed results amon
                                                 
128 See Table 6.8.  From 1990 to 2000, the median home value in the Portland region increased from 2.34 to 3.76 
times the median household’s income.  The median home value in the Seattle region increased from 3.61 to 4.23 
times the median household’s income. 
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Of primary interest to this research is the statistical significance of the interaction 
variables representing the interaction of Portland’s urban growth boundaries with each smart 
growth variable.  These interaction variables provided two interesting results, neither of which 
gave evidence that urban containment altered the relationship between the smart growth 
principles and the supply of affordable housing.  The first interesting result was no change in the 
interaction variables’ statistical significance between 1990 and 2000.129   Only Portland had 
urban g
smart growth principles and affordable housing. 
re statistically significant in the expected direction 
in all 
significant in 2000 in five of the six models, but not 
significant in 1990.  The proportion of minorities was consistently significant in 2000.  In 1990, 
the proportion of minorities was significant in all models except for models 5 and 6. 
                                                
rowth boundaries in 1990.  Therefore, I expected interaction variables to be significant in 
1990 but not in 2000.  Because this change in significance did not occur, the findings do not 
support the hypothesis that region-wide urban containment policies change the relationship 
between the 
The second interesting result was the different relationship between public parks and 
affordable housing in the Portland region as compared to Seattle.  The negative and statistically 
significant coefficient for the interaction of Portland and public parks indicates a negative 
relationship between the proportion of land in public parks and the proportion of affordable 
rental units in the Portland region.  There was no statistically significant relationship between 
parks and affordable rental units in the Seattle region.  These findings indicate that public parks 
may be more highly valued as a neighborhood amenitity in Portland than in Seattle. 
Only three of the control variables we
models for 1990 and 2000.  First, an older housing stock in the neighborhood was 
associated with a greater proportion of housing that was affordable rental units for extremely 
low-income households.  Second, a greater proportion of units with four or more bedrooms was 
associated with a smaller proportion of affordable rental units.  Third, a greater proportion of 
units in the neighborhood subsidized by a public housing authority was associated with a greater 
proportion of affordable rental units. 
Two other control variables were not consistently significant.  A higher vacancy rate and 
a greater proportion of minorities were associated with a greater proportion of affordable rental 
units.  The vacancy rate was statistically 
 
0 
s indicate this interaction to be significant in both 1990 and 2000.   
129 In models 3 and 4, the interaction of Portland and public parks was negative and statistically significant in 200
but not in 1990.  However, the other model
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Similar analyses were undertaken for the regions of Philadelphia and Baltimore.  Table 
7.14 provides the results.  Once again, models 1 and 2 exclude the variables for multi-unit 
structures.  The Adjusted R2 for the four models ranged from .62 to .69.  Unlike the analysis of 
extremely low-income rental units in the regions of Portland and Seattle, multicollinearity was 
not a concern in models 3 and 4 as indicated by the low VIF scores presented earlier. 
Unlike the Portland and Seattle analysis, the relationship between residential density and 
the proportion of affordable rental units was consistently significant and positive in models 1 and 
2 and models 3 and 4 for the regions of Baltimore and Philadelphia.  Among the four models, an 
increase in residential density by 1,000 units per square mile was associated with at least a 2% 
increase in the proportion of affordable rental units. 
The relationship between multi-unit structures and the proportion of affordable rental 
units in the Baltimore and Philadelphia regions was dependent on the size of the structures.  An 
increase of .01 in the proportion of units in structures of 2 to 4 units was associated with a 1.2% 
increase in the proportion of units that were affordable rentals in 1990 and a 1.9% increase in the 
proportion of affordable rental units in 2000.  Contrary to expectations, the variable for structures 
of 5 or more units was not statistically significant.130  These results indicate that large multi-unit 
structures were not associated with affordable rentals for extremely low-income ho
re in the Portland and Seattle analysis. 
The variable measuring public parks was statistically significant and negative in 1990 and 
2000 for all models.  This result was expected as the positive amenity provided by public parks 
was expected to increase demand for housing while the preservation of land in parks was 
expected to decrease the supply of housing.  The magnitude of this negative relationship 
increased from 1990 to 2000.  For example, Model 3 indicates that an increase of .01 in the 
proportion of land in parks was assoc
nits in 1990 and with a 2.1% decrease in the proportion of affordable rental units in 2000. 
 
130 Appendix I provides results for regressions which exclude the variable for residential density.  When density is 
excluded, the variable for units in structures of 5 or more units remains statistically insignificant. 
Table 7-14. Re ore a ncom 757) 
 
gression Coefficients, Baltim nd Philadelphia, Extremely Low-I
ulti-Unit Structures Excluded 
e Rental Units (n=1
Full Model  M – All Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  1990  2000 1990 2000  1990  2000 1990 2000 
        Smart Growth Variables 
Residential Density (1,000 dwelling units / square mile) .024*** .027*** .022*** .026*** .024*** .021*** .021*** .020** 
Mixed Land Use         
Diversity of all uses .221** .153   .270** .039   
Balance of pop. serving jobs to residents   .028 .019   .065 -.074 
% of land in parks -.013*** -.022*** -.013*** -.021*** -.012*** -.021*** -.012*** -.021*** 
Units in Structure         
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units     .012*** .019*** .012*** .020*** 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units     -.003 .001 -.002 .001 
         
        Interactions 
Residential Density * Baltimore (1,000 d.u.(s) / square mile) .023 -.009 .018 -.015 .011 -.017 .008 .023 
Mixed Use * Baltimore         
Diversity * Baltimore .314 .223   .320 .220   
Servbal * Baltimore   .214 .027   .235 .033 
% of land in parks * Baltimore .009 .021*** .009 .021*** .011 .025*** .011 .025*** 
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units * Baltimore     .013** .005 .012** .005 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units * Baltimore     .001 .003 .000 .003 
         
Other Variables         
% of housing that is vacant .024 25**.027*** *** .029*** .026*** .0 * .021*** .027*** .022*** 
% of housing stock that is 20 or mo .00 00 re years old .002 2 .002** .002 .0 .001 .001 .001 
% of housing with 4 or more bedro -.01 004**oms -.003*** 1*** -.003*** -.011*** -. * -.010*** -.004*** -.010*** 
% of housing that is subsidized .046 56**.056*** *** .057*** .047*** .0 * .042*** .057*** .043*** 
% of population that is minority .007 06**.006*** *** .005*** .006*** .0 * .006*** .005*** .006*** 
Baltimore City .511 33 .124 *** .135 .537*** .0 .382*** .040 .402*** 
Philadelphia City .176 03 .049 ** .061 .180** .0 .102 .018 .107 
Baltimore Region .11 67 .147 7 .228*** .194** .0 .114 .155** .187** 
Constant .648 99** .132 *** .172** .727*** .1 .632*** .230*** .670*** 
R-squared 0. 70 0.68 72 0.68 0.71 0. 0.73 0.69 0.73 
Adjusted R-Squared 0. 65 0.63 67 0.62 .067 0. 0.69 0.64 0.69 
Note:
oeffi
 ** significant at 5%; *** si ln(% or ex  
c cients is the relative change in hange 
gnificant at 1%.  Dependent variable:  
 the dependent variable given a 1-unit c
of all units that are affordable rentals f
in the independent variable. 
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 The one smart growth variable that showed inconsistent results was of mixed land use.  In 
1990, a greater diversity index was positive and statistically significant.  The diversity index 
includes land use activities which may provide negative externalities to residents.  Examples 
include industrial activities, warehouses, utilities, or other less desirable land uses.  These types 
and uses lower home values and could increase the proportion of units that are affordable for 
-income households.  The diversity index was not statistically significant in 2000.  The 
ance between population-serving jobs and residents was not statistically significant in either 
0 or 2000. 
Comparing the coefficients of the interaction variables in models 3 and 4, we find that the 
istical significance of two interactions changed from 1990 to 2000.  Only one of these 
nges provided limited evidence that urban containment may influence the relationship 
ween any of the smart growth principles and affordable housing.  First, the interaction 
ween Baltimore and the proportion of housing in structures of 2 to 4 units was positive and 
istically significant in 1990, indicating that the positive relationship between structures of 2 to 
nits and affordable rental units was of a stronger magnitude in the Baltimore region as 
pared to the Philadelphia region.  In 2000, the interaction variable was not statistically 
nificant, indicating that structures of 2 to 4 units were no longer more strongly associated with 
rdable housing in the Baltimore region after priority funding areas were implemented.   
This may finding may indicate that the positive relationship between these multi-unit 
ctures of 2 to 4 units and affordable rental units became weaker in the Baltimore region after 
 implementation of priority funding areas as compared to the relationship prior to urban 
tainment.  Admittedly, stronger evidence would be provided for the hypotheses had the 
raction variable been negative and statistically significant in 2000.  This would have 
icated that the positive relationship between structures of 2 to 4 units and affordable housing 
s weaker in the Baltimore region than in the Philadelphia region after the implementation of 
an containment in Baltimore. 
Unfortunately, an alternative explanation is plausible.  It could be that the relationship 
between structures of 2 to 4 units and affordable rental units no longer differed between the two 
regions in 2000 because of some other event which occurred in one region, but not the other, 
between 1990 and 2000.  During this time period, the Baltimore region’s population growth rate 
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was twice that of the Philadelphia region.  It is possible that this greater growth in population 
resulted
able was positive and statistically significant.  In models 3 and 4 for 2000, the 
coeffic
mely 
low-inc
elopment, as well as housing demand, back into the inner city 
 in greater growth in the demand for housing in multi-unit structures in Baltimore as 
compared to Philadelphia, thereby weakening the positive relationship between structures of 2 to 
4 units and the supply of affordable units in Baltimore. 
The second change in significance of an interaction variable was unexpected.  This 
unexpected change from 1990 to 2000 was of the interaction of public parks and the Baltimore 
region.  In 1990, the interaction was not statistically significant.  Therefore, the negative 
relationship between parks and affordable rental units was similar in both regions.  In 2000, the 
interaction vari
ients for the interaction were .025.  These coefficients indicate that the negative 
relationship between public parks and affordable rental units was stronger in the Philadelphia 
region as compared to the Baltimore region.  Further analysis indicates that the relationship was 
not statistically significant in the Baltimore region.131  This result was unexpected as it was 
hypothesized that urban containment policies would increase the value of parks within developed 
areas which, in turn, would increase the magnitude of the negative association between parks and 
affordable housing in the Baltimore region as compared to the Philadelphia region. 
Among the control variables, a higher vacancy rate, a greater proportion of units 
subsidized by a public housing authority, and a greater proportion of population that was a 
minority, were each associated with a greater proportion of affordable rental units for extre
ome households.  A greater proportion of units with four or more bedrooms was 
associated with a smaller proportion of affordable rental units. 
7.6.1 Analysis of Extremely Low-Income Rental Units in the Central City 
Urban containment policies, such as urban growth boundaries and priority funding areas, push 
new commercial and housing dev
                                                 
131 In model 3, the 95% confidence interval for the public parks (non-interaction) variable is -.0324 to -.0101 and the 
confidence interval for the interaction variable is .0114 to .0391.  In model 4, the confidence interval for public 
parks is -.0321 to -.0010 and the interval for the interaction variable is .0111 to .0393.  Additional regressions 
switching the interaction variables to represent an interaction between the Philadelphia region and the smart growth 
variables indicated that the relationship between parks and affordable housing was not statistically significant in 
Baltimore. 
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When multi-unit variables were included in models 3 and 4, two interesting changes 
s that residential 
density was no longer statistically significant, with one exception.  The second interesting 
change was that the measures of mixed land use also became statistically insignificant, with the 
 
(Nelson et al. 2004).  For this reason, a second set of analyses were limited to the central city 
neighborhoods of each metropolitan region.  Table 7.15 provides the results from the analysis of 
extremely low-income rental units in the central cities of Portland and Seattle.  Models 1 thru 4 
explained from 67% to 74% of the variation in the pr
nits among the central city neighborhoods. 
Once again, Models 1 and 2 exclude multi-unit structures from the regression.  There are 
two important variables to highlight from them.  Similar to the regional analysis, residential 
density was statistically significant when the variables for multi-unit structures were excluded.  
In 1990 and 2000, model 1 indicates that an increase in residential density by 1,000 units per 
square mile was associated with a 2.6% increase in the proportion of affordable rental units.  The 
only model, among those excluding multi-unit structures, in which density was not significant 
was model 2 in 1990.  Second, mixed land use was also statistically significant in models 1 and 
2.  An increase in mixed land use was associated with a greater proportion of affordable rental 
units.  This relationship was consistently significant in both 1990 and 2000, as well as for either 
measure of mixed land use. 
Models 3 and 4, once again, included variables for the proportion of housing
4 units and in structures of 5 or more units.  The proportion of housing in structures of 2 
to 4 units was positive and statistically significant in both 1990 and 2000, with a .01 increase in 
the proportion of housing in these structures associated with a 2.0% to 2.6% increase in the 
proportion of affordable rental units.  The proportion of housing in structures of 5 or more units 
was positive and statistically significant in 1990, but not in 200
occurred to the significance of other variables.  The first interesting change wa
exception of model 4 in 2000. 
 
 
Table 7-15. Centr Coeff attle, 1) 
 
al City, Regression icients, Portland and Se
 Multi-Unit Struc
Extremely Low-Income Rental Units (n=24
tures Excluded Full Model – All Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  1990  2000 1990 2000  1990  2000 1990 2000 
        Smart Growth Variables 
Residential Density (1,000 dwelling units / square mile) .026** .026** .015 .022** -.034 .021 -.028 .020** 
Mixed Land Use         
Diversity of all uses .743** .732***   -.323 .471   
Balance of pop. serving jobs to residents   .608*** .678***   -.118 .512** 
% of land in parks .005 .000 -.004 -.003 -.001 -.005 -.003 -.004 
Units in Structure         
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units     .020*** .024*** .019*** .023*** 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units     .020*** .005 .018*** .005 
         
Interactions         
Residential Density * Portland (1,0 .029 00 d.u.(s) / square mile) .037 .027 .012 .044 .005 .030 .003 
Mixed Use * Portland         
Diversity * Portland  .444 -.060  .653 -.381   
Servbal * Portland .267   .012   .485 -.058 
% of land in parks * Portland -.02-.021 -.024 1 -.026 .002 -.012 .005 -.017 
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units * Portland     -.003 -.005 -.001 -.006 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units * Portland     -.005 .003 -.003 .001 
         
Other Variables         
% of housing that is vacant .037 .018 .024 .001 ** .008 .017 .006 .007 
% of housing stock that is 20 or mo .010 .015re years old .010** .005 *** .006 .016*** .005 *** .006 
% of housing with 4 or more bedroo -.029 -.016ms -.027** -.026*** *** -.027*** -.018*** -.016*** *** -.018*** 
% of housing that is subsidized .050 .042.050*** .061*** *** .060*** .043*** .057*** *** .056*** 
% of population that is minority .007 .008.007*** .009*** *** .009*** .008*** .009*** *** .010*** 
Portland City 
 
-.247 -.150-.356 -.368**  -.375*** -.239 -.211  -.283** 
Constant .465 -.393.341 .768** .737 -.340 .340  .322 
R-squared 0.69 0.75 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.67 0.73 0.68 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.74 
Note: ** significant at 5%; *** sig ndent that a useho  
coefficients is the relative change in  given penden
nificant at 1%.  Depe
 the dependent variable
 variable:  ln(% of all units 
 a 1-unit change in the inde
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When the variables for multi-unit structures were included in models 3 and 4, 
multicollinearity was a concern.  The correlations between structures of 5 or more units and 
density, as well as between structures of 5 or more units and mixed land use, were stronger 
among central city census tracts than they were among all census tracts in the region.  The 
correlations are shown in Table 7.16.  In 2000, the correlation between structures of 5 or more 
units and density was .580 and .668 in the regions of Portland and Seattle, respectively.  The 
correlation between structures of 5 or more units and mixed land use was .634 and .711 in the 
regions of Portland and Seattle, respectively. 
 
Table 7-16. Correlations for Cities of Portland and Seattle 
Year City 
Correlation of % units in 
structures of 5 or more 
units and density 
Correlation of % units in 
structures of 5 or more 
units and mixed land use 
(diversity index) 
1990 Portland .576*** .639*** Seattle .639*** .705*** 
2000 Portland .580*** .634*** Seattle .668*** .711*** 
Note  Significant at 5%.  *** Significant at 1%.  See Appendix D, Tables 9 & 10 for complete 1990 correlation 
matrices for tracts in the central cities. 
 
Because of these high correlations, another analysis was conducted excluding structures 
of 5 or more units.  Table 7.17 provides the results.  Once again, model 5 measures mixed land 
use as the diversity index of all land use types and model 6 measures it as the balance between 
population-serving jobs and residents.  After structures of 5 or more units were removed from the 
ana , three interesting changes occurred in the remaining coefficients.  First, the coefficients 
for residential density were again positive and statistically significant, as in models 1 and 2, 
indicating greater residential density was associated with a greater proportion of affordable rental 
units.  Second, mixed land use was also again associated with a greater proportion of affordable 
rent nits.  Both of these changes were likely the result of removing multicollinearity from the 
model by dropping the variable for structures of 5 or more units. 
The third interesting change after structures of 5 or more units were removed from the 
ana  was that the pattern of statistical significance of structures of 2 to 4 units changed.  A 
greater proportion of housing in structures of 2 to 4 units was associated with a greater 
proportion of affordable rental units in 2000, but was no longer significant in 1990.  In model 5, 
:  **
lysis
al u
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a .01 increase in the proportion of housing in these structures was associated with a 2.2% 
increase in the proportion of affordable rental units in 2000.  The coefficient in model 6 was 
similar.132 
 
Table 7-17. Central City, Regression Coefficients, Portland and Seattle, Extremely Low-Income 
Rental Units, Without 5-or-more Unit Structures (n=241) 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 
  1990  2000 1990 2000 
Smart Growth Variables     
Residential Density (1,000 dwelling units / square mile) .028** .033*** .019** .030*** 
Mixed Land Use     
Div .696***   ersity of all uses .731** 
Balance of pop. serving jobs to residents   .612** .638*** 
% of land in parks .005 .002 .009 .002 
Units in Structure     
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units 5.015 .022*** .01  .020*** 
% of hous  in structures of 5 or more unitsing      
     
Interactio    ns  
Residentia  * Portland s) / square mile) .025 .02 .010 l Density (1,000 d.u.( .037 9 
Mixed Use nd     * Portla  
Divers rtland -.145   ity * Po .343 
Servbal * Portland   .177 -.020 
% of land in parks * Portland -.021 -.027 -.021 -.029 
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units * Portland -.001 -.005 .003 -.004 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units * Portland     
     
Other Variables     
% of housing that is vacant .028 .008 .039** .014 
% of housing stock that is 20 or more years old .009*** .004 .010*** .005 
% of housing with 4 or more bedrooms -.024*** -.021*** -.026*** -.022*** 
% of housing that is subsidized .051*** .060*** .050*** .059*** 
% of population that is minority .006** .008*** .005** .009*** 
Portland City 
 
-.326** -.304 -.266 -.339** 
Constant .221 .556 .342 .541 
R-squared 0.70 0.74 0.70 0.75 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.69 0.72 0.68 0.73 
Note: ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Dependent variable:  ln(% of all units that are affordable rentals 
for extremely low-income households).  Interpretation of coefficients is the relative change in the dependent 
variable given a 1-unit change in the independent variable.  
 
There were no significant interaction variables in either 1990 or 2000.  This result 
provides evidence that urban containment policies, which Portland but not Seattle had in 1990, 
                                                 
132 The proportion of units in structures of 2 to 4 units and the proportion in structures of 5 or more units were not 
significantly correlated, see Appendix D, Tables 9 and 10. 
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ee control variables were consistently significant in the expected manner.  A greater 
roportion of units with four or more bedrooms was associated with a smaller proportion of 
affordable r 
proportion of affordable rental units.  And, a greater proportion of minorities was also associated 
with a greater supply of affordable units.   
Two other control variables were sporadically significant.  A greater proportion of units 
that were more than 20 years old was associated with a greater supply of affordable rental units 
in 1990, but not 2000.  A higher vacancy rate was associated with a greater supply of affordable 
rental units in models 2 and 6 in 1990, but in not other models. 
Table 7.18 provides the results for the analysis of rental units affordable for extremely 
low-income households in the central cities of Baltimore and Philadelphia.  Results for models 1 
and 2, without multi-unit structures, were similar to those found in models 3 and 4, with multi-
unit structures.  Therefore, this discussion highlights models 3 and 4.  Unlike the analysis of the 
cities of Portland and Seattle, multicollinearity was not a threat.133 
As in the regional analysis, residential density was statistically significant in all models.  
In model 3, an increase in density by 1,000 units per square mile was associated with a 2.7% 
increase in the proportion of affordable rental units in 1990 and a 1.9% increase in 2000.  In 
model 4, a similar increase in density was associated with a 1.9% and 1.8% increase in the 
proportion of affordable units in 1990 and 2000, respectively. 
Another similarity between the central city and regional analyses is the statistical 
significance of structures of 2 to 4 units.  A .01 increase in the proportion of units in structures of 
2 to 4 units was associated with a 1.4% increase in the proportion of affordable rental units in 
1990 and a 2.0% increase in 2000.  Multi-unit structures of 5 or more units were not consistently 
signific
                                                
do not alter the relationships between the smart growth principles and affordable rental units in 
the central city. 
Thr
p
 rental units.  A greater proportion of subsidized units was associated with a greate
ant. 
 
 
133 Correlations among the independent variables are in Appendix D, Tables 11 and 12.  The highest VIF for the 
of variables included in Table 7.19 is 5.20.  Also, similar results to those presented here are obtained when structures 
5 or more units are excluded. 
 
Table 7-18. Centr Coeff nd P ely Lal City, Regression icients, Baltimore a
 Multi-Unit S
hiladelphia, Extrem
tructures Excluded 
ow-Income Rental Units
Full M
 (n=529) 
odel – All Variables 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  1990  2000 1990 2000  1990  2000 1990 2000 
        Smart Growth Variables 
Residential Density (1,000 dwelling   units / square mile) .025** .024*** .019** .024*** .027*** .019** .019*** .018**
Mixed Land Use         
Diversity of all uses .545** .133   .768*** .059   
Balance of pop. serving jobs to residents   .100 .091   .219 .016 
% of land in parks ** -.029*** -.044*** -.031*** -.045*** -.028*** -.043*** -.032*** -.043*
Units in Structure         
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units     .014*** .020*** .013*** .020*** 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units     -.006*** .000 -.004 .000 
         
        I ons nteracti
Residential Density * Baltimore (1,000 d.u.(s) /square mile) .036*** -.013 .032*** -.019 .030*** -.012 .029*** -.018 
Mixed Use * Baltimore         
Diversity * Baltimore .418 .303   .280 .282   
Servbal * Baltimore   .330 -.007   .267 -.023 
% of land in parks * Baltimore *** * .038*** .045*** .041*** .046*** .037*** .048 .041*** .048**
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units * Baltimore     -.003 -.009 -.004 -.009 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units * Baltimore     .003 .003 .001 .004 
         
        Other Variables 
% of housing that is vacant ** * .029*** .026*** .034*** .027*** .027*** .024* .032*** .025**
% of housing stock that is 20 or more years old .000 .000 .000 -.000 -.002 .001 -.001 .001 
% of housing with 4 or more bedroo . *** ** ms 002 -.008*** .001 -.009*** .001 -.010 -.001 -.010*
% of housing that is subsidized . .0 ** * 047*** .034*** .049*** .035*** 47*** .032* .049*** .032**
% of population that is minority . . .0 *** * 006*** .007*** 005*** .007*** 06*** .007 .005*** .007**
Baltimore City 
 
. . .1 ** * 018 .393** 092 .525*** 09 .482* .153 .589**
Constant . . .2158 1.041 388 1.124 10 .787 .420 .832 
R-squared 0 0 0.  0.6.64 0.58 .63 0.58 66 0.61 4 0.61 
Adjusted R-Squared 0 0 0.  0.6.63 0.57 .62 0.57 65 0.60 3 0.60 
Note: **
oefficie
 significant at 5%; *** sig ndent  units ntals f -inco pretat  
c nts is the relative change in  given e inde
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A third similarity between the central city and regional analyses of Baltimore and 
Philadelphia is the relationship between mixed land use and the supply of affordable rental units.  
A greater diversity of all land uses was associated with a greater proportion of affordable rental 
units in 1990, but not in 2000.  In 2000, the diversity index was not statistically significant.  The 
balance between population-serving jobs and residents was not significant in either 1990 or 
200
A fourth similarity between the central city and regional analyses is the negative and 
statistically significant relationship between the proportion of land in public parks and the 
proportion of units that were affordable rental units.  Model 3 indicates that an increase of .01 in 
the proportion of land in public parks was associated with a 2.8% decline in the proportion of 
affordable rental units in 1990 and a 4.3% decline in 2000.  This negative relationship was of 
greater magnitude in the central cities compared the regions as a whole.  This difference in 
magnitude is not surprising as the central cities would be more built-up than other areas of the 
region.  Therefore, permanent open space would likely be valued more in the central city than 
elsewhere. 
There were only two statistically significant interaction variables.  The first interaction 
provides no evidence that urban containment policies influence the relationship between the 
smart growth variables and affordable housing in the central city.  The positive and statistically 
sign ant interaction between Baltimore and public parks indicates, at the very least, the 
negative relationship between parks and affordable housing was of a smaller magnitude in 
Bal iladelphia.134  This interaction was significant in both 1990 and 2000.  
Therefore, the implementation of priority funding areas in Baltimore in 1997 is not a cause of 
this interaction. 
                                                
0. 
ific
timore than in Ph
 
134 O e relationship was not statistically significant in Baltimore.  The confidence intervals do not allow for an 
exac ermination.  In model 3 for 1990, the 95% confidence interval for public parks was -.0451 to -.0108 and the 
conf ce interval for the interaction between Baltimore and public parks was .0174 to .0571.  In model 4 for 1990, 
the confidence interval for public parks was -.0491 to -.0151 and for the interaction of Baltimore and public parks 
was . 6 to .0612.  In model 3 for 2000, the 95% confidence interval for public parks was -.0628 to -.0225 and for 
the i ction of Baltimore and public parks was .0252 to .0702.  In model 4 for 2000, the confidence interval for 
l was -.0634 to -.0223 and for the interaction variable was .0252 to .0713.  Separate regressions in which 
the interaction variables were switched from an interaction with Baltimore to an interaction with Philadelphia 
indicated that public parks were not statistically significant in Baltimore. 
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r in the city of Baltimore than in the city of Philadelphia.  In 2000, this interaction was no 
longer 
riable was negative and statistically significant. 
Table 7.19 provides the results of the analyses for very low-income rental units in the regions of 
Portland and Seattle.  The models explained a greater percentage of the variation of affordable 
 
The second statistically significant interaction provides very limited evidence that the 
implementation of priority funding areas in Baltimore altered the relationship between the smart 
growth principles and the supply of affordable housing in the central city.  The positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for the interaction of Baltimore and housing density in 1990 
indicates that the positive relationship between residential density and affordable housing was 
stronge
statistically significant.  This finding provides limited evidence that the positive 
association between density and affordable housing may have become weaker in Baltimore after 
the implementation of priority funding areas as compared to prior their implementation. 
Three of the control variables were statistically significant in both 1990 and 2000.  A 
higher vacancy rate, the proportion of units subsidized by a public housing authority, and the 
proportion of population that was a minority were each associated with a greater proportion of 
housing being affordable rental units for extremely low-income households.  The proportion of 
housing units that contained four or more bedrooms was not statistically significant in 1990.  In 
2000, the va
The next section expands the definition of affordable housing to include a greater portion 
of the housing market.  As discussed in Section 7.2.1, rental units affordable to very low-income 
households include a greater proportion of the housing market than rental units affordable to 
extremely low-income households. 
7.7 ANALYSIS OF VERY LOW-INCOME RENTAL UNITS 
very low-income rental units than the previous models did for extremely low-income rental units. 
For models 1 and 2 without the multi-unit variables, the adjusted R2 ranged from .70 in 1990 to 
.74 in 2000. 
 
Tabl icients, Portland and Se w-In 4) e 7-19. Regression Coeff
 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
in the independent variable. 
attle, Very Lo
re affordable rentals f
Multi-Unit Str
come Rental Units (n=72
mely low-income households).  Inter
uctures Excluded 
 
Note: ** significant at Dependent variable:  ln(% of all units that a or extre riable 
given a 1-unit change 
 
 
pretation of coefficients is the relative change in the dependent va
Full Model – All Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  1990  2000 1990 2000  1990  2000 1990 2000 
Smart Growth V         ariables 
Residential Dens ts / squa e) .05ity (1,000 dwelling uni re mil 2*** .034*** .046** .032*** -.037*** -.020*** -.029*** -.018** 
Mixed Land Use         
Diversity of a .5ll uses 87*** .528***   -.426** -.030   
Balance of p dents  op. serving jobs to resi  .568*** .456***   -.187 .082 
% of land in park .01s 0 .014 .013 .015 .000 .004 -.002 .003 
Units in Structure         
% of housing nits  in structures of 2 - 4 U     .043*** .039*** .043*** .040*** 
% of housing ore units in structures of 5 or m      .024*** .017*** .023*** .017*** 
         
Interactions         
Residential Dens u.(s) / sq mile) -.003 ity * Portland (1,000 d. uare .042 -.003 .027 .018 -.002 .019 .006 
Mixed Use * Por  tland        
Diversity * P -.038 ortland .225   .091 -.237   
Servbal * Po  rtland  -.212 .175   -.021 -.115 
% of land in park -.016 s * Portland -.015 -.018 -.019 .004 -.003 .005 -.003 
% of housing in s  * Portlatructures of 2 - 4 Units nd     -.004 .004 -.000 .003 
% of housing in s  units * P d tructures of 5 or more ortlan     -.009*** .001 -.008** .000 
         
Other Variables         
% of housing tha -.012**t is vacant * -.021*** -.012** -.017*** -.006 -.014** -.007** -.015*** 
% of housing stoc ars old .010***k that is 20 or more ye  .005*** .010*** .005*** .015*** .008*** .014*** .008*** 
% of housing wit -.042** -.0h 4 or more bedrooms * -.045*** 43*** -.045*** -.025*** -.028*** -.025*** -.028*** 
% of housing tha .021*** .02t is subsidized  .018*** 2*** .018*** .011*** .011*** .011*** .011*** 
% of population t .008*** .00hat is minority .011*** 9*** .011*** .005*** .008*** .005*** .008*** 
Portland City -.187** -.1 -.288*** 49 -.266*** -.264*** -.286*** -.277*** -.294*** 
Seattle City -.339** -.3* -.079 23*** -.082 -.443*** -.213*** -.461*** -.212*** 
Portland Region 
 
.059 .09-.150 1 -.105 .160** -.006 .159*** -.053 
Consta 81** 2.5nt 2.4 * 2.734*** 37*** 2.806*** 1.700*** 2.016*** 1.686*** 2.007*** 
R-squared 0.74 0.70.77 4 0.78 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.86 
Adjusted R-Squa 0.71 0.7red 0.74 0 0.74 0.81 0.84 0.82 0.84 
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The initial models without multi-unit variables once again indicate a positive relationship 
between residential density and the proportion of affordable very low-income rental units.  In 
comparison to the previous analysis of extremely low-income units, the coefficient of density is 
of a greater magnitude for very low-income units.  In model 1, an increase in density by 1,000 
units per square mile was associated with a 5.2% increase in the proportion of affordable units in 
1990 and a 3.4% increase in 2000.  The initial models 1 and 2 also indicate a positive relationhip 
between mixed land use and the proportion of affordable rental units. 
Once again, variables for multi-unit structures were included in models 3 and 4. In 
contrast to the analyses for extremely low-income rental units, there was a sizable difference in 
the sted R2 between the initial models without the multi-unit variables and those with the 
multi-unit variables.  For model 3, the adjusted R2 was .81 in 1990 and .84 in 2000.  For model 4, 
the adjusted R2 was .82 and .84 in 1990 and 2000, respectively. 
There were two significant changes from models 1 and 2 to models 3 and 4.  First, the 
relationship between density and the proportion of affordable rental units was statistically 
sign ant and negative, rather than positive, in models 3 and 4.  Holding the proportion of 
housing in multi-unit structures constant, an increase in density was associated with a decrease in 
the proportion of affordable units.  Second, the variables for mixed land use became statistically 
insignificant.  The only exception is that of the diversity index in 1990 (model 3).  In this case, 
the coefficient for the diversity measure of mixed land use was significant and negative.   
In models 3 and 4, one interaction variable provided evidence that urban containment 
policies may alter the relationship between multi-unit structures and affordable housing.  The 
pos sociation between structures of 5 or more units and the proportion of affordable rental 
units was weaker in the Portland region as compared to the Seattle region in 1990.  There was no 
difference between the two regions regarding this relationship in 2000.  Only Portland had urban 
growth boundaries throughout the region in 1990 while both regions had urban growth 
boundaries in 2000.  This difference in urban growth boundaries could explain the negative and 
significant interaction in 1990.  
Table 7.20 provides the results for models 5 and 6, which exclude structures of 5 or more 
units.  These structures were excluded from the analysis because of the potential threat of 
multicollinearity discussed in Section 7.5.  There are four interesting differences in models 5 and 
6 from models 3 and 4.  First, the adjusted R2 declines by a noticeable degree.  For model 5, the 
adju
ific
itive as
 288 
Adjusted R2 was .76 in 1990 and .78 in 2000.  In comparison, model 3 had an Adjusted R2 of .81 
in 1990 and .84 in 2000.  Including structures of 5 or more units in the model explained a greater 
proportion of the variation in a neighborhood’s supply of affordable housing.  This finding 
indicates that these structures are significant in explaining the supply of affordable rental 
units.135 
 
Table 7-20. Regression Coefficients, Portland and Seattle, Very Low-Income Rental Units, Without 
5-or-more Unit Structures (n=724) 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 
Note: ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Dependent variable:  ln(% of all units that are affordable rentals for 
extremely low-income households).  In
a 1-unit change in the independent variab
terpretation of coefficients is the relative change in the dependent variable given  
le. 
  1990  2000 1990 2000 
Smart Growth Variables     
Residential Density (1,000 dwelling units / square mile) .059*** .044*** .054*** .041*** 
Mixed Land Use     
Diversity of all uses .549*** .512***   
Balance of pop. serving jobs to residents   .537*** .446*** 
% of land in parks .015 .020** .018 .021** 
Units in Structure     
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units .043*** .040*** .043*** .039*** 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units     
     
Interactions     
Residential Density * Portland (1,000 d.u.(s) / square mile) -.016 .024 -.016 .012 
Mixed Use * Portland     
Diversity * Portland -.176 .070   
Servbal * Portland   -.284 .065 
% of land in parks * Portland -.020 -.024** -.022 -.028** 
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units * Portland -.003 .000 -.002 .002 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units * Portland     
     
Other Variables     
% of housing that is vacant -.007 -.011 -.007 -.008 
% of housing stock that is 20 or more years old .010*** .005*** .010*** .005*** 
% of housing with 4 or more bedrooms -.035*** -.038*** -.036*** -.038*** 
% of housing that is subsidized .021*** .017*** .021*** .017*** 
% of population that is minority .004** .010*** .005** .010*** 
Portland City -.236*** -.351*** -.213*** -.334*** 
Seattle City 
 
-.445*** -.184** -.426*** -.183** 
Portland Region .081 -.120 .086 -.107 
Constant 2.176*** 2.408*** 2.227*** 2.479*** 
R-squared 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.81 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.76 0.78 0.76 0.79 
 
                                                 
135 Further evidence for this point is found in Appendix G.  The proportion of very low-income rental units was 
regressed on each smart growth principle, individually.  The R2 for the proportion of very low-income rental units 
regressed on the proportion of housing in structures of 2 to 4 units and on structures of 5 or more units was .63 and 
.67 in 1990 and 2000, respectively.  In comparison, the R2 for the proportion of very low-income rental units 
regressed on residential density was .22 and .20 in 1990 and 2000, respectively. 
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Second, residential density was once again positive and statistically significant in models 
5 and 6.  One possible explanation for the change in density’s relationship to the supply of 
affordable housing is the linear relationship between structures of 5 or more units and density, 
which makes the results of models 3 and 4 unreliable.  The reason for potentially unreliable 
coefficients and significance levels for density in models 3 and 4 was discussed in Section 7.5. 
Third, mixed land use w stically significant in models 5 
and 6, as it was in models 1 and 2 but not in models 3 and 4.  There are two possible 
explanations for these changes in the statistical significance of mixed land use.  First, a linear 
relationship between mixed land use and structures of 5 or more units may make the results of 
models 3 and 4 unreliable.   
The second explanation for the change in statistical significance of mixed land use is that 
there may be an interaction effect between mixed land use and large multi-unit structures not 
captured by the model.  There may be different preferences for mixed land use in neighborhoods 
of multi-unit housing than in neighborhoods of single-family dwellings.  Similarly, there may be 
different demand for multi-unit housing in neighborhoods of mixed land use than in 
neighborhoods that are exclusively residential.  Housing consumers may have greater demand 
for single-family dwellings in exclusively residential neighborhoods, but greater demand for 
housing in structures of 5 or more units in neighborhoods with a diversity of land uses.  These 
interactions may influence the coefficients for both mixed land use, as well as for structures of 5 
or more units, when they are both included in the model.136 
The fourth difference in models 5 and 6 from models 3 and 4 is the positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for public parks in 2000 in models 5 and 6.  This coincides 
with a negative and statistically significant interaction variable between Portland and public 
parks.  These findings indicate that the relationship between parks and affordable very low-
income rental units differed between the regions of Portland and Seattle in 2000.  The 
relationship was positive in Seattle.  The relationship was, at the very least, weaker in Portland  
as once again positive and stati
as
                                                 
136 An attempt was made to include an interaction variable between mixed land use and the proportion of housing in
structures of 5 or more units.  However, there was a clear threat of multicollinearity and the results were 
questionable. 
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compar
e 
associa
 Baltimore.  Without the variables for multi-unit structures, the 
adjuste
ed to Seattle.  Additional analyses indicated that the relationship was statistically 
insignificant in the Portland region.137 
With one exception, the control variables were statistically significant in the expected 
manner.  A greater proportion of housing that was more than 20 years old, a greater proportion of 
units subsidized by a public housing authority, and a greater proportion of minorities wer
ted with a greater proportion of units being affordable rental units for very low-income 
households.138  A greater proportion of units with 4 or more bedrooms was associated with a 
smaller proportion of affordable rental units. 
Table 7.21 provides the results of the analyses of very low-income rental units in the 
regions of Philadelphia and
d R2 in models 1 and 2 was .65 and .67 in 1990 and 2000, respectively.  With the 
variables for multi-unit structures, the adjusted R2 for models 3 and 4 were .70 and .74 in 1990 
and 2000, respectively. 
In models 1 and 2 without multi-unit structures, there were two similarities between the 
analyses for extremely low-income rental units in the regions of Philadelphia and Baltimore and 
the analyses of very low-income rental units.  First, there was a positive association between 
residential density and the proportion of housing affordable for very low-income renters.  In 
model 1, an increase in density by 1,000 units per square mile was associated with a 2.7% 
increase in the proportion of very low-income rental units in 1990 and a 1.7% increase in 2000.   
                                                 
137 In model 5, the 95% confidence intervals were .0032 to .0362 for public parks and -.0456 to -.0031 for the 
interaction of Portland and public parks.  In model 6, the confidence intervals were .0042 to .0373 for public parks 
and -.0491 to -.0067 for the interaction of Portland and public parks.   In additional regressions, the interaction 
variables were switched from the interaction of Portland with the smart growth variables to the interaction of Seattle 
with the smart growth variables.  The results of these regressions indicated that the relationship between public 
parks and the supply of very low-income rental units was statistically insignificant in the region of Portland and the 
same relationship was positive and significant in Seattle. 
138 Earlier versions of the model included an additional variable for the African-American population.  However, the 
as 
nalysis.  See the Appendix for further details. 
African-American variable was strongly correlated with the minority variable.  This strong correlation produced 
conflicting signs of the coefficients and the results were unreliable.  The variable for African-Americans w
dropped from the a
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Multi-Unit Structures Exclud
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ed 
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Full Model – All Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  1990  2000 1990 2000  1990  2000 1990 2000 
        Smart Growth Variables 
Residential Density (1,000 dwelling units / square mile) .027*** .017** .024*** .013 .014 -.003 .012 -.007 
Mixed Land Use         
Diversity of all uses .392*** .714***   .181 .187   
Balance of pop. serving jobs to residents  .338 .249** ***   .063 -.080 
% of land in parks -.020* -.02** -.020*** -.021*** 0*** -.024*** -.021*** -.024*** -.021*** 
Units in Structure         
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units     .025*** .030*** .025*** .030*** 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units     .009*** .011*** .009*** .012*** 
         
        Interactions 
Residential Density * Baltimore (1,000 d.u.(s) / square mile) .011 .009.013 .010  .013 .012 .011 .010 
Mixed Use * Baltimore         
Diversity * Baltimore -.123  -.02-.219  .043 7   
Servbal * Baltimore  -.12   -.159 5  -.044 .023 
% of land in p .016* .021 .028* * arks * Baltimore * .021*** .017** *** .023*** ** .023*** .028**
% of housing Units * Baltimore  in structures of 2 - 4     -.005.004  .004 -.005 
% of housing  more units * Baltimore  in structures of 5 or     .004 .005** .005** .003 
         
Other Variab   les       
% of housing .022* .011 .007  that is vacant ** .009 .024*** ** .007 .008 .009 
% of housing ore years old .007* .008 .009* *  stock that is 20 or m ** .009*** .007*** *** .008*** ** .008*** .009**
% of housing ooms -.018* -.02 -.021 **  with 4 or more bedr ** -.026*** -.018*** 7*** -.014*** *** -.014*** -.021*
% of housing .030* .026 .015* *  that is subsidized ** .025*** .031*** *** .023*** ** .024*** .016**
% of populati .007** .006 .006* * on that is minority * .007*** .006*** *** .007*** ** .006*** .006**
Baltimore Cit .116 -.08 -.234y -.109 .123 2 -.136 ** -.126 -.212 
Philadelphia .103 .090 0.14 City .095 .119  .064 .073 .019 
Baltimore Re .413** .217 .273* * gion * .264** .427*** *** .400*** ** .443*** .260**
Constant 1.182* 1.84 1.397 ** ** 1.629*** 1.234*** 9*** .916*** *** .936*** 1.488*
R-squared 0.70 0.72 0.780.72 0.70  0.74  0.74 0.78 
Adjusted R-S 0.65 0.67 0.74quared 0.67 0.65  0.70  0.70 0.74 
Note: ** si
oefficients
gn significant at 1%.  Dependent varia fordab y low pretat  
c  is n the dependent variable given a 1- iable. 
ificant at 5%; *** 
 the relative change i
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Second, there was a negative association between a greater proportion of land in public 
parks and the proportion of affordable very low-income rental units in the Philadelphia region.  
In model 1, a .01 increase in the proportion of land in parks was associated with a 2.0% decline 
in the proportion of very low-income rental units in 1990 and 2000.  The interaction of parks and 
Baltimore was statistically significant and positive.  This finding indicates that parks, at the very 
least, had a weaker negative association with the proportion of affordable units in the Baltimore 
region as compared to Philadelphia.  The negative coefficient for parks is discussed further in 
this section. 
In models 1 and 2, there is one significant difference between the analyses for extremely 
low-income rental units and the analyses for very low-income rental units presented in this 
section.  The association between mixed land use and the proportion of very low-income rental 
units was positive.  This association was statistically significant in 1990 and 2000 for both 
measures of mixed land use. 
As shown in models 3 and 4, two significant changes occurred when multi-unit structures 
were added to the model.  First, housing density was no longer statistically significant in 
explaining the proportion of affordable rental units for very low-income households, but was 
significant in the earlier analysis of extremely low-income rental units.  These findings indicate 
greater residential density, as compared to the type of housing available, is not as predictable in 
its i ct on affordable housing.139 
Second, mixed land use became statistically insignificant.  Mixed land use may have lost 
its s ificance because of an interaction between mixed land use and structures of 5 or more 
units.  As discussed previously, there may be a greater demand for mixed land use 
neighborhoods among consumers of housing in large multi-unit structures as compared to 
consumers of single-family homes.  This interaction may influence the coefficient and 
significance of mixed land use.140 
Three smart growth variables were consistently statistically significant among models 3 
and 4.  First, a greater proportion of land in public parks was associated with a smaller 
proportion of affordable rental units for very low-income households in the Philadelphia region.  
                                                
mpa
ign
 
139 R ving the variable for structures of 5 or more units did not alter the statistical significance of density.  
Additionally, removing the variable for structures of 2 to 4 units did not alter the statistical significance of density. 
140 When structures of 5 or more units are removed from the model, mixed land use becomes positive and 
nificant (similar to models 1 and 2). 
emo
statistically sig
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This re
e rental units was “less negative” in the Baltimore region than in the Philadelphia 
region.
ry low-income households.  The results for multi-unit structures 
were m
etween 1990 and 2000, providing limited evidence that the 
implem
r the implementation of priority funding areas throughout the 
lationship was expected as public parks were hypothesized to provide positive amenities 
which increase demand for housing.  Greater demand would raise prices and decrease the 
proportion of affordable rental units for very low-income households.  Parks may also increase 
the demand for more expensive housing, which would entice property owners to upgrade their 
units, making them unaffordable.  However, the interaction between Baltimore and public parks 
was positive and statistically significant.  Combined with the negative coefficient for the public 
park variable without an interaction, we can conclude that the relationship between public parks 
and affordabl
141 
The two other significant smart growth variables were the proportion of units in 
structures of 2 to 4 units and the proportion in structures of 5 or more units.  A greater proportion 
of housing in either of these structures was associated with an increase in the proportion of 
affordable rental units for ve
ore consistent in this analysis than in the previous analysis for extremely low-income 
rental units.  In the previous analysis, only multi-unit structures of 2 to 4 units were statistically 
significant in explaining the variation in the proportion of rental units for extremely low-income 
households. 
The interaction of the Baltimore region and multi-unit structures of 5 or more units 
changed in statistical significance b
entation of Baltimore’s priority funding areas may weaken the positive relationship 
between multi-unit structures and affordable housing.  The interaction was positive and 
statistically significant in 1990, when neither region had an urban containment policy.  This 
finding indicates that the positive relationship between structures of 5 or more units and the 
proportion of very low-income rental units was stronger in the Baltimore region than in the 
Philadelphia region.  In 2000, afte
                                                 
141 For model 3 in 1990, the 95% confidence interval for public parks is -.0353 to -.0133 and for the interaction of 
Baltimore with public parks is .0094 to .0368.  For model 4 for 1990, the confidence interval for public parks is -
.0355 to -.0131 and the interaction of Baltimore with public parks is .0096 to .0374.  For model 3 in 2000, the 
confidence interval for public parks is -.0312 to -.0110 and for the interaction of Baltimore with public parks is 
income rental units is insignificant in the Baltimore region. 
.0146 to .0415.  For model 4 in 2000, the confidence interval for public parks is -.0307 to -.0104 and for the 
interaction of Baltimore with public parks is .0143 to .0414.  Switching the interaction variables to represent the 
interaction between Philadelphia, rather than Baltimore, and the smart growth variables, indicated that the 
relationship between parks and affordable very low-
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re bedrooms was associated with a smaller proportion of affordable rental units. 
ental units in the central cities, the Box-Cox procedure identified a linear model as 
the bes
residential density and mixed land use.  Each of them had a positive association with the 
proportion of affordable rental units for very low-income households.  These findings are similar 
Baltimore region, the difference between the two regions was no longer significant.  This change 
could be the result of priority funding areas.  But it could also be that the strength of the 
relationship increased in the Philadelphia region to equal that found in Baltimore. 
With the exception of the vacancy rate, all of the control variables were statistically 
significant and had the expected relationship with the proportion of affordable rental units.  A 
greater proportion of older units, a greater proportion of units subsidized by a public housing 
authority, and a larger proportion of minorities were each associated with a greater proportion of 
rental units affordable to very low-income households.  A greater proportion of units containing 
four or mo
7.7.1 Analysis of Very Low-Income Rental Units in the Central City 
A similar analysis was limited to neighborhoods within the central city of each region.  As 
discussed in Section 7.5, the previous analyses transformed the dependent variable by its log in 
order to create a better fitting linear model as determined by the Box-Cox procedure.  For very 
low-income r
t fitting model.  For that reason, the dependent variable in the following analysis of very 
low-income rental units in central cities is not transformed and is the percentage of housing units 
in each neighborhood that are affordable rentals for very low-income households. 
Table 7.22 provides the results for the central cities of Portland and Seattle.  Once again 
multi-unit structures were excluded from models 1 and 2.  The Adjusted R2 for model 1 was .70 
and .71 in 1990 and 2000, respectively.  The Adjusted R2 for model 2 was .66 and .69 in 1990 
and 2000, respectively. 
The only two statistically significant smart growth variables in models 1 and 2 were 
to those found in the regional analysis of very low-income rental units. 
 
Table 7-22 , Reg cients Income tal Un
 
. Central City ression Coeffi , Portland and Seattle, Very Low-
-Unit Structures Exclude
 Ren its (n=241) 
Full Model – All Varia Multi d bles 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 2000  1990  1990  2000 1990  2000 1990 2000 
Smart Growth Varia         bles 
Residential Density .669** -.480 (1,000 dwelling units / square mile) 1.335*** .875*** .942*** * -.432 -.383 -.214 
Mixed Land Use         
Diversity of all u  -5.11ses 25.719*** 17.821***  6 -12.917**   
Balance of pop. s s 15.311  erving jobs to resident   21.581*** ***  .778 1.947 
% of land in parks .409 -.166 -.069 .435 .058 -.167 -.193 -.101 
Units in Structure         
% of housing in s structures of 2 - 4 Unit     .410*  ** .507*** .390*** .448***
% of housing in  units structures of 5 or more     .594*  ** .546*** .553*** .454***
         
Interactions         
Residential Density ) / sq .315 .790 * Portland (1,000 d.u.(s uare mile) .658 .469 .700 .180 .689 -.054 
Mixed Use * Portlan   d       
Diversity * Portl  5.597and 3.788 11.953   13.050   
Servbal * Portla 1.453  nd   -5.413  -1.972 -1.021 
% of land in parks * -.929 .444  Portland -.363 -.953 -.374 .214 .504 .193 
% of housing in stru ortlanctures of 2 - 4 Units * P d     .311** .063 .345** .130 
% of housing in stru s * Poctures of 5 or more unit rtland     -.138 -.072 -.082 .029 
         
Other Variables         
% of housing that is -.211 -.435vacant -.195 -.645 .179  -.578 -.434 -.670 
% of housing stock t  old .104 .233*  hat is 20 or more years .054 .083 .065 ** .168*** .227*** .164***
% of housing with 4 -.815** -.304 *  or more bedrooms -.564*** -.765*** -.657*** * *** -.300*** -.291*** -.294**
% of housing that is .571*** .346*  subsidized .573*** .556*** .577***  ** .303*** .336** .277***
% of population that .099** .134*   is minority .122** .119** .089 ** .168*** .135*** .175***
Portland City 
 
-4.029 30 -1.157 -7.263*** 1.295  .3 -3.834 -1.497 -.999 
Constant 17.11 8.8010.301 16.100** 14.984 5 - 1*** -2.285 -9.535** -4.984 
R-squared 0.70 0.87 0.71 0.72 0.68 0.86 0.87 0.86 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.69 0.86 0.70 0.71 0.66 0.85 0.86 0.85 
Note: ** significant at 5% at 1%. ls for very low-incom
 
 
; *** significant   Dependent Variable: % of units that are affordable renta e households. 
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Variables for multi-unit structures were added to models 3 and 4.  The Adjusted R2 for 
models 3 and 4 was significantly higher than those found in models 1 and 2, indicating that 
multi-unit structures are important variables for explaining the supply of affordable units.  
Models 3 and 4 explained 86% and 85% of the variation in the proportion of affordable rental 
units for very low-income households in 1990 and 2000, respectively. 
The only smart growth variables to be consistently significant in models 3 and 4 were the 
proportion of units in structures of 2 to 4 units and in structures of 5 or more units.  Residential 
density became statistically insignificant after the inclusion of multi-unit structures in the model.  
Mixed land use also became statistically significant, with one exception in which the diversity 
index was negative in 2000. 
One interaction changed in significance from 1990 to 2000 in an unexpected direction in 
models 3 and 4.  First, the positive coefficient in 1990 of the interaction between Portland and 
multi-unit structures of 2 to 4 units indicates that the positive relationship between these small 
multi-unit structures and affordable rental units was stronger in the central city of Portland than 
in the central city of Seattle.  The interaction was not significant in 2000.  This will be discussed 
further after models 5 and 6.  
Models 5 and 6 exclude the variable for structures of 5 or more units.  The results of 
these models are in Table 7.23.  As expected from previous analyses, density and mixed land use 
bec  statistically significant.  These results further indicate structures of 5 or more units 
infl e statistical significance of density and mixed land use. 
The models which exclude large multi-unit structures had an Adjusted R2 that is 
sign antly lower than the models which include them.  Models 5 and 6 explained from 71% to 
73% of the variation in the proportion of affordable rental units.  This is significantly lower than 
the 86% and 85% of the variation explained by models 3 and 4.  Once again, this finding 
indicates that structures of 5 or more units are an important variable for explaining the supply of 
affordable rental units. 
No interaction variables provided evidence that urban containment policies influence the 
relationship between the smart growth principles and the supply of affordable housing.  One 
interaction was statistically significant, which was the same significant interaction found in 
models 3 and 4.  In 1990, the interaction of Portland and structures of 2 to 4 units was positive 
and statistically significant.  In 2000, it was not significant. This finding is contrary to the 
ame
uence th
ific
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hypothesis that multi-unit structures would have a weaker positive relationship to affordable 
housing in regions of urban containment.  The coefficient of the interaction was positive, 
indicating a stronger relationship in 1990, when only Portland had a region-wide urban 
containment policy. 
 
 Table 7-23. Central City, Regression Coefficients, Portland and Seattle, Very Low-Income Rental 
Units, Without 5-or-more Unit Structures (n=241) 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 
  1990  2000 1990 2000 
Smart Growth Variables     
Residential Density (1,000 dwelling units / square mile) 1.388*** .988*** 1.022*** .804*** 
Mixed Land Use     
Diversity of all uses 26.209*** 17.662***   
Balance of pop. serving jobs to residents   22.496*** 15.718*** 
% of land in parks .030 .526 .167 .506 
Units in Structure     
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units .272 .302 .263 .229 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units     
     
Interactions     
Residential Density * Portland (1,000 d.u.(s) /square mile) .641 .444 .708 .324 
Mixed Use * Portland     
Diversity * Portland -2.607 8.549   
Servbal * Portland   -10.369 -1.928 
% of land in parks * Portland -.268 -1.011 -.297 -.995 
% of housing in structures of 2 - 4 Units * Portland .369** .107 .479** .313 
% of housing in structures of 5 or more units * Portland     
     
Other Variables     
% of housing that is vacant -.088 -.494 .226 -.084 
% of housing stock that is 20 or more years old .037 .063 .050 .079 
% of housing with 4 or more bedrooms -.505*** -.677*** -.595*** -.715*** 
% of housing that is subsidized .570*** .536*** .569*** .541*** 
% of population that is minority .079 .113** .048 .092** 
Portland City 
 
-2.489 -7.100** -2.098 -5.865** 
Constant 8.268 12.962 12.887** 14.611** 
R-squared 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.73 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.71 
Note: ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Dependent Variable: % of units that are affordable rentals for very 
low-income households.  
Table 7.24 provides the results for the analysis of very low-income rental units in the 
central cities of Baltimore and Philadelphia.  Among all of the analyses in this research, this 
analysis was the weakest.  Excluding multi-unit structures, model 1 had an adjusted R2 of .59 and 
.42 in 1990 and 2000, respectively.  Model 2 had an adjusted R2 of .57 and .39 in 1990 and 2000, 
respectively. 
 
 7-24. Central City, Regression Coefficients, Baltimore and Philadelphia, Very Low-Income Rental Units (nTable
 
=529) 
ariables  Multi-Unit Structures Excluded Full Mo  – All Vdel
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  1990  2000 1990 2000  1990  2000 1990 2000 
Smart Grow         th Variables 
Residential D  units / square mile) .239 .112 .129 -.016 .070 -.282** -.023 ensity (1,000 dwelling -.346** 
Mixed Land        Use  
Diversity 12.515*** 20.749***   8.698*** 7.067   of all uses  
Balance residents   6.652** 10.778***   3.093 of pop. serving jobs to 1.231 
% of land in -.271** -.347** -.346*** -.425** -.302*** -.32 -.350*** parks 8** -.339** 
Units in Structure         
% of hou - 4 Units sing in structures of 2     .308*** .405 304*** *** . .409*** 
% of hou or more units sing in structures of 5     .135*** .241 152*** *** . .261*** 
         
Interactions          
Residential D 000 d.u.(s)/ square mile) .881*** .706** .866*** .579** 1.090*** .796 1.070*** ensity * Baltimore (1, *** .724*** 
Mixed Use *         Baltimore  
Diversity -.084 -4.667   3.827 -1.2   * Baltimore 45  
Servbal *   -.998 -6.165   2.462  Baltimore -3.524 
% of land in .287** .252 .362** .318 .407*** .443 .457*** parks * Baltimore ** .465*** 
% of housing nits * Baltimore  in structures of 2 - 4 U     .032 -. .023 075 -.076 
% of housing ore units * Baltimore  in structures of 5 or m     .043 . 035 095 . .099 
         
Other Varia         bles 
% of housing .248*** .040 .323*** .120 .070 .124 .131  that is vacant .165 
% of housing re years old -.036 -.003 -.035 -.034 .046 .176 .055  stock that is 20 or mo .170 
% of housing ms -.026 -.136*** -.054 -.194*** -.029 -.15 -.047  with 4 or more bedroo 2*** -.167*** 
% of housing .500*** .586*** .526*** .614*** .426*** .425 .447***  that is subsidized *** .442*** 
% of populat .103*** .125*** .086*** .096*** .108*** .110 .093*** ion that is minority *** .094*** 
Baltimore Ci
 
2.485 .712 2.516 1.311 -2.147 -2. 1.258 ty 479 - -1.757 
Constant 5.171 10.719 9.036 19.769** -4.082 -8. 1.811 097 - -5.013 
R-squared 0.60 0.43 0.58 0.40 0.67 0. 66 59 0. 0.59 
Adjusted R- 0.59 0.42 0.57 0.39 0.66 0. 65 Squared 58 0. 0.57 
Note: ** sig ificant at 1%.  Dependent Variable: % of units that are affordable rentals for very low-income households. 
 
nificant at 5%; *** sign
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In models 1 and 2, three consistent patterns among the smart growth variables were 
revealed.  First, residential density was not statistically significant.  However, the interaction of 
density and Baltimore was positive and statistically significant.  These findings indicate that 
density was not associated with the proportion of affordable very low-income rental units in the 
city of Philadelphia, but was associated with affordable rental units in the city of Baltimore. This 
is a erent result from the regional analysis for Baltimore and Philadelphia, where there was a 
pos ociation between density and affordable units in both regions.   
The second consistent pattern is mixed land use was associated with a greater proportion 
of affordable very low-income rental units.  This finding is similar to the regional analysis of 
very low-income units.  This relationship was also found for extremely low-income rental units 
in th entral cities. 
The third consistent pattern was the negative relationship between public parks and the 
supply of affordable very low-income rental units.  A greater proportion of land in public parks 
was associated with a smaller proportion of affordable rental units.  But the positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of the interaction between Baltimore and public parks in 1990 
indicates the relationship between parks and the proportion of affordable very low-income rental 
unit iffered between the central cities of Philadelphia and Baltimore.  In Baltimore, the 
relationship was, at the very least, not as strongly negative as compared to Philadelphia or it was 
not significant in 1990.  This will be further discussed regarding models 3 and 4. 
Models 3 and 4 present the results when multi-unit structures are included in the analysis.  
These models performed better than models 1 and 2.  Model 3 had an adjusted R2 of .66 and .58 
in 1990 and 2000, respectively.  Model 4 had an adjusted R2 of .65 and .57 in 1990 and 2000, 
respectively.   
Models 3 and 4 provide further evidence that multi-unit structures are important in 
explaining the supply of affordable housing.  As in other analyses, a greater proportion of 
housing in structures of 2 to 4 units, as well as in structures of 5 or more units, was associated 
with a greater proportion of affordable very low-income rental units. 
Residential density behaved in an interesting manner when multi-unit structures were 
included in the model.  It was not significant in 1990, but was negative and significant in 
 diff
itive ass
e c
s d
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2000.14
in public parks was 
associa
s not as negative in the city of Baltimore as in the city of Philadelphia.  We 
cannot 
ffordable housing.  There were no changes in the statistical significance of any of 
the inte
2  This result is different from the regional analysis where density was not significant in 
models 3 and 4.  The interaction between Baltimore and density was statistically significant and 
positive.  These findings indicate that, similar to models 1 and 2, greater density was associated 
with a greater proportion of affordable very low-income rental units in the city of Baltimore, but 
not in the city of Philadelphia. 
Another similarity between models 3 and 4 and models 1 and 2 is the relationship 
between parks and affordable housing.  A greater proportion of land 
ted with a smaller proportion of affordable rental units.  The interaction between 
Baltimore and public parks was positive and statistically significant.  The positive interaction 
indicates that the negative relationship between parks and affordable rental units for very low-
income households i
conclude that the relationship between parks and affordable housing in Baltimore is 
positive.143 
One difference between models 3 and 4 from models 1 and 2 is the significance of mixed 
land use.  Unlike in models 1 and 2, the diversity index was statistically significant in only one 
instance in models 3 and 4.  In 1990, an increase in the diversity index was associated with an 
increase in the proportion of affordable rental units.  As discussed previously, this is possibly the 
result of an interaction between mixed land use and the proportion of housing in structures of 5 
or more units.  
From models 3 and 4, the analysis of very low-income rental units in the central cities of 
Baltimore and Philadelphia does not provide support for the hypothesis that the implementation 
of urban containment policy in Baltimore changed the relationship between the smart growth 
variables and a
raction variables from 1990 to 2000. 
                                                 
142 The low correlations between residential density and multi-unit structures in the central cities of Baltimore and 
Philadelp
12. 
interval for public parks was -.5737 to -.0754 and the confidence interval for the interaction of Baltimore with public 
parks was .1765 to .7375.  For model 3 in 2000, the confidence interval for public parks was -.6076 to -.0488 and for 
the interaction of Baltimore with public parks was .1041 to .7824.  For model 4 in 2000, the confidence interval for 
public parks was -.6278 to -.0508 and for the interaction of Baltimore with public parks was .1130 to .8177. 
hia provide evidence that multicollinearity is not an issue in these models.  See Appendix D, Tables 11 and 
143 For model 3 in 1990, the 95% confidence interval for public parks was -.5276 to -.0754 and the confidence 
interval for the interaction of Baltimore with public parks was .1342 to .6798.  For model 4 in 1990, the confidence 
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In comparison to the other analyses of this research, fewer control variables were 
statistically significant.  A greater proportion of units subsidized by a public housing authority 
was associated with a greater proportion of affordable very low-income rental units.  A greater 
proportion of minorities was also associated with a greater proportion of affordable rental units.  
A greater proportion of units with four or more bedrooms was associated with a greater 
proport
ental units for extremely low-income and very low-income households.  The four 
smart g
scussing the model, the measurement of variables, data sources, and assumptions 
for a r
y low-income rental units, was limited to the 
neighborhoods of each region’s central cities.  The purpose of comparing regional results with 
those of the central city was to idenfity significant differences in the impact of smart growth 
e 
ion of affordable units only in 2000, but not in 1990. 
7.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented analyses of the impact of four smart growth principles on the supply of 
affordable r
rowth principles were residential density, a variety of housing options measured as the 
proportion of units in multi-unit structures, mixed land use, and public open space in the form of 
public parks.  Included in these analyses were interaction variables to test the impact urban 
containment policies may have on the relationship between each smart growth principle and 
affordable housing.   
After di
egression analysis, this chapter’s last two sections provided results from four different 
analyses.  The first analysis was of extremely low-income rental units among neighborhoods of 
the paired regions of Portland and Seattle, as well as among neighborhoods of the paired regions 
of Baltimore and Philadelphia.   
The second analysis, of extremel
variables, or their interaction with urban containment, on affordable housing for low-incom
households.  There were no discernible differences in the patterns of behavior among variables 
when comparing the region and the central city analyses. 
The third and fourth analyses broadened the definition of affordable housing to include 
affordable rental units for very low-income households whose income is higher than extremely 
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low-inc
The second difference between the analyses is the strong explanatory power of multi-unit 
structures for very low-income rentals as compared to extremely low-income rentals.  For every 
analysis, models 1 and 2 excluded hile models 3 and 4 included them.  
When multi-unit structures were included, the adjusted R  increased by a greater magnitude in 
the analyses for very low-income units.  These changes in the adjusted R2 indicated the 
ome households.  There were two differences between these analyses and the previous 
two.  First, the models were better able to explain the supply of very low-income rental units as 
compared to extremely low-income units.  This was determined by comparing the adjusted R2 of 
the models.  This is not too suprising as extremely low-income rental units are a very tiny portion 
of the rental market.  Therefore, it is more difficult to capture changes in this segment of the 
market. 
 multi-unit structures w
2
importance of multi-unit structures, particularly those with 5 or more units, on the supply of very 
low-income units. 
The purpose of the analyses in this chapter was to test the seven hypotheses presented in 
Chapter 4 concerning the relationship between smart growth and the supply of affordable units.  
Rather than summarizing those results here, the concluding chapter summarizes the analyses’ 
findings in relation to each of the seven hypotheses drawn from the theoretical framework. 
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8.0  CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The purpose of this research was to answer the two primary questions proposed in the 
introduction.  These two questions were: 
• What is the relationship between four smart growth principles – specifically 
neighborhood density, a variety of housing options, mixed land use, and public open 
space – and the supply of affordable housing for extremely and very low-income 
households? 
 
• 
affordable housing, but rather tested the impact of urban containment on the relationship between 
each of four smart growth principles and the supply of affordable housing.  Therefore, this 
research does not address the question of whether urban containment reduces the supply of 
affordable housing.  Rather, the objective of this research was to test whether urban containment, 
by restricting the availability of land on the urban fringe, altered the impact of residential 
density, a variety of housing options, mixed land use, and public open space on the supply of 
affordable housing. 
A quasi-experimental research design was utilized to allow for a comparison of the 
impact of the four smart growth principles in neighborhoods within a region of urban 
containment to neighborhoods in a region without urban containment.  Interaction variables of 
the urban containment region with each smart growth principle were included in the analyses to 
capture differences between the two regions. 
I chose two pairs of regions for this research.  The first pair included Portland and Seattle.  
Portland implemented urban growth boundaries in 1979, approximately 15 years prior to Seattle.  
Therefore, the region of Portland had urban containment boundaries in 1990 while Seattle did 
Are these relationships different in metropolitan areas which have implemented a form of 
urban containment, such as urban growth boundaries or priority funding areas, from areas 
which have no such policy?  If so, what are these differences? 
 
This research did not test the direct impact of urban containment on the supply of 
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not.  By 2000, both regions had a region-wide urban containment policy in the form of urban 
growth boundaries.  
The second set of comparison regions included Baltimore and Philadelphia.  Neither 
region had urban containm
Baltimore region in 97.  Therefore, there was a region-wide urban containment policy in 
Baltimore, but not in the Philadelphia region, in 2000. 
The analyses were performed at two different points in time, in 1990 and 2000.  If the 
ate, we would expect to find the interaction variables 
ent.  There 
ilar 
Table 8.1 summarizes the urban containment policy for each region as of 1990 and 2000, 
 expected changes.  In the 
Portland/Seattle analyses, I hypothesized that the interaction variables would be significant in 
1990 and not in 2000.  I found only weak evidence fo
changes are the following section. 
 
ent in 1990.  Priority funding areas were implemented throughout the 
 19
hypothesis that urban containment alters the relationship between each smart growth variable and 
the supply of affordable housing is accur
statistically significant when only a single region of each pair had urban containm
would be no statistical significance of the interaction variables when both regions had sim
policies.   
the expected change in the statistical significance of the interaction variables between the two 
time periods, and the strength of the research findings supporting these
r this hypothesis.  Only one interaction 
variable, representing multi-unit structures of 5 or more units, changed in statistical significance 
in the expected manner.  This result is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 In the Baltimore/Philadelphia analyses, I hypothesized that the interaction variables 
would not be significant in 1990, but would be significant in 2000 after the implementation of 
priority funding areas throughout the Baltimore region.  While the statistical significance of 
some of the interaction variables changed, their change in significance did not occur in a manner 
I had expected.  Details of these 
This chapter is divided into three sections.  The first section summarizes the research 
findings as they apply to each hypothesis presented in Chapter Four.  The second section 
discusses the policy implications of the findings.  Finally, the third section presents limitations to 
this current study and suggests future research to address these limitations. 
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Table 8-1. Expected Changes in Significance of Interaction Variables and Evidence 
 
 
1990 2000 
 
Portland Urban Growth Boundaries Urban Growth Boundaries 
 
Seattle None Urban Growth Boundaries 
 
Expected Change in 
Interaction Variables of Change from statistically
Por
 significant to not statistically significant 
tland and Smart Growth 
Principles 
 
Evidence for the Expected 
Changes in Significance of 
Interaction Variables 
 
Weak – only structures of 5 or more units 
 
Baltimore None Priority Funding Areas 
 
Philadelphia None None 
 
Expected Change in 
Interaction Variables of 
Baltimore and Smart Growth 
Principles 
Change from not statistically significant to statistically significant 
 
Evidence for the Expected 
Changes in Significance of 
Interaction Variables 
Weak – only multi-unit structures, and not in expected manner 
  
The the
m Chapter Seven in 
rms of the seven hypotheses. 
Table 8.2 summarizes the strength of the evidence from the analyses in the previous 
hapter for each of the seven hypotheses.  The evidence was strongest for the hypotheses 
8.1 FINDINGS AND THE SEVEN HYPOTHESES 
oretical framework in Chapter Four presented seven hypotheses regarding the impact of 
the four smart growth principles of housing density, a variety of housing options, mixed land use, 
and open space (in the form of public parks) on the supply of affordable housing in regions with 
and without urban containment.  This section summarizes the findings fro
te
c
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concern  of affordable 
units.  The evidence was moderate to strong for a positive relationship between residential 
density and affordable units.  The evidence was weak for a negative relationship between land in 
public parks and the supply of affordable units. 
 
Table 8-2.  Hypotheses and Strength of Evidence 
ing the positive association between multi-unit structures and the supply
 
Hypothesis Strength of Evidence 
 
1. Greater housing density is associated with a greater supply of 
affordable units for low-income households. 
Moderate 
 
2. In regions with urban containment, the association between greater 
housing density and a greater supply of affordable units for low-
income households is weaker than in regions without urban 
containment. 
 
No Evidence 
3. A greater supply of multi-unit structures, a measure of the variety of 
housing options, is associated with a greater supply of affordable 
units for low-income households. 
Strong 
 
4. In regions with urban containment, the association between multi-
unit structures and a greater supply of affordable units for low-
income households is weaker than in regions without urban 
containment. 
 
Weak 
5. Mixed land use neighborhoods in regions with urban containment 
are associated with a lower supply of affordable housing units for 
low-income households. 
 
No Evidence 
6. A greater proportion of land in public parks, a form of open space, is 
associated with a lower supply of affordable housing for low-income 
households. 
 
Weak 
7. In regions of urban containment, the association between a greater 
proportion of land in public parks and a smaller supply of affordable 
housing is stronger than in regions without urban containment. 
 
 
No Evidence 
 
 
The evidence that any of the smart growth variables interacted with urban containment to 
alter their relationship to the supply of affordable units was mostly non-existent.  The analyses 
provided no
mixed land use, or public parks.  The only 
 evidence that there was an interaction between urban containment and density, 
evidence of an interaction was between urban 
containment and multi-unit structures, with weak evidence that multi-unit structures have a 
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weaker positive association with affordable housing in regions of urban containment.  The 
remainder of this section discusses each of the seven hypotheses, individually. 
 
Hypothesis 1:    Greater housing density is associated with a greater supply of affordable units 
for low-income households.  
 
 the analyses provided moderate evidence 
that greater housing density was associated with a greater supply of affordable units.  First, the 
coefficient for density was positive and statistically significant in the analyses for Portland and 
Seattle, as long as structures of 5 or more units were excluded from the model.  When large 
multi-unit structures were included in the model, the association between density and affordable 
housing became either statistically insignificant or negative.  
Second, density was positive and statistically significant in Baltimore and Philadelphia in 
the analyses of extremely low-income rental units.  This was true in both the regional, as well as 
the central city, analyses. 
The results are slightly different for very low-income units in Baltimore and Philadelphia.  
Greater density was associated with a greater proportion of very low-income rental units in the 
regions of Baltimore and Philadelphia as long as multi-unit structures were not included in the 
model.  Density was not significant for very low-income rental units when multi-unit structures 
were included.  Among the central cities of Baltimore and Philadelphia, only in the city of 
Baltimore was there a positive relationship between density and very low-income rental units. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2:    In regions with urban containment, the association between greater housing 
density and a greater supply of affordable units for low-income households is 
weaker than in regions without urban containment. 
 
The analyses did not provide evidence for this hypothesis.  Between 1990 and 2000, there 
ere no
density or the inter
There are two points from which to conclude
w  changes in the statistical significance of either the interaction variable for Portland and 
action variable for Baltimore and density.  Therefore, urban containment did 
not alter the association between density and affordable housing.  If urban containment did have 
an impact on this relationship, the interaction variable for Portland and density would have been 
significant in 1990 when only Portland had a region-wide urban containment policy.  The 
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interaction variable for Baltimore and density would have been significant in 2000 when 
Baltimore had a region-wide urban containment policy. 
 
Hypothesis 3:    A greater supply of multi-unit structures, a measure of the variety of housing 
options, is associated with a greater supply of affordable units for low-income 
households. 
altimore and Philadelphia. 
its were associated with a greater proportion of affordable extremely 
low-inc
 is 
lways some demand for housing in multi-unit structures among higher income households, a 
aller relative supply of these units in a region may reduce their association with affordability 
The posit more units and affordable 
ery low-income rental units was consistently significant throughout all four regions, as well as 
in their
 
The analyses provided strong evidence for a positive relationship between multi-unit 
structures and affordable housing.  There are three important findings to support this hypothesis.  
First, the positive relationship between structures of 2 to 4 units and affordable housing was 
consistently positive for both extremely low-income, as well as very low-income, rental units 
throughout all four regions, as well as in the central cities of B
Second, the relationship between structures of 5 or more units and affordable extremely 
low-income units was positive in one pair of regions.  A greater proportion of units in multi-unit 
structures of 5 or more un
ome rental units in the regions of Portland and Seattle, but not in the regions of Baltimore 
and Philadelphia.  There is no obvious explanation for the lack of statistical significance in the 
Baltimore and Philadelphia regions.  One possible explanation is that, as a proportion of the 
housing stock, there is less housing in these multi-unit structures in Philadelphia and Baltimore 
as compared to Portland and Seattle.  In 2000, the proportion of housing in these structures was 
19% in Baltimore, 15% in Philadelphia, 21% in Portland, and 27% in Seattle.  Because there
a
sm
for extremely low-income renters in that region. 
ive relationship between multi-unit structures of 5 or 
v
 central cities.  It is not surprising that multi-unit structures of 5 or more units are more 
consistently significant in explaining the supply of very low-income rentals as compared to 
extremely low-income rentals.  Extremely low-income rental units are a much smaller fraction of 
the market as units must have a much lower price to be considered ‘affordable’ for extremely 
low-income households than for very low-income households.  It is likely that changes in the 
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type of housing available are likely to more strongly impact very low-income units, because they 
are a larger portion of the overall housing stock, than extremely low-income units. 
The third important finding regarding multi-unit structures is the significant explanatory 
units among nei
from the analyses lowered the adjusted R2 of the models by as much as .07 in the regional 
analysi
Hypoth
ikely makes it difficult to capture the interaction 
affect o
relationship between structures of 2 to 4 units and extremely low-income rental units, as well as 
power that structures of 5 or more units have in explaining the supply of very low-income rental 
ghborhoods.  In Portland and Seattle, removing structures of 5 or more units 
s and by as much as .15 in the central city analysis.  The adjusted R2 represents the 
proportion of the variation in the supply of affordable units that is explained by the independent 
variables.  Therefore, the model does a better job of explaining the supply of very low-income 
rental units when structures of 5 or more units are included. 
 
esis 4:  In regions with urban containment, the association between multi-unit 
structures and a greater supply of affordable units for low-income 
households is weaker than in regions without urban containment. 
 
Support for this hypothesis was weak as there were only one analysis which provided 
evidence for it.  There was a weaker relationship between structures of 5 or more units and 
affordable very low-income rental units in the Portland region as compared to the Seattle region 
when only Portland had urban growth boundaries.  After Seattle implemented urban growth 
boundaries, this difference was no longer significant.  This is the only interaction variable, 
throughout this research, which performed in its hypothesized manner.   
This result was not replicated for extremely low-income units in the Portland and Seattle 
regions.  As mentioned previously, the small size of the extremely low-income rental housing 
stock, relative to the overall size of the market, l
f urban containment on the relationship between multi-unit structures and the supply of 
affordable extremely low-income rental units. 
A second finding from this research provided some further evidence, albeit limited, for 
the hypothesis that urban containment alters the relationship between multi-unit structures and 
the supply of affordable housing.  The positive impact of multi-unit structures in the Baltimore 
region may have become weaker after the implementation of priority funding areas there.  The 
interaction variables indicated that, prior to priority funding areas in the Baltimore region, the 
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the relationship between structures of 5 or more units and very low-income rental units, were 
stronger in the Baltimore region as compared to Philadelphia.  After priority funding areas were 
establis
he Baltimore region as compared to 
e Philadelphia region during the 1990’s.  The growth rate in terms of residents was 7.2% in 
10.7% in Baltim
creased the demand for all types of housing relative to Philadelphia, including for housing in 
multi-u
g units for low-income 
 
hed, the relationships were no longer stronger in Baltimore and were similar to those 
found in Philadelphia.  This change in the Baltimore region could have been the result of urban 
containment pushing demand for housing into developed areas and areas designated for 
development.  As demand for housing increases in developed and other designated areas, 
demand will increase for housing in multi-unit structures as well as for single-family dwellings.  
Therefore, the strong association between multi-unit structures and affordable units may decline. 
On the other hand, there is an alternative explanation for this change.  The population 
growth rate, of residents and of households, was higher in t
th
Baltimore as compared to 3.6% in Philadelphia.  In terms of households, the growth rate was 
ore and 6.5% in Philadelphia.  This stronger growth in Baltimore may have 
in
nit structures.  This increase in demand may explain why the relationship between multi-
unit structures and affordable housing was no longer stronger in Baltimore, as compared to 
Philadelphia, by 2000. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  Mixed land use neighborhoods in regions with urban containment are 
associated with a lower supply of affordable housin
households. 
The analyses did not provide evidence for this hypothesis.  The direction and statistical 
significance of the interaction variables for mixed land use did not change in the expected 
manner between 1990 and 2000 in either the analyses for Portland and Seattle or in the analyses 
for Philadelphia and Baltimore. 
There are two issues regarding my two measures of mixed land use, the diversity index of 
all land uses and the balance of population-serving jobs to residents, which may have influenced 
my lack of significant findings.  First, I used employment and population data to estimate the 
diversity of land use within each neighborhood.  Land use data were not used because of the lack 
of standardization of data for various land use categories at the neighborhood level among the 
four metropolitan regions of Portland, Seattle, Baltimore, and Philadelphia.  Using my measure, I 
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assume that the amount of land used by a particular activity is strongly correlated with the 
number of employees employed by that activity.  But using employment and population data 
does not exactly capture the amount of land used for different activities as many residents, or 
employees of a particular industry, may be concentrated within a small area of land relative to 
the land area of the neighborhood or may be widely spread throughout.  The mixture of 
employees and residents within a neighborhood may not be the best measure of mixed land use 
as the measure masks the possibility that housing consumers are more sensitive to the amount of 
land which is consumed by particular activities than the number of employees that are employed 
by thos
ent in retail, finance and insurance, real estate, education, health, social 
rvices, arts, entertainment, and food services. 
Hypothesis 6:  
ith a lower supply of affordable housing for low-income 
households. 
 
the region.  First, only in Philadelphia was the relationship 
betwee
e activities. 
A second issue with regard to my two measures of mixed land use is that a neighborhood 
dominated by one land use has a low index score, while a neighborhood with an even 
distribution of land uses has an index score of 1.  However, a low score does not indicate which 
land use dominates the neighborhood.  It may be dominated by residential use or by a specific 
industry.  A score somewhere between 0 and 1 does not specify the type of land uses within the 
mix.  To address this issue and to select only land uses which residents would more likely view 
as a positive amentity in their neighborhood, the balance of population-serving jobs and residents 
includes only employm
se
 
 A greater proportion of land in public parks, a form of open space, is 
associated w
The analyses provided only weak evidence that a greater proportion of land in public 
parks was associated with a lower supply of affordable housing.  The results indicate that this 
relationship was dependent on 
n public parks and affordable units consistently negative and statistically significant, for 
both extremely low-income and very low-income rental units.  With only one exception, the 
interaction of Baltimore and parks indicated that this negative relationship was either weaker or 
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non existent in Baltimore.144  Second, there was a negative relationship between public parks and 
extremely low-income rental units in the region of Portland but not in Seattle. 
One potential explanation for the weak support for this hypothesis from my analyses is 
my measure of public parks.  Using the neighborhood, defined by census tracts, as the level of 
analysis, my analyses precludes finding a negative relationship between public parks and the 
supply of affordable housing within smaller distances such as a block.  The literature review in 
Chapter Three indicated that public parks have their greatest impact on home values at closer 
distances smaller than a census tract.  This limitation to my research is further discussed in 
Section 8.3. 
 
tionship between public parks and the supply of 
affordable housing would be stronger in areas of urban containment because of the reduction of 
boundaries beca
eclines, land preserved as public parks would be more valuable as an amenity to housing 
consum
closer distances. 
                                                
Hypothesis 7:    In regions of urban containment, the association between a greater proportion 
of land in public parks and a smaller supply of affordable housing is stronger 
than in regions without urban containment. 
 
The analyses did not provide evidence for this hypothesis. The direction and statistical 
significance of the interaction variables for public parks did not change in the expected manner 
between 1990 and 2000 in either the analyses for Portland and Seattle or in the analyses for 
Philadelphia and Baltimore.   
It was hypothesized that the negative rela
open space within urban containment boundaries. Open space should decline within these 
use development is prohibited, or discouraged, outside of them.  As open space 
d
ers.  Hypothetically, people would be willing to pay more for housing near a public park, 
reducing the supply of affordable units near the park, as open space declines.  However, the 
findings do not support this hypothesis.  It may be that the preservation of open space outside of 
urban containment boundaries serves as a substitute for open space within them.  Alternatively, 
my measure of public parks at the neighborhood level, once again, prevents capturing the impact 
of urban containment on the relationship between public parks and affordable housing within 
 
144 As mentioned in Chapter 7’s footnotes, results from an interaction of Philadelphia and parks, rather than 
Baltimore and parks, indicated that parks were not statistically significant in Baltimore.  
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8.2 IMPLICATIONS 
Smart growth has receiv
ary purpose of this research was to test claims that specific smart growth 
impact of four p
and open space using.  To date, there have been 
mpirical studies of these relationships. Given the popularity of the smart growth principles 
 
advocates to give greater cons
                                                
ed a growing amount of attention in recent years among diverse groups 
of people, including planners, environmentalists, politicians, academics, and others.  Typically, 
these groups see smart growth as a means to protect the environment and preserve open space 
rather than to address social issues such as affordable housing.  But recently, smart growth 
proponents have begun to pay more attention to ways in which the smart growth principles can 
be applied to social concerns, such as housing.145 
The prim
principles can increase the supply of affordable housing for low-income households. It tested the 
rinciples – greater housing density, a variety of housing options, mixed land use, 
in the form of public parks – on affordable ho
few e
in recent years, it is imperative that research address this gap and this research begins to do so. 
The results of this research have implications for public policy, specifically as it pertains to urban 
planning, growth management, and attempts to curb sprawl. 
The first policy implication is the necessity among planners and growth management 
ideration to the types of housing developed as they encourage 
greater residential density to reduce sprawl.  Growth management states such as Oregon and 
Washington encourage, if not mandate, greater residential density as a means to increase the 
supply of housing for households with limited income while at the same time preserve open 
space.  This research’s finding that residential density is consistently statistically significant and 
positive when multi-unit structures are not explicitly included in the model provides evidence 
that greater residential density, without regard to the type of housing, is associated with a greater 
supply of affordable rental units. 
This research, however, also suggests a more reliable and stronger source of affordable 
units than greater residential density in general is the presence of multi-unit structures.  When 
variables to measure the presence of multi-unit structures are included in the model, they are 
 
4). 145 For example, see the Smart Growth Network (2001), Arigoni (2001), and Downs (200
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positive and statistically signif e significance of the variable for 
residential density becomes less reliable. 
low-incom
ulti-unit structures.  At the same 
time, this research cons
was associated with a greater s
explains why few local com
icant in almost every case.  Th
It is not difficult to see how an increase in residential density may not be associated with 
an increase in the supply of affordable units.  Song and Knaap (2004) found in Portland that 
residents sacrificed the size of their yards in response to higher land costs and growth 
management mandates, thereby increasing residential density.  However, residents did not 
change their preferences regarding the size of their single-family, detached homes.  Reducing lot 
sizes may increase density, but does not necessarily increase the supply of affordable housing for 
e households if new housing units themselves not only remain single-family 
dwellings, but grow in size.146,147 
As local municipalities and counties develop and update their comprehensive plans, there 
should not only be a discussion of residential density in general, but also of the type of housing 
as well.  A variety of housing types are associated with not only higher density, but also with a 
greater supply of affordable housing.  Multi-unit structures and attached homes, such as 
townhomes, by the nature of their design increase density as they concentrate more housing units 
on any given area of land.  This is especially true for large m
istently found that a greater supply of housing in multi-unit structures 
upply of affordable rental units. 
An example of a growth management policy which gives specific attention to the type of 
housing, in addition to density in general, is found in Portland’s Metropolitan Housing Rule 
(MHR).  The housing rule was passed in 1981, two years after Portland implemented its urban 
growth boundary.  Not only does the MHR require municipalities to plan for specific density 
targets, but it requires them to “allow the opportunity” for half of all newly developed housing 
units to be in multi-unit structures (Portland Metro 2000, p. 30; 2004, p. 21).  But this type of 
policy is rare. 
Individual municipalities are likely to have an adversity to multi-unit housing, which 
prehensive plans specifically state the type of housing which should 
                                                 
146 Song and Knaap (2004) provide evidence that this is the case in Washington County of the Portland Region. 
147 The Portland Metro’s Housing Advisory Technical Committee (H-TAC) concluded that developers have 
historically built housing below allowable densities because of demand in the housing market for lower density.  
The committee concluded that, in some places, zoning in the Portland region allows for higher density than the 
market will bear (Portland Metro 2000, pp. 30-31). 
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be encouraged to achieve higher density and few local policies requiring multi-unit structures 
exist.   Municipalities have a financial interest in allowing the development of new housing 
which a
structures within their jurisdictions.  A mandate from a higher 
level o
nit structures is Portland’s 
Metrop
ousing are necessary within the smart growth movement.  If proponents of smart 
growth
greater supply of affordable units was a variety of housing options as measured by the proportion 
ulti-unit structures.  In addition, the results of this research can only be used to 
e that 
ttracts higher income households.  Higher income households provide a greater tax base 
and are more likely to ‘pay their own way’ in terms of public services they consume (Hamilton 
1975).  New, high quality single-family dwellings are more likely to attract the type of household 
which benefit the municipality, financially, than multi-family units (Orfield 2002).  Many 
municipalities, for these reasons, implement restrictions which prevent affordable, multi-unit 
housing (Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing 1991). 
For this reason, state or regional authority must be used to encourage municipalities to 
increase production of multi-unit 
f government, which is uniformly enforced across local jurisdictions, would improve the 
probability of an increase in multi-unit structures for two reasons.  First, jurisdictions could be 
required to implement zoning which permits more multi-unit structures.  Second, a jurisdiction 
may be more likely to approve multi-unit structures if it knows other jurisdictions are also 
approving the development of multi-unit structures.  Without this knowledge, a jurisdiction may 
be fearful that it will experience an increase in multi-unit structures while another jurisdiction is 
approving only single-family homes for higher income households.    
One such example of the state encouraging multi-u
olitan Housing Rule.  It was the result of legislation by the state of Oregon requiring the 
Portland Metro to establish such a rule.  However, local jurisdictions fiercely protect their control 
over land use decisions within their borders.  In most areas of the country, there is little political 
support allowing the state or regional authorities to impose specific land use laws on 
municipalities (Downs 2004). 
A second policy implication is that state, regional and local policies specific to the supply 
of affordable h
 are to be proponents of affordable housing, they cannot rely solely on smart growth 
principles tested in this research.  The only smart growth principle reliably associated with a 
of housing in m
determine association and not causation.  The results do not provide conclusive evidenc
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multi-unit structures cause an increase in affordable housing.  This limitation will be further 
discussed in Section 8.3. 
To truly provide a variety of housing options for low-income households, smart growth 
advocates must support policies which are specific to increasing the supply of affordable units.  
Such policies include148: 
• Density bonuses which allow developers to build housing densities greater than 
typically allowed if they set aside of portion of their units for low-income 
households; 
• Inclusionary zoning, as opposed to exclusionary zoning, which requires new 
housing developments to include a proportion of units affordable to low-income 
households; 
• Relaxation of building codes and excessive zoning which increases the cost of 
housing; 
• Support of Housing Trust Funds which create dediciated streams of funding for 
affordable housing units from government revenue or private philanthropy. 
 
Unfortunately, affordable housing for low-income households is rarely, if ever, at the 
forefro
t in that the home is a significant asset among most homeowners.  
This fe
nt of smart growth.149  As discussed in Section 2.3.1, smart growth advocates are slower 
to adopt affordable housing policies than they are to adopt mechanisms by which to preserve 
open space and combat sprawl.  There are a number of reasons for the slow adoption of 
affordable housing policies.  First, homeowners prefer to not have affordable housing adjacent o 
their own home.  Their fear is that low-income housing lowers the value of their home.  The 
impact of this fear is significan
ar might not prevent people from supporting policies for affordable housing, as long as 
the housing is not located in their own neighborhood.150   
The second reason for the slow adoption of affordable housing policies is the economic 
incentive for local municipalities to prohibit affordable housing in order to protect their tax base.  
                                                 
148 For details of programs like these, see Meck, Retzlaff, and Schwab (2003).  For inclusionary zoning, see Porter 
(2004) and Brown (2001). 
149 For this reason, these policies were not the focus of study in this research. 
150 This phenonmenon is commonly called NIMBY, “not in my backyard.” 
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Prohibiting affordable housing within a jurisdiction keeps out low-income households, who bring 
a net loss to municipalities’ budgets.  Low income households are likely to consume more local 
public e
e state.  An example is New Jersey’s Council on Affordable Housing 
(C
for low-incom
including those listed above.  Participation is voluntary among municipalties, but those choosing 
to subm
practices.
e or regional affordable housing policies.  
For exam
planning organization (Portland Metro) from requiring municipalities to meet specific affordable 
ho
strateg gy or 
affordable housing goal by a municipality is voluntary. 
portive of an increase in the diversity 
of hou
xpenditures than the local tax revenue they provide. 
To overcome local objections to affordable housing policies, they need to be required of 
local municipalities by th
OAH) which requires jurisdictions to adopt methods to achieve their “fair-share” of housing 
e households.  Municipalities are free to choose from a variety of methods, 
it an affordable housing plan to COAH are exempt from lawsuits concerning their zoning 
151   
However, there can be strong opposition to stat
ple, political pressure pushed Oregon’s state legislature to prohibit Portland’s regional 
using goals.  At best, Portland Metro could only make suggestions to municipalities regarding 
ies to increase the supply of affordable units.  Adoption of any specific strate
A third implication is that growth management advocates are not incorrect when they 
argue greater density, and changes in the type of housing, may help to alleviate the potentially 
adverse affects of urban containment policies on affordable housing.  This is particularly true for 
changes in the type of housing.  The hypotheses of this research were that urban containment 
policies would weaken the positive associations between affordable housing and density, as well 
as between affordable housing and multi-unit structures.  But other than weak evidence that 
urban containment may weaken the positive association between multi-unit structures and 
affordable units, there is no support for these hypotheses.  Therefore, advocates of urban 
containment policies to curb sprawl should be equally sup
sing types, and greater housing density, if they are not to exacerbate the shortage of 
affordable units for extremely low-income and very low-income households. 
                                                 
151 COAH is discussed further in Section 6.3.3.1. 
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8.3 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are limitations to this research that should be explored in future studies.  The first 
ake unlikely, the 
structures.  Once again, neighborhoods with a larger number of affordable rental units may also 
have fewer homeowners to organize against greater residential density or alternative land uses. 
 To control for the potentially endogenous relationship between affordable housing and 
the smart growth variables, a lagged model could be utilized in future research.  The four smart 
uctures, mixed land use, and public parks – could be 
limitation is that the current model tested for association, but not causation, between the four 
smart growth principles and the supply of affordable housing.  For example, a strong positive 
association was found between the proportion of housing in multi-unit structures and the 
proportion of affordable units.  But the model does not allow for the interpretation that multi-unit 
structures cause affordable units.  The present research was a “point in time” analysis at two 
different points in time, the years 1990 and 2000.  The independent variables were measured at 
the same point in time as the dependent variable.  Therefore, the analysis does not adequately 
capture causation.  It does not measure the independent variables at a point in time prior to the 
measure of the dependent variables nor did it measure changes in the independent variables 
leading up to the measure of the dependent variable.  In order to determine causation, changes in 
the independent variables must occur prior to changes in the dependent variable. 
 There is a possibility that a large number of affordable housing units in a neighborhood 
cause multi-unit structures.  Zoning restrictions prohibit, or at least m
development of multi-unit structures in neighborhoods or municipalities dominated by 
unaffordable single-family homes.  As discussed elsewhere, homeowners have an aversion to 
types of adjacent land uses they fear may lower their home’s value.  One such aversion is to 
multi-unit structures.  Therefore, there is the possibility that additional multi-unit structures are 
more likely to be developed in neighborhoods with fewer unaffordable owner-occupied homes 
and a greater supply of affordable rental units already.  
 The same reverse causation pattern may also exist between the other smart growth 
principles and the supply of affordable housing.  Neighborhoods with a large supply of 
affordable housing, and low-income households, may present fewer barriers to developers who 
want to develop new high-density housing or alternative land uses, such as commercial 
growth variables – density, multi-unit str
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measured at a point in time prior to the measure of the dependent variable – affordable housing.  
For example, the smart growth variables could be measured as of 1980.  The dependent variable 
 
 
ing public services for which the 
would be the supply of affordable housing in 1990.  This is the first step in setting up an 
appropriate lagged model in which the dependent variable lags behind the independent variables. 
 Additional independent variables could be included to make the model dynamic over 
time rather than static at one point in time.  The additional variables should measure the change 
in each smart growth principle during the decade prior to the measure of the dependent variable. 
To continue the example given in the previous paragraph, the additional independent variables 
would be the change in each smart growth variable from 1980 to 1990, as well as the supply of 
affordable housing in 1980.  Therefore, the supply of affordable housing in 1990 would be a 
function of the supply in 1980 and changes in the smart growth variables from 1980 to 1990.152 
A second limitation of this research is that additional affordable housing is likely to be 
located in neighborhoods that already have affordable housing, regardless of residential density, 
mixed land use, or parks, because of public policies regarding subsidized housing.  Therefore, 
my analysis may find little significance regarding the impact of the smart growth variables. 
HOPE VI, HOME, and other subsidized housing programs typically provide new affordable 
housing where affordable housing already exists.  This occurs for two reasons.  First, political 
battles over the placement of subsidized housing often prevent these units from being developed 
in neighborhoods with unaffordable, single-family homes occupied by homeowners.  The reason 
for this aversion to subsidized units on the part of homeowners has been previously discussed.  
Homeowners do not want land uses or housing types in their neighborhood that may lower 
values.  They also do not want low-income households consum
higher income homeowners pay.  Therefore, affordable housing may attract other subsidized, 
affordable housing investments as those investments are more likely to be rejected in higher-
income neighborhoods with a more costly housing stock. 
                                                 
152 The lagged model is appropriate for the analyses of Portland/Seattle and Baltimore/Philadelphia in both 1990 an
2000.  The lagged model would still allow me to test the impact of urban containment on the relationships between 
d 
ch smea art growth principle and affordable housing.  However, extending the analyses of Portland/Seattle beyond 
2000 to 2010 would not be useful as both regions woulds still have urban growth boundaries as they did in 2000.  A 
lagged model to 2010 would be beneficial for Baltimore and Philadelphia as more time would have passed between 
the time of Baltimore’s establishment of priority funding areas and the analysis. 
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The second reason new affordable housing units are likely located in neighborhoods 
which already have affordable units is a result of the goals among agencies developing 
affordable housing.  Section 2.1.2.2 explained the growing importance of the non-profit sector in 
the provision of affordable housing for low-income households.  Community Development 
Corporations (CDCs) are playing a growing role in the development of affordable housing as the 
Federal government takes less direct responsibility.  Through state and regional housing agencies 
and intermediary organizations, CDCs have access to public money, such as Community 
Development Block Grants (CDBG), HOME, and LIHTC funds.  At the same time, CDCs have 
kept their initial mission of addressing problems created by urban decline, specifically in low-
income neighborhoods.  CDCs attempt to revitalize their neighborhoods through housing and 
other investments.  Therefore, CDC investments in affordable housing are made in low-income 
neighb
 undeveloped land and the supply of 
affordable housing for low-income households. 
A fourth limitation is this research did not address the location of affordable housing 
 
orhoods which likely have a stock of affordable units.153  
A third limitation of this research is it assumed the urban containment policies were 
effective and functioned in the expected manner.  There is evidence in the literature for this 
assumption.  While no policy is perfect, Maryland’s public infrastructure spending was 
successfully re-directed to priority funding areas (Daniels 2001; Maurer, Forsyth, and Whipple 
2001); Portland’s urban growth boundaries increased development density and directed a sizable 
proportion of new housing to older urban neighborhoods and other locations within urban growth 
boundaries (Nelson and Moore 1996; Song and Knaap 2004); and Seattle’s urban growth areas 
decreased development in farming areas in favor of development within urban growth 
boundaries (Fulton et al. 2006). 
A potential avenue of research is to measure the extent to which regional urban 
containment policies actually change land use patterns, particularly with regard to the 
consumption of undeveloped land on the urban fringe.  A study could then explore the 
relationship between the change in the consumption of
relative to the location of jobs for low-income households.  Many metropolitan regions have a 
spatial mismatch between jobs and housing as low wage jobs are often not easily accessible from
                                                 
153 There is the possibility that some of the affordable housing stock that already exists in these low-income 
ommunities in which CDCs work is of inadequate quality. c
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neighborhoods which have a supply of low-income housing (Kasarda 1990; Coulton, Leete, and 
Bania 1999).154  One argument receiving growing attention within the realm of smart growth is 
the extent to which neighborhoods with greater density, mixed land uses, and access to public 
transportation reduce commuting costs for households.  The Center for Transit Oriented 
Development (2007,  p. 7) reports that families living in neighborhoods with a greater diversity 
of land uses, greater residential density, and transit services spend 9% of their income on 
transportation as compared to 19% spent by the average family.  Presumably, these lower 
transportation costs are the result of access to employment and daily necessities without the 
required expenditures of a car.155   Therefore, households may achieve financial gains if they live 
in a compact, mixed use neighborhood with public transportation.  On the other hand, Haas et al. 
(2007, p. 54) report that expenditures on housing are higher in these types of neighborhoods for 
some metropolitan regions. 
There has been no research regarding the combination of transportation affordability and 
the supply affordable housing, as they pertain specifically to extremely and very low-income 
households, in neighborhoods of greater density and mixed land use.  If compact, mixed use 
neighborhoods do reduce commuting costs, then low-income households living in those 
neighborhoods may be better off even if these neighborhoods do not have a greater number of 
affordable units.  Low-income households would be able to spend more of their income on 
housing as they spend less on transportation.  A future avenue of research is to explore the 
impact of compact and mixed use neighborhoods on commuting patterns and transportation costs 
for low-income households. 
A fifth potential limitation is the level at which data was aggregated for the analysis.  
This limitation is especially pertinent to public parks.  The literature review indicated the impact 
of public parks on housing values declines as the distance between the two increases.  Using the 
                                                 
154 This l
among A
regarding the spatial mis-match hypothesis as it pertains to race.  For two reviews, see Holzer (1991) and Ihlanfeldt 
and Sjoquist (1998). 
 the 
kings.edu/metro/umi/ctod_page.htm. 
ine of reasoning stems from Kain’s (1968) spatial mis-match hypothesis in which he argued unemployment 
frican-Americans was exacerbated by their segregation in neighborhoods of inner cities as jobs were 
decentralizing to the suburbs.  He found that a greater distance between a workplace and the nearest residential 
concentration of African-Americans was statistically significant in explaining a lower proportion of workers within 
the workplace who were African-American.  He attributed some of his findings to transportation barriers, housing 
segregation, and discrimination in the labor market.  Since his article, numerous studies have been published 
155 Also see the Housing & Transportation Affordability Index being developed by the Brookings Instritution and
Center for Transit Oriented Development at http://www.broo
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census tract as the level of analysis may not adequately capture the impact of public parks on the 
supply of affordable units.  Parks may have an impact within a few blocks, but maybe not within 
an entire tract.  This would be especially true for census tracts which cover a large area of land.  
Therefore, the variable for public parks may not be providing the best estimates for the 
relationship between them and affordable units.  Additionally, the model did not capture distance 
from the park.  It captured the amount park space relative to the census tract’s size. 
Despite these limitations, this research provides a better understanding of the 
complexities regarding the impact of four specific smart growth principles on the supply of 
affordable housing for low-income households.  While a number of rhetorical claims have been 
made about the benefits of smart growth on the housing opportunities for low-income 
households, few of these claims were empirically tested prior to this research. 
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Appendix A 
MARYLAND’S ECONOMIC GROWTH, RESOURCE PROTECTION, AND 
PLANNING ACT OF 1992 
Maryland’s 1992 Economic Growth, Resource Protection, and Planning Act required local 
governments and counties throughout Maryland to devise comprehensive plans addressing seven 
“visions” for the state’s future with regard to population growth and protection of the state’s 
natural resources.  The Act required that localities incorporate the following visions into their 
plans (Maryland Department of Planning 2005; Frece 2005, pp. 106-107): 
? Development is concentrated in suitable areas 
 
? Sensitive Areas are protected – “sensitive areas” must include habitats for 
endangered species, floodplains, steep slopes, and streams and stream buffers 
 
? In rural areas, growth is directed to existing population centers and resource areas 
are protected 
 
? Stewardship of the Chesapeake Bay and the land is a universal ethic 
 
? Conservation of resources, including a reduction in resource consumption is 
practiced 
 
? Economic growth is encouraged and regulatory mechanisms are streamlined in a 
manner to achieve the other visions 
 
? Funding mechanisms are addressed to achieve these visions 
 
The 1992 Act designated little responsibility to the state in growth management policies 
(Cohen 2002, p. 300).  Local governments were free to identify their own “sensitive areas” and 
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use their own discretion in establishing standards for site location of new development.  In 
addition, there was no mandate for a state-level comprehensive plan.  The state had two roles.  
First, the state would comment on local comprehensive plans with recommendations on the 
identification of sensitive areas and site develo ent.  Local jurisdictions, however, were not 
required to include the state’s recommendations in their final plans.  The second role of the state 
was to ensure that public expenditures were consistent with local plans.  State funds could be 
used to facilitate new development only if the proposed development was consistent with the 
compr d not 
approve public works or transporta  were consistent with local 
plans  (Maryland Department of Planning 2005).   
Maryland’s 1992 Planning Act was criticized for not strengthening the state’s control or 
influence over local land use decisions.  Because of continued local control over land use 
e growth which were 
outlin  for the Smart Growth Act which 
was passed five years later to im
107). 
pm
ehensive plan of the development’s local government.  Additionally, the state coul
tion projects unless the projects
decisions, the planning act was seen as ineffective in adequately directing growth and 
revitalizing older neighborhoods (Cohen 2002, p. 301).  Supporters, however, saw the 
preservation of local autonomy as a strong point of the 1992 Act as legislation giving stronger 
authority to the state had been rejected in the past (Porter 1999, p. 2).  One of the most 
significant outcomes of the 1992 Act was the seven “visions” for futur
ed by the state.  These visions served as the foundation
prove Maryland’s growth management efforts (Frece 2005, p. 
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Appendix B 
ADEQUACY FACTORS FOR PHYSICAL CONDITION OF HOUSING UNITS 
Tables B-1 and B-2 provide adequacy factors indicating the percentage of rental units that were 
in acceptable physical condition as reported by the M-AHS.  The total supply of rental units in 
each price range, reported by the U.S. Census, was multiplied by these factors in order to 
estimate the number of units that were not only affordable, but also physically adequate.  For 
each region, separate factors were estimated for the central city and the rest of the region. 
 
Table B-1. 1990 Adequacy Factors 
Rent 
Range 
Portland, 
Central 
Portland,  
Rest of 
Seattle, 
Central 
Seattle,  
Rest of 
Baltimore, 
Central 
Baltimore, 
Rest of 
Phila., 
Central 
Phila.,
Rest o
City Region City Region City Region City 
  
f 
Region 
Less than 
$300 
80.4% 88.5% 89.5% 98.2% 82.1% 94.7% 72.4% 87.9% 
$300 to 
$449 
93.8% 95.8% 93.0% 95.9% 81.9% 93.9% 84.4% 91.5% 
$450 to 
$599 
96.3% 96.8% 93.5% 95.2% 84.1% 93.6% 88.1% 93.3% 
Source:  Metropolitan American Housing Surveys, 1989 (Philadelphia), 1990 (Portland), 1991 (Seattle & 
Baltimore). 
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Table B-2. 2000 Adequacy Factors 
Rent 
Range 
Portland, 
Central 
City 
Portland, 
Rest of 
Region 
Seattle, 
Central 
City 
Seattle, 
Rest of 
Region 
Baltimore, 
Central 
City 
Baltimore, 
Rest of 
Region 
Phila.,  
Central 
City 
Phila, 
Rest of 
Region 
Less than 
$400 
87.0% 96.7% 85.4% 88.9% 84.6% 92.3% 82.0% 94.2% 
$400 to 
$599 
90.1% 93.3% 88.7% 89.3% 88.0% 90.1% 90.8% 93.7% 
$600 to 
$799 
92.7% 93.4% 90.0% 87.4% 86.9% 91.6% 83.4% 88.1% 
Source:  Metropolitan American Housing Surveys, 1998 (Baltimore), 1999 (Philadelphia), 2002 (Portland), 2004 
(Seatt
 
le) 
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Appendix C 
MAPS OF MIXED LAND USE 
The following maps, beginning on the next page, provide a graphic presentation of the two 
measures of mixed land use.  The diversity index ranges from a score of 0 to 1, with 0 indicating 
a neighborhood with only one land use.  A score of 1 indicates a neighborhood with an equal mix 
of land uses.  The second measure is the balance between population-serving employment and 
the number of residents in each neighborhood.  A score of 0 indicates a neighborhood that is 
completely residential with no ‘population-serving’ activities or, alternatively, has no residents. 
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Figure C-1. Diversity Index by Census Tract, Portland, 2000 
  
Figure C-2. Balance of ‘Population-Serving’ Jobs to Residents by Census Tract, Portland, 2000 
 
 
 329 
Figure C-3. Diversity Index by Census Tract, Seattle, 2000  
 
Figure C-4. Balance of ‘Population-Serving’ Jobs to Residents by Census Tract, Seattle, 2000 
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Figure C-5. Diversity Index by Census Tract, Baltimore, 2000 
 
Figure C-6. Balance of ‘Population-Serving’ Jobs to Residents by Census Tract, Baltimore, 2000 
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Figure C-7. Diversity Index by Census Tract, Philadelphia, 2000 
 
C-7. Balance of ‘Population-Serving’ Jobs to Residents by Census Tract, Philadelphia, 2000 
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Appendix D 
CORRELATION MATRICES BY REGION AND YEAR 
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Table D-1. Correlations for Portland in 2000 (n=325) 
 
  
Density 
(100 
d.u./squ. 
mile) 
mixed land 
use index 
with all 
industries 
included 
balance of 
service 
jobs and 
residents 
% of 
land in 
parks 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 2 - 4 
units 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 5 or 
more units 
vacancy 
rate all 
units 
% units 
built 
before 
1970 
% units 
with four 
or more 
bedrooms 
% units 
subsidized by 
federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies 
% 
population 
that is 
minority 
% 
population 
that is black
Density  
(100 d.u./square mile) 
 
  
1 .067 .262** -.026 .298** .525** -.025 .426** -.384** .368** .252** .176**
mixed land index with 
all industries included 
 
  
.067 1 .838** .117* .245** .550** .307** .093 -.358** .231** .015 .019
balance of service 
jobs and residents 
 
  
.262** .838** 1 .151** .283** .584** .209** .132* -.363** .280** -.015 -.036
% of land in parks   -.026 .117* .151** 1 .139* .001 .091 .074 -.161** .093 .082 .010
% of housing in 
structures of 2 - 4 
units  
 
  
.298** .245** .283** .139* 1 .290** .028 .300** -.496** .367** .290** .204**
% of housing in 
structures of 5 or 
more units  
  
.525** .550** .584** .001 .290** 1 .257** .004 -.525** .386** .185** .049
vacancy rate all units   -.025 .307** .209** .091 .028 .257** 1 -.071 -.313** .044 .136* .117*
% before 1970 
 
  .426** .093 .132* .074 .300** .004 -.071 1 -.235** .245** .258** .335**
% units with four or 
more bedrooms 
 
  
-.384** -.358** -.363** -.161** -.496** -.525** -.313** -.235** 1 -.399** -.336** -.139*
% of units subsidized 
by federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies  
 
  
.368** .231** .280** .093 .367** .386** .044 .245** -.399** 1 .453** .413**
% population that is 
minority 
 
  
.252** .015 -.015 .082 .290** .185** .136* .258** -.336** .453** 1 .814**
% population that is 
black 
 
  
.176** .019 -.036 .010 .204** .049 .117* .335** -.139* .413** .814** 1
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed.  *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed. 
 
Table D-2. Correlations for Seattle in 2000 (n=399)  
 
  
Density 
(100 
d.u./squ. 
mile) 
mixed land 
use index 
with all 
industries 
included 
balance of 
service 
jobs and 
residents 
% of 
land in 
parks 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 2 - 4 
units 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 5 or 
more units 
vacancy 
rate all 
units 
% units 
built 
before 
1970 
% units 
with four 
or more 
bedrooms 
% units 
subsidized by 
federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies 
% 
population 
that is 
minority 
% 
population 
that is black
Density  
(100 d.u./square mile) 
 
  
1 .167** .218** -.073 .166** .607** .053 .348** -.389** .332** .139** .195**
mixed land index with 
all industries included 
 
  
.167** 1 .856** .169** .241** .551** .407** .059 -.475** .246** .090 .061
balance of service 
jobs and residents 
 
  
.218** .856** 1 .126* .258** .530** .248** .099* -.434** .262** .131** .105*
% of land in parks   -.073 .169** .126* 1 .031 .130** -.008 .125* -.118* -.015 .131** .060
% of housing in 
structures of 2 - 4 
units  
 
  
.166** .241** .258** .031 1 .260** .051 .207** -.459** .283** .159** .198**
% of housing in 
structures of 5 or 
more units  
  
.607** .551** .530** .130** .260** 1 .309** .066 -.636** .397** .289** .220**
vacancy rate all units   .053 .407** .248** -.008 .051 .309** 1 -.073 -.349** .159** .028 .055
% before 1970 
 
  .348** .059 .099* .125* .207** .066 -.073 1 -.215** .141** .199** .246**
% units with four or 
more bedrooms 
 
  
-.389** -.475** -.434** -.118* -.459** -.636** -.349** -.215** 1 -.371** -.257** -.252**
% of units subsidized 
by federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies  
 
  
.332** .246** .262** -.015 .283** .397** .159** .141** -.371** 1 .494** .482**
% population that is 
minority 
 
  
.139** .090 .131** .131** .159** .289** .028 .199** -.257** .494** 1 .812**
% population that is 
black 
 
  
.195** .061 .105* .060 .198** .220** .055 .246** -.252** .482** .812** 1
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed.  *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed. 
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Table D-3. Correlations for Baltimore in 2000 (n=548) 
 
  
Density 
(100 
d.u./squ. 
mile) 
mixed land 
use index 
with all 
industries 
included 
balance of 
service 
jobs and 
residents 
% of 
land in 
parks 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 2 - 4 
units 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 5 or 
more units 
vacancy 
rate all 
units 
% units 
built 
before 
1970 
% units 
with four 
or more 
bedrooms 
% units 
subsidized by 
federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies 
% 
population 
that is 
minority 
% 
population 
that is black
Density  
(100 d.u./square mile) 
 
  
1 -.273** -.155** .047 .537** .119** .645** .513** -.448** .273** .512** .500**
mixed land index with 
all industries included 
 
  
-.273** 1 .801** .040 -.056 .202** -.071 -.131** -.004 .033 -.274** -.290**
balance of service 
jobs and residents 
 
  
-.155** .801** 1 .065 -.040 .266** -.080 -.088* -.041 .080 -.155** -.177**
% of land in parks   .047 .040 .065 1 .017 .033 .069 .349** -.295** .019 .154** .150**
% of housing in 
structures of 2 - 4 
units  
 
  
.537** -.056 -.040 .017 1 .042 .541** .459** -.291** .288** .405** .400**
% of housing in 
structures of 5 or 
more units  
  
.119** .202** .266** .033 .042 1 .027 -.194** -.372** .297** .147** .105*
vacancy rate all units   .645** -.071 -.080 .069 .541** .027 1 .421** -.322** .315** .551** .554**
% before 1970 
 
  .513** -.131** -.088* .349** .459** -.194** .421** 1 -.498** .055 .341** .360**
% units with four or 
more bedrooms 
 
  
-.448** -.004 -.041 -.295** -.291** -.372** -.322** -.498** 1 -.258** -.359** -.350**
% of units subsidized 
by federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies  
 
  
.273** .033 .080 .019 .288** .297** .315** .055 -.258** 1 .362** .360**
% population that is 
minority 
 
  
.512** -.274** -.155** .154** .405** .147** .551** .341** -.359** .362** 1 .993**
% population that is 
black 
 
  
.500** -.290** -.177** .150** .400** .105* .554** .360** -.350** .360** .993** 1
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed.  *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed. 
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Table D-4.  Correlations for Philadelphia in 2000 (n=1208) 
 
  
Density 
(100 
d.u./squ. 
mile) 
mixed land 
use index 
with all 
industries 
included 
balance of 
service 
jobs and 
residents 
% of 
land in 
parks 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 2 - 4 
units 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 5 or 
more units 
vacancy 
rate all 
units 
% units 
built 
before 
1970 
% units 
with four 
or more 
bedrooms 
% units 
subsidized by 
federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies 
% 
population 
that is 
minority 
% 
population 
that is black
Density  
(100 d.u./square mile) 
 
  
1 -.282** -.158** -.076** .436** .161** .444** .464** -.410** .195** .509** .473**
mixed land index with 
all industries included 
 
  
-.282** 1 .793** .038 -.018 .295** -.114** -.166** .032 -.008 -.287** -.308**
balance of service 
jobs and residents 
 
  
-.158** .793** 1 .081** .014 .310** -.086** -.102** .039 .007 -.191** -.205**
% of land in parks   -.076** .038 .081** 1 -.035 .011 -.075** .136** -.028 -.017 .006 .017
% of housing in 
structures of 2 - 4 
units  
 
  
.436** -.018 .014 -.035 1 .157** .393** .408** -.422** .247** .361** .329**
% of housing in 
structures of 5 or 
more units  
  
.161** .295** .310** .011 .157** 1 .076** -.067* -.292** .195** .051 .013
vacancy rate all units   .444** -.114** -.086** -.075** .393** .076** 1 .330** -.335** .328** .678** .638**
% before 1970 
 
  .464** -.166** -.102** .136** .408** -.067* .330** 1 -.385** .146** .390** .363**
% units with four or 
more bedrooms 
 
  
-.410** .032 .039 -.028 -.422** -.292** -.335** -.385** 1 -.224** -.323** -.267**
% of units subsidized 
by federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies  
 
  
.195** -.008 .007 -.017 .247** .195** .328** .146** -.224** 1 .413** .412**
% population that is 
minority 
 
  
.509** -.287** -.191** .006 .361** .051 .678** .390** -.323** .413** 1 .959**
% population that is 
black 
 
  
.473** -.308** -.205** .017 .329** .013 .638** .363** -.267** .412** .959** 1
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed.  *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed. 
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Table D-5.  Correlations for Portland in 1990 n=325 
  
  
Density 
(100 
d.u./squ. 
mile) 
mixed land 
use index 
with all 
industries 
included 
balance of 
service 
jobs and 
residents 
% of 
land in 
parks 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 2 - 4 
units 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 5 or 
more units 
vacancy 
rate all 
units 
% units 
built 
before 
1970 
% units 
with four 
or more 
bedrooms 
% units 
subsidized by 
federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies 
% 
population 
that is 
minority 
% 
population 
that is black
Density  
(100 d.u./square mile) 
 
  
1 .285** .336** -.025 .271** .539** .114* .434** -.338** .350** .284** .199**
mixed land index with 
all industries included 
 
  
.285** 1 .880** .189** .337** .631** .197** .318** -.411** .320** .171** .109*
balance of service 
jobs and residents 
 
  
.336** .880** 1 .142* .276** .609** .133* .245** -.395** .260** .056 .004
% of land in parks   -.025 .189** .142* 1 .078 .002 -.010 .096 -.134* .109* -.016 -.052
% of housing in 
structures of 2 - 4 
units  
 
  
.271** .337** .276** .078 1 .289** .068 .250** -.369** .352** .292** .190**
% of housing in 
structures of 5 or 
more units  
  
.539** .631** .609** .002 .289** 1 .251** .074 -.510** .398** .120* .043
vacancy rate all units   .114* .197** .133* -.010 .068 .251** 1 .060 -.263** .250** .471** .491**
% before 1970 
 
  .434** .318** .245** .096 .250** .074 .060 1 -.101 .211** .387** .345**
% units with four or 
more bedrooms 
 
  
-.338** -.411** -.395** -.134* -.369** -.510** -.263** -.101 1 -.405** -.099 -.003
% of units subsidized 
by federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies  
 
  
.350** .320** .260** .109* .352** .398** .250** .211** -.405** 1 .447** .396**
% population that is 
minority 
 
  
.284** .171** .056 -.016 .292** .120* .471** .387** -.099 .447** 1 .953**
% population that is 
black 
 
  
.199** .109* .004 -.052 .190** .043 .491** .345** -.003 .396** .953** 1
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed.  *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed. 
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Table D-6.  Correlations for Seattle in 1990 n=399 
 
  
Density 
(100 
d.u./squ. 
mile) 
mixed land 
use index 
with all 
industries 
included 
balance of 
service 
jobs and 
residents 
% of 
land in 
parks 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 2 - 4 
units 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 5 or 
more units 
vacancy 
rate all 
units 
% units 
built 
before 
1970 
% units 
with four 
or more 
bedrooms 
% units 
subsidized by 
federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies 
% 
population 
that is 
minority 
% 
population 
that is black
Density  
(100 d.u./square mile) 
 
  
1 .281** .338** -.065 .194** .583** .022 .388** -.334** .287** .205** .208**
mixed land index with 
all industries included 
 
  
.281** 1 .887** .222** .313** .646** .073 .226** -.400** .349** .207** .139**
balance of service 
jobs and residents 
 
  
.338** .887** 1 .140** .288** .620** .064 .216** -.373** .353** .180** .117*
% of land in parks   -.065 .222** .140** 1 .040 .135** .006 .102* -.113* .000 .084 .057
% of housing in 
structures of 2 - 4 
units  
 
  
.194** .313** .288** .040 1 .259** .024 .248** -.437** .296** .262** .244**
% of housing in 
structures of 5 or 
more units  
  
.583** .646** .620** .135** .259** 1 .126* .082 -.569** .442** .223** .175**
vacancy rate all units   .022 .073 .064 .006 .024 .126* 1 -.048 -.309** .122* .065 .121*
% before 1970 
 
  .388** .226** .216** .102* .248** .082 -.048 1 -.183** .133** .301** .273**
% units with four or 
more bedrooms 
 
  
-.334** -.400** -.373** -.113* -.437** -.569** -.309** -.183** 1 -.369** -.199** -.193**
% of units subsidized 
by federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies  
 
  
.287** .349** .353** .000 .296** .442** .122* .133** -.369** 1 .514** .442**
% population that is 
minority 
 
  
.205** .207** .180** .084 .262** .223** .065 .301** -.199** .514** 1 .879**
% population that is 
black 
 
  
.208** .139** .117* .057 .244** .175** .121* .273** -.193** .442** .879** 1
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed.  *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed. 
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Table D-7. Correlations for Baltimore in 1990 (n=549) 
 
  
Density 
(100 
d.u./squ. 
mile) 
mixed land 
use index 
with all 
industries 
included 
balance of 
service 
jobs and 
residents 
% of 
land in 
parks 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 2 - 4 
units 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 5 or 
more units 
vacancy 
rate all 
units 
% units 
built 
before 
1970 
% units 
with four 
or more 
bedrooms 
% units 
subsidized by 
federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies 
% 
population 
that is 
minority 
% 
population 
that is black
Density  
(100 d.u./square mile) 
 
  
1 -.177** -.102* .045 .454** .106* .415** .449** -.392** .277** .504** .499**
mixed land index with 
all industries included 
 
  
-.177** 1 .874** .097* -.044 .168** .156** -.021 -.040 .025 -.195** -.203**
balance of service 
jobs and residents 
 
  
-.102* .874** 1 .097* -.023 .235** .151** -.003 -.070 .082 -.124** -.135**
% of land in parks   .045 .097* .097* 1 .033 .028 -.039 .347** -.290** .001 .107* .110**
% of housing in 
structures of 2 - 4 
units  
 
  
.454** -.044 -.023 .033 1 -.002 .381** .390** -.232** .216** .369** .368**
% of housing in 
structures of 5 or 
more units  
  
.106* .168** .235** .028 -.002 1 .282** -.193** -.351** .316** .121** .103*
vacancy rate all units   .415** .156** .151** -.039 .381** .282** 1 .084* -.210** .225** .342** .334**
% before 1970 
 
  .449** -.021 -.003 .347** .390** -.193** .084* 1 -.406** -.023 .250** .263**
% units with four or 
more bedrooms 
 
  
-.392** -.040 -.070 -.290** -.232** -.351** -.210** -.406** 1 -.218** -.246** -.251**
% of units subsidized 
by federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies  
 
  
.277** .025 .082 .001 .216** .316** .225** -.023 -.218** 1 .380** .378**
% population that is 
minority 
 
  
.504** -.195** -.124** .107* .369** .121** .342** .250** -.246** .380** 1 .998**
% population that is 
black 
 
  
.499** -.203** -.135** .110** .368** .103* .334** .263** -.251** .378** .998** 1
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed.  *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed. 
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Table D-8. Correlations for Philadelphia in 1990 (n=1208) 
 
  
Density 
(100 
d.u./squ. 
mile) 
mixed land 
use index 
with all 
industries 
included 
balance of 
service 
jobs and 
residents 
% of 
land in 
parks 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 2 - 4 
units 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 5 or 
more units 
vacancy 
rate all 
units 
% units 
built 
before 
1970 
% units 
with four 
or more 
bedrooms 
% units 
subsidized by 
federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies 
% 
population 
that is 
minority 
% 
population 
that is black 
Density  
(100 d.u./square mile) 
 
  
1 -.081** -.056 -.076** .426** .155** .465** .414** -.369** .198** .478** .456** 
mixed land index with 
all industries included 
 
  
-.081** 1 .868** .050 .106** .251** .051 .114** -.041 .089** -.138** -.154** 
balance of service 
jobs and residents 
 
  
-.056 .868** 1 .077** .076** .251** .040 .090** .010 .066* -.106** -.111** 
% of land in parks   -.076** .050 .077** 1 -.036 .012 -.079** .126** .014 -.018 -.027 -.016 
% of housing in 
structures of 2 - 4 
units  
 
  
.426** .106** .076** -.036 1 .075** .385** .333** -.365** .216** .339** .316** 
% of housing in 
structures of 5 or 
more units  
  
.155** .251** .251** .012 .075** 1 .277** -.085** -.272** .183** .020 .007 
vacancy rate all units   .465** .051 .040 -.079** .385** .277** 1 .151** -.240** .297** .587** .568** 
% before 1970 
 
  .414** .114** .090** .126** .333** -.085** .151** 1 -.272** .099** .297** .285** 
% units with four or 
more bedrooms 
 
  
-.369** -.041 .010 .014 -.365** -.272** -.240** -.272** 1 -.205** -.224** -.200** 
% of units subsidized 
by federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies  
 
  
.198** .089** .066* -.018 .216** .183** .297** .099** -.205** 1 .397** .389** 
% population that is 
minority 
 
  
.478** -.138** -.106** -.027 .339** .020 .587** .297** -.224** .397** 1 .968** 
% population that is 
black 
 
  
.456** -.154** -.111** -.016 .316** .007 .568** .285** -.200** .389** .968** 1 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed.  *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed. 
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Table D-9.  Correlations for City of Portland in 1990 (n=124) 
 
  
Density 
(100 
d.u./squ. 
mile) 
mixed land 
use index 
with all 
industries 
included 
balance of 
service 
jobs and 
residents 
% of land 
in parks 
% of 
housing 
in 
structure
s of 2 - 4 
units 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 5 or 
more units 
vacancy 
rate all 
units 
% units 
built 
before 
1970 
% units 
with four 
or more 
bedrooms 
% units 
subsidized by 
federal funds 
- public 
housing 
agencies 
% 
population 
that is 
minority 
% 
population 
that is 
black 
Density  
(100 d.u./square mile) 
 
  
1 .106 .290 ** -.227 * .093 .576 ** .095 .105 -.349 ** .329 ** .037 .010 
mixed land index with 
all industries included 
 
  
.106 1 .817 ** .067 .266 ** .636 ** .274 ** -.002 -.359 ** .220 * .000 -.024 
balance of service 
jobs and residents 
 
  
.290 **  .817 **  1 -.007 .172 .593 ** .108 -.041 -.360 ** .208 * -.154 -.159 
% of land in parks   -.227 *  .067 -.007 1 -.146 -.227 * -.125 -.022 -.021 -.023 -.105 -.139 
% of housing in 
structures of 2 - 4 
units  
 
  
.093 .266 **  .172 -.146 1 .178 * .167 .114 -.186 * .231 ** .276 ** .193 * 
% of housing in 
structures of 5 or 
more units  
  
.576 **  .636 **  .593 ** -.227 * .178 * 1 .268 ** -.203 *  -.514 ** .402 ** -.022 -.045 
vacancy rate all units   .095 .274 **  .108 -.125 .167 .268 ** 1 .124 -.241 ** .479 ** .787 ** .786 ** 
% before 1970 
 
  .105 -.002 -.041 -.022 .114 -.203 * .124 1 .091 -.006 .293 ** .273 ** 
% units with four or 
more bedrooms 
 
  
-.349 **  -.359 **  -.360 ** -.021 -.186 * -.514 ** -.241 ** .091 1 -.333 ** .014 .081 
% of units subsidized 
by federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies  
 
  
.329 **  .220 *  .208 * -.023 .231 ** .402 ** .479 ** -.006 -.333 ** 1 .502 ** .465 ** 
% population that is 
minority 
 
  
.037 .000 -.154 -.105 .276 ** -.022 .787 ** .293 **  .014 .502 ** 1 .975 ** 
% population that is 
black 
 
  
.010 -.024 -.159 -.139 .193 * -.045 .786 ** .273 **  .081 .465 ** .975 ** 1 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed.  *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed. 
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Table D-10 Correlations for City of Seattle in 1990 (n=117) 
 
  
Density 
(100 
d.u./squ. 
mile) 
mixed land 
use index 
with all 
industries 
included 
balance of 
service 
jobs and 
residents 
% of land 
in parks 
% of 
housing 
in 
structure
s of 2 - 
4 units 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 5 or 
more units 
vacancy 
rate all 
units 
% units 
built 
before 
1970 
% units 
with four 
or more 
bedrooms 
% units 
subsidized by 
federal funds 
- public 
housing 
agencies 
% 
population 
that is 
minority 
% 
population 
that is 
black 
Density  
(100 d.u./square mile) 
 
  
1 .242 **  .392 ** -.217 * -.060 .639 ** .376 ** -.018 -.445 ** .197 * -.110 -.032 
mixed land index with 
all industries included 
 
  
.242 **  1 .815 ** .053 .068 .705 ** .451 ** -.354 **  -.647 ** .404 ** .072 .014 
balance of service 
jobs and residents 
 
  
.392 **  .815 **  1 -.054 .048 .696 ** .393 ** -.340 **  -.534 ** .419 ** .061 .009 
% of land in parks   -.217 *  .053 -.054 1 -.100 -.066 -.182 * .039 -.015 -.130 -.016 -.086 
% of housing in 
structures of 2 - 4 
units  
 
  
-.060 .068 .048 -.100 1 -.028 .101 -.080 -.208 * .097 .207 * .215 * 
% of housing in 
structures of 5 or 
more units  
  
.639 **  .705 **  .696 ** -.066 -.028 1 .565 ** -.447 **  -.741 ** .460 ** .029 .007 
vacancy rate all units   .376 **  .451 **  .393 ** -.182 * .101 .565 ** 1 -.185 *  -.500 ** .496 ** .396 ** .496 ** 
% before 1970 
 
  -.018 -.354 **  -.340 ** .039 -.080 -.447 ** -.185 * 1 .430 ** -.315 ** -.081 .039 
% units with four or 
more bedrooms 
 
  
-.445 **  -.647 **  -.534 ** -.015 -.208 * -.741 ** -.500 ** .430 **  1 -.425 ** -.141 -.104 
% of units subsidized 
by federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies  
 
  
.197 *  .404 **  .419 ** -.130 .097 .460 ** .496 ** -.315 **  -.425 ** 1 .572 ** .486 ** 
% population that is 
minority 
 
  
-.110 .072 .061 -.016 .207 * .029 .396 ** -.081 -.141 .572 ** 1 .870 ** 
% population that is 
black 
 
  
-.032 .014 .009 -.086 .215 * .007 .496 ** .039 -.104 .486 ** .870 ** 1 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed.  *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed. 
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D-11.  Correlations for City of Baltimore (n=187) 
 
  
Density 
(100 
d.u./squ. 
mile) 
mixed land 
use index 
with all 
industries 
included 
balance of 
service 
jobs and 
residents 
% of land 
in parks 
% of 
housing 
in 
structure
s of 2 - 
4 units 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 5 or 
more units 
vacancy 
rate all 
units 
% units 
built 
before 
1970 
% units 
with four 
or more 
bedrooms 
% units 
subsidized by 
federal funds 
- public 
housing 
agencies 
% 
population 
that is 
minority 
% 
population 
that is 
black 
Density  
(100 d.u./square mile) 
 
  
1 -.270 **  -.216 ** -.364 ** .230 ** -.030 .341 ** -.052 .046 .149 * .189 ** .177 *
mixed land index with 
all industries included 
 
  
-.270 **  1 .856 ** .099 -.131 .260 ** .227 ** -.115 -.258 ** .088 -.379 ** -.387 **
balance of service 
jobs and residents 
 
  
-.216 **  .856 **  1 .076 -.101 .293 ** .181 * -.227 **  -.153 * .192 ** -.297 ** -.304 **
% of land in parks   -.364 **  .099 .076 1 -.177 * -.146 * -.175 * .173 *  -.195 ** -.108 -.074 -.065
% of housing in 
structures of 2 - 4 
units  
 
  
.230 **  -.131 -.101 -.177 * 1 -.002 .303 ** -.045 .353 ** .179 * .153 * .146 *
% of housing in 
structures of 5 or 
more units  
  
-.030 .260 **  .293 ** -.146 * -.002 1 .190 ** -.510 **  -.112 .370 ** .014 .002
vacancy rate all units   .341 **  .227 **  .181 * -.175 * .303 ** .190 ** 1 -.187 *  .129 .189 ** .165 * .155 *
% before 1970 
 
  -.052 -.115 -.227 ** .173 * -.045 -.510 ** -.187 * 1 -.048 -.639 ** -.220 ** -.217 **
% units with four or 
more bedrooms 
 
  
.046 -.258 **  -.153 * -.195 ** .353 ** -.112 .129 -.048 1 -.035 .173 * .174 *
% of units subsidized 
by federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies  
 
  
.149 *  .088 .192 ** -.108 .179 * .370 ** .189 ** -.639 **  -.035 1 .317 ** .314 **
% population that is 
minority 
 
  
.189 **  -.379 **  -.297 ** -.074 .153 * .014 .165 * -.220 **  .173 * .317 ** 1 .999 **
% population that is 
black 
 
  
.177 *  -.387 **  -.304 ** -.065 .146 * .002 .155 * -.217 **  .174 * .314 ** .999 ** 1
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed.  *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed. 
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D-12.   Correlations for City of Philadelphia (n=342) 
 
  
Density 
(100 
d.u./squ. 
mile) 
mixed land 
use index 
with all 
industries 
included 
balance of 
service 
jobs and 
residents 
% of land 
in parks 
% of 
housing 
in 
structure
s of 2 - 
4 units 
% of 
housing in 
structures 
of 5 or 
more units 
vacancy 
rate all 
units 
% units 
built 
before 
1970 
% units 
with four 
or more 
bedrooms 
% units 
subsidized by 
federal funds 
- public 
housing 
agencies 
% 
population 
that is 
minority 
% 
population 
that is 
black 
Density  
(100 d.u./square mile) 
 
  
1 -.225 **  -.140 ** -.362 ** .174 ** .111 * .275 ** .141 **  -.151 ** .047 .224 ** .223 ** 
mixed land index with 
all industries included 
 
  
-.225 **  1 .811 ** .027 -.044 .398 ** .044 -.154 **  -.058 .148 ** -.346 ** -.371 ** 
balance of service 
jobs and residents 
 
  
-.140 **  .811 **  1 .103 -.021 .352 ** .018 -.164 **  .043 .139 ** -.283 ** -.281 ** 
% of land in parks   -.362 **  .027 .103 1 -.091 .007 -.216 ** -.170 **  -.104 -.053 -.182 ** -.153 ** 
% of housing in 
structures of 2 - 4 
units  
 
  
.174 **  -.044 -.021 -.091 1 .031 .326 ** -.069 .044 .132 * .215 ** .212 ** 
% of housing in 
structures of 5 or 
more units  
  
.111 *  .398 **  .352 ** .007 .031 1 .241 ** -.390 **  -.115 * .215 ** -.104 -.094 
vacancy rate all units   .275 **  .044 .018 -.216 ** .326 ** .241 ** 1 -.029 .139 ** .279 ** .463 ** .456 ** 
% before 1970 
 
  .141 **  -.154 **  -.164 ** -.170 ** -.069 -.390 ** -.029 1 .024 -.103 .129 * .130 * 
% units with four or 
more bedrooms 
 
  
-.151 **  -.058 .043 -.104 .044 -.115 * .139 ** .024 1 .003 .167 ** .181 ** 
% of units subsidized 
by federal funds - 
public housing 
agencies  
 
  
.047 .148 **  .139 ** -.053 .132 * .215 ** .279 ** -.103 .003 1 .320 ** .313 ** 
% population that is 
minority 
 
  
.224 **  -.346 **  -.283 ** -.182 ** .215 ** -.104 .463 ** .129 *  .167 ** .320 ** 1 .954 ** 
% population that is 
black 
 
  
.223 **  -.371 **  -.281 ** -.153 ** .212 ** -.094 .456 ** .130 *  .181 ** .313 ** .954 ** 1 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed.  *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed. 
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Appendix E 
BOX-COX MODELS 
The following regressions provide the box-cox transformation of the dependent variable (% of 
units that are affordable rental units) that provides for the best fitting model.  Throughout these 
tables: 
• ‘D’ is the diversity index as the measure of mixed land use;  
• ‘Servbal’ is the balance of population-serving jobs to residents as the second 
measure of mixed land use; 
• ‘hu-sqmi’ is the number of housing units per square mile;156 
• Theta is the constant in the box-cox transformation:  y = (yθ – 1) / θ. 
 
                                                 
156 The coefficients in the tables reported in Chapter Seven are based on housing density being measured in the 100s 
of housing units per square mile.  For comparability, multiply the coefficients for housing density reported in the 
appendix by 100. 
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1990 Portland and Seattle Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MIXED LAND USE 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =        724 
                                                  LR chi2(98)     =     844.72 
Log likelihood = -1338.008                        Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /theta |  -.1247489   .0387214    -3.22   0.001    -.2006414   -.0488563 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Estimates of scale-variant
------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of chi2 
-------------+----------------------------------------------- 
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |  -6.54e-06     0.285    0.593          1 
           D |  -.0863189     0.411    0.522          1 
      D_Plnd |   -.139712     0.516    0.473          1 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0246391     4.813    0.028          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0028625     0.243    0.622          1 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -1520.7397       365.46           0.000 
theta =  0      -1343.5104        11.00           0.001 
theta =  1      -2004.3972      1332.78           0.000 
---------------------------------------------------------                              
 parameters 
   perc_park |  -.0017084     0.043    0.836          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .0160875    12.955    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0073952    17.138    0.000          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |  -1.01e-06     0.002    0.962          1 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0012657     0.244    0.622          1 
    vac_rate |   .0047174     2.156    0.142          1 
       b1970 |   .0109404    99.683    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0161027    55.552    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0513404   144.755    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0033525     4.440    0.035          1 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
-
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WITH “BALANCE” MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE                 
 
           Number of obs   =        724 
---------------------- 
 
                                       
                                                  LR chi2(98)     =     842.59 
Log likelihood = -1339.0747                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---
 adjpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /theta |  -.1191315   .0384986    -3.09   0.002    -.1945874   -.0436757 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
imates of scale-variant parameters Est
---------------------------------------
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of chi2 
-------------+----------------------------------------------- 
Notrans      | 
-4.11e-06     0.116    0.733          1      hu_sqmi |  
     servbal |   .0235706     0.035    0.852          1 
   perc_park |  -.0018233     0.050    0.824          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .0163509    13.363    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0067472    15.842    0.000          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |   3.88e-06     0.034    0.854          1 
servbal_Plnd |  -.0735291     0.166    0.684          1 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0266564     5.785    0.016          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0040973     0.518    0.472          1 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0020825     0.762    0.383          1 
    vac_rate |   .0048198     2.218    0.136          1 
       b1970 |   .0106566    96.090    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0160488    54.454    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0517624   144.298    0.000          1 
    per_min |    .0034228     4.537    0.033          1 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -1524.9533       371.76           0.000 
theta =  0      -1344.1405        10.13           0.001 
theta =  1      -2004.0505      1329.95           0.000 
---------------------------------------------------------
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1990 Port
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------- 
acec~59000 |  -.2929515     2.299    0.129          1 
--- 
-- 
 
theta = -1      -705.55131       305.85           0.000 
theta =  0      -555.59913         5.94           0.015 
theta =  1      -723.96843       342.68           0.000 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
land and Seattle Central Cities – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
 
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
                                                  Number of obs   =        241 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     334.89 
Log likelihood = -552.6287                        Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /theta |   .1276758   .0509242     2.51   0.012     .0278662    .2274855 
---
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of chi2 
-------------+--
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0000465     4.903    0.027          1 
           D |  -.3703738     0.982    0.322          1 
   perc_park |   .0038542     0.040    0.841          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .0214348     5.805    0.016          1 
      unit_5 |   .0261103    36.072    0.000          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |   .0000554     2.465    0.116          1 
      D_Plnd |    .873635     2.962    0.085          1 
perpark_Plnd |   -.005477     0.049    0.825          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0028375     0.062    0.803          1 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0070951     1.656    0.198          1 
    vac_rate |   .0173737     1.349    0.245          1 
       b1970 |   .0198546    32.493    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |   -.019419    11.998    0.001          1 
   per_subsd |   .0596107    51.649    0.000          1 
   per_min |   .0096529    10.328    0.001          1   
pl
       _cons |  -.6531368 
-------------+--------------------------------------------
      /sigma |   .5822403 
-----------------------------------------------------------
 
---------------------------------------------------------
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
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WITH “BALANCE” MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
  
                                                  Number of obs   =        241 
 
R chi2(16)     =     335.36 
chi2(df)    df of chi2 
---- 
 
 
                                                  L
Log likelihood = -552.39294                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
jpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]  ad
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /theta |    .126431   .0506075     2.50   0.012     .0272421    .2256199 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
---------------------------------------------------------- ---
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>
-------------+----------------------------------------------- 
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0000399     4.139    0.042          1 
-.1244987     0.150    0.698          1      servbal |  
   perc_park |   .0021231     0.012    0.912          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .0203941     5.339    0.021          1 
      unit_5 |   .0243385    37.692    0.000          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |   .0000366     1.216    0.270          1 
servbal_Plnd |   .6153706     2.193    0.139          1 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0006227     0.001    0.979          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0004174     0.001    0.970          1 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0044024     0.881    0.348          1 
    vac_rate |   .0191696     1.685    0.194          1 
       b1970 |   .0193781    32.255    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0178639    10.523    0.001          1 
   per_subsd |   .0582246    49.803    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0101295    11.367    0.001          1 
placec~59000 |  -.1683272     1.002    0.317          1 
       _cons |  -.7191668 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
      /sigma |   .5804977 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value   
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -706.39914       308.01           0.000 
theta =  0      -555.34461         5.90           0.015 
theta =  1      -724.99493       345.20           0.000 
---------------------------------------------------------
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2000 Portland and Seattle Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
     z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------------------- 
931    .0660292 
--------------- 
---- 
chi2 
---- 
 
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
                                                Number of obs   =        724 
                                                  LR chi2(98)     =     916.35 
Log likelihood = -1272.1964                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err. 
-------------+-------------------------
      /theta |  -.0107319   .0391646    -0.27   0.784    -.0874
---------------------------------------------------------------
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
---------------------------------------------------------
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000187     2.713    0.100          1 
           D |   .5132556    14.324    0.000          1 
   perc_park |   .0086327     1.052    0.305          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .0219021    18.628    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0032929     3.604    0.058          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |  -8.20e-06     0.162    0.687          1 
      D_Plnd |  -.4231326     6.628    0.010          1 
perpark_Plnd |   -.041359    13.251    0.000          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |   -.006325     0.901    0.342          1 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0009004     0.143    0.705          1 
    vac_rate |   .0133809     5.576    0.018          1 
       b1980 |   .0057384    24.768    0.000          1 
  51.924    0.000          1     four_bdr |  -.0162048  
   per_subsd |   .0729392   210.004    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0045275     8.991    0.003          1 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -1492.5075       440.62           0.000 
theta =  0      -1272.2342         0.08           0.784 
theta =  1      -1809.2031      1074.01           0.000 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 351 
WITH “BALANCE” MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =        724 
7 
 
----------------------- 
chi2(df)    df of chi2 
 
 Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
                                                  LR chi2(98)     =     916.6
Log likelihood = -1272.0357                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
jpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]  ad
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /theta |  -.0044555   .0391988    -0.11   0.910    -.0812837    .0723727 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
--------------------------------------
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>
-------------+----------------------------------------------- 
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000158     1.970    0.160          1 
     servbal |   .4347687    14.146    0.000          1 
   perc_park |   .0111298     1.750    0.186          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .0232058    20.995    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0038837     5.217    0.022          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |  -6.37e-06     0.101    0.750          1 
servbal_Plnd |  -.2603305     2.460    0.117          1 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0467273    16.848    0.000          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0091292     1.964    0.161          1 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0025669     1.206    0.272          1 
    vac_rate |   .0153869     7.495    0.006          1 
       b1980 |   .0056428    23.669    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0162473    51.629    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0736455   210.235    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0045873     9.115    0.003          1 
 
---------------------------------------------------------
  
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -1494.0834       444.10           0.000 
theta =  0      -1272.0422         0.01           0.909 
theta =  1      -1803.8056      1063.54           0.000 
---------------------------------------------------------
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2000 Port nits 
 
-- 
-- 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -629.30422       251.93           0.000 
theta =  0      -505.24676         3.81           0.051 
theta =  1      -671.49042       336.30           0.000 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
land and Seattle Cities – Extremely Low-Income Rental U
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
                                                  Number of obs   =        241 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     331.11 
g likelihood = -503.33976                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 Lo
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /theta |   .1117987   .0556857     2.01   0.045     .0026568    .2209407 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of chi2 
---------------------------------------------- -------------+-
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000236     1.914    0.166          1 
           D |   .5775835     2.190    0.139          1 
   perc_park |  -.0062959     0.131    0.717          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .0267772     9.169    0.002          1 
      unit_5 |   .0069614     3.231    0.072          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |   9.85e-06     0.109    0.742          1 
      D_Plnd |  -.3496541     0.516    0.473          1 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0125919     0.324    0.569          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0067939     0.346    0.556          1 
  unit5_Plnd |   .0024639     0.249    0.618          1 
    vac_rate |   .0060147     0.152    0.696          1 
       b1980 |   .0063681     3.056    0.080          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0175914    10.654    0.001          1 
   per_subsd |   .0729148    71.085    0.000          1 
    per_min |   .0109667    18.503    0.000          1  
placec~59000 |  -.2451901     1.856    0.173          1 
       _cons |   .2182072 
-------------+---------------------------------------------
      /sigma |   .5182159 
-----------------------------------------------------------
 
---------------------------------------------------------
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
 353 
WITH “BALANCE” MEAURE OF MXED LAND USE 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =        241 
R chi2(16)     =     340.91 
chi2(df)    df of chi2 
---- 
                                                  L
Log likelihood = -498.43821                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /theta |   .1386986   .0547012     2.54   0.011     .0314861     .245911 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
----------------------------------------------------------- --
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>
-------------+----------------------------------------------- 
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000225     1.865    0.172          1 
  .7048898     6.035    0.014          1      servbal | 
   perc_park |  -.0054548     0.095    0.758          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .0257711     8.103    0.004          1 
      unit_5 |   .0068479     3.738    0.053          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |   3.81e-06     0.017    0.896          1 
servbal_Plnd |  -.0658214     0.032    0.858          1 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0182986     0.669    0.413          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0077449     0.453    0.501          1 
  unit5_Plnd |   .0006763     0.025    0.874          1 
    vac_rate |   .0086247     0.329    0.567          1 
       b1980 |   .0078414     4.427    0.035          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0194633    12.547    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0758063    73.475    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0121679    21.480    0.000          1 
placec~59000 |  -.3180983     4.016    0.045          1 
       _cons |   .1454404 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
      /sigma |   .5286052 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
  Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value  
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
 ---------------------------------------------------------
theta = -1      -631.72681       266.58           0.000 
theta =  0      -501.43146         5.99           0.014 
theta =  1      -662.41373       327.95           0.000 
---------------------------------------------------------
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1990 Bal e Rental Units 
---------------------------------------- 
 Conf. Interval] 
--------------- 
532   -.2700911 
--------------- 
---- 
chi2 
---- 
 
 
theta =  1      -5022.5328      4215.39           0.000 
---------------------------------------------------------
timore and Philadelphia Regions – Extremely Low-Incom
 
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MEASURE OF MIXED USE 
 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =       1757 
                                                  LR chi2(261)    =    1822.04 
Log likelihood = -2914.8401                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
--------------------------------------
 adjpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95%
-------------+-------------------------------------------------
      /theta |  -.3249222   .0279756   -11.61   0.000    -.3797
---------------------------------------------------------------
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
---------------------------------------------------------
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000199    26.261    0.000          1 
           D |   .1700051     8.171    0.004          1 
   perc_park |  -.0090623    11.226    0.001          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .0076824    21.549    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |  -.0020371     7.687    0.006          1 
    husqmi_B |  -3.23e-06     0.168    0.682          1 
         D_B |    .163022     2.334    0.127          1 
   perpark_B |   .0088198     4.928    0.026          1 
   unit2t4_B |   .0068489     6.542    0.011          1 
     unit5_B |   .0004623     0.162    0.687          1 
    vac_rate |   .0154938    51.263    0.000          1 
       b1970 |   .0005739     1.064    0.302          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0037513    25.476    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0318509   311.064    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0034081    58.837    0.000          1 
   Baltimore |   .1101204     4.085    0.043          1 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2
---------------------------------------------------------
theta = -1      -3136.3439       443.01           0.000 
theta =  0      -2994.5849       159.49           0.000 
 355 
WITH “BALANCE” MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =       1757 
       LR chi2(261)    =    1805.63 
og likelihood = -2923.0449                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
 
 
 
 
                                           
L
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   /theta |  -.3317877   .0280663   -11.82   0.000    -.3867965   -.2767788    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of chi2 
----------+----------------------------------------------- ---
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000181    22.129    0.000          1 
     servbal |   .0287553     0.284    0.594          1 
   perc_park |  -.0089381    10.914    0.001          1 
  .007818    22.442    0.000          1     unit_2t4 |  
      unit_5 |  -.0016315     4.981    0.026          1 
    husqmi_B |  -5.08e-06     0.427    0.513          1 
   servbal_B |   .1288875     1.846    0.174          1 
   perpark_B |   .0089313     5.061    0.024          1 
   unit2t4_B |   .0064248     5.786    0.016          1 
     unit5_B |   .0002689     0.055    0.815          1 
    vac_rate |   .0164521    58.743    0.000          1 
       b1970 |   .0008714     2.491    0.114          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0037066    24.869    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0319895   315.477    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0030376    48.488    0.000          1 
   Baltimore |   .1563979    11.686    0.001         1 
---------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2
--------------------------------------------------------- 
eta = -1       -3139.979       433.87           0.000 th
theta =  0      -3005.7237       165.36           0.000 
theta =  1      -5030.7262      4215.36           0.000 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 356 
  
1990 Baltimore and Philadelphia Central Cities – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
 
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =        529 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     580.37 
Log likelihood = -1266.5232           
  
            Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
--------------- 
Conf. Interval] 
--------------- 
  .0582551    .2109409 
--------------------- 
---- 
chi2 
---- 
-- 
    /sigma |   .7043844 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -1551.1331       569.22           0.000 
theta =  0       -1272.185        11.32           0.001 
theta =  1      -1573.8453       614.64           0.000 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------------------
 adjpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------
      /theta |    .134598   .0389512     3.46   0.001   
---------------------------------------------------------
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
---------------------------------------------------------
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000296    11.793    0.001          1 
           D |   .9343447    19.385    0.000          1 
   perc_park |  -.0309617     9.849    0.002          1 
    unit_2t4 |    .016831    15.960    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |  -.0068944    10.286    0.001          1 
    husqmi_B |   .0000449     7.222    0.007          1 
         D_B |   .3811558     1.330    0.249          1 
   perpark_B |   .0418155    11.445    0.001          1 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0033149     0.235    0.628          1 
     unit5_B |   .0037527     1.232    0.267          1 
    vac_rate |   .0344027    40.150    0.000          1 
       b1970 |  -.0031224     1.597    0.206          1 
    four_bdr |   .0015208     0.284    0.594          1 
   per_subsd |   .0624993   174.971    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0073381    52.035    0.000          1 
placeco~4000 |   .0521074     0.053    0.818          1 
       _cons |   .1991287 
-------------+---------------------------------------------
  
 357 
WITH “BALANCE” MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =        529 
   =     551.20 
Log likelihood = -1281.1067                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
0.000          1 
---- 
---- 
 
2 
 
                                                  LR chi2(16)  
 
 adjpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    
-
      /theta |   .1332584   .0396089     3.36   0.001     .0556264    .2108903 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
imates of scale-variant parameters Est
------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of chi2 
-------------+----------------------------------------------- 
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000194     5.231    0.022          1 
  servbal |   .2810259     2.060    0.151          1    
   perc_park |  -.0360149    12.730    
    unit_2t4 |   .0164253    14.465    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   -.004763     4.905    0.027          1 
    husqmi_B |   .0000436     6.691    0.010          1 
 .3311802     1.166    0.280          1    servbal_B |  
   perpark_B |   .0469642    13.757    0.000          1 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0043025     0.377    0.539          1 
     unit5_B |   .0025068     0.529    0.467          1 
    vac_rate |   .0406873    55.595    0.000          1 
       b1970 |  -.0021762     0.739    0.390          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0002914     0.010    0.921          1 
   per_subsd |   .0646691   177.794    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0056997    32.398    0.000          1 
placeco~4000 |   .1195308     0.333    0.564          1 
       _cons |   .4510948 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
      /sigma |   .7225886 
---------------------------------------------------------
 
---------------------------------------------------------
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
d       chi2       Prob > chi    H0:       log likelihoo
--------------------------------------------------------- 
      556.47           0.000 theta = -1      -1559.3425 
theta =  0      -1286.4824        10.75           0.001 
eta =  1      -1581.4797       600.75           0.000 th
--------------------------------------------------------- 
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2000 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
---------------------------------------- 
3759    -.015542 
--------------- 
----- 
chi2 
---- 
 
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =       1757 
                                                  LR chi2(261)    =    2214.03 
Log likelihood = -3718.5369                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------
      /theta |  -.0596505   .0225048    -2.65   0.008     -.10
---------------------------------------------------------------
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
--------------------------------------------------------
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000198    13.538    0.000          1 
           D |    .028907     0.078    0.780          1 
   perc_park |  -.0199781    29.920    0.000          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .0176861    57.717    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0006718     0.431    0.512          1 
    husqmi_B |  -.0000179     2.566    0.109          1 
         D_B |   .2022971     1.494    0.222          1 
   perpark_B |    .023768    19.581    0.000          1 
   unit2t4_B |   .0043471     1.218    0.270          1 
     unit5_B |   .0022926     1.901    0.168          1 
    vac_rate |   .0185776    45.190    0.000          1 
       b1980 |   .0010674     1.447    0.229          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0092866    75.948    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0370239   230.559    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0056948    73.032    0.000          1 
   Baltimore |   .1151365     2.046    0.153          1 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -4356.8143      1276.55           0.000 
theta =  0      -3722.1166         7.16           0.007 
theta =  1      -5051.2909      2665.51           0.000 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 359 
WITH “BALANCE” MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
 
  Number of obs   =       1757 
                                                LR chi2(261)    =    2212.03 
chi2(df)    df of chi2 
 
 
 
                                                
  
Log likelihood = -3719.5387                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
jpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]  ad
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /theta |  -.0610621   .0225037    -2.71   0.007    -.1051685   -.0169556 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
---------------------------------------------------------- ---
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>
-------------+----------------------------------------------- 
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000189    12.788    0.000          1 
-.0729517     0.903    0.342          1      servbal |  
   perc_park |   -.019553    28.613    0.000          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .0179124    59.420    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0010545     1.065    0.302          1 
    husqmi_B |  -.0000228     4.398    0.036          1 
   servbal_B |   .0377038     0.082    0.774          1 
   perpark_B |    .023657    19.390    0.000          1 
   unit2t4_B |   .0043599     1.231    0.267          1 
     unit5_B |   .0025696     2.395    0.122          1 
    vac_rate |   .0194773    51.087    0.000          1 
       b1980 |   .0010113     1.302    0.254          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0093155    76.630    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0372351   233.401    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0052979    67.050    0.000          1 
   Baltimore |   .1796064     8.057    0.005          1 
---------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -4356.3974      1273.72           0.000 
theta =  0      -3723.2917         7.51           0.006 
theta =  1      -5055.2601      2671.44           0.000 
---------------------------------------------------------
 360 
 
 Low-Income Rental Units 
  8.22   0.000      .253748    .4126519 
--------------- 
chi2 
---- 
-- 
---- 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -2075.9929      1005.48           0.000 
theta =  0      -1607.3244        68.14           0.000 
theta =  1      -1700.3227       254.13           0.000 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
2000 Baltimore and Philadelphia Central Cities – Extremely
 
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MEASURE OF MIXED USE 
                                                Number of obs   =        529   
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     533.67 
Log likelihood = -1573.2554                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------+---------------------------------------------------------------- --
      /theta |   .3331999   .0405374   
---------------------------------------------------------------
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
---------------------------------------------- ---------------
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000187     1.665    0.197          1 
           D |    .286764     0.470    0.493          1 
   perc_park |  -.0668586    17.305    0.000          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .0367848    29.508    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0018705     0.273    0.601          1 
    husqmi_B |    .000011     0.146    0.702          1 
         D_B |   .4912766     0.643    0.423          1 
   perpark_B |   .0794069    15.471    0.000          1 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0113877     1.020    0.313          1 
     unit5_B |   .0077934     1.768    0.184          1 
    vac_rate |    .047711    37.855    0.000          1 
       b1980 |  -.0030706     0.193    0.661          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0133187     7.724    0.005          1 
   per_subsd |   .0764616   106.738    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0137868    52.690    0.000          1 
placeco~4000 |   .6127628     2.825    0.093          1 
       _cons |   1.136637 
-------------+---------------------------------------------
      /sigma |   1.147706 
---------------------------------------------------------
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
 361 
WITH “BALANCE” MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
   =        529 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     531.37 
og likelihood = -1574.4077                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
-------------------------------- 
0.226          1 
---- 
---- 
 
                                                  Number of obs
L
  
----------------------------------------------
 adjpre_afe1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /theta |   .3315439   .0405338     8.18   0.000     .2520991    .4109887 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of chi2 
-------------+----------------------------------------------- 
trans      | No
     hu_sqmi |   .0000169     1.468    
     servbal |   .1582709     0.264    0.607          1 
   perc_park |   -.067944    17.651    0.000          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .0366093    29.154    0.000          1 
  .0020627     0.361    0.548          1       unit_5 | 
    husqmi_B |  -1.16e-06     0.002    0.967          1 
   servbal_B |  -.1652241     0.113    0.737          1 
   perpark_B |   .0812401    16.071    0.000          1 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0110696     0.962    0.327          1 
     unit5_B |   .0099115     2.950    0.086          1 
    vac_rate |   .0507021    45.695    0.000          1 
       b1980 |  -.0033954     0.236    0.627          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0145876     9.382    0.002          1 
   per_subsd |   .0769798   107.443    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0126867    50.776    0.000          1 
placeco~4000 |    .829285     6.662    0.010          1 
       _cons |   1.266488 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
      /sigma |   1.146144 
---------------------------------------------------------
 
---------------------------------------------------------
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
od       chi2       Prob > chi2     H0:       log likeliho
--------------------------------------------------------- 
heta = -1      -2076.4867      1004.16           0.000 t
theta =  0      -1608.1469        67.48           0.000 
theta =  1       -1702.159       255.50           0.000 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
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1990 Portland and Seattle Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
     z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------------------- 
882     .432222 
--------------- 
---- 
chi2 
---- 
 123.458    0.000          1 
 
---------------------------------------------------------
 
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MIXED LAND USE 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =        724 
                                                  LR chi2(99)     =    1498.36 
Log likelihood = -2100.3995                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err. 
-------------+-------------------------
      /theta |   .3765551    .028402    13.26   0.000     .3208
---------------------------------------------------------------
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
---------------------------------------------------------
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0000531     4.180    0.041          1 
           D |  -.7842471     7.434    0.006          1 
   perc_park |   .0199723     1.314    0.252          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .1003168   102.166    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0665166   263.553    0.000          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |   .0000331     0.529    0.467          1 
      D_Plnd |   .0133196     0.001    0.976          1 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0238698     1.008    0.315          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |   .0192237     2.273    0.132          1 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0158924     8.538    0.003          1 
    vac_rate |  -.0169804     6.263    0.012          1 
       b1970 |   .0343485   206.024    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |   -.052194  
   per_subsd |   .0479456    34.036    0.000          1 
  17.526    0.000          1      per_min |   .0140094  
       Portl |   .2395738     2.765    0.096          1 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
---------------------------------------------------------
theta = -1      -3018.2817      1835.76           0.000 
theta =  0      -2186.0725       171.35           0.000 
theta =  1      -2312.9184       425.04           0.000 
 363 
WITH “BALANCE” MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE                 
          LR chi2(99)     =    1490.29 
           Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
 
 
  H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
 
                                                 Number of obs   =        724 
                                        
g likelihood = -2104.4303            Lo
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------+---------------------------------------------------------------- ---
      /theta |   .3811757   .0284755    13.39   0.000     .3253647    .4369867 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
          |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of chi2    
-------------+----------------------------------------------- 
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0000382     2.203    0.138          1 
     servbal |  -.2749245     1.056    0.304          1 
 .0152947     0.755    0.385          1    perc_park |  
    unit_2t4 |    .100379    99.094    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0634181   259.125    0.000          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |   .0000405     0.823    0.364          1 
servbal_Plnd |  -.1945012     0.254    0.614          1 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0221799     0.855    0.355          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |   .0190742     2.180    0.140          1 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0147962     8.439    0.004          1 
    vac_rate |  -.0176181     6.506    0.011          1 
       b1970 |   .0336056   197.406    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0526771   121.459    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0482721    33.229    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0140996    17.083    0.000          1 
       Portl |   .2223289     2.702    0.100          1 
---------------------------------------------------------
 
---------------------------------------------------------
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
  
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -3022.9476      1837.03           0.000 
theta =  0      -2191.6377       174.41           0.000 
theta =  1      -2313.5083       418.16           0.000 
---------------------------------------------------------
 364 
1990 Portland and Seattle Central Cities – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
 
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =        241 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     472.94 
Log likelihood = -768.94117                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------
      /theta |   .6203045   .0531017   
---------------------------------------- 
 11.68   0.000     .5162271    .7243819 
--------------- 
----- 
chi2 
---- 
-- 
--- 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -1200.4799       863.08           0.000 
theta =  0      -840.47296       143.06           0.000 
theta =  1      -791.73083        45.58           0.000 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------------------
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
--------------------------------------------------------
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0001492     5.067    0.024          1 
           D |  -2.080686     3.054    0.081          1 
   perc_park |  -.0842318     1.906    0.167          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .1691318    32.936    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .1630907   118.220    0.000          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |   .0002003     3.196    0.074          1 
      D_Plnd |   1.442382     0.811    0.368          1 
perpark_Plnd |   .1845481     5.539    0.019          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |   .0635756     3.030    0.082          1 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0413004     5.565    0.018          1 
    vac_rate |  -.0911399     3.657    0.056          1 
       b1970 |   .0582995    27.630    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |  -.1113567    37.330    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0812428    11.484    0.001          1 
   per_min |   .0378163    15.603    0.000          1   
placec~59000 |   .4804972     0.614    0.433          1 
       _cons |   1.296465 
-------------+---------------------------------------------
      /sigma |   1.845115 
----------------------------------------------------------
 
---------------------------------------------------------
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
 365 
WITH “BALANCE” MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =        241 
                                                  L
g likelihood = -770.23505                       
R chi2(16)     =     470.35 
Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
---- 
Lo
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------+---------------------------------------------------------------- ---
      /theta |   .6271051   .0528968    11.86   0.000     .5234293     .730781 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
          |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of chi2    
-------------+----------------------------------------------- 
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0001115     3.091    0.079          1 
     servbal |  -.2129761     0.041    0.839          1 
-.0951491     2.323    0.127          1    perc_park |  
    unit_2t4 |   .1657495    30.500    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .1530632   117.949    0.000          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |   .0001874     2.976    0.085          1 
servbal_Plnd |  -.4555041     0.113    0.736          1 
perpark_Plnd |   .1999599     6.514    0.011          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |   .0728253     3.938    0.047          1 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0280672     3.347    0.067          1 
    vac_rate |  -.0988256     4.165    0.041          1 
       b1970 |   .0567445    25.689    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |   -.109028    35.163    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0817897    11.021    0.001          1 
     per_min |   .0391642    15.810    0.000          1 
placec~59000 |   .7651491     1.931    0.165          1 
       _cons |   1.021497 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
      /sigma |   1.893964 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
------------------------------ ---------------------------
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
  H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2   
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -1206.9871       873.50           0.000 
theta =  0      -843.85578       147.24           0.000 
theta =  1      -792.40897        44.35           0.000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------
 
 366 
2000 Portland and Seattle Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
     z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------------------- 
259    .4620421 
--------------- 
---- 
chi2 
---- 
 
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =        724 
                                                  LR chi2(99)     =    1626.57 
Log likelihood = -2008.5908                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err. 
-------------+-------------------------
      /theta |    .411284   .0258975    15.88   0.000     .3605
---------------------------------------------------------------
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
---------------------------------------------------------
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0000416     3.401    0.065          1 
           D |   -.310089     1.094    0.296          1 
   perc_park |   .0137568     0.683    0.409          1 
    unit_2t4 |     .11349   116.355    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0628011   263.984    0.000          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |   4.19e-06     0.010    0.920          1 
      D_Plnd |  -.2607694     0.336    0.562          1 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0271269     1.459    0.227          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |   .0138934     1.070    0.301          1 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0021581     0.194    0.659          1 
    vac_rate |  -.0373908    11.081    0.001          1 
       b1980 |   .0236008   101.544    0.000          1 
 151.138    0.000          1     four_bdr |  -.0578644  
   per_subsd |   .0558252    41.711    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0237382    60.878    0.000          1 
       Portl |   -.138094     0.613    0.434          1 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -3008.0053      1998.83           0.000 
theta =  0      -2127.2572       237.33           0.000 
theta =  1      -2230.0539       442.93           0.000 
---------------------------------------------------------
 367 
WITH “B
                                                Number of obs   =        724 
rob > chi2     =      0.000 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
ALANCE” MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
  
                                                  LR chi2(99)     =    1623.59 
Log likelihood = -2010.0807                       P
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   /theta |      .4116   .0259245    15.88   0.000     .3607888    .4624112    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of chi2 
-------------+------------------------
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0000348     2.447    0.118          1 
     servbal |   .1071684     0.214    0.644          1 
   perc_park |   .0118862     0.510    0.475          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .1130089   114.726    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |     .06077   261.595    0.000          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |   .0000166     0.176    0.675          1 
servbal_Plnd |  -.2905239     0.697    0.404          1 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0252857     1.258    0.262          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |   .0132834     0.974    0.324          1 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0023145     0.254    0.614          1 
    vac_rate |  -.0410411    13.694    0.000          1 
       b1980 |    .023207    98.192    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0573667   148.211    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0548578    40.055    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0243843    63.899    0.000          1 
       Portl |  -.1684919     1.532    0.216          1 
---------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -3008.7377      1997.31           0.000 
theta =  0      -2128.6736       237.19           0.000 
theta =  1       -2231.032       441.90           0.000 
---------------------------------------------------------
 368 
2000 Portland and Seattle Cities – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
     z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------- 
377    .6258208 
--------------- 
---- 
chi2 
---- 
---- 
---- 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -1173.7323       886.37           0.000 
theta =  0      -799.54547       138.00           0.000 
theta =  1      -772.52699        83.96           0.000 
---------------------------------------------------------
 
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =        241 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     504.91 
Log likelihood = -730.5449                        Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err. 
-------------+------------------------------------------------
      /theta |   .5352792   .0461955    11.59   0.000     .4447
---------------------------------------------------------------
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
---------------------------------------------------------
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0000722     2.991    0.084          1 
           D |  -2.138121     4.940    0.026          1 
   perc_park |    -.02939     0.477    0.490          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .1440673    41.409    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .1011544    88.170    0.000          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |  -3.26e-06     0.002    0.964          1 
      D_Plnd |   1.223165     1.033    0.310          1 
perpark_Plnd |   .0376855     0.485    0.486          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |   .0278461     0.971    0.324          1 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0012773     0.011    0.916          1 
    vac_rate |  -.1059491     7.727    0.005          1 
       b1980 |    .032983    13.379    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0971828    49.016    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0619352    10.976    0.001          1 
     per_min |    .037089    34.190    0.000          1 
placec~59000 |  -.8539329     3.750    0.053          1 
       _cons |   3.026647 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
      /sigma |   1.267364 
---------------------------------------------------------
 
 369 
 
 
WITH “BALANCE” MEAURE OF MXED LAND USE 
---------------------- 
---- 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =        241 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     499.72 
Log likelihood = -733.13683                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /theta |   .5295772   .0457923    11.56   0.000     .4398259    .6193285 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
---------------------------------------
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of chi2 
-------------+----------------------------------------------- 
Notrans      | 
 -.0000334     0.729    0.393          1      hu_sqmi | 
     servbal |   .3671602     0.296    0.586          1 
   perc_park |  -.0160338     0.145    0.704          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .1330664    35.837    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0838875    79.196    0.000          1 
 husqmi_Plnd |  -.0000206     0.088    0.767          1 
servbal_Plnd |   -.268548     0.094    0.759          1 
perpark_Plnd |   .0235049     0.194    0.659          1 
unit2t4_Plnd |   .0311717     1.289    0.256          1 
  unit5_Plnd |    .009476     0.867    0.352          1 
    vac_rate |  -.1275096    12.254    0.000          1 
       b1980 |   .0315842    12.430    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0962023    48.574    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0568544     9.401    0.002          1 
     per_min |   .0382705    36.235    0.000          1 
placec~59000 |  -.5482886     2.102    0.147          1 
       _cons |    2.61415 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
      /sigma |    1.25963 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -1177.5969       888.92           0.000 
theta =  0      -801.97372       137.67           0.000 
theta =  1      -776.48518        86.70           0.000 
---------------------------------------------------------
 370 
1990 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
           Number of obs   =       1757 
 
 
                                       
                                                  LR chi2(261)    =    2541.86 
Log likelihood = -5004.4856                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /theta |    .249444   .0189458    13.17   0.000      .212311     .286577 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of chi2 
-------------+----------------------------------------------- 
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000216     5.493    0.019          1 
           D |   .3810813     7.258    0.007          1 
   perc_park |  -.0376893    34.110    0.000          1 
    unit_2t4 |    .042837   115.349    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0157333    78.955    0.000          1 
    husqmi_B |   .0000443     5.584    0.018          1 
         D_B |   .0282838     0.012    0.911          1 
   perpark_B |   .0366783    15.035    0.000          1 
   unit2t4_B |   .0153588     5.769    0.016          1 
     unit5_B |   .0079888     8.543    0.003          1 
    vac_rate |   .0124607     5.985    0.014          1 
       b1970 |   .0118398    77.962    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0181596   101.001    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0476632   138.604    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0121928   130.502    0.000          1 
   Baltimore |   .5576388    18.532    0.000          1 
------------------------------- --------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value   
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -6697.9683      3386.97           0.000 
theta =  0      -5089.1495       169.33           0.000 
theta =  1      -5740.6788      1472.39           0.000 
---------------------------------------------------------
 371 
WITH “BALANCE” MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
 
  Number of obs   =       1757 
                                                LR chi2(261)    =    2532.61 
chi2(df)    df of chi2 
 
 
                                                
  
Log likelihood = -5009.1116                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
jpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]  ad
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /theta |   .2470739   .0189534    13.04   0.000     .2099259    .2842219 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
---------------------------------------------------------- ---
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>
-------------+----------------------------------------------- 
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000181     3.949    0.047          1 
  .139357     1.179    0.278          1      servbal |  
   perc_park |  -.0375907    33.951    0.000          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .0429646   116.789    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0162632    85.040    0.000          1 
    husqmi_B |   .0000405     4.802    0.028          1 
   servbal_B |  -.1072931     0.227    0.634          1 
   perpark_B |   .0372016    15.506    0.000          1 
   unit2t4_B |   .0144722     5.155    0.023          1 
     unit5_B |   .0079441     8.432    0.004          1 
    vac_rate |   .0145568     8.331    0.004          1 
       b1970 |   .0123217    85.734    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0180905   100.294    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0484835   143.964    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0114623   119.754    0.000          1 
   Baltimore |   .6257576    32.966    0.000          1 
---------------------------------------------------------
    
--------------------------------------------------------- 
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1       -6698.302      3378.38           0.000 
theta =  0      -5092.1816       166.14           0.000 
theta =  1      -5747.9606      1477.70           0.000 
---------------------------------------------------------
 372 
  
1990 Baltimore and Philadelphia Central Cities – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
 
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =        529 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     553.90 
Log likelihood = -1793.4709           
  
            Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
--------------- 
Conf. Interval] 
--------------- 
  .4970874    .6679082 
--------------------- 
---- 
chi2 
---- 
--- 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -2660.5825      1734.22           0.000 
theta =  0      -1900.4466       213.95           0.000 
theta =  1      -1834.0136        81.09           0.000 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------------------
 adjpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------
      /theta |   .5824978   .0435775    13.37   0.000   
---------------------------------------------------------
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
---------------------------------------------------------
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000444     2.693    0.101          1 
           D |   2.287063    11.683    0.001          1 
   perc_park |  -.1133662    13.176    0.000          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .1018718    55.970    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0356814    27.085    0.000          1 
    husqmi_B |     .00023    18.521    0.000          1 
         D_B |   1.013324     0.944    0.331          1 
   perpark_B |   .1345845    11.938    0.001          1 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0161557     0.551    0.458          1 
     unit5_B |   .0048578     0.207    0.649          1 
    vac_rate |   .0246398     2.146    0.143          1 
       b1970 |   .0199729     6.498    0.011          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0158212     3.055    0.081          1 
   per_subsd |    .105825    61.511    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0310499    89.924    0.000          1 
placeco~4000 |    .431038     0.359    0.549          1 
       _cons |   .3126412 
-------------+--------------------------------------------
      /sigma |   2.224877 
 373 
W
 
ITH “BALANCE” MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
                                                  Number of obs   =        529 
6)     =     535.56 
 
P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------------------ 
0.000          1 
---- 
---- 
 
 
 
 
                                                  LR chi2(1
Log likelihood = -1802.6415                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    
------------+-----------------------------------
      /theta |   .5702233   .0438937    12.99   0.000     .4841932    .6562535 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
---------------------------------------------------------- ---
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of chi2 
-------------+----------------------------------------------- 
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000198     0.594    0.441          1 
     servbal |   .6803552     1.317    0.251          1 
 perc_park |  -.1224271    16.004    0.000          1   
    unit_2t4 |   .0978248    53.504    
      unit_5 |   .0391918    35.061    0.000          1 
    husqmi_B |   .0002151    17.341    0.000          1 
   servbal_B |   .7292477     0.618    0.432          1 
  .1429923    13.992    0.000          1    perpark_B | 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0188549     0.778    0.378          1 
     unit5_B |   .0020144     0.037    0.847          1 
    vac_rate |   .0394543     6.001    0.014          1 
       b1970 |    .021691     7.938    0.005          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0199406     5.012    0.025          1 
   per_subsd |   .1073487    64.944    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0260435    71.123    0.000          1 
placeco~4000 |   .6520357     1.062    0.303          1 
       _cons |   .9539083 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
      /sigma |   2.187131 
---------------------------------------------------------
 
---------------------------------------------------------
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2
---------------------------------------------------------
theta = -1      -2660.9759      1716.67           0.000 
      203.30           0.000 theta =  0      -1904.2892 
theta =  1      -1844.7028        84.12           0.000 
------------------------------- --------------------------
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2000 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
     z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------- 
302    .4007632 
--------------- 
---- 
chi2 
---- 
--------------------------------------------------------
 
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =       1757 
                                                  LR chi2(261)    =    2874.36 
Log likelihood = -5412.7279                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err. 
-------------+------------------------------------------------
      /theta |   .3642967   .0186057    19.58   0.000     .3278
---------------------------------------------------------------
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
---------------------------------------------------------
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0000136     1.311    0.252          1 
           D |   .4172222     3.346    0.067          1 
   perc_park |  -.0425213    27.819    0.000          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .0721952   189.791    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0327341   195.218    0.000          1 
    husqmi_B |   .0000595     5.793    0.016          1 
         D_B |  -.2166555     0.351    0.553          1 
   perpark_B |   .0623369    27.587    0.000          1 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0058169     0.449    0.503          1 
     unit5_B |   .0138873    14.177    0.000          1 
    vac_rate |   .0172099     8.088    0.004          1 
       b1980 |   .0202311   103.524    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0356297   213.359    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0513085   101.055    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0163284   121.596    0.000          1 
   Baltimore |   .5214608     8.602    0.003          1 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 ---------------------------------------------------------
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
 ---------------------------------------------------------
theta = -1      -7718.5186      4611.58           0.000 
theta =  0      -5607.8031       390.15           0.000 
theta =  1      -5914.9444      1004.43           0.000 
-
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WITH “B
 
                                                 Number of obs   =       1757 
                                                  LR chi2(261)    =    2873.83 
  Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------+----------------------------------------------- 
 .0739218   197.177    0.000          1 
 
ALANCE” MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
Log likelihood = -5412.9925                     
 
--
 adjpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /theta |   .3659525    .018623    19.65   0.000     .3294521     .402453 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of chi2 
---
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0000205     3.060    0.080          1 
     servbal |   -.178907     1.103    0.294          1 
   perc_park |  -.0413926    26.033    0.000          1 
    unit_2t4 |  
      unit_5 |   .0350801   220.840    0.000          1 
    husqmi_B |   .0000563     5.439    0.020          1 
   servbal_B |  -.1699775     0.339    0.561          1 
   perpark_B |   .0624502    27.369    0.000          1 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0068689     0.622    0.430          1 
     unit5_B |   .0133897    13.064    0.000          1 
    vac_rate |   .0198398    10.954    0.001          1 
       b1980 |   .0201191   101.574    0.000          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0357211   212.481    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0526035   105.098    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0152679   111.520    0.000          1 
   Baltimore |   .4916786    12.241    0.000          1 
---------------------------------------------------------
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
     H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -7719.7298      4613.47           0.000 
theta =  0      -5609.3993       392.81           0.000 
theta =  1      -5912.5943       999.20           0.000 
---------------------------------------------------------
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000 Baltimore and Philadelphia Central Cities – Very2  Low-Income Rental Units 
--------------------------------------- 
Conf. Interval] 
--------------- 
403    .6729151 
--------------- 
---- 
chi2 
---- 
---- 
--- 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
   Test         Restricted     LR statistic      P-Value 
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
theta = -1      -2852.3203      1940.36           0.000 
theta =  0       -1981.697       199.11           0.000 
theta =  1        -1915.41        66.54           0.000 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
WITH DIVERSITY INDEX AS MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =        529 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     481.43 
Log likelihood = -1882.1423                       Prob > chi2     =      0.000 
  
---------------------------------------
 adjpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------
      /theta |   .5794777    .047673    12.16   0.000     .4860
---------------------------------------------------------------
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
---------------------------------------------------------
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |   -.000059     4.314    0.038          1 
           D |   1.196553     2.085    0.149          1 
   perc_park |  -.1143276    12.948    0.000          1 
    unit_2t4 |   .1174585    72.831    0.000          1 
      unit_5 |   .0595457    66.657    0.000          1 
    husqmi_B |   .0001563     7.630    0.006          1 
         D_B |   .1976134     0.027    0.870          1 
   perpark_B |   .1331503    11.196    0.001          1 
   unit2t4_B |   -.037647     2.839    0.092          1 
     unit5_B |   .0135331     1.356    0.244          1 
    vac_rate |   .0414298     7.495    0.006          1 
      b1980 |   .0462058    11.143    0.001          1  
    four_bdr |  -.0550744    31.520    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0935272    45.230    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0290827    59.615    0.000          1 
placeco~4000 |  -.0718309     0.010    0.920          1 
       _cons |   .8060396 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
      /sigma |   2.266962 
----------------------------------------------------------
 
 377 
WITH “BALANCE” MEASURE OF MIXED LAND USE 
 
                                                 Number of obs   =        529 
rob > chi2     =      0.000 
---- 
---- 
 
 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     478.36 
Log likelihood = -1883.6771                       P
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 adjpre_afv1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /theta |   .5732552   .0476651    12.03   0.000     .4798334     .666677   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
Estimates of scale-variant parameters 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |      Coef.  chi2(df)  P>chi2(df)    df of chi2 
-----------+----------------------------------------------- --
Notrans      | 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0000701     6.777    0.009          1 
     servbal |  -.1262319     0.044    0.834          1 
   perc_park |  -.1123659    12.771    0.000          1 
  .1166691    73.754    0.000          1     unit_2t4 | 
      unit_5 |   .0628624    82.258    0.000          1 
    husqmi_B |   .0001342     6.249    0.012          1 
   servbal_B |  -.3845242     0.161    0.688          1 
   perpark_B |   .1333331    11.502    0.001          1 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0380042     2.976    0.084          1 
     unit5_B |   .0141689     1.582    0.209          1 
    vac_rate |   .0495064    11.854    0.001          1 
       b1980 |   .0441937    10.526    0.001          1 
    four_bdr |  -.0567183    35.011    0.000          1 
   per_subsd |   .0955614    48.255    0.000          1 
     per_min |   .0248158    51.225    0.000          1 
placeco~4000 |   .1748145     0.079    0.779          1 
       _cons |   1.468571 
-------------+-------------------------------------------
      /sigma |   2.229133 
---------------------------------------------------------
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
     LR statistic      P-Value    Test         Restricted
    H0:       log likelihood       chi2       Prob > chi2 
-------------------------------------------------------- -
theta = -1      -2848.5664      1929.78           0.000 
theta =  0      -1980.8175       194.28           0.000 
theta =  1      -1917.9127        68.47           0.000 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix F 
RESIDUALS 
On the l regression models.  The 
depend units for extremely low-
income at heteroskedasticity, non-
constan iolation of ordinary least 
squares
ls, therefore only select 
scatterp ixed land 
use is m
 following pages are scatterplots of the residuals from the initia
ent variable is the log of the proportion of affordable rental 
 and very low-income households.  The scatterplots indicate th
t variance of the error term, is present.  To deal with this v
, robust standard errors were utilized in STATA.   
The scatterplots show a similar pattern among all mode
lots are shown.  All scatterplots are from the analysis of model 3, in which m
easured by the diversity index. 
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2000 – Seattle and Portland Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
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1990 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Extremely Low-Income rental Units 
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2000 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
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1990 Portland and Seattle Central Cities – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
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1990 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
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Appendix G 
SIMPLE REGRESSION MODELS OF SMART GROWTH VARIABLES 
1990 Portland and Seattle Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
hu_sqmia 0.000     
 (5.53)***     
husqmi_Plnd 0.000     
 (1.68)     
D  1.697    
  (7.90)***    
D_Plnd  -0.273    
  (0.82)    
servbal   1.674   
   (8.02)***   
servbal_Plnd   -0.508   
   (1.64)   
unit_2t4     0.053 
     (7.37)*** 
unit_5     0.018 
     (8.84)*** 
unit2t4_Plnd     -0.007 
     (0.63) 
unit5_Plnd     -0.003 
     (0.78) 
perc_park    0.027  
    (1.51)  
perpark_Plnd    -0.035  
 
 
   (1.54)  
Portland Dummy 0.028 0.118 0.176 0.151 0.195 
 (0.31) (1.11) (2.14)** (1.97)** (2.49)** 
Constant 0.843 0.610 0.755 1.088 0.397 
 (13.42)*** (9.22)*** (14.12)*** (21.30)*** (8.02)*** 
Observations 724 724 724 724 724 
R-squared 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.34 
a.  Housing Density measured as units per square mile. 
** significant below .05 level; *** significant below .01 level 
Number in parentheses is t-test statistic. 
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2000 Portland and Seattle Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
hu_sqmia 0.000     
 (5.25)***     
husqmi_Plnd 0.000     
 (1.40)     
D  1.993    
  (9.07)***    
D_Plnd  -0.641    
  (1.89)    
servbal   1.683   
   (8.11)***   
servbal_Plnd   -0.480   
   (1.63)   
unit_2t4     0.052 
     (8.24)*** 
unit_5     0.018 
     (13.21)*** 
unit2t4_Plnd     -0.004 
     (0.44) 
unit5_Plnd     -0.005 
  (1.73)    
perc_park    0.031  
    (2.23)**  
perpark_Plnd    -0.033  
    (1.64)  
Portlan  d Dummy -0.244 0.033 -0.076 -0.142 -0.071 
 (2 (0.26) (0.84) (2.05)** (1.00) .93)*** 
Constant 1.017 0.541 0.804 1.242 0.511 
 (16.70)*** (6.59)*** (13.06)*** (26.14)*** (10.80)*** 
Observations 724 724 724 724 724 
R-squared 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.02 0.41 
a.  Hous
** signif
ing Density me ured as unit uare mi
icant below .  level; *** gnificant bel l. 
entheses  t-test stat tic. 
as s per sq le. 
ow .01 05 si leve
Number in par
 
is is
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1990 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
hu_sqmi  a 0.000     
 (10.31)***     
husqmi_B 0.000     
 (4.30)***     
D  0.316    
  (2.60)***    
D_B  -0.048    
  (0.19)    
servbal   0.096   
   (0.81)   
servbal_B   0.173   
   (0.75)   
unit_2t4     0.043 
     (14.45)*** 
unit_5     0.005 
     (3.48)*** 
unit2t4_B     0.015 
     (3.38)*** 
unit5_B     0.004 
     (1.69) 
perc_park  .020   -0  
    (4.39)***  
perpark_B    0.026  
    (3.56)***  
Baltimore Dummy 0.217 0.388 0.324 0.302 0.249 
 (3.75)*** *** ** * * (3.94) (4.24)* (5.13)** (4.42)**
Constant 0.517 0.703 0.788 0.860 0.333 
 (15.55)*** *** ***  ** (14.90) (19.93) (29.46)*** (10.06)*
Observations 1757 1757 1757 1757 1757 
R-squared 0.24 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.29 
a.  Housing Density ed as un  square 
1 level.
measur its per mile. 
** significant below .05 level; *** significant below .0  
Number in parentheses is t-test statistic. 
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 2000 Baltimore and elphia Regio tremely Low e Rental Unit
2) 3) 4) ) 
 Philad ns – Ex -Incom s 
 (1) ( ( ( (5
hu_sqmia 0.000     
 (10.65)***     
husqmi_B .000 0     
 (4.19)***     
D  -0.578    
  (3.49)***    
D_B  0.284    
  (0.95)    
servbal   -0.337   
   (2.55)**   
servbal_B   0.093   
   (0.36)   
unit_2t4     0.058 
     (16.72)*** 
unit_5     0.006 
     (3.67)*** 
unit2t4_B     0.016 
     (2.73)*** 
unit5_B     0.005 
     (1.86) 
perc_park    -0.027  
    (4.93)***  
perpark_B    0.054  
    (6.22)***  
Baltimore Dummmy 0.228 0.307 0.384 0.242 0.340 
 (3.47)*** (2.60)*** (4.25)*** (3.78)*** (5.18)*** 
Constant 0.808 1.400 1.290 1.252 0.546 
 (20.12)*** 3)*** 0)*** )*** )*** (20.9 (27.1 (39.50 (14.19
Observations 1757 1757 1757 1757 1757 
R-squared 0.30 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.36 
a.  Housing Density measured as units per square mile. 
** significant below .05 level; *** significant below .01 level. 
Number in parentheses is t-test statistic. 
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1990 Portland and Seattle Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
hu_sqmi  a 0.000    
 (5.17)***     
husqmi_ lnd 0P .000     
 (0.92)     
D  2.188    
  (10.78)***    
D_Plnd  -0.325    
  (1.18)    
servbal   2.162   
  2.83)*** (1   
servbal_Plnd   -0.675   
   (2.79)***   
unit_2t4     0.073 
     (17.03)*** 
unit_5     0.026 
     (26.50)*** 
unit2t4_Plnd     -0.010 
     (1.56) 
unit5_Plnd     -0.008 
     (3.65)*** 
perc_park  051   0.  
    (2.52)**  
perpark_Plnd    -0.026  
    (1.17)  
Portland Dummy 0.237 0.286 0.375 0.299 0.479 
 (2.27)** (2.66)*** (4.36)*** (3.85)*** (6.38)*** 
Constant 2.156 1.827 2.013 2.421 1.450 
 (27.99)*** (24.86)*** (33.74)*** (42.93)*** (27.21)*** 
Observations 724 724 724 724 724 
R-squared 0.22 0.27 0.25 0.04 0.63 
a.  Housing Density me it  m
 below . * be l.
asured as un
el; **
s per square
icant 
ile. 
1 leve** significant 05 lev signif low .0  
Number in parentheses est stat  
 
is t-t istic.
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2000 Portland and Seattle Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
hu_sqmia 0.000     
 (5.21)***     
husqmi_Plnd 0.000     
 (1.50)     
D  2.127    
  (9.79)***    
D_Plnd  -0.403    
  (1.28)    
servbal   1.856   
   (10.06)***   
servbal_Plnd   -0.320   
   (1.28)   
unit_2t4     0.069 
     (15.98)*** 
unit_5     0.025 
     (22.75)*** 
unit2t4_Plnd     -0.000 
     (0.06) 
unit5_Plnd     -0.003 
     (1.77) 
perc_park    0.055  
    (3.66)***  
perpark_Plnd    -0.028  
    (1.45)  
Portland Dummy -0.037 0.173 0.106 0.074 0.085 
 (0.37) (1.24) (1.06) (0.99) (1.12) 
Constant 2.305 1.818 2.081 2.536 1.578 
 (32.56)*** (19.08)*** (29.72)*** (48.71)*** (31.59)*** 
Observations 724 724 724 724 724 
R-squared 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.02 0.67 
a.  Housing Density measured as units per square mile. 
** significant below .05 level; *** significant below .01 level. 
Number in parentheses is t-test statistic. 
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imore and lphia Regions – Very Low-Incom tal Units 
) ) ) ) 
1990 Balt Philade e Ren
 (1) (2 (3 (4 (5
hu_sqmia 0.000     
 (12.45)***     
husqmi_B 0.000     
 (2.92)***     
D  0.500    
  (3.44)***    
D_B  -0.425    
  (1.66)    
servbal   0.236   
   (1.72)   
servbal_B   -0.124   
   (0.54)   
unit_2t4     0.067 
     (15.79)*** 
unit_5     0.014 
     (8.55)*** 
unit2t4_B     -0.003 
     (0.60) 
unit5_B     0.004 
     (1.88) 
perc_park    -0.027  
    (4.23)***  
perpark_B    0.050  
    (5.62)***  
Baltimore Dummy 0.335 0.580 0.464 0.275 0.479 
 (4.91)*** (5.36)*** (5.48)*** (4.24)*** (6.72)*** 
Constant 1.538     1.763 1.875 2.000 1.119
 (36.38)*** )*** (30.28 (39.91)*** 7)*** 2)*** (58.1 (24.7
Observations 1757 1757 1757 1757 1757 
R-squared 0.28 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.43 
a.  Housing Density measured as units per square mile. 
 significant below .05 level; *** significant below .01 level. 
Number in parentheses is t-test statistic. 
**
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2000 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
hu_sqmia 0.000     
 (11.36)***     
husqmi_B 0.000     
 (2.32)**     
D  -0.100    
  (0.56)    
D_B  -0.008    
  (0.03)    
servbal   -0.074   
   (0.53)   
servbal_B   0.102   
   (0.42)   
unit_2t4     0.071 
     (20.60)*** 
unit_5     0.018 
     (13.01)*** 
unit2t4_B     -0.014 
      (2.59)***
unit5_B     0.005 
      (1.98)**
perc_park    -0.019  
    (2.60)***  
perpark_B    0.054  
    (5.39)***  
Baltimore Dummy 0.169 0.251 0.221 0.068 0.402 
 (2.40)** (2.26)** (2.56)** (1.07) (5.66)*** 
Constant 2.006 2.431 2.416 2.440 1.450 
 (45.03)*** (33.99)*** (47.51)*** (70.41)*** (32.74)*** 
Observations 1757 1757 1757 1757 1757 
R-squared 0.24 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.48 
a.  Housing Density measured as units per square mile. 
** significant below .05 level; *** significant below .01 level. 
Number in parentheses is t-test statistic. 
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Appendix H 
OLS REG NON-ROBUST ST S) RESSION OUTPUT ( ANDARD ERROR
 395 
1990 Portland and Seattle Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     724 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 99,   624) =   15.87 
       Model |  419.254162    99  4.23489053           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  166.486634   624  .266805503           R-squared     =  0.7158 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6707 
       Total |  585.740796   723  .810153245           Root MSE      =  .51653 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ln1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |  -5.36e-06   .0000154    -0.35   0.728    -.0000356    .0000249 
           D |   -.024401   .1712673    -0.14   0.887     -.360731     .311929 
   perc_pa
    unit_2
      unit_5 |   .0090894   .0022263     4.08   0.000     .0047175    .0134613 
 husqmi_Plnd |  -7.11e-06   .0000273    -0.26   0.794    -.0000607    .0000464 
      D_Plnd |  -.2529432    .266796    -0.95   0.343      -.77687    .2709836 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0335419   .0141498    -2.37   0.018    -.0613288    -.005755 
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0049682   .0075848    -0.66   0.513     -.019863    .0099266 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0006495   .0032356    -0.20   0.841    -.0070034    .0057045 
    vac_rate |   .0059802   .0040542     1.48   0.141    -.0019814    .0139418 
       b1970 |   .0125133   .0013273     9.43   0.000     .0099068    .0151197 
    four_bdr |  -.0169346    .002642    -6.41   0.000    -.0221229   -.0117463 
   per_subsd |     .06601   .0047644    13.85   0.000     .0566538    .0753662 
     per_min |   .0043072   .0019907     2.16   0.031     .0003979    .0082166 
       Portl |   .0653105   .0858762     0.76   0.447    -.1033309    .2339519 
rk |  -.0008449   .0103983    -0.08   0.935    -.0212647     .019575 
t4 |   .0186288    .005709     3.26   0.001     .0074176    .0298401 
 
 
 
1990 Portland and Seattle Central Cities – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     241 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 16,   224) =   41.92 
       Model |  165.707581    16  10.3567238           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  55.3400856   224  .247053954           R-squared     =  0.7496 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7318 
       Total |  221.047666   240  .921031943           Root MSE      =  .49705 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ln1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0000342   .0000178    -1.93   0.055    -.0000692    7.74e-07 
           D |  -.3230696   .3186365    -1.01   0.312    -.9509781     .304839 
   perc_park |  -.0011919    .016336    -0.07   0.942    -.0333839        .031 
    unit_2t4 |    .019643   .0074937     2.62   0.009     .0048758    .0344101 
      unit_5 |   .0198961   .0035194     5.65   0.000     .0129606    .0268315 
 husqmi_Plnd |   .0000438   .0000301     1.46   0.146    -.0000154     .000103 
      D_Plnd |   .6533863   .4311791     1.52   0.131       -.1963    1.503072 
perpark_Plnd |   .0023065   .0208941     0.11   0.912    -.0388677    .0434806 
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0028575   .0097253    -0.29   0.769    -.0220223    .0163073 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0051469   .0046888    -1.10   0.274    -.0143866    .0040928 
    vac_rate |   .0166836   .0127001     1.31   0.190    -.0083433    .0417105 
       b1970 |   .0158428   .0028685     5.52   0.000       .01019    .0214955 
    four_bdr |   -.017636   .0046694    -3.78   0.000    -.0268376   -.0084345 
   per_subsd |   .0431607   .0063103     6.84   0.000     .0307255     .055596 
     per_min |   .0077001   .0025355     3.04   0.003     .0027037    .0126965 
placec~59000 |  -.2394255    .164561    -1.45   0.147    -.5637112    .0848602 
       _cons |  -.3403847    .265578    -1.28   0.201    -.8637356    .1829662 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 396 
2000 Portland and Seattle Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     724 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 99,   624) =   17.78 
       Model |  362.396649    99  3.66057222           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  128.503873   624  .205935695           R-squared     =  0.7382 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6967 
       Total |  490.900523   723   .67897721           Root MSE      =   .4538 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ln1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000173   .0000124     1.39   0.165    -7.13e-06    .0000417 
           D |   .4356436   .1633408     2.67   0.008     .1148794    .7564079 
   perc_park |   .0080562   .0091834     0.88   0.381    -.0099779    .0260903 
    unit_2t4 |   .0210008    .005573     3.77   0.000     .0100568    .0319448 
      unit_5 |    .003601   .0018798     1.92   0.056    -.0000904    .0072924 
 husqmi_Plnd |  -7.52e-07    .000023    -0.03   0.974     -.000046    .0000444 
      D_Plnd |  -.2204276   .2476857    -0.89   0.374    -.7068259    .2659708 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0406476    .012366    -3.29   0.001    -.0649316   -.0163636 
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0046622   .0074075    -0.63   0.529    -.0192088    .0098844 
  unit5_Plnd |    -.00185   .0026952    -0.69   0.493    -.0071428    .0034428 
    vac_rate |   .0139498   .0061731     2.26   0.024     .0018272    .0260725 
       b1980 |   .0057541    .001247     4.61   0.000     .0033053    .0082029 
    four_bdr |  -.0166061   .0023773    -6.99   0.000    -.0212746   -.0119377 
   per_subsd |   .0745898   .0046066    16.19   0.000     .0655434    .0836361 
     per_min |   .0044585   .0016433     2.71   0.007     .0012313    .0076856 
       Portl |   -.117963   .0972032    -1.21   0.225    -.3088481     .072922 
 
 
 
 
2000 Portland and Seattle Central Cities – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
 
 
 
     Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     241 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 16,   224) =   41.32 
       Model |  138.942496    16    8.683906           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  47.0796882   224  .210177179           R-squared     =  0.7469 
------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7288 -
       Total |  186.022184   240  .775092434           Root MSE      =  .45845 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ln1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000215    .000015     1.43   0.155    -8.15e-06     .000051 
           D |   .4714725   .3443018     1.37   0.172    -.2070123    1.149957 
   perc_park |   -.004706   .0153672    -0.31   0.760    -.0349888    .0255767 
    unit_2t4 |   .0236823   .0077315     3.06   0.002     .0084465    .0389181 
      unit_5 |   .0048786   .0033718     1.45   0.149    -.0017659     .011523 
 husqmi_Plnd |   5.19e-06   .0000264     0.20   0.844    -.0000468    .0000572 
      D_Plnd |  -.3807875   .4283708    -0.89   0.375     -1.22494    .4633647 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0115634   .0195499    -0.59   0.555    -.0500886    .0269618 
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0047003   .0101938    -0.46   0.645    -.0247883    .0153877 
  unit5_Plnd |   .0033243   .0043174     0.77   0.442    -.0051837    .0118323 
    vac_rate |   .0057914   .0136232     0.43   0.671    -.0210545    .0326374 
       b1980 |   .0052119   .0032105     1.62   0.106    -.0011148    .0115387 
    four_bdr |  -.0164786   .0046505    -3.54   0.000     -.025643   -.0073143 
   per_subsd |   .0570095   .0066631     8.56   0.000     .0438792    .0701398 
     per_min |   .0093779   .0022121     4.24   0.000     .0050187    .0137371 
placec~59000 |  -.2114058   .1588899    -1.33   0.185     -.524516    .1017043 
       _cons |   .3396148   .3381893     1.00   0.316    -.3268247    1.006054 
 
 
 397 
1990 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1757 
-------------+------------------------------           F(261,  1495) =   13.24 
       Model |  1118.96533   261  4.28722347           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  483.932091  1495  .323700395           R-squared     =  0.6981 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6454 
       Total |  1602.89742  1756  .912811741           Root MSE      =  .56895 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ln1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000236   5.94e-06     3.98   0.000      .000012    .0000353 
           D |   .2696829   .0911132     2.96   0.003     .0909597    .4484062 
   perc_park |  -.0119522   .0041442    -2.88   0.004    -.0200812   -.0038233 
    unit_2t4 |   .0119142   .0025304     4.71   0.000     .0069507    .0168777 
      unit_5 |  -.0025537   .0011262    -2.27   0.024    -.0047629   -.0003445 
    husqmi_B |   .0000109    .000012     0.90   0.367    -.0000128    .0000345 
         D_B |   .3199978   .1635338     1.96   0.051    -.0007823    .6407778 
   perpark_B |   .0108633   .0060923     1.78   0.075     -.001087    .0228135 
   unit2t4_B |   .0128884   .0040976     3.15   0.002     .0048507    .0209261 
     unit5_B |   .0006277   .0017619     0.36   0.722    -.0028284    .0040838 
    vac_rate |   .0247389   .0032842     7.53   0.000     .0182967     .031181 
       b1970 |   .0003041   .0008528     0.36   0.721    -.0013686    .0019769 
    four_bdr |  -.0037191    .001129    -3.29   0.001    -.0059336   -.0015045 
   per_subsd |   .0559821   .0025144    22.26   0.000       .05105    .0609142 
     per_min |   .0055589   .0006726     8.26   0.000     .0042395    .0068783 
   Baltimore |   .0672402   .0832473     0.81   0.419    -.0960537     .230534 
 
 
 
1990 Baltimore and Philadelphia Central Cities – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
    Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     529 
-----------+------------------------------           F( 16,   512) =   62.56 
 
  
--
       Model |  347.077244    16  21.6923277           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  177.533716   512  .346745539           R-squared     =  0.6616 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6510 
       Total |   524.61096   528  .993581363           Root MSE      =  .58885 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
n1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] l
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000271   7.12e-06     3.80   0.000     .0000131    .0000411 
           D |   .7681248   .1757785     4.37   0.000     .4227889    1.113461 
   perc_park |  -.0279586   .0081737    -3.42   0.001    -.0440167   -.0119004 
    unit_2t4 |   .0136584   .0034951     3.91   0.000     .0067918     .020525 
      unit_5 |  -.0057758   .0017878    -3.23   0.001    -.0092882   -.0022635 
    husqmi_B |     .00003   .0000138     2.18   0.030     2.94e-06     .000057 
         D_B |   .2801548   .2759553     1.02   0.310    -.2619891    .8222988 
   perpark_B |   .0372242   .0102384     3.64   0.000     .0171097    .0573387 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0031098   .0057097    -0.54   0.586     -.014327    .0081075 
     unit5_B |   .0025394   .0028194     0.90   0.368    -.0029996    .0080785 
    vac_rate |   .0273187   .0044471     6.14   0.000     .0185818    .0360556 
       b1970 |  -.0019671   .0020568    -0.96   0.339    -.0060078    .0020736 
    four_bdr |   .0005787   .0023764     0.24   0.808    -.0040899    .0052474 
   per_subsd |   .0467644   .0034238    13.66   0.000      .040038    .0534907 
     per_min |   .0059914   .0008296     7.22   0.000     .0043616    .0076212 
placeco~4000 |   .1086355     .18808     0.58   0.564    -.2608679     .478139 
       _cons |   .2098402   .2249552     0.93   0.351    -.2321086     .651789 
 
 
 398 
2000 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1757 
-------------+------------------------------           F(261,  1492) =   15.69 
       Model |  1403.74929   261  5.37834976           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  511.510892  1492  .342835719           R-squared     =  0.7329 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6862 
       Total |  1915.26018  1753  1.09256143           Root MSE      =  .58552 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ln1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000207   6.32e-06     3.27   0.001     8.27e-06     .000033 
           D |   .0392427   .1213758     0.32   0.747    -.1988426     .277328 
   perc_park |   -.021235   .0042716    -4.97   0.000    -.0296141    -.012856 
    unit_2t4 |   .0192542   .0027136     7.10   0.000     .0139313    .0245772 
      unit_5 |   .0008489   .0012017     0.71   0.480    -.0015084    .0032062 
    husqmi_B |  -.0000173   .0000131    -1.32   0.188     -.000043    8.46e-06 
         D_B |   .2201135   .1945067     1.13   0.258    -.1614221    .6016492 
   perpark_B |    .025255   .0062929     4.01   0.000     .0129111    .0375988 
   unit2t4_B |   .0053676   .0046211     1.16   0.246    -.0036969    .0144321 
     unit5_B |   .0025515   .0019535     1.31   0.192    -.0012804    .0063833 
    vac_rate |    .020744   .0032178     6.45   0.000     .0144321    .0270559 
       b1980 |   .0011105   .0010426     1.07   0.287    -.0009346    .0031555 
    four_bdr |  -.0095153   .0012198    -7.80   0.000    -.0119079   -.0071226 
   per_subsd |   .0423902   .0026399    16.06   0.000      .037212    .0475685 
     per_min |   .0063208   .0007728     8.18   0.000      .004805    .0078366 
   Baltimore |   .1144996   .0945047     1.21   0.226    -.0708765    .2998758 
 
 
 
 
000 Baltimore and Philadelphia Central Cities – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 2
 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     529 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 16,   510) =   49.96 
       Model |  296.964125    16  18.5602578           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  189.479457   510  .371528348           R-squared     =  0.6105 
-----------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5983 --
       Total |  486.443582   526  .924797684           Root MSE      =  .60953 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ln1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000186   7.62e-06     2.45   0.015     3.66e-06    .0000336 
           D |   .0585952   .2217895     0.26   0.792    -.3771383    .4943288 
   perc_park |  -.0426364   .0084102    -5.07   0.000    -.0591593   -.0261136 
    unit_2t4 |   .0202494   .0035423     5.72   0.000     .0132902    .0272086 
      unit_5 |    .000066   .0018982     0.03   0.972    -.0036634    .0037953 
    husqmi_B |  -.0000121   .0000151    -0.80   0.421    -.0000417    .0000175 
         D_B |   .2822748   .3252689     0.87   0.386    -.3567569    .9213066 
   perpark_B |   .0477091   .0106111     4.50   0.000     .0268622     .068556 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0092904   .0059701    -1.56   0.120    -.0210193    .0024386 
     unit5_B |   .0026715   .0031045     0.86   0.390    -.0034277    .0087707 
    vac_rate |   .0238754   .0040446     5.90   0.000     .0159292    .0318215 
       b1980 |   .0010217   .0037001     0.28   0.783    -.0062477    .0082911 
    four_bdr |  -.0098327   .0025133    -3.91   0.000    -.0147704   -.0048951 
   per_subsd |   .0319336   .0036306     8.80   0.000     .0248009    .0390664 
     per_min |   .0070098   .0009836     7.13   0.000     .0050774    .0089422 
aceco~4000 |   .4822691   .1920558     2.51   0.012     .1049512    .8595871 pl
       _cons |   .7869241   .3798133     2.07   0.039      .040733    1.533115 
 
 399 
 
1990 Portland and Seattle Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     724 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 99,   624) =   35.37 
       Model |  534.643767    99  5.40044209           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  95.2717043   624  .152679013           R-squared     =  0.8488 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.8248 
      Total |  629.915471   723   .87125238           Root MSE      =  .39074  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ln1adjpre_~v |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0000372   .0000117    -3.19   0.001      -.00006   -.0000143 
           D |  -.4260089   .1295587    -3.29   0.001    -.6804328    -.171585 
   perc_park |   .0004433    .007866     0.06   0.955    -.0150037    .0158904 
    unit_2t4 |   .0433972   .0043187    10.05   0.000     .0349162    .0518782 
      unit_5 |   .0244984   .0016841    14.55   0.000     .0211912    .0278056 
 husqmi_Plnd |   .0000177   .0000206     0.86   0.392    -.0000228    .0000582 
      D_Plnd |   .0914714   .2018235     0.45   0.651     -.304864    .4878068 
perpark_Plnd |   .0036349   .0107039     0.34   0.734    -.0173851    .0246549 
unit2t4_Plnd |  -3.88e-06   .0057377    -0.00   0.999    -.0112713    .0112636 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0086969   .0024476    -3.55   0.000    -.0135035   -.0038904 
    vac_rate |  -.0063595   .0030669    -2.07   0.039    -.0123822   -.0003368 
       b1970 |   .0145985   .0010041    14.54   0.000     .0126268    .0165702 
    four_bdr |  -.0250364   .0019986   -12.53   0.000    -.0289612   -.0211116 
   per_subsd |   .0107947   .0036041     3.00   0.003      .003717    .0178723 
     per_min |   .0047246   .0015059     3.14   0.002     .0017673    .0076819 
      Portl |   .1604757   .0649629     2.47   0.014     .0329034     .288048  
 
 
 
 
 
990 Portland and Seattle Central Cities – Very Low-Income Rental Units 1
     Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     241 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 16,   224) =   90.71 
       Model |  65242.0077    16  4077.62548           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  10069.8412   224  44.9546484           R-squared     =  0.8663 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.8567 
       Total |   75311.849   240  313.799371           Root MSE      =  6.7048 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  adjpre_afv |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0004802   .0002396    -2.00   0.046    -.0009523   -8.12e-06 
           D |  -5.116013   4.298203    -1.19   0.235     -13.5861    3.354072 
   perc_park |  -.1663005   .2203629    -0.75   0.451    -.6005499     .267949 
    unit_2t4 |   .4101586    .101085     4.06   0.000     .2109594    .6093577 
      unit_5 |   .5942952    .047475    12.52   0.000     .5007404      .68785 
 husqmi_Plnd |   .0007898   .0004054     1.95   0.053    -9.14e-06    .0015887 
      D_Plnd |   5.596633   5.816331     0.96   0.337    -5.865092    17.05836 
perpark_Plnd |   .4440117   .2818479     1.58   0.117    -.1114009    .9994243 
unit2t4_Plnd |   .3105791   .1311883     2.37   0.019     .0520581    .5691001 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.1376387   .0632483    -2.18   0.031    -.2622766   -.0130009 
    vac_rate |  -.4348763   .1713159    -2.54   0.012    -.7724733   -.0972793 
       b1970 |   .2329988   .0386947     6.02   0.000     .1567466     .309251 
    four_bdr |  -.3035935   .0629871    -4.82   0.000    -.4277165   -.1794704 
   per_subsd |   .3460523   .0851226     4.07   0.000     .1783088    .5137957 
     per_min |   .1339583    .034202     3.92   0.000     .0665596    .2013571 
placec~59000 |   .3300111   2.219823     0.15   0.882    -4.044396    4.704418 
       _cons |  -8.801119   3.582478    -2.46   0.015    -15.86079   -1.741449 
 
 400 
2000 Portland and Seattle Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
 
 
     Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     724 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 99,   624) =   39.27 
       Model |  485.242326    99  4.90143763           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  77.8801777   624  .124807977           R-squared     =  0.8617 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.8398 
       Total |  563.122504   723    .7788693           Root MSE      =  .35328 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ln1adjpre_~v |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0000197   9.68e-06    -2.03   0.043    -.0000387   -6.55e-07 
           D |  -.0296799   .1271599    -0.23   0.816     -.279393    .2200332 
   perc_park |   .0037541   .0071492     0.53   0.600    -.0102853    .0177936 
    unit_2t4 |   .0394047   .0043385     9.08   0.000     .0308848    .0479245 
      unit_5 |   .0170991   .0014634    11.68   0.000     .0142254    .0199729 
 husqmi_Plnd |  -2.04e-06   .0000179    -0.11   0.910    -.0000372    .0000332 
      D_Plnd |  -.2367058   .1928218    -1.23   0.220    -.6153641    .1419525 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0031758   .0096269    -0.33   0.742    -.0220807    .0157292 
unit2t4_Plnd |   .0039423   .0057667     0.68   0.494    -.0073821    .0152667 
  unit5_Plnd |   .0010716   .0020982     0.51   0.610    -.0030489     .005192 
    vac_rate |  -.0138031   .0048057    -2.87   0.004    -.0232405   -.0043657 
       b1980 |   .0082737   .0009708     8.52   0.000     .0063673    .0101801 
    four_bdr |   -.028084   .0018507   -15.17   0.000    -.0317184   -.0244497 
   per_subsd |   .0109757   .0035862     3.06   0.002     .0039332    .0180182 
     per_min |   .0081131   .0012793     6.34   0.000     .0056007    .0106254 
       Portl |  -.0056216   .0756721    -0.07   0.941    -.1542245    .1429813 
 
 
 
 
2000 Portland and Seattle Central Cities – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     241 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 16,   224) =   89.70 
       Model |  55015.4202    16  3438.46376           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  8586.37798   224  38.3320446           R-squared     =  0.8650 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.8554 
       Total |  63601.7982   240  265.007492           Root MSE      =  6.1913 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  adjpre_afv |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |  -.0004316   .0002028    -2.13   0.034    -.0008313   -.0000319 
           D |  -12.91739   4.649727    -2.78   0.006     -22.0802    -3.75459 
   perc_park |  -.1665834   .2075308    -0.80   0.423    -.5755459    .2423791 
    unit_2t4 |   .5069836   .1044126     4.86   0.000     .3012271    .7127401 
      unit_5 |   .5456501   .0455352    11.98   0.000     .4559178    .6353823 
 husqmi_Plnd |   .0001795   .0003566     0.50   0.615    -.0005231    .0008822 
      D_Plnd |   13.05026   5.785063     2.26   0.025     1.650152    24.45037 
perpark_Plnd |   .2141734   .2640173     0.81   0.418    -.3061019    .7344487 
unit2t4_Plnd |   .0629339   .1376652     0.46   0.648    -.2083506    .3342185 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0718722    .058306    -1.23   0.219    -.1867705    .0430262 
    vac_rate |  -.5784376   .1839782    -3.14   0.002     -.940987   -.2158881 
       b1980 |   .1678584   .0433577     3.87   0.000     .0824172    .2532995 
    four_bdr |  -.3004039   .0628042    -4.78   0.000    -.4241666   -.1766412 
   per_subsd |   .3029389   .0899836     3.37   0.001     .1256163    .4802615 
     per_min |   .1680433   .0298741     5.63   0.000     .1091731    .2269135 
placec~59000 |  -3.834018   2.145776    -1.79   0.075    -8.062508    .3944723 
       _cons |  -2.285027   4.567179    -0.50   0.617    -11.28516    6.715105 
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1990 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
   Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1757 
 
  
-------------+------------------------------           F(261,  1495) =   16.73 
       Model |  1561.05261   261  5.98104449           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   534.55652  1495   .35756289           R-squared     =  0.7449 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7004 
       Total |  2095.60913  1756  1.19339928           Root MSE      =  .59797 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -
ln1adjpre_~v |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |   .0000136   6.24e-06     2.19   0.029     1.40e-06    .0000259 
           D |   .1813473   .0957604     1.89   0.058    -.0064916    .3691863 
   perc_park |  -.0242774   .0043555    -5.57   0.000     -.032821   -.0157338 
    unit_2t4 |   .0249734   .0026594     9.39   0.000     .0197568    .0301901 
      unit_5 |   .0085208   .0011837     7.20   0.000     .0061989    .0108426 
    husqmi_B |   .0000127   .0000126     1.00   0.317    -.0000121    .0000375 
         D_B |   .0428056   .1718748     0.25   0.803    -.2943357     .379947 
   perpark_B |   .0231367    .006403     3.61   0.000     .0105769    .0356965 
   unit2t4_B |   .0040795   .0043066     0.95   0.344    -.0043681    .0125272 
     unit5_B |   .0046195   .0018518     2.49   0.013     .0009872    .0082519 
    vac_rate |   .0068729   .0034517     1.99   0.047     .0001021    .0136436 
       b1970 |   .0081694   .0008962     9.12   0.000     .0064114    .0099275 
    four_bdr |  -.0138672   .0011866   -11.69   0.000    -.0161948   -.0115397 
   per_subsd |   .0232575   .0026426     8.80   0.000     .0180738    .0284412 
     per_min |   .0066217   .0007069     9.37   0.000      .005235    .0080084 
   Baltimore |   .4003207   .0874933     4.58   0.000     .2286981    .5719432 
 
 
 
1990 Baltimore and Philadelphia Central Cities – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
    Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     529 
 
 
  
-------------+------------------------------           F( 16,   512) =   65.62 
       Model |  65198.8238    16  4074.92649           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  31792.9643   512  62.0956335           R-squared     =  0.6722 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6620 
       Total |  96991.7881   528  183.696568           Root MSE      =  7.8801 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  adjpre_afv |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |    .000069   .0000953     0.72   0.469    -.0001182    .0002562 
           D |   8.698221    2.35229     3.70   0.000     4.076893    13.31955 
   perc_park |  -.3015368   .1093817    -2.76   0.006    -.5164289   -.0866447 
    unit_2t4 |   .3076239   .0467724     6.58   0.000     .2157344    .3995134 
      unit_5 |   .1346139   .0239248     5.63   0.000      .087611    .1816168 
    husqmi_B |   .0010898   .0001843     5.91   0.000     .0007278    .0014518 
         D_B |   3.826719   3.692868     1.04   0.301    -3.428319    11.08176 
   perpark_B |   .4070075   .1370121     2.97   0.003     .1378324    .6761826 
   unit2t4_B |   .0320113   .0764073     0.42   0.675    -.1180992    .1821217 
     unit5_B |   .0431852   .0377298     1.14   0.253    -.0309391    .1173095 
    vac_rate |   .0695243   .0595123     1.17   0.243    -.0473939    .1864426 
       b1970 |   .0464743   .0275238     1.69   0.092    -.0075991    .1005478 
    four_bdr |  -.0289768    .031801    -0.91   0.363    -.0914533    .0334997 
   per_subsd |   .4257352   .0458171     9.29   0.000     .3357226    .5157478 
     per_min |   .1078312   .0111017     9.71   0.000     .0860208    .1296417 
placeco~4000 |  -2.146594    2.51691    -0.85   0.394    -7.091336    2.798147 
       _cons |  -4.081946   3.010379    -1.36   0.176     -9.99616    1.832268 
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2000 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1757 
-------------+------------------------------           F(261,  1492) =   19.97 
       Model |   1528.1169   261  5.85485402           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  437.449361  1492  .293196623           R-squared     =  0.7774 
------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7385 -
       Total |  1965.56626  1753  1.12125856           Root MSE      =  .54148 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ln1adjpre_~v |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |  -3.46e-06   5.84e-06    -0.59   0.554    -.0000149    8.00e-06 
           D |   .1873644   .1122454     1.67   0.095    -.0328112    .4075399 
   perc_park |  -.0210926   .0039503    -5.34   0.000    -.0288414   -.0133438 
    unit_2t4 |   .0297666   .0025095    11.86   0.000     .0248441    .0346892 
      unit_5 |    .011492   .0011113    10.34   0.000      .009312    .0136719 
    husqmi_B |   .0000119   .0000121     0.98   0.327    -.0000119    .0000357 
         D_B |  -.0268283   .1798751    -0.15   0.881    -.3796632    .3260067 
   perpark_B |    .028046   .0058195     4.82   0.000     .0166308    .0394613 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0047388   .0042735    -1.11   0.268    -.0131214    .0036438 
     unit5_B |   .0035064   .0018065     1.94   0.052    -.0000372    .0070501 
    vac_rate |   .0073038   .0029757     2.45   0.014     .0014668    .0131409 
       b1980 |    .009007   .0009642     9.34   0.000     .0071157    .0108982 
    four_bdr |  -.0206684    .001128   -18.32   0.000    -.0228811   -.0184558 
   per_subsd |   .0151811   .0024413     6.22   0.000     .0103924    .0199698 
    per_min |   .0061046   .0007146     8.54   0.000     .0047028    .0075064  
   Baltimore |   .2731229   .0873956     3.13   0.002     .1016915    .4445543 
 
 
 
 
2000 Baltimore and Philadelphia Central Cities – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
placeco~4000 |  -2.479479   2.936171    -0.84   0.399    -8.247958       3.289 
       _cons |  -8.097296   5.806628    -1.39   0.164    -19.50515    3.310558 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     527 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 16,   510) =   45.82 
       Model |  63658.9059    16  3978.68162           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
   Residual |  44286.3488   510  86.8359781           R-squared     =  0.5897  
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5769 
       Total |  107945.255   526  205.219115           Root MSE      =  9.3186 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  adjpre_afv |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hu_sqmi |   -.000282   .0001164    -2.42   0.016    -.0005108   -.0000533 
           D |   7.066605   3.390743     2.08   0.038     .4050613    13.72815 
   perc_park |  -.3282075   .1285756    -2.55   0.011    -.5808105   -.0756045 
    unit_2t4 |   .4048269   .0541544     7.48   0.000     .2984338      .51122 
      unit_5 |   .2413929   .0290204     8.32   0.000     .1843787     .298407 
    husqmi_B |   .0007963   .0002304     3.46   0.001     .0003435     .001249 
         D_B |  -1.245384   4.972747    -0.25   0.802    -11.01497    8.524205 
   perpark_B |    .443259   .1622242     2.73   0.007     .1245491    .7619689 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0751631   .0912709    -0.82   0.411    -.2544763      .10415 
     unit5_B |    .095239    .047462     2.01   0.045     .0019939    .1884841 
    vac_rate |   .1242713   .0618348     2.01   0.045     .0027891    .2457535 
       b1980 |   .1759151   .0565682     3.11   0.002     .0647797    .2870505 
    four_bdr |  -.1521843    .038423    -3.96   0.000    -.2276712   -.0766975 
   per_subsd |   .4252271   .0555049     7.66   0.000     .3161807    .5342735 
     per_min |   .1099231   .0150374     7.31   0.000     .0803803     .139466 
 
 
. 
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Appendix I 
REGRESSION MODELS WITH HOUSING DENSITY EXCLUDED 
sidential density.  
but with housing 
 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =     724 
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The analysis in Chapter Seven provided mixed results for the impact of re
Below are the same regression models as those presented in Chapter Seven, 
density excluded from the model. 
1990 Portland and Seattle Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units.
                                                       F( 66,   626) =  
                                                       Prob > F      =  
                                                       R-squared     =  
                                                       Root MSE      =  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust 
ln1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Int
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------
           D |  -.0084527   .2176915    -0.04   0.969    -.4359466    .4
   perc_park |  -.0000324   .0158774    -0.00   0.998    -.0312119    .0
    unit_2t4 |   .0187714   .0056776     3.31   0.001      .007622    .0
      unit_5 |   .0086279   .0025043     3.45   0.001       .00371    .0
      D_Plnd |  -.2293226   .3446777    -0.67   0.506    -.9061872    .4
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0053463   .0085492    -0.63   0.532    -.0221349    .0
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0010157   .0034721    -0.29   0.770    -.0078341    .0
perpark_Plnd |  -.0341439   .0223766    -1.53   0.128    -.0780862    .0
    vac_rate |   .0060718   .0043546     1.39   0.164    -.0024795    .0
       b1970 |     .01232   .0013336     9.24   0.000     .0097012    .0
    four_bdr |  -.0169504   .0029568    -5.73   0.000     -.022757   -.0
   per_subsd |    .065831   .0057797    11.39   0.000      .054481     .
     per_min |   .0044025   .0021933     2.01   0.045     .0000953    .0
       Portl |   .0602761   .0914708     0.66   0.510    -.1193507     .
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1990 Portland and Seattle Central Cities – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =     241 
                                                       F( 15,   225) =   78.28 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7455 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .50003 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
ln1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           D |  -.1017493   .3949838    -0.26   0.797    -.8800899    .6765914 
   perc_park |   .0048283   .0282652     0.17   0.865      -.05087    .0605267 
    unit_2t4 |   .0194564   .0070892     2.74   0.007     .0054868    .0334261 
      unit_5 |    .015534   .0041778     3.72   0.000     .0073015    .0237666 
    
perp
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0026487   .0110881    -0.24   0.811    -.0244985     .019201 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0014057   .0057313    -0.25   0.806    -.0126996    .0098883 
    vac_rate |   .0149616   .0146049     1.02   0.307    -.0138182    .0437415 
       b1970 |   .0140044   .0028396     4.93   0.000     .0084088    .0195999 
    four_bdr |  -.0167569   .0051815    -3.23   0.001    -.0269673   -.0065465 
   per_subsd |   .0431551   .0061873     6.97   0.000     .0309627    .0553474 
  D_Plnd |   .4989654   .5398279     0.92   0.356    -.5647996     1.56273 
ark_Plnd |  -.0038231   .0342928    -0.11   0.911    -.0713991     .063753 
     per_min |   .0084008   .0025181     3.34   0.001     .0034387    .0133629 
placec~59000 |  -.1534893   .1514761    -1.01   0.312    -.4519826    .1450039 
       _cons |   -.314051   .2861064    -1.10   0.274    -.8778417    .2497398 
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2000 Portland and Seattle Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =     724 
                                                       F( 66,   626) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7372 
                                                       Root MSE      =    .454 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
ln1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           D |   .3840997   .1718554     2.24   0.026     .0466169    .7215825 
   perc_park |   .0050003   .0122803     0.41   0.684    -.0191153    .0291158 
    unit_2t4 |   .0201804    .005694     3.54   0.000     .0089987    .0313621 
      unit_5 |    .005184   .0015524     3.34   0.001     .0021356    .0082325 
      D_Plnd |  -.2306481   .2596049    -0.89   0.375      -.74045    .2791537 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0379364   .0146764    -2.58   0.010    -.0667574   -.0091154 
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0034398   .0081584    -0.42   0.673    -.0194609    .0125813 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0023452    .002462    -0.95   0.341    -.0071799    .0024895 
    vac_rate |   .0132753   .0063792     2.08   0.038      .000748    .0258026 
       b1980 |   .0060741   .0012555     4.84   0.000     .0036085    .0085397 
    four_bdr |  -.0166088    .002236    -7.43   0.000    -.0209998   -.0122179 
   per_subsd |   .0754805   .0070818    10.66   0.000     .0615735    .0893875 
     per_min |   .0040016   .0018011     2.22   0.027     .0004647    .0075384 
       Portl |  -.1144521   .0971259    -1.18   0.239    -.3051841    .0762799 
 
 
 
2000 – Portland and Seattle Central Cities – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =     241 
                                                       F( 14,   226) =   44.99 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7433 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .45964 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
ln1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           D |    .290814   .3004039     0.97   0.334    -.3011367    .8827647 
    unit_2t4 |   .0231727   .0072917     3.18   0.002     .0088042    .0375412 
      unit_5 |   .0079776   .0026735     2.98   0.003     .0027094    .0132459 
   perc_park |  -.0126504   .0185297    -0.68   0.495    -.0491634    .0238627 
      D_Plnd |  -.3469055   .3956405    -0.88   0.382    -1.126522    .4327105 
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0042374   .0107212    -0.40   0.693    -.0253636    .0168888 
  unit5_Plnd |   .0024776    .003101     0.80   0.425     -.003633    .0085881 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0038543   .0212772    -0.18   0.856    -.0457813    .0380727 
    vac_rate |   .0057818   .0191325     0.30   0.763    -.0319192    .0434827 
       b1980 |   .0063824    .003593     1.78   0.077    -.0006977    .0134626 
    four_bdr |  -.0168223   .0048877    -3.44   0.001    -.0264536   -.0071909 
   per_subsd |   .0587551   .0085736     6.85   0.000     .0418607    .0756496 
     per_min |   .0087216    .002018     4.32   0.000     .0047451    .0126981 
placec~59000 |  -.2100397   .1533861    -1.37   0.172    -.5122894    .0922101 
       _cons |   .3411923   .4025111     0.85   0.398    -.4519622    1.134347 
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1990 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =    1757 
                                                       F(137,  1497) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6929 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .57345 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
ln1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           D |   .2038891   .1090637     1.87   0.062    -.0100449    .4178231 
   perc_park |  -.0145504   .0044241    -3.29   0.001    -.0232284   -.0058723 
    unit_2t4 |   .0130797   .0030325     4.31   0.000     .0071313    .0190282 
      unit_5 |  -.0020008   .0014478    -1.38   0.167    -.0048408    .0008391 
         D_B |   .2772412   .1913625     1.45   0.148    -.0981258    .6526083 
   perpark_B |   .0099679   .0065873     1.51   0.130    -.0029534    .0228893 
   unit2t4_B |   .0130763   .0060096     2.18   0.030     .0012881    .0248645 
     unit5_B |   .0004339    .002093     0.21   0.836    -.0036716    .0045393 
    vac_rate |    .027243   .0046871     5.81   0.000      .018049    .0364371 
       b1970 |   .0010598   .0009138     1.16   0.246    -.0007326    .0028523 
    four_bdr |   -.004232   .0010892    -3.89   0.000    -.0063686   -.0020954 
   per_subsd |   .0563949    .004261    13.24   0.000     .0480367     .064753 
     per_min |   .0057703   .0009587     6.02   0.000     .0038897    .0076508 
   Baltimore |   .0845323   .0812248     1.04   0.298    -.0747941    .2438587 
 
 
 
1990 Baltimore and Philadelphia Central Cities – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =     529 
                                                       F( 14,   514) =   65.60 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6384 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .60752 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
ln1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           D |   .5623375   .2467803     2.28   0.023     .0775154     1.04716 
   perc_park |   -.037743    .008428    -4.48   0.000    -.0543006   -.0211854 
    unit_2t4 |   .0141975    .003688     3.85   0.000     .0069521     .021443 
      unit_5 |  -.0048117   .0021683    -2.22   0.027    -.0090715   -.0005518 
         D_B |   .1673168   .3280505     0.51   0.610    -.4771679    .8118015 
   perpark_B |   .0373611   .0100776     3.71   0.000     .0175628    .0571594 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0009957   .0056481    -0.18   0.860    -.0120919    .0101006 
     unit5_B |   .0011093   .0028899     0.38   0.701    -.0045682    .0067868 
    vac_rate |   .0340145   .0057722     5.89   0.000     .0226746    .0453545 
       b1970 |  -.0010264   .0027874    -0.37   0.713    -.0065025    .0044497 
    four_bdr |  -.0022881   .0023543    -0.97   0.332    -.0069133    .0023371 
   per_subsd |   .0479527   .0052554     9.12   0.000     .0376279    .0582775 
     per_min |   .0058449    .000972     6.01   0.000     .0039353    .0077546 
placeco~4000 |   .3327816   .1551859     2.14   0.032      .027905    .6376582 
       _cons |   .3818828   .2864115     1.33   0.183    -.1807983     .944564 
 407 
2000 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
      R
 Baltimore |   .0740834    .103456     0.72   0.474    -.1288509    .2770177 
egression with robust standard errors                   Number of obs =    1757 
                                                       F(137,  1494) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7310 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .58723 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
ln1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           D |  -.0587383   .1493745    -0.39   0.694    -.3517443    .2342676 
   perc_park |    -.02355   .0059675    -3.95   0.000    -.0352555   -.0118445 
    unit_2t4 |   .0205422     .00378     5.43   0.000     .0131275    .0279569 
      unit_5 |   .0015847    .001544     1.03   0.305    -.0014438    .0046133 
         D_B |   .3127606   .2304667     1.36   0.175    -.1393121    .7648333 
   perpark_B |   .0271448   .0071328     3.81   0.000     .0131535    .0411361 
   unit2t4_B |   .0039622   .0059998     0.66   0.509    -.0078066    .0157311 
     unit5_B |   .0019029   .0023197     0.82   0.412    -.0026473    .0064532 
    vac_rate |   .0218063     .00611     3.57   0.000     .0098212    .0337914 
       b1980 |   .0015382   .0012018     1.28   0.201    -.0008192    .0038957 
    four_bdr |  -.0098622    .001167    -8.45   0.000    -.0121514    -.007573 
   per_subsd |   .0421087   .0045874     9.18   0.000     .0331102    .0511072 
     per_min |    .006467   .0011905     5.43   0.000     .0041318    .0088022 
  
 
 
 
 
 
2000 Baltimore and Philadelphia Central Cities – Extremely Low-Income Rental Units 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =     529 
                   F( 14,   512) =   63.49                                     
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6058 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .61195 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
ln1adjpre_~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           D |  -.1120979    .293407    -0.38   0.703    -.6885277     .464332 
   perc_park |  -.0493587   .0098994    -4.99   0.000    -.0688072   -.0299103 
    unit_2t4 |   .0212858   .0043502     4.89   0.000     .0127393    .0298323 
      unit_5 |   .0013464   .0024127     0.56   0.577    -.0033936    .0060865 
         D_B |   .4027275   .3744904     1.08   0.283    -.3329993    1.138454 
   perpark_B |     .05366   .0108105     4.96   0.000     .0324216    .0748983 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0099016   .0059396    -1.67   0.096    -.0215706    .0017674 
     unit5_B |   .0017573   .0034075     0.52   0.606    -.0049371    .0084516 
    vac_rate |   .0257512   .0067598     3.81   0.000     .0124708    .0390316 
       b1980 |   .0021352   .0073553     0.29   0.772     -.012315    .0165854 
    four_bdr |  -.0113014   .0022969    -4.92   0.000    -.0158138   -.0067889 
   per_subsd |   .0317564   .0055962     5.67   0.000     .0207621    .0427507 
     per_min |   .0069354     .00141     4.92   0.000     .0041654    .0097055 
placeco~4000 |   .3473308   .1430669     2.43   0.016     .0662603    .6284012 
       _cons |   .8633169   .7437226     1.16   0.246    -.5978064     2.32444 
 408 
1990 Portland and Seattle Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =     724 
                                                       F( 66,   626) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8460 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .39362 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
             |               Robust 
      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] ln1adjpre_~v |      Coef.   Std. Err.
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           D |  -.3265822   .1959659    -1.67   0.096    -.7114124     .058248 
   perc_park |   .0057961   .0122629     0.47   0.637    -.0182853    .0298775 
    unit_2t4 |    .044229   .0056241     7.86   0.000     .0331847    .0552733 
      unit_5 |   .0213511   .0023198     9.20   0.000     .0167955    .0259066 
      D_Plnd |   .0633128   .2567321     0.25   0.805    -.4408476    .5674732 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0014245   .0153406    -0.09   0.926    -.0315498    .0287009 
unit2t4_Plnd |  -.0013991   .0065311    -0.21   0.830    -.0142246    .0114264 
  unit5_Plnd |   -.006989   .0026078    -2.68   0.008    -.0121102   -.0018678 
    vac_rate |  -.0064438   .0033024    -1.95   0.051     -.012929    .0000413 
       b1970 |   .0138663   .0010864    12.76   0.000     .0117329    .0159997 
    four_bdr |  -.0253836   .0028042    -9.05   0.000    -.0308902   -.0198769 
   per_subsd |   .0103583   .0036442     2.84   0.005      .003202    .0175145 
     per_min |   .0053032   .0015134     3.50   0.000     .0023313    .0082752 
       Portl |   .1638011   .0712244     2.30   0.022     .0239334    .3036687 
 
 
 
1990 Portland and Seattle Central Cities – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
egression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =     241 
                                                      F( 14,   226) =  112.79 
 
 
R
 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8632
                                                       Root MSE      =  6.7518 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  adjpre_afv |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- -
           D |  -2.191513   5.741918    -0.38   0.703    -13.50606     9.12303 
    -0.21   0.832    -.9043093    .7281296    perc_park |  -.0880899    .414216
    unit_2t4 |   .4028136   .0897034     4.49   0.000     .2260515    .5795756 
      unit_5 |     .53373   .0600602     8.89   0.000     .4153803    .6520796 
      D_Plnd |   1.825815   7.179405     0.25   0.799    -12.32132    15.97295 
perpark_Plnd |      .3693   .4740693     0.78   0.437    -.5648611    1.303461 
unit2t4_Plnd |   .3239589    .145695     2.22   0.027     .0368645    .6110532 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0520708     .07203    -0.72   0.470    -.1940071    .0898654 
    vac_rate |  -.4728701   .2803204    -1.69   0.093    -1.025246    .0795057 
       b1970 |   .2155233   .0503325     4.28   0.000     .1163423    .3147043 
    four_bdr |  -.2940902   .0628549    -4.68   0.000    -.4179469   -.1702335 
   per_subsd |   .3532992   .1324073     2.67   0.008     .0923885    .6142099 
     per_min |   .1434589   .0406567     3.53   0.001     .0633443    .2235735 
placec~59000 |   2.495924   1.834286     1.36   0.175    -1.118566    6.110413 
       _cons |  -8.893974   4.581767    -1.94   0.053    -17.92242    .1344719 
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2000 Portland and Seattle Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =     724 
                                                       F( 66,   626) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8604 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .35438 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
ln1adjpre_~v |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           D |   .0287724   .1259335     0.23   0.819    -.2185308    .2760757 
   perc_park |   .0072453   .0057589     1.26   0.209    -.0040638    .0185543 
    unit_2t4 |   .0403406   .0037093    10.88   0.000     .0330565    .0476247 
      unit_5 |   .0152962   .0011027    13.87   0.000     .0131307    .0174618 
      D_Plnd |  -.2144131   .2015329    -1.06   0.288    -.6101755    .1813494 
perpark_Plnd |  -.0062014   .0080942    -0.77   0.444    -.0220965    .0096938 
unit2t4_Plnd |   .0024843    .005822     0.43   0.670    -.0089488    .0139174 
  unit5_Plnd |    .001451   .0017086     0.85   0.396    -.0019042    .0048063 
    vac_rate |  -.0129696    .005564    -2.33   0.020    -.0238959   -.0020432 
       b1980 |   .0078784   .0009995     7.88   0.000     .0059157    .0098412 
    four_bdr |  -.0280763   .0022831   -12.30   0.000    -.0325597    -.023593 
   per_subsd |   .0098971   .0032694     3.03   0.003     .0034769    .0163173 
     per_min |   .0086525   .0012852     6.73   0.000     .0061287    .0111763 
       Portl |  -.0130974   .0862561    -0.15   0.879    -.1824838     .156289 
 
 
 
2000 Portland and Seattle Central Cities – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =     241 
                                                       F( 14,   226) =   91.45 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8620 
                                                     Root MSE      =  6.2318   
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  adjpre_afv |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           D |  -9.348954   5.528355    -1.69   0.092    -20.24267     1.54476 
   perc_park |  -.0123757   .3569845    -0.03   0.972    -.7158193     .691068 
    unit_2t4 |   .5138528   .0919758     5.59   0.000     .3326131    .6950925 
      unit_5 |   .4832716   .0493983     9.78   0.000     .3859315    .5806117 
      D_Plnd |   11.16664   6.776155     1.65   0.101    -2.185887    24.51916 
perpark_Plnd |   .0667704   .3944164     0.17   0.866    -.7104336    .8439743 
unit2t4_Plnd |   .0587102   .1259384     0.47   0.642    -.1894534    .3068738 
  unit5_Plnd |  -.0302614   .0608766    -0.50   0.620    -.1502198    .0896969 
    vac_rate |  -.5888984   .3619256    -1.63   0.105    -1.302079    .1242818 
       b1980 |   .1508932   .0535386     2.82   0.005     .0453946    .2563918 
    four_bdr |  -.2940768   .0523069    -5.62   0.000    -.3971483   -.1910052 
   per_subsd |     .27848   .1187359     2.35   0.020     .0445091     .512451 
     per_min |   .1787333   .0377037     4.74   0.000     .1044375    .2530291 
placec~59000 |  -3.134765    1.80652    -1.74   0.084    -6.694541    .4250113 
       _cons |  -2.707813   5.655543    -0.48   0.633    -13.85215    8.436526 
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1990 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =    1757 
                                                       F(137,  1497) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7432 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .59958 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
ln1adjpre_~v |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           D |   .1433837   .1179137     1.22   0.224      -.08791    .3746773 
   perc_park |   -.025734   .0057428    -4.48   0.000    -.0369988   -.0144691 
    unit_2t4 |   .0255789   .0034927     7.32   0.000     .0187277      .03243 
      unit_5 |   .0088037   .0016343     5.39   0.000      .005598    .0120095 
         D_B |  -.0017735   .1869336    -0.01   0.992     -.368453     .364906 
   perpark_B |   .0219656   .0069825     3.15   0.002     .0082691    .0356622 
   unit2t4_B |   .0045905   .0043525     1.05   0.292    -.0039472    .0131281 
     unit5_B |   .0045905   .0021433     2.14   0.032     .0003863    .0087947 
    vac_rate |   .0086057   .0045597     1.89   0.059    -.0003382    .0175497 
       b1970 |   .0086178   .0012218     7.05   0.000     .0062211    .0110145 
    four_bdr |  -.0142087   .0013838   -10.27   0.000    -.0169231   -.0114942 
   per_subsd |   .0235718   .0037672     6.26   0.000     .0161822    .0309613 
     per_min |   .0067408   .0008516     7.92   0.000     .0050704    .0084112 
   Baltimore |    .417972   .0937645     4.46   0.000     .2340482    .6018958 
 
 
 
 
 
1990 Baltimore and Philadelphia Central Cities – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =     529 
                                                       F( 14,   514) =   68.96 
                                                     Prob > F      =  0.0000   
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6394 
                  Root MSE      =  8.2493                                      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  adjpre_afv |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           D |    7.94965   2.616059     3.04   0.002     2.810167    13.08913 
   perc_park |  -.3107279   .1089653    -2.85   0.005       -.5248   -.0966558 
    unit_2t4 |   .2920264   .0541917     5.39   0.000      .185562    .3984908 
      unit_5 |   .1274529   .0314265     4.06   0.000     .0657127     .189193 
         D_B |  -1.433766   4.247948    -0.34   0.736    -9.779242     6.91171 
   perpark_B |   .2240507   .1351329     1.66   0.098      -.04143    .4895314 
   unit2t4_B |   .1007688   .0806164     1.25   0.212    -.0576092    .2591469 
     unit5_B |   .0377932   .0529916     0.71   0.476    -.0663135    .1418999 
    vac_rate |    .167248   .0749774     2.23   0.026     .0199481    .3145479 
       b1970 |    .046968   .0387048     1.21   0.225    -.0290711    .1230072 
    four_bdr |  -.0540066   .0276832    -1.95   0.052    -.1083927    .0003794 
   per_subsd |   .4494893   .0737539     6.09   0.000     .3045932    .5943854 
     per_min |   .1034563   .0127881     8.09   0.000     .0783329    .1285798 
laceco~4000 |   6.951529   2.216753     3.14   0.002     2.596518    11.30654 p
       _cons |  -3.556874   3.996582    -0.89   0.374    -11.40852    4.294772 
 
 
 
 411 
2000 Baltimore and Philadelphia Regions – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =    1757 
                                                       F(137,  1494) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7773 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .54129 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
ln1adjpre_~v |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           D |   .2021913    .144582     1.40   0.162     -.081414    .4857966 
   perc_park |  -.0206323   .0051407    -4.01   0.000    -.0307161   -.0105485 
    unit_2t4 |   .0294763   .0028303    10.41   0.000     .0239245    .0350281 
      unit_5 |   .0113522   .0013888     8.17   0.000     .0086279    .0140765 
         D_B |  -.0778379   .1915523    -0.41   0.685     -.453578    .2979021 
   perpark_B |   .0269275   .0066492     4.05   0.000     .0138847    .0399703 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0038383   .0042867    -0.90   0.371    -.0122468    .0045703 
     unit5_B |    .003805   .0025882     1.47   0.142    -.0012719    .0088819 
    vac_rate |   .0077232   .0043893     1.76   0.079    -.0008867     .016333 
       b1980 |   .0089353    .001328     6.73   0.000     .0063305    .0115402 
    four_bdr |  -.0206865   .0013343   -15.50   0.000    -.0233038   -.0180693 
   per_subsd |   .0152561   .0028481     5.36   0.000     .0096693    .0208428 
     per_min |   .0060312   .0008881     6.79   0.000     .0042891    .0077733 
   Baltimore |   .2938401   .0951082     3.09   0.002     .1072803    .4803998 
 
 
 
2000 Baltimore and Philadelphia Central Cities – Very Low-Income Rental Units 
egression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =     529 
.0000 
R
                                                       F( 14,   512) =   55.93 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5793 
                                                       Root MSE      =  9.4175 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  adjpre_afv |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     1.55   0.121    -2.430646    20.68127            D |   9.125313   5.882068
   perc_park |  -.2137475   .1339466    -1.60   0.111    -.4769001     .049405 
    unit_2t4 |   .3851986   .0687902     5.60   0.000     .2500528    .5203443 
      unit_5 |   .2235358   .0502851     4.45   0.000     .1247452    .3223264 
         D_B |  -6.694902    7.04963    -0.95   0.343    -20.54466    7.154859 
   perpark_B |   .2593007   .1608928     1.61   0.108    -.0567906    .5753919 
   unit2t4_B |  -.0231087   .0906211    -0.26   0.799    -.2011436    .1549263 
     unit5_B |   .1169425   .0635407     1.84   0.066      -.00789     .241775 
    vac_rate |   .1513941   .0972483     1.56   0.120    -.0396606    .3424488 
       b1980 |   .1659872   .0911034     1.82   0.069    -.0129953    .3449697 
    four_bdr |  -.1441824    .030794    -4.68   0.000    -.2046806   -.0836842 
   per_subsd |   .4362048   .0979624     4.45   0.000      .243747    .6286625 
     per_min |   .1038704   .0178271     5.83   0.000     .0688471    .1388938 
placeco~4000 |   4.192436   2.114236     1.98   0.048     .0387911    8.346081 
       _cons |  -9.790416   9.171656    -1.07   0.286    -27.80912    8.228293 
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Appendix J 
A NOTE ABOUT THE VARIABLE FOR AFRICAN-AMERICANS 
Two independent variables for m  
first variable was the proportion of the population that was minority.  The second variable was 
the proportion of the population that was Af
measur  statistical 
signific ans.  The 
high c op of the 
variabl
y and the 
proport  from .812 
in Seatt
Table J can 
 phia 
inorities were included in initial models for this research.  The
rican-American.  The purpose for including both 
es was to capture differences which may exist in the explanatory power and
ance between the variable for all minorities and a variable for African-Americ
orrelation between these two variables, however, made it necessary to dr
es.  The variable for African-Americans was dropped from the analysis. 
The correlations between the proportion of the population that was minorit
ion that was African-American are shown in Table J-1.  The correlations range
le (2000) to .998 in Baltimore (1990). 
 
-1. Correlations of Proportions of Population Minority and African-Ameri
Portland Seattle Baltimore Philadel
Region Region Region Region 
1990 .953*** .879*** .998*** .968*** 
2000 .814*** .812*** .993*** .959*** 
 
In the analyses for very low-income rental units in Portland and Seattle, I included both 
proportions in the model simultaneously.  A greater proportion of minorities was associated with 
a larger proportion of affordable rental units.  A greater proportion of African-Americans was 
associated with a smaller proportion of affordable units.  I decided the most plausible 
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explanation for these contradictory findings is the strong correlation between these two 
proportions.   
When only one of these variables at a time was included, both variables were positive.  
When the African-American variable was d opp  the regressions, the minority variable 
was still positive and significant in both 1990 and 2000.  When the minority variable was 
dropped from the regression, the African-American variable became positive and statistically 
significant in 2000, but not statistically significant in 1990.  Therefore, it was likely the 
collinearity when both 
variables were included at the same time. 
In analyses of very low-income rental units in the regions of Baltimore and Philadelphia, 
the same results were found when the variable for minorities and the variable for African-
r ed from
between the two variables which caused the contradictory findings 
Americans were included simultaneously in the model.  The coefficient for minorities was 
positive and statistically significant and the coefficient for African-Americans was negative and 
statistically significant.  When each is included separately, each variable is positive and 
statistically significant. 
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